JESSIE WILLIAMS v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2011)

OPINION

Opinion By Justice Morris

At trial, a jury convicted Jessie Williams of capital murder.   He complains on appeal that the two trial judges in the case erred in denying his motion to suppress, one of the judges erred by failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with his motion to suppress, and the evidence against him is factually insufficient.   The State additionally requests that we modify the judgment to reflect that appellant was sentenced to life in prison without parole.   Concluding appellant's issues are without merit, we affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.

Factual Background

Appellant and the deceased were involved in opposite ends of a large scale drug deal that took place in a McDonald's parking lot.   Appellant and his accomplice arrived at the parking lot in a Dodge Magnum, and appellant got out and went inside the McDonald's.   After the deceased delivered to appellant's accomplice a large amount of cocaine, appellant re-entered the Dodge Magnum, the deceased was shot, and the Magnum sped away.   The deceased's partner in the drug deal was nearby and shot at the Magnum, hitting appellant.   At the hospital, appellant admitted in his second written statement to police that he had shot the deceased in the back of the head and that he and the accomplice had agreed to steal the cocaine from the deceased.

The statement begins, “When I talked to Detective Thompson earlier, I lied because I was scared.”   Appellant admitted he was armed with a “black gun” during the shooting.   Appellant stated that he and a man named “Mitch” had agreed to the plan earlier, so he knew that when “Mitch” called him on his cell phone inside the McDonald's, he was “to hurry out and jump in the car quick so he could back out, drop the [deceased] off around the corner and keep the money and dope.”   As “Mitch” backed out the car with the deceased and appellant inside, appellant said he heard gunfire, so he ducked.   Then, appellant claimed, he shot the deceased “three times in the back of the head” before “everybody started shooting.”   Appellant said that he gave the gun back to “Mitch” when “Mitch” told him to and was dropped off near some apartments.   He maintained that “Mitch” told him to pay someone standing around at the apartments $100 to take him to the hospital.   Appellant claimed that “Mitch” told him “if anything happens, tell the police that Dirty was in the car because the car belongs to Dirty.”

Bill Jones, the senior nursing administrator at Parkland Hospital, testified at trial that when the officer wanted to speak with appellant before taking his second, incriminating statement, he prevented him from doing so until he examined appellant himself.   Jones examined appellant to see if his mannerisms and speech were purposeful and appropriate and if he appeared to have a “clear head.”   Jones cleared appellant for talking with police, then remained in the room as appellant gave his statement.   Jones testified that appellant appeared to understand what he was doing and indicated that he was giving the statement voluntarily.   According to Jones, he asked appellant “on more than one occasion if he realized the implications of what he was doing, and he said he did.”   Jones noted that appellant received a total of six milligrams of morphine, given in two-milligram increments, in the hours that included his first and second statements to police.   In Jones's opinion, that amount of morphine would not commonly cause side effects such as confusion or impaired thinking in a man of appellant's size.   Jones did not see evidence of such side effects when appellant gave his second statement.

Several .40 caliber cartridge casings were found in the back right seat of the Magnum.   There were two bullet holes in the front of the car's glove box.   Police eventually were informed about a gun that had been found buried in the ground near where the Magnum had been abandoned.   The gun was filled with some sort of epoxy, but after it was cleaned and test-fired, it was linked to the cartridge casings found in the car as well as the single bullet found in the deceased's brain.

DNA evidence in the case demonstrated that the deceased had been sitting in the front passenger seat of the Dodge Magnum and appellant had been sitting in the rear passenger seat.   The deceased died from close-range bullet wounds to the back of his head.   Police discovered stacks of what appeared to be bundles of money in a Wal Mart bag in the cargo area of the Magnum.   The bills on the outside of the stacks amounted to approximately $1,000 cash, but the stacks consisted mainly of paper cut to the size of dollar bills.

Derrick Hall, known to his friends as “Dirty,” testified that he and Kenji LeJay were friends who sometimes exchanged vehicles.   On the day of the shooting, LeJay was driving Hall's Dodge Magnum, while Hall was driving LeJay's Cadillac Escalade.   According to Hall, on the day of the shooting, LeJay called and told him to come pick him up because someone had tried to rob him.   He picked up LeJay, then LeJay directed him to appellant, who was approximately three minutes away.   Appellant was walking down a street with his shirt tied around his waist.   When Hall got nearer to appellant, he could see appellant was bleeding.   Appellant got into the Escalade, and Hall drove him to the hospital and dropped him off there.   Hall testified that he was not paid for taking appellant to the hospital.   He further testified that he was not present during the shooting.

