IN RE: MELISSA RAMIREZ (2026)

OPINION

By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Melissa Ramirez asserts that the trial court ² abused its discretion by ordering her to pay one-half of the costs for mediation when she had filed an uncontested statement of inability to afford the payment of court costs under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 145. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

This original proceeding arises from a divorce and custody proceeding between Ramirez and real party in interest Silvestre Fermin Torres. The former couple has two minor children. On July 16, 2025, Ramirez filed a statement providing, inter alia, that she was being represented in the case by Texas RioGrande Legal Aid (TRLA),³ without cost. Ramirez stated that she or her dependents received public benefits in the form of “Food stamps/SNAP”; that her monthly take-home pay was $1,048 as a driver for Amazon Flex; that she received $230 per month in public benefits; and that she earned an additional $110 monthly as a “Spark Driver” for Walmart delivery services. The statement indicated that Ramirez's total monthly income was $1,388.

In terms of assets, Ramirez stated that she possessed $23 in cash, and she possessed a 2025 Hyundai Kona but had no equity in the vehicle. She denied having any other assets. Ramirez alleged that she had total monthly expenses of $1,848, and she explained that her debts included $30,000 for a car loan, $20,000 for a timeshare, and $9,000 for other loans and a credit card.

On August 7, 2025, the trial court ordered the parties to mediate the case and to split the costs of mediation. On August 20, 2025, Ramirez filed an “Objection to Mediation and Request to Reconsider.” Ramirez asserted that she had filed an uncontested statement that she was “indigent and cannot afford mediation fees,” and that TRLA was not required to pay for her share of the mediation on her behalf. Thereafter, Torres advised the trial court that he would pay all costs for mediation. On October 2, 2025, the trial court signed an “Order of Referral to Mediation” requiring the parties to mediate and ordering Torres to pay the mediation fees.

On November 6, 2025, the trial court held a status hearing. The parties advised that through mediation they had agreed on temporary orders, and the mediator had submitted a mediated settlement agreement. The trial court set a docket control conference to be held on November 19, 2025, and ordered the parties to mediate a second time prior to the final hearing. Torres declined to pay the full costs for the second mediation. Ramirez reminded the trial court that she had filed an uncontested statement of indigence, and she objected to paying for any costs of the second mediation. The trial court informed the parties that they both would pay for mediation:

This is the problem with Legal Aid. I understand they're a non-profit organization, but they want to take cases. The nature of the beast with these cases is that there's mediation, there's social studies. And we're not going to say, oh just because we're this person, tack it on the other guy. That's not the way it works. You want to take the case or get off the case, that simple.

Both sides are paying for it. We're not going to be tackling that issue here. So[,] you can file your objections if you want to preserve it for the record for appeal, but I don't know how—I don't think it's going to go anywhere honestly because you get on it, you pay for it.

On November 17, 2025, Ramirez filed an “Objection to Order Requiring Petitioner to Pay Mediation Costs and Motion to Reconsider.” Nevertheless, on December 8, 2025, the trial court signed an order requiring the parties to attend mediation prior to a final hearing and ordered Ramirez to pay one-half of the costs. On December 11, 2025, Ramirez filed a notice of appeal assailing the trial court's ruling. We dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See In re Marriage of Ramirez, No. 13-25-00670-CV, 2026 WL 234515, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 29, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Ramirez then filed this original proceeding. We ordered Torres to file a response to Ramirez's petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4, 52.8. Torres filed a response advising that he “is hereby agreeing to pay the entire cost of [m]ediation.” Torres does not otherwise address Ramirez's claims in this original proceeding. Ramirez filed a reply to Torres's response asserting in relevant part that Torres's offer to pay has not rendered this original proceeding moot.⁴

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the party seeking relief lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re Ill. Nat'l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A court abuses its discretion if no evidence supports the finding on which its ruling rests and if the court could reasonably have reached only a contrary conclusion.” In re AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We conduct a “benefits-and-detriments analysis” to determine if the relator possesses an adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P'ship, 655 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136–37.

III. TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 145

“The concept that courts should be open to all, including those who cannot afford the costs of admission, is firmly embedded in Texas jurisprudence.” Higgins v. Randall Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 257 S.W.3d 684, 686 (Tex. 2008); see Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Hon. Thirteenth Ct. of Apps., 934 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. 1996) (“Our state Constitution and our rules of procedure recognize that our courts must be open to all with legitimate disputes, not just those who can afford to pay the fees to get in.”). “Access to the civil justice system cannot be denied because a person cannot afford to pay court costs.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 145 cmt. Court costs include mediation fees. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.054(b); Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 370, 376 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.).

