WHITE v. WHITE (2026)

OPINION

Sherri Bene White appeals the trial court's Order on Petition for Enforcement of Spousal Maintenance in favor of Gary Lynn White.¹ In a single issue, she contends the trial court misapplied Section 8.059(a-1) of the Texas Family Code by refusing to hold Gary in contempt for non-payment of spousal maintenance. We affirm.

Background

This appeal arises from an enforcement proceeding pertaining to a spousal maintenance obligation established in the parties' 2017 final decree of divorce. Sherri filed for divorce from Gary in October of 2015, following over sixteen years of marriage. The parties entered into an agreed mediated settlement agreement (MSA) dividing their marital estate in June of 2016.

Under the terms of the MSA, the parties agreed that Gary would pay Sherri a total sum of $175,000 for her equity interest in their marital residence and any community interest in the businesses owned by the parties. The parties further agreed to terms of repayment, which required Gary to make an initial payment of $15,000 payable on September 1, 2016, with the remaining balance of $160,000 to be paid in monthly installments of $2,000 each month thereafter as “spousal maintenance” until the obligation was paid in full. This obligation also contained an enforcement clause noting that, “[n]on-payment of these sums is enforceable by contempt pursuant to Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code.”

During an agreed prove-up hearing in June of 2016, the trial court incorporated the terms of their MSA into the final decree of divorce and found the division of the marital estate to be just, right, and equitable. Although the trial court pronounced the parties divorced in this hearing, the final decree of divorce was not entered until February of 2017.²

Relevant here, the divorce decree memorialized Gary's obligation to pay Sherri the sum of $175,000, characterized as “spousal maintenance,” as reflected in the MSA. The terms under the final decree of divorce expressly invoke the spousal maintenance provisions of Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code and contain an enforcement clause in the instance of non-payment. The decree also references the spousal maintenance obligation in at least three different parts. Specifically, the decree contains the following language under the section awarding property to Sherri:

W-7. The total sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100 ($175,000.00) DOLLARS for Wife's equity interest in the marital residence located at 1031 Riverwood Drive, Longview, Gregg County, Texas and any community interest in the businesses owned by the parties. Payment of the $175,000.00 shall be paid as follows:

The sum of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00) owed to SHERRI BENE' WHITE shall be payable on or before September 1, 2016 or at closing of the martial residence if the residence is sold, whichever occurs first.

The remaining balance of one hundred sixty thousand and no/100 ($160,000.) dollars shall be paid in monthly installments of $2,000.00 each [month] as spousal maintenance, due and payable on the 15th day of October, 2016, and a like payment being due and payable on the 15th day of each month thereafter until the sum of $160,000.00 is paid in full. Non-payment of these sums is enforceable by contempt pursuant to Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code.

In a separate section specifically referencing “Court-Ordered Maintenance,” the decree further memorializes the spousal maintenance obligation as follows:

Court-Ordered Maintenance

The Court finds that under the circumstances presented in this case, SHERRI BENE' WHITE is eligible for maintenance under the provisions of Texas Family Code Chapter 8. Accordingly, GARY LYNN WHITE is ordered to pay as maintenance the sum of six hundred dollars ($600.00) on Friday, June 24, 2016, and the sum of three hundred dollars ($300.00) per week ever Friday beginning July 1, 2016 through Friday, August 26, 2016 for a total sum of three thousand three hundred dollars ($3,300.00).

GARY LYNN WHITE is further ordered to pay as maintenance an initial payment in the sum of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00) due and payable on September 1, 2016 or at the closing of the marital residence, whichever occurs first. Thereafter, GARY LYNN WHITE is ordered to pay the sum of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per month to SHERRI BENE' WHITE, with the first payment being due on October 15, 2016, and a like amount being due on the fifteenth (15th) day of each consecutive month thereafter until the earliest of one of the following events occurs:

1. The total of $175,000.00 is paid in full; or

2. Further orders of the Court affecting Husband's obligation.

The decree also reflects this spousal maintenance obligation was reached pursuant to an agreement between Sherri and Gary with the following language:

The Court finds that GARY LYNN WHITE and SHERRI BENE' WHITE entered into certain agreements concerning payment of the $175,000.00 to wife by husband for wife's equity interest in the marital residence and any community interest in the businesses owned by the parties.

