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RONALD ROSS WINDLE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Opinion By Justice Myers
Ronald Ross Windle pleaded guilty to possession of heroin in an amount less than one gram. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court assessed punishment at six months' confinement in a state jail facility and a $1500 fine. The trial court's rule 25.2(d) certification states the case involves a plea bargain and appellant has no right to appeal. See Tex.R.App. P. 25.2(d). Appellant filed a brief contending “the trial court erred in implicitly overruling appellant's motion to suppress evidence of a controlled substance.” We conclude we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.
A defendant who pleads guilty pursuant to a plea bargain agreement may appeal only those matters raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial or with the trial court's permission. Tex.R.App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The trial court did not give appellant permission to appeal; therefore, we must consider whether appellant has the right to appeal based on his pretrial motions to suppress.
Rule 25.2(a)(2)(A) requires that a motion be both filed and ruled on before trial. Appellant filed a pro se motion to suppress on May 25, 2010. Although he included with the motion a handwritten “Order” for the judge's signature, the order was not signed. A second pro se motion to suppress was filed on August 18, 2010. Again, although there was an order provided for the trial court to either grant or deny the motion, the trial court did not sign the order. Nor are there any written orders ruling on the motions to suppress in the record.
No hearing was held on appellant's motions to suppress. At the guilty plea hearing, neither the trial judge, the prosecutor, nor appellant's attorney mentioned the motions to suppress. Although appellant asserts the trial court implicitly denied the motion to suppress, nothing in the record shows the trial court either considered or ruled, explicitly or implicitly, on appellant's pro se motions to suppress. See Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 104–05 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).
Because appellant's motions to suppress were not ruled on before he pleaded guilty, we conclude the trial court's rule 25.2(d) certification, which states the case involves a plea bargain and appellant has no right to appeal, is supported by the record. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614–15 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). Thus, we conclude we have no jurisdiction over the appeal.
We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
LANA MYERS JUSTICE
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Docket No: No. 05–10–01652–CR
Decided: May 31, 2011
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
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FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
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