When appellant first spoke to police at the hospital, he said that he had been robbed at an unnamed apartment complex.   Once he learned the officer had a surveillance DVD of a shooting that had occurred in a McDonald's parking lot, he then admitted in his first written statement that he had lied.   At the time of this first statement, appellant appeared to be calm “for just being shot.”   The officer taking the statement was unaware of whether appellant was medicated at the time of the statement.   In it, appellant claimed that his friend “Mitch” contacted appellant at his home in Shreveport, Louisiana to test some drugs for him in Dallas.   Appellant further claimed that Derrick Hall was present during the drug deal and that appellant was shot through the car window while Hall and “Mitch” attempted to rob the deceased of the drugs at gunpoint.   He stated, “I saw Dirty and Mitch shoot the [deceased].   I lied because I was scared.”   Appellant also claimed that after “Mitch” and Hall let him out of the car, he paid someone $100 to take him to the hospital.

John Ramos testified that the deceased was the father of his sister's child, and he thought of him as a brother.   Ramos admitted that he and the deceased sold marijuana and cocaine together.   He stated that Kenji LeJay had contacted the deceased to set up a deal the night before the deceased was shot.   He and the deceased declined to take part in a drug deal at that time of night, so they agreed to meet with LeJay the next morning.   That day, they met with appellant and LeJay at a house.   They had three kilos of cocaine with them in a child's backpack.   As they were parked behind the house, LeJay got into the back seat of their car and examined the cocaine.   LeJay told the deceased to go inside the house to count the money (which was supposed to be $50,000, with another $5,500 to be paid later) while Ramos stayed out in the car.   Ramos and the deceased discussed the situation in Spanish, then the deceased declined to make the deal.   The men then parted ways.

Afterward, LeJay called again and agreed to do the deal at a location closer to Ramos and the deceased.   He called the deceased and asked him to meet them at the McDonald's at Montfort Drive and Interstate 635.   He specified that he wanted the deceased to come by himself because it made him nervous when Ramos spoke to the deceased in Spanish.   The deceased and Ramos secretly agreed that the deceased would go to the location separately but Ramos would be nearby in a truck, ensuring the deceased was safe.   They agreed to call each other on their cell phones and leave them on;  the deceased would have his phone switched on in his pocket, and Ramos (with his phone on mute) would have his phone on speaker so he could hear what was happening during the drug deal.   As the deceased parked at McDonald's, Ramos parked his truck in a nearby parking lot with the nose of the truck pointed toward McDonald's so he would have a view of the deceased.

The deceased told Ramos he was walking to the Dodge Magnum, the same car they had seen earlier that day.   Ramos heard LeJay ask the deceased where Ramos was, and the deceased stated that he had left Ramos at home.   Then Ramos heard shuffling, which he assumed was the drug exchange.   Next, Ramos saw appellant approach the Magnum.   As soon as appellant got into the back passenger seat behind the deceased, Ramos heard the deceased screaming.   He heard the deceased saying “please, please, and ․ begging.”   Then he heard a gunshot.   Ramos dropped the phone, picked up his gun, and drove to the McDonald's.   When Ramos got close enough to the Magnum to look inside it, he saw the deceased “leaned over” and unmoving in the front passenger seat.   Ramos locked eyes with LeJay and fired his gun at him.   As their car went by, he shot out the Magnum's back window.   He did not fire after that because he was concerned he might hit the deceased.   Afterward, he called 911 and told them that a man in a green Dodge Magnum had kidnapped his brother.   He chased the Magnum until he lost it around the intersection of the Dallas North Tollway and Interstate 635.   Then he threw his gun out the window as he was driving down the tollway.

Discussion

Appellant's first through third issues concern his motion to suppress the written statements he made to police.   He alleges in his first and second issues that the original judge in the case, Judge Magnis, erred in denying the motion to suppress and erred in failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law.   On May 8, 2009, Judge Magnis, of the 283 rd Judicial District Court, orally denied appellant's motion to suppress without entering written findings of facts and conclusions of law.   On June 11, 2009, the case was transferred from the 283 rd Judicial District Court to the 291 st Judicial District Court.¹

That same day, Judge Susan Hawk, of the 291 st Judicial District Court, denied appellant's motion to suppress with written findings of fact and conclusions of law.   In his third issue, appellant complains Judge Hawk erred in denying the motion to suppress.   Judge Hawk's decision to hear the motion to suppress essentially amounted to her agreement to reconsider the issue.   Any error committed by Judge Magnis in resolving the motion is therefore irrelevant, because his holding was effectively nullified by Judge Hawk's denial of the motion and the findings she made with respect to her decision.   See Gutierrez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 257, 261–62 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.).   Accordingly, we resolve appellant's first two issues against him and limit our analysis to whether Judge Hawk erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress his statements.

