DOROTHY CURRY BUIE v. RICHARD BAGUIO (2011)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice FitzGerald

Appellant Dorothy Curry Buie sued several defendants, alleging that she was the rightful owner of a parcel of real property by virtue of adverse possession.   After a bench trial, the trial judge rendered a take-nothing judgment against appellant.   On appeal, appellant contends that she was denied a fair trial.   Because appellant's brief is deficient, and because the appellate record does not support her key factual contentions, we affirm.

I. Background

We have no reporter's record, so we draw the facts solely from the clerk's record.   Appellant sued appellee Richard L. Baguio, Washington Mutual Bank, and three others for trespass to try title and to quiet title.   The gist of her claim was that she had lived in a certain house in Dallas County for over 25 years and that it belonged to her by adverse possession.   She alleged that in 2006, Baguio purported to buy the house from someone else and granted a deed of trust to Washington Mutual Bank. She further alleged that Baguio commenced eviction proceedings against her.

Baguio and the Bank answered;  the record does not indicate that the other three defendants were ever served.   The Bank obtained summary judgment, and appellant's claims against the Bank were severed out.¹

The trial was continued several times.   In May 2009, the trial judge signed an order continuing the trial until the court's two-week trial docket beginning August 10, 2009.   According to the judgment, the judge held a bench trial on August 12, 2009.   On August 14, 2009, the judge signed a judgment ordering that appellant take nothing from “Defendants.”   The judgment also contains the sentence, “This is a final and appealable judgment as it disposes of all claims against all parties.”

This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

Appellant complains that the trial judge denied her a fair trial by telling her at a pretrial hearing that the next court setting would be a mediation rather than a trial.   She also asserts that the court violated her rights by denying her a court reporter and by giving “preferential treatment” to her opponent.

We affirm the judgment for two independent reasons.   First, appellant's brief does not comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.   When she filed her original brief on appeal, we directed her to file an amended brief because of several deficiencies.   For example, her original brief did not contain a concise statement of the facts supported by record references and generally did not include appropriate citations to authorities or to the record.   She filed an amended brief.   Her amended brief still contains no citations to the record on appeal.   Her amended brief contains references to two rules of civil procedure, two local rules of court, and three subparts of Canon 3 of the code of judicial conduct, but she does not present an argument explaining the relevance of these authorities or applying them to the fact of this case.   Indeed, her entire argument is a single paragraph in which she asserts without explanation that the trial judge or opposing counsel violated each of these rules.  “The failure to adequately brief an issue, either by failing to specifically argue and analyze one's position or provide authorities and record citations, waives any error on appeal.”  In re B.A.B., 124 S.W.3d 417, 420 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.);   see also In re M.A.S., 233 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (“Failure to provide substantive analysis waives an issue on appeal.”).

Second, the appellate record does not support the key facts on which appellant relies in her brief.   There is nothing in the record to substantiate her assertions that the trial judge ever told her that the August 12 proceeding would be a mediation rather than a trial and that she was “denied” a court reporter.   We will not consider factual assertions that appear solely in briefs and are not supported by the appellate record.  Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver, 262 S.W.3d 796, 797 (Tex.2008) (per curiam).   Without a reporter's record, we cannot assess her assertion that the trial judge was biased and gave preferential treatment to her opponent at the trial.   Thus, we cannot review appellant's complaints about these matters.   See Willms v. Americas Tire Co., 190 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (“[W]ithout a reporter's record, an appellate court cannot review a trial court's order for an abuse of discretion.”).

III. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

091100F.P05

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Appellant appealed the severed summary judgment in favor of the Bank. We dismissed that appeal for want of prosecution.   See Buie v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 05–08–01179–CV, 2009 WL 242530 (Tex.App.—Dallas Feb. 3, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem.op.)..  FN1. Appellant appealed the severed summary judgment in favor of the Bank. We dismissed that appeal for want of prosecution.   See Buie v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 05–08–01179–CV, 2009 WL 242530 (Tex.App.—Dallas Feb. 3, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem.op.).

KERRY P. FITZGERALD JUSTICE