Under Rule 145, “[a] party who cannot afford payment of court costs must file the Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs approved by the Supreme Court or another sworn document containing the same information.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(b). The party “should” also submit with the statement “any available evidence” of the party's inability to afford the payment of costs, and some specified matters listed in the rule provide prima facie evidence of the inability to pay. Id. R. 145(d)(1)–(3). A statement of inability to pay that is uncontested in the trial court is conclusive as a matter of law. See Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. 2016); Equitable Gen. Ins. v. Yates, 684 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1984); Strickland v. iHeartMedia, Inc., 668 S.W.3d 34, 38 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.); Abrigo v. Ginez, 580 S.W.3d 416, 419 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.); see also Espinoza v. FGMS Holdings, LLC, No. 13-25-00650-CV, 2026 WL 199369, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 26, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (combined app. & orig. proceeding). “It is an abuse of discretion for any judge ․ to order costs in spite of an uncontested affidavit of indigence.” Campbell, 487 S.W.3d at 152; see Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 38; Abrigo, 580 S.W.3d at 419; see also Espinoza, 2026 WL 199369, at *4.

The clerk, court reporter, or a party may file a motion to require the declarant to pay costs; however, any such motion “must contain sworn evidence—not merely allegations—either that the Statement was materially false when made or that because of changed circumstances, it is no longer true.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(e)(1). Alternatively, the trial “court on its own may require the declarant to prove the inability to afford costs when evidence comes before the court that the declarant may be able to afford costs or when an officer or professional must be appointed in the case.” Id. R. 145(e)(2). Rule 145 further provides in relevant part that:

When a Statement has been filed, the declarant must not be ordered to pay costs unless these procedural requirements have been satisfied:

(1) Notice and Hearing. The declarant must not be required to pay costs without an oral evidentiary hearing. The declarant must be given 10 days' notice of the hearing. Notice must either be in writing and served in accordance with Rule 21a or given in open court. At the hearing, the burden is on the declarant to prove the inability to afford costs.

(2) Findings Required. An order requiring the declarant to pay costs must be supported by detailed findings that the declarant can afford to pay costs.

(3) Partial and Delayed Payment. The court may order that the declarant pay the part of the costs the declarant can afford or that payment be made in installments. But the court must not delay the case if payment is made in installments.

(4) Order Must State Notice of Right to Appeal. An order requiring the declarant to pay costs must state in conspicuous type: “You may challenge this order by filing a motion in the court of appeals within 10 days after the date this order is signed. See Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145.”

Id. R. 145(f). A declarant may not be required to pay costs when these procedural requirements are not met. See Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 36 (“A party who files a statement of inability to afford costs cannot be required to pay costs ․ unless certain procedural requirements have been satisfied.”); Emerson v. Holly Lake Ranch Ass'n, 603 S.W.3d 172, 174 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (stating that “a party who files a Statement may not be required to pay court costs unless the trial court holds an oral evidentiary hearing, with proper notice given to the declarant”); see also Espinoza, 2026 WL 199369, at *4.

If the trial court holds a hearing on a statement, the proponent bears the burden of proving the inability to afford costs. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(f)(1); Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 36; Emerson, 603 S.W.3d at 174. “The test for determining indigence is straightforward: ‘Does the record as a whole show by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant would be unable to pay the costs, or a part thereof, or give security therefor, if he really wanted to and made a good-faith effort to do so?’ ” In re C.H.C., 331 S.W.3d 426, 429 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Higgins, 257 S.W.3d at 686); see Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 36; Emerson, 603 S.W.3d at 174.

IV. ANALYSIS

Ramirez asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to pay for mediation costs because she had filed an uncontested statement of inability to pay under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. She further asserts that, to the extent that the trial court's order requiring her to pay was premised on the concept that an indigent party's counsel should pay for costs, the trial court erred as a matter of law.

We begin by examining how Torres's offer to pay for all mediation costs affects our analysis of this original proceeding. Torres offers no argument or authority regarding the impact of his offer to pay on Ramirez's claim for relief. Ramirez asserts that her petition for writ of mandamus has not been rendered moot because the trial court's order remains extant, and even if the order has been rendered moot, the “capable of repetition” exception to mootness applies to the case.