The Court finds said sum does provide a domestic support obligation for funds to meet SHERRI BENE' WHITE's living necessities, but shall not constitute or be interpreted to be income taxable to SHERRI BENE' WHITE nor income tax deductible by GARY LYNN WHITE.

Gary failed to make any of the required payments to Sherri following entry of the final decree of divorce. In September of 2019, Sherri filed her first enforcement action against Gary, who was served by publication and did not appear at the proceedings. In a default order dated October 1, 2019, the trial court found Gary to be in arrears in the amount of $86,641.75 for unpaid spousal maintenance.

Gary remained in arrears following the 2019 proceedings. Thereafter, Sherri filed her second enforcement action against Gary in 2023, seeking to have Gary held in contempt of court and imprisoned for non-payment pursuant to Section 8.059 of the Texas Family Code. This time, Gary appeared with counsel for the enforcement proceedings. During a bench trial, Gary disputed that he owed spousal maintenance as set forth in Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code. Specifically, he argued the $160,000 amount was an agreed contractual support obligation for the division of the parties' home and business, and thus, not governed under the spousal maintenance provisions of the Texas Family Code.

In an order dated October 16, 2024, the trial court confirmed that Gary was in arrears for non-payment of spousal maintenance and entered a cumulative judgment in the amount of $91,500 for the spousal maintenance arrearages, attorney's fees, and court costs. However, the trial court denied Sherri's request to hold Gary in contempt for non-payment, finding the spousal maintenance obligation to be contractual in nature and therefore, not enforceable by contempt proceedings. This proceeding followed.

Spousal Maintenance versus Voluntary Support Obligations

In her sole issue, Sherri argues the trial court erred in not holding Gary in contempt for the unpaid amount of support for the immediate five-year period following their divorce pursuant to Section 8.059(a-1) of the Texas Family Code. Gary counters that any obligation he owes to Sherri is a voluntary contractual obligation regarding the division of the marital estate and governed by Section 7.006 of the Texas Family Code, which is not enforceable by contempt.

Standard of Review

There were no findings of fact or conclusions of law requested by Sherri and no such findings appear in the record before the court. “In a nonjury trial, when, as here, a trial court makes no separate findings of fact or conclusions of law, we must assume that the trial court made all findings in support of its judgment.” Mutti v. Spencer Distrib. LLP, No. 12-20-00155-CV, 2021 WL 1681122, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Pharo v. Chambers Cty., Tex., 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1996)). When a party does not request findings of fact or conclusions of law and none are filed, the trial court's judgment, “must be affirmed if it can be upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence.” Hall v. Hall, No. 12-22-00086-CV, 2023 WL 2298753, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam)). “In determining whether some evidence supports the judgment and the implied findings of fact, ‘it is proper to consider only that evidence most favorable to the issue and to disregard entirely that which is opposed to it or contradictory in its nature.’ ” Id. (quoting Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)).

Spousal Maintenance

Chapter 8 of the Family Code governs the award of spousal maintenance in a divorce decree. Tex. Fam Code Ann. §§ 8.001-8.359 (West 2020 & Supp. 2025); see also Dalton v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 131 (Tex. 2018). The Family Code defines “maintenance” as “an award in a suit for dissolution of a marriage of periodic payments from the future income of one spouse for the support of the other spouse.” Tex. Fam Code Ann. § 8.001(1).

A trial court may award spousal maintenance in limited circumstances if the spouse requesting spousal maintenance satisfies specific eligibility requirements. Id. § 8.051; Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 130; see, e.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 176 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Among the possibilities stated in the statute, the spouse requesting support may be eligible if she lacks sufficient property, including separate property, upon the dissolution of the marriage and either (1) has been married to the other spouse for at least 10 years and lacks the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs, or (2) is unable to earn sufficient income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs because of an incapacitating physical or mental disability. Tex. Fam Code Ann. § 8.051(2)(A)-(B). However, a statutory presumption exists that spousal maintenance is not warranted. Id. § 8.053(a). To rebut this presumption, the requesting spouse must exercise diligence in seeking suitable employment or develop requisite skills to become self-supporting during separation and during the timeframe the suit for dissolution of marriage is pending. Id.

