MELSHELL LENEE MORRIS v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2011)

OPINION

Opinion By Justice Moseley

A jury convicted Melshell Lenee Morris of driving while intoxicated, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04 (West 2011), and the trial court set punishment at 180 days' confinement, probated for fifteen months, and assessed an $800 fine.   Morris appeals and argues in two points of error that the trial court erred by denying her motion for mistrial regarding a juror who had a potential bias for the State, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.   We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The jury panel was not asked during voir dire whether they knew any of the witnesses who would testify during trial.   After the jury was sworn, however, the State indicated that one of its witnesses might know one of the jurors.   The witness was called outside the jury's presence and testified that she and one of the jurors had played soccer together for about two years, but had not been in contact for over a year.   Morris moved for a mistrial arguing that the juror would likely find the witness credible because of their prior relationship.   The trial judge then questioned the juror, who confirmed she had played soccer with the witness for one season about two years before, but they did not have a relationship outside of soccer and they had not spoken since then.   The juror said that her prior relationship with the witness would not affect her in deciding the case.   The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial.

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial.   See Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).   The “mere fact that a juror knows, or is a neighbor, or an intimate acquaintance of, and on friendly relations with, one of the parties to a suit, is not sufficient basis for disqualification.”  Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (quoting Allbright v. Smith, 5 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Comm'n App.1928, judgm't adopted)).   Mere acquaintance with the defendant or a State's witness is not a sufficient basis for disqualification of a juror.   See Taylor v. State, 671 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, pet. ref'd).   The juror's statement that the prior relationship would not affect her decision in the case supports the trial court's ruling.   We overrule Morris's first point of error.

Morris's second point of error challenges the sufficiency ¹ of the evidence to support the conviction.   We review all the record evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational jury could have found the accused guilty of all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.   See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);  Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895, 899 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (plurality op.).

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a).  “Intoxicated” means not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other substance into the body.   Id. § 49.01(2)(A).

Morris contends the only evidence of intoxication came from (1) a witness who claimed to have observed her driving;  and (2) the arresting officer's observations of Morris, which were contradicted by the video evidence from the officer's onboard camera and the video from the intoxilyzer room.

Around 2:00 a.m. on February 1, 2008, Loreal Roe, who was a passenger in another vehicle, saw Morris driving her vehicle on Interstate 30 in Mesquite.   Roe, who had been drinking that night, testified that Morris was not keeping a steady speed, was swerving, and almost hit the median.   Roe called 911 after about ten minutes because she was concerned that Morris was possibly driving while intoxicated.   While Roe was on the phone, Morris pulled off the highway and into the parking lot of a fast food restaurant.

Mesquite police officer Chris Quigley responded to a call about a possible DWI and found Morris's vehicle about 40 yards from the restaurant.   The vehicle was running with its lights on and was backing up.   Quigley turned on his overhead lights and approached the vehicle when it stopped.   Morris was the only person in the vehicle.   Quigley asked for her drivers license, but she had difficulty getting it.   Quigley immediately noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from her breath as he talked to her.   Morris said she had been out celebrating with friends and had consumed only one glass of wine.   Quigley noticed Morris was not wearing shoes, her speech was slurred, and her eyes were glazed over.   Quigley asked Morris to perform some field sobriety tests, but she refused.   Quigley arrested Morris for driving while intoxicated based on the report from Roe and his own observations.   After her arrest, Morris refused to provide a breath sample for alcohol analysis.   In Quigley's opinion, Morris did not have the normal use of her mental faculties due to the introduction of alcohol into her system.

Video and audio recordings from Quigley's in-car video and from the intoxilyzer room were played for the jury.   The recordings show Morris's interaction with Quigley at the restaurant and her refusal to perform the field sobriety tests.   The video from the intoxilyzer room shows Morris standing and reading along while Quigley reads her the statutory warnings regarding breath tests.   She refuses to take the breath test and signs a form indicating her refusal.

Morris contends the videos contradict Quigley's testimony and show she had normal use of her faculties.   The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses's credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, and it is the jury's role to resolve all conflicts in the evidence.   See Westbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).   Considering all the evidence (including that summarized above) in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found the Morris guilty of driving while intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt.   See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;  Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895.   Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.   We overrule Morris's second point of error.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (plurality op.), the court of criminal appeals held there is no meaningful distinction between the legal and factual sufficiency standards of review.   Accordingly, we analyze appellant's issues under the legal sufficiency standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).   See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895..  FN1. In Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (plurality op.), the court of criminal appeals held there is no meaningful distinction between the legal and factual sufficiency standards of review.   Accordingly, we analyze appellant's issues under the legal sufficiency standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).   See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895.

JIM MOSELEY JUSTICE