RICHARD BINGHAMES HENDRIX INDIVIDUALLY AND WILLIAM SHANE JORDAN INDIVIDUALLY v. POWER RENTAL SOLUTIONS LLC ERS RENTAL SOLUTIONS LLC (2026)

OPINION

Appellants Richard Binghames Hendrix and William Shane Jordan challenge a default judgment against them for almost two million dollars. In a single issue, appellants contend that we must reverse the default judgment because the record does not reflect that appellee Power Rental Solutions, LLC (PRS) requested, paid for, obtained, or served any citation on appellants. Because the record does not include the citation, we cannot determine whether PRS properly served appellants. We therefore reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Last term, this court decided a related appeal involving these parties and explained their underlying dispute. See Henco Energy-Rick Hendrix Energy, LLC v. Power Rental Sols., LLC, No. 14-22-00525-CV, 2025 WL 1037255 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 8, 2025, pet. filed) (mem. op.). In this case, PRS contends that while the related matter was pending, Hendrix fraudulently transferred funds to Jordan in violation of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.

PRS sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting Hendrix and Jordan from further disposition of their assets. The trial court granted the TRO and set the matter for a temporary injunction (TI) hearing. After PRS's repeated efforts to serve appellants with notice of the TI hearing failed, the trial court extended the TRO and granted PRS's emergency motion for substituted service. In its order, the trial court authorized PRS to serve appellants “by sending a copy of Plaintiff's Original Petition, the Temporary Restraining Order, the Order Extending the Temporary Restraining Order, the Notice of Oral Hearing of Plaintiff's Temporary Injunction, and Citation to [appellants'] confirmed email addresses ․ and social media [accounts]” (emphasis added).

In the subsequent return of service, the process server averred that he served appellants via email and Facebook with the following documents: “CORRESPONDENCE LETTER; TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; PLAINTIFF'S EXPEDITED REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION[ ]; ORDER EXTENDING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; EXHIBITS A THROUGH H; ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE SERVICE.” Absent from this list is any reference to the citation.

Ultimately, the trial court granted the TI. PRS moved for default judgment and a permanent injunction after appellants did not answer or otherwise respond to the suit. The trial court signed an order granting a final default judgment and permanent injunction against appellants and awarding various fees and costs requested by PRS. In its order, the trial court found that appellants were “served with a copy of Plaintiff's Original Petition, citation, and a copy of the Court's Order Granting Substituted Service on or about February 22, 2024” (emphasis added) and that the court had personal jurisdiction over appellants. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

A trial court's jurisdiction is dependent upon citation issued and served in a manner provided for by law. Creaven v. Creaven, 551 S.W.3d 865, 870 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Unless the record affirmatively shows an appearance by the defendant, proper service of citation on the defendant, or a written waiver of service at the time the default judgment is entered, the trial court does not have personal jurisdiction to render the default judgment against the defendant. Id. We review de novo whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction. Id.

For a default judgment to withstand direct attack, the record must establish strict compliance with the rules of civil procedure governing issuance, service, and return of citation. Id. (citing Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994)); see also Spanton v. Bellah, 612 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam). There are no presumptions in favor of valid issuance, service, or return of citation. Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 316; Creaven, 551 S.W.3d at 870. If the record does not affirmatively show strict compliance with the rules, the attempted service of process is invalid, the trial court has no personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and the judgment is void. Creaven, 551 S.W.3d at 870. Virtually any deviation from the statutory requisites for service of process will destroy a default judgment. Id.; see also Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 316–17.

Because “no-answer default judgments are disfavored” under Texas law, Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 316, any doubts concerning a default judgment must be resolved against the party who secured it, In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916, 922 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

ANALYSIS

In their sole issue, appellants contend that we must reverse the default judgment because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over them. Specifically, appellants argue that the record does not demonstrate that PRS obtained and served appellants with a citation. PRS disputes appellants' contention that the record must contain the actual served citation but argues that the record does reflect that the citation existed and was properly served on appellants.

The parties agree on at least two principles of law relevant to this appeal: (1) strict compliance with the rules for service of citation must affirmatively appear on the record; and (2) reviewing courts indulge no presumptions in favor of valid issuance, service, and return of citation.¹ See Creaven, 551 S.W.3d at 870. But, contrary to PRS's arguments, the application of these agreed-upon principles leads us to conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render the default judgment.

Two of our sister courts have held that strict compliance with the rules regarding service of process could not be demonstrated if the record did not include a copy of the citation. See In re A.R.A.-G., No. 01-18-01073-CV, 2019 WL 6315194, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Goss v. Sillmon, 570 S.W.3d 319, 322–23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Garcia v. Ennis, 554 S.W.3d 209, 215–217 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.).²

As the Goss court observed, the citation has several important functions: it gives the trial court proper jurisdiction over the parties, satisfies due process, and informs the defendant that she has been sued so that she may appear and defend against the suit. Goss, 570 S.W.3d at 322 (citing El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alspini, 315 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.)). Rule 99 specifies the contents of the citation and its notice requirements. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 99(b) (detailing form of citation), (c) (setting out notice requirements for citation). Further, rule 99 requires that the citation be included in the record. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 99(a) (“The clerk must retain a copy of the citation in the court's file.”). Without a copy of the citation in the record, a reviewing court cannot determine whether the citation contained the information rule 99 requires. See id.; see also Goss, 570 S.W.3d at 322; Garcia, 554 S.W.3d at 215.