If the trial court determines that the requesting spouse is eligible to receive maintenance, the court must then determine the nature, amount, duration, and manner of the periodic payments by considering many relevant factors, such as the financial resources, education, and employment skills of the requesting spouse. See id. § 8.052. The trial court may also consider other relevant factors pertaining to the marriage, such as the separate property of either spouse, contributions by one spouse to help increase the earning power of the other spouse, marital misconduct by either spouse, or instances of family violence, as defined by Section 71.004 of the Texas Family Code. See id. However, an order containing a spousal support obligation, “does not award ‘spousal maintenance’ under Chapter 8 [of the Texas Family Code] unless it complies with the statute's eligibility, duration, termination, and other requirements.” Id. §§ 8.001-8.359; Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 134; In re Green, 221 S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex. 2007).

Voluntary Spousal Maintenance Support Obligations

Chapter 7 of the Family Code addresses voluntary spousal support obligations reached by agreement of the divorcing parties. See Tex. Fam. Code § 7.006(a) (West 2020); Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 131 (noting that this statute, “continues to encourage divorcing parties to amicably settle their disputes by agreeing to any spousal-support obligations.”). Such agreements are governed by the rules of contract law. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 131; Green, 221 S.W.3d at 647-48; Buys v. Buys, 924 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Tex. 1996) (holding, “The rules of contract law govern the construction of a property settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree. If the agreement is worded so that we can give it a certain or definite legal meaning, it is not ambiguous and we construe it as a matter of law.”).

Parties in a dissolution of marriage proceeding may also agree to spousal maintenance as a voluntary support obligation. See generally Waldrop v. Waldrop, 552 S.W.3d 396, 402-03 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.). “But Texas law distinguishes between court-ordered spousal maintenance awards under Chapter 8 [of the Texas Family Code] and court-approved voluntary obligations under Chapter 7.” Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 131. Both types of obligations differ in how they are created and how these obligations may be enforced. See id. at 130-34; Tex. Fam Code Ann. §§ 7.006, 8.051—.059; Kee v. Kee, 307 S.W.3d 812, 815-16 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (noting that a spousal maintenance obligation arising from Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code is enforceable by contempt, but an obligation to pay contractual maintenance, “creates nothing more than a debt.”).

Enforcement of Spousal Maintenance Awards

A trial court is authorized to enforce a spousal maintenance obligation though contempt. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.059. To be punishable by contempt, the spousal maintenance obligation, whether contractual or court-imposed, must satisfy the requirements of Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code. Id.; Green, 221 S.W.3d at 647-48. The mere fact that a trial court approves a contractual spousal support agreement and incorporates it into a divorce decree does not convert that support obligation into court-ordered maintenance governed by the termination, modification, and enforcement provisions of Chapter 8 of the Family Code. See Green, 221 S.W.3d at 648; see also Cardwell v. Sicola-Cardwell, 978 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet denied). “Chapter 8's enforcement provisions apply only to spousal-maintenance orders that a court enters ‘on the authority’ of Chapter 8 and that meet that chapter's ‘other requirements.’ ” Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 131 (citing Green, 221 S.W.3d at 647-48). However, a court may not enforce an agreed obligation to pay spousal maintenance by contempt for any amount which, “exceeds the amount of periodic support the court could have ordered under this chapter or for any period of maintenance beyond the period of maintenance the court could have ordered under this chapter.” Tex. Fam Code Ann. § 8.059(a-1).

Analysis

In the present case, it is undisputed Gary's support obligation to pay Sherri $175,000 as “spousal maintenance” was made voluntarily by the parties in their 2016 MSA as part of their divorce. The trial court later approved and incorporated this obligation from the MSA into the final decree of divorce in an uncontested hearing. Accordingly, we find this obligation to be a contractual support obligation voluntarily established by the parties. See Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 134. We must now determine whether this contractual spousal maintenance obligation is enforceable by contempt.