Appellant specifically complains that due to the severe pain he was in from his gunshot wound and the strong pain relievers he had been given for the pain, his statements could not have been given voluntarily.   During the trial before Judge Hawk and outside the presence of the jury, police detective Dwayne Allen Thompson testified that he spoke with appellant at Parkland Hospital.   Medical personnel at the hospital indicated to Thompson that appellant would be able to give a statement.   Appellant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to give his first statement.

Approximately six hours later, when Thompson learned that the first statement was inconsistent with evidence that had been collected, he returned to appellant to see if appellant would agree to give a “more truthful story.”   Appellant agreed, and gave his second statement, in which he admitted to shooting the deceased.   He also admitted in the second statement that Hall had not been present for the shooting.   Thompson testified that appellant did not appear unwilling to cooperate in giving a statement.

Thompson's testimony followed that of nurse Jones, who testified before the jury regarding his belief that appellant was aware of what he was doing when he made the second statement.   Appellant offered no evidence at this hearing to show how much pain he was in at the time of the statements or that the morphine likely caused him to be confused or disoriented.²  At the conclusion of Thompson's testimony, trial judge Susan Hawk orally denied the motion to suppress and admitted both written statements into evidence for all purposes.   Judge Hawk also filed findings of fact and conclusions of law in conjunction with her determination.³

We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence.   We give total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts;  we review de novo the trial court's application of the law to those facts.   See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).   When the trial judge makes explicit findings of fact, we afford those findings almost total deference as long as the record supports them.   See State v. Castleberry, 332, S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex.Crim.App.2011).   Accordingly, the prevailing party in a motion to suppress is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.  Id.

Here, Judge Hawk explicitly found that appellant had been duly warned of his rights and had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights when he made his second statement.   She additionally found that the statement “was in all things made freely and voluntarily without compulsion or persuasion and was made by the defendant in full knowledge of his rights and the consequences of making such statement.”   To the extent Judge Hawk's findings pertain only to the second written statement, we must nevertheless view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judge's ruling on the first statement and assume that the trial judge made implicit findings of fact that support her ruling, as long as those findings are supported by the record.   See Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).   Testimony by the officer taking the written statements in addition to testimony provided by the nurse who determined appellant's condition before he was permitted to give the second statement show that appellant gave the statements voluntarily.   Indeed, even the statements' admissions that appellant had lied to police about the extent of his participation in the drug deal and murder offer some proof of the soundness of appellant's mind at the time he made the statements.   We conclude that Judge Hawk did not abuse her discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress.   We resolve appellant's third issue against him.

In his fourth issue, appellant complains the evidence against him is factually insufficient.   The court of criminal appeals held in Brooks v. State that the legal-sufficiency standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), is now “the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense.”  Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.Crim.App.2010).   We will therefore interpret appellant's factual sufficiency challenge as a legal sufficiency challenge in the interest of justice.

In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.   Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).   We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict.   See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).

The evidence in appellant's case shows the deceased was killed by close-range gunshots to the back of his head.   Appellant admitted in his written statement that he had fired gunshots into the back of the deceased's head, and DNA evidence confirmed that he was sitting behind the deceased in the car.   Moreover, Ramos testified that just after appellant got into the car, he heard the deceased plead for his life before he heard a gunshot.   Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude it is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction for capital murder.   We resolve appellant's fourth issue against him.

In a counterpoint, the State requests that we modify the trial court's judgment to reflect not just that appellant was sentenced to “LIFE,” as it currently does, but rather to life imprisonment without parole.   Based on the record and the law applicable to the case, we sustain the State's counterpoint and modify the judgment as requested.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.31(a)(2) (West Supp.2010);  see also Tex.R.App. P. 43.2(b);  Abron v. State, 997 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd).

We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Appellant does not complain about the transfer order in this appeal..  FN1. Appellant does not complain about the transfer order in this appeal.

FN2. These issues were addressed to a far greater extent during the hearing before Judge Magnis..  FN2. These issues were addressed to a far greater extent during the hearing before Judge Magnis.

FN3. Although the written findings of fact and conclusions of law mention only appellant's second statement, appellant does not complain about this oversight..  FN3. Although the written findings of fact and conclusions of law mention only appellant's second statement, appellant does not complain about this oversight.

JOSEPH B. MORRIS JUSTICE