RAYMOND EARL JACKSON v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2010)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice Murphy

Raymond Earl Jackson appeals the revocation of his community supervision in both cases.   In two issues, appellant contends the sentences violated his constitutional rights under both the United States and Texas Constitutions.   See U.S. Const.  AmendD.  VIII, XIV;  Tex. Const.  ArtT. I, § 13.   We affirm.   The background of the case and the evidence admitted at trial are well known to the parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts.   We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.

Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to two offenses of violations of a protective order.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.07(a) (West Supp.2009).   Appellant also pleaded true to two prior convictions for violations of a protective order.   Pursuant to plea agreements, the trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at eight years' imprisonment, probated for five years, and a $750 fine in each case.   The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision in each case, alleging two violations:  having contact with the complainant, and committing a new offense of violation of a protective order.   In a hearing on the motions, the trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at eight years' imprisonment in each case.

Appellant contends the sentences violate his constitutional rights because they are grossly disproportionate to the offenses and inappropriate to the offender.   Appellant asserts that he lived with the complainant while the protective order was in effect, and after the revocation proceeding was over, the State dismissed an offense that was alleged in the motions to revoke.   Appellant argues that because he has a longstanding drug addiction and stole the complainant's property to support that addiction, the trial court should have given him probation with drug treatment.   The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaints for appellate review, and the sentences are not disproportionate to the offenses and circumstances.

Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in motions for new trial.   See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1);  Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion).   After sentencing, appellant did not object to the sentences, and he did not file a motion for new trial in either case.   Thus, appellant has not preserved this issue for our review.

In addition, we note that the trial court imposed punishment in these cases within the statutory range for the offenses.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.34, 25.07(g) (West Supp.2009).   As a general rule, punishment that is assessed within the statutory range for an offense is neither excessive nor unconstitutionally cruel or unusual.  Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd).

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the eight-year sentences.   See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal).   We resolve appellant's two issues against him.

In each case, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

MARY MURPHY JUSTICE