----------- Michael Scott, Appellant v. Joe Mireles, Appellee (2010)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Michael Scott, appeals an order dismissing his lawsuit.   In his sole issue, Scott asserts that the trial court did not have jurisdiction and, therefore, its order of dismissal is void.   We conclude that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over this matter.   We therefore affirm.

Background

Scott was an inmate at the Texas Department of Corrections McConnell Unit. Appellee, Joe Mireles, was a corrections officer at the unit.   Scott filed this lawsuit against Mireles alleging that Mireles assaulted Scott by striking Scott with his fist on the left side of Scott's buttocks.   Scott filed this lawsuit in the Fort Bend County District Court.   The Attorney General's office, acting as amicus curiae, filed a notice that Scott has previously been declared a vexatious litigant and that his suit is subject to dismissal if he failed to obtain permission from the local administrative judge pursuant to section 11.103 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 11.103 (Vernon 2002).   After giving 10 days' notice, the trial court dismissed Scott's suit.

Jurisdiction

In his sole issue, Scott contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, the trial court's order of dismissal is void.   Scott asserts that the incidents giving rise to this lawsuit occurred at the McConnell Unit, which is in Bee County, but this lawsuit was filed in Fort Bend County, contrary to a mandatory venue provision of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

“[A]n action that accrued while the plaintiff was housed in a facility operated by or under contract with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice shall be brought in the county in which the facility is located.”  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.019(a) (Vernon 2002).   Filing a lawsuit in a county of improper venue is not a jurisdictional defect that would render a trial court's actions void.  Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citing Gordon v. Jones, 196 S.W.3d 376, 383 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)).  “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the court's power to hear a particular type of suit.”   Id. (quoting Gordon, 196 S.W.3d at 382).   Texas district courts are courts of general jurisdiction with the power to “hear and determine any cause that is cognizable by courts of law or equity.”  Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex.2006) (citing Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 24.007-.008 (Vernon 2004);  Tex. Const. art.   V, § 8).  “Courts of general jurisdiction presumably have subject matter jurisdiction unless a contrary showing is made.”  Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex.2002).

“In contrast, venue ‘refers to the propriety of prosecuting, in a particular form, a suit on a given subject matter with specific parties, over which the forum must, necessarily, have subject-matter jurisdiction.’ ”  Scott, 209 S.W.3d at 264 (quoting Gordon, 196 S.W.3d at 383).  “Venue may and generally does refer to a particular county․”  Id. (quoting Gordon, 196 S.W.3d at 383).  “Venue pertains solely to where a suit may be brought and is a different question from whether the court has jurisdiction of the property or thing in controversy.”  Id. (quoting Gordon, 196 S.W.3d at 383).

Here, Scott asserts that the trial court is not a court in the county where the events giving rise to this suit occurred.   This is a complaint about venue, not about jurisdiction.   See id.   Accordingly, we hold that Scott's challenge concerning the venue of the litigation does not constitute a lack of jurisdiction in the trial court.  Id.

We overrule Scott's sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's order dismissing this suit.

Elsa Alcala Justice