We are persuaded by the reasoning in these cases. As the Garcia court observed, numerous decisions from Texas appellate courts (including this one) have concluded that strict compliance with the service-of-process rules was not shown where the citation failed to include certain information required by rule 99(b). See Garcia, 554 S.W.3d at 215; see also Montgomery v. Hitchcock, No. 03-14-00643-CV, 2016 WL 3068219, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin May 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rule 99(b)(4)); Midstate Env't Servs., LP v. Peterson, 435 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, no pet.) (rules 99(b)(2) and (8)); Mansell v. Ins. Co. of the West, 203 S.W.3d 499, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (rule 99(b)(4)). Logically, if strict compliance cannot be found when just one of the pieces of information required by rule 99(b) is omitted, then “the complete absence of the entire citation—and the inability to confirm that the citation contains any of the information required by rule 99(b)—surely renders service invalid as well.” Garcia, 554 S.W.3d at 215.

PRS argues that the absence of the citation from the record is not fatal to the default judgment for two alternative reasons: (1) the trial court expressly found in the judgment that appellants were served with the citation ³ and (2) we can infer from other information in the record that the citation was included with the other documents served upon appellants.⁴ But, as PRS acknowledges, we cannot indulge any presumptions in favor of valid issuance, service, and return of citation. See Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 316; Creaven, 551 S.W.3d at 870; see also Furst, 176 S.W.3d at 872 (substituted service). We therefore must reject any invitation to presume the existence of the citation. See Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 316; Creaven, 551 S.W.3d at 870. Further, even if we could infer its existence, we would still be unable to determine whether the citation met the requirements of rule 99 without a copy in the record.

PRS also suggests that because appellants only relied on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(a) and 107, and no cases cited by appellants directly hold that the record must contain the citation, we are limited to a consideration of only those rules and cases. We are mindful of the Texas supreme court's directive that reviewing courts “should reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.” Weekley Homes, LLC v. Paniagua, 646 S.W.3d 821, 827 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008)). We treat issue statements in briefs as covering any subsidiary question that is fairly included. Id. at 826 (citing Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f)). Here, appellants' brief identified the following issue: the default judgment must be reversed because the Texas supreme court requires strict compliance with the rules for service of citation to affirmatively appear on the record, but here, the record demonstrates that PRS failed to request, pay for, obtain, or serve any citation on appellants. A brief's issue statement is sufficient if it directs our attention to the error about which the complaint is made. Id. at 827. Because appellants' briefing does so, we decline to find waiver. See id.; Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f).

We conclude that because the citation does not appear in the record, PRS failed to show strict compliance with the rules of civil procedure governing issuance, service, and return of citation. See Goss, 570 S.W.3d at 322; Garcia, 554 S.W.3d at 215–17. As a result, the record does not reflect that PRS properly served appellants via substituted service, there is no showing that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over appellants, and the default judgment is void. See Creaven, 551 S.W.3d at 870.

We sustain appellants' sole issue.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the trial court erred in rendering default judgment against appellants. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.⁵

FOOTNOTES

1.   These principles apply equally to substituted service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b)(2). See Furst v. Smith, 176 S.W.3d 864, 871–72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (holding that record did not affirmatively reflect compliance with rule 106(b)(2) where service return did not state that copy of petition had been served with citation; court stated that it “indulge[d] no presumptions in favor of compliance with service requirements”).

2.   See also Crown Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Dunavin, No. 05-07-01367-CV, 2009 WL 2837754, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 4, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that where record did not include citation or return of service of citation for appellee, court lacked evidence that appellee was properly served with process and could not conclude that trial court erred in not granting default judgment against appellee; without proper service of citation, trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter default judgment).

3.   In support of this argument, PRS directs us to Vernon v. Perrien, 390 S.W.3d 47, 58 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied). PRS argues that Vernon held that “[u]nder the presumption of regularity, we are required to presume recitations in the final judgment are correct absent any evidence to the contrary.” But Vernon dealt with findings of fact made following a bench trial. See id. at 54, 57, 58. The Texas supreme court has repeatedly held that in the context of a no-answer default judgment, we cannot indulge any presumptions in favor of valid issuance, service, or return of citation. See, e.g., WWLC Invest., L.P. v. Miraki, 624 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam); Spanton v. Bellah, 612 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).

4.   Specifically, PRS points to a letter in the record from the Secretary of State indicating that the package sent to the Secretary for purposes of long-arm service on appellants was deficient for two reasons: (1) there was no forwarding address; and (2) there was only one copy of the process, but two were required. PRS asks us to infer from this that the package included the citation, because the letter did not suggest that the citation was missing.

5.   We deny appellants' motion to abate this appeal as moot.

Ken Wise Justice