For a contractual spousal maintenance obligation to be enforceable by contempt, the obligation must meet the requirements and limitations of Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code. Id. (holding that “an order incorporating a voluntary support obligation that does not qualify as spousal maintenance creates a debt that is enforceable as a contract, not a court-ordered obligation that is enforceable as a judgment.”). If the contested obligation falls under Chapter 7 of the Texas Family Code, then it is characterized as a debt which is not enforceable by contempt. Ex parte Hall, 854 S.W.2d 656, 656-57 (Tex. 1993) (recognizing an obligation imposed by law on spouses to support one another is considered a legal duty and not a debt under Article I, Section 18 of the Texas Constitution). However, there is nothing in the record, nor any findings from the trial court, indicating Sherri established her eligibility for Chapter 8 spousal maintenance by demonstrating she lacked sufficient earning ability or was disabled to qualify for spousal maintenance. See Tex. Fam Code Ann. § 8.051; Green, 221 S.W.3d at 647-48. In fact, the record in this matter indicates the opposite. For instance, Sherri admits in her testimony the agreed $175,000 support obligation set out in the final decree of divorce represented her equity in the marital home located in Gregg County as well as “any community interest” from a business owned by the parties—in other words, an agreed amount to equalize the division of the marital estate between the parties.

Although Sherri contends the trial court misinterpreted Section 8.059(a-1) of the Texas Family Code by not holding Gary in contempt for the five-year period immediately following the divorce, we cannot agree. It is true a contractual spousal maintenance obligation may be enforced by contempt under certain circumstances, and Sherri is correct that the maximum duration of spousal maintenance the trial court could have ordered in this case is for a five-year period. See Tex. Fam Code Ann. § 8.054. However, Sherri's argument ignores an essential requirement for Section 8.059(a-1) to apply—the spouse to receive the maintenance must first establish and satisfy the statutory requirements under Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code for the enforcement provisions to be available. See Green, 221 S.W.3d at 647-48; Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 134-35; Waldrop, 552 S.W.3d at 403 (noting that an “agreed maintenance provision, enforceable as a contract, is not subject to chapter 8 merely because it references chapter 8 or states that a spouse is eligible for spousal maintenance under chapter 8.”). Under Sherri's interpretation of this section, any contractual agreement to pay spousal maintenance which invokes Chapter 8 is enforceable by contempt—notwithstanding whether the requirements of Chapter 8 are satisfied. See Green, 221 S.W.3d at 648-49. Although the contested spousal maintenance obligation in this case may contain the nomenclature of spousal maintenance, an agreed monthly support provision reached in mediation to equalize the division of the marital estate does not fall under the purview of Chapter 8 merely because it is entitled “Spousal Maintenance” or references portions of the statute. See id.; Waldrop, 552 S.W.3d at 403; Ammann v. Ammann, No. 03-09-00177-CV, 2010 WL 4260955, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin, Oct. 28, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting the mere reference to Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code, “does not transform the contractual alimony obligation into a court-ordered maintenance obligation governed by that chapter.”).

While it is undisputed Gary failed to make any of the contractual spousal maintenance payments to Sherri as specified in their divorce decree, his conduct is not punishable by contempt. See Green, 221 S.W.3d at 649 (holding a party “cannot be jailed unless his obligation arises from a legal duty with a statutory or constitutional basis. There can be no imprisonment absent such authority”). However, other remedies may be available for Sherri under contract theory to enforce their contractual agreement and recover unpaid arrearages. See id. (noting other possible legal mechanisms, such as a breach of contract action or lien).

Because the enforcement provisions of Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code do not apply to Gary's spousal maintenance obligation, we conclude the agreed contractual support obligation in this case is a debt which cannot be enforced by contempt. Thus, the trial court did not err by refusing to hold Gary in contempt for non-payment of the maintenance obligation. We overrule Sherri's sole issue.

Disposition

Having overruled Sherri's sole issue, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that all costs of this appeal are hereby adjudged against the Appellant, SHERRI BENE WHIITE, for which execution may issue, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their first names.

2.   Gary was not represented by counsel in either the mediation or entry of the final decree of divorce.

C. Michael Davis, Justice