A case is moot when a justiciable controversy does not exist between the parties or when the parties do not have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. See Abbott v. Mex. Am. Leg. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681, 689 (Tex. 2022); Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012). The “capable of repetition” exception to the mootness doctrine applies when: (1) the challenged action was too short to be fully litigated before the action ceased or expired, and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the litigant will be subject to the same action again. See Pressley v. Casar, 567 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). Under the specific circumstances present in this case, where the trial court's order requiring Ramirez to pay half of the costs of mediation has not been withdrawn or vacated, we conclude that the trial court's order requiring Ramirez to pay continues to present a justiciable controversy. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding).

We turn to the merits. Ramirez's statement was provided on a form approved by the Texas Supreme Court. See Misc. Docket No. 22-9090 (Tex. Oct. 20, 2022). Ramirez completed the statement in its entirety and declared under penalty of perjury that the statement was true and correct and that she could not afford to pay court costs. The clerk of the trial court did not return Ramirez's affidavit for correction. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(c)(2) (providing that the clerk “may return a Statement for correction only if it is not sworn—not for failure to attach evidence or any other reason”). Ramirez's statement was sufficient to invoke the protections of Rule 145. See id.; Abrigo, 580 S.W.3d at 420; see also Espinoza, 2026 WL 199369, at *6.

Here, neither Torres, nor the district clerk, nor the court reporter filed a motion with sworn evidence seeking to require Ramirez to pay costs. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(e)(1). The record contains no indicia that the trial court sua sponte sought to require Ramirez to prove the inability to pay after it determined that the appointment of a mediator was appropriate. See id. R. 145(e)(2). In any event, Ramirez did not receive the required ten days' notice of hearing on her statement, see id. R. 145(f)(1), and the trial court did not hold the mandatory evidentiary hearing on Ramirez's statement. See id. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered Ramirez to pay for half of the mediation costs.

Based upon the record, it appears that the trial court assumed that TRLA would and should pay Ramirez's costs of the mediation. In this regard, we note that a fee agreement between counsel and an indigent client may be considered in determining if the litigant is able to pay costs on appeal. See Griffin Indus., Inc., 934 S.W.2d at 354. “If the agreement provides that the attorney is to pay or advance costs, and the appellant makes no further showing, the agreement would be some evidence that the appellant has a source of funds from which to pay costs.” Id. However, “when the facts establish that the attorney will not or cannot pay those costs, as is the case here, we cannot erect a legal fiction” that the applicant can pay if she really wanted to and made a good faith effort to do so. Id. Thus, “[w]hen the attorney is obligated to the client to pay or advance costs but will not or cannot do so, the indigent should not be stripped of his or her indigent status.” Id.

The record before the Court does not include a fee agreement or any other documentation supporting an inference that TRLA is required to pay for Ramirez's costs or that it has agreed to do so. See id. In any event, Ramirez's statement of inability to pay was uncontested in the trial court and was therefore conclusive as a matter of law. See Campbell, 487 S.W.3d at 152; Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 38; Abrigo, 580 S.W.3d at 419; see also Espinoza, 2026 WL 199369, at *6. Thus, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order Ramirez to pay for half of the costs of mediation. See In re AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 223. Further, balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments, we conclude that any remedy by appeal or by motion under Rule 145(g)(1) after a final judgment has been rendered would be inadequate and would fail to protect the substantive rights provided by Rule 145. See In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P'ship, 655 S.W.3d at 843; In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136–37; see also Espinoza, 2026 WL 199369, at *6. Accordingly, we sustain the sole issue presented in this original proceeding.

V. CONCLUSION

We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. We direct the trial court to vacate its order requiring Ramirez to pay for half of the mediation costs and to proceed in accordance with our opinion. Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to promptly comply.

Delivered and filed on the 2nd day of April, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

2.   This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number F-2881-25-F in the 332nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Juan R. Alvarez. See id. R. 52.2.

3.   According to the record, “TRLA is funded by the Texas Access to Justice Foundation and the Legal Services Corporation and is a nonprofit that provides civil legal services to persons living at or below 200% of the federal poverty guidelines published annually by the United States Department of Health and Human Services.”

4.   We note that Ramirez does not request to shift the costs for mediation to the opposing party. Rather, she argues that the trial “court has several options available to it, including foregoing a second mediation or seeking/appointing a pro bono mediator through the county bar association.”

L. ARON PEÑA JR. Justice