CHARLES WILLIAM EDEN v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2011)

OPINION

Opinion By Justice Lang–Miers

Charles William Eden appeals his conviction for murder.   The jury assessed punishment at life in prison.   We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Appellant and the victim lived together at Tourist Court Motel in Dallas, Texas.   The victim was an older man with cancer.   The investigation led to appellant, who subsequently confessed to the murder.   Appellant, a crack user, said in his statement that he woke up one morning and thought the victim had stolen money from his money bag, so he grabbed a hammer and hit the victim in the head.   He left the body in the motel room for about a day before disposing of it.   A city sanitation worker found the body in a vacant, wooded area.

In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel advised the court that appellant intended to testify that the victim was a registered sex offender, had not complied with the registration requirements, had stolen money from appellant in the past, and appellant was protecting his money from the victim.   Counsel proffered that appellant thought the victim was going to steal appellant's money again and run away because the victim had not complied with the sex offender registration requirements.   The State objected that the victim's status as a sex offender was not relevant, that the victim was current on his registration, and that the victim “never had a failure to register case.”   Defense counsel proffered that the testimony was admissible as evidence of appellant's state of mind when he killed the victim:  “that's clearly admissible, Judge, because that's what he's thinking.   I mean, we can't just say, oh, he's thinking half of it, but not the other half.   He was thinking—that was what he was thinking in his mind that this is a sex offender who is going to be running away from here․”  The trial court excluded the testimony, but told defense counsel that appellant could “get into the fact he thought [the victim] was going to steal the money․”  However, appellant chose not to testify if he could not “let the whole story out about [the victim].”

On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court denied him due process and prevented him from putting on a defense by excluding the testimony about the victim's sex offender status.   But appellant did not preserve this issue for our review because he did not argue that the exclusion of the testimony violated his constitutional rights.   See Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (basis for proffer of evidence at trial must comport with appellate complaint).   A complaint on appeal must comport with the objection at trial.  Id. Appellant's argument that the testimony was admissible to prove his state of mind did not put the trial court on notice that he was making a due process argument.   See id.   We resolve appellant's sole issue against him and affirm the trial court's judgment.

ELIZABETH LANG–MIERS JUSTICE