IN RE: A PURPORTED LIEN OR CLAIM AGAINST DIANA SCHAUMBURG (2026)

OPINION

In this appeal from a dismissal for want of prosecution, appellant Diana Schaumburg argues the trial court erred by refusing to consider her ex parte Section 51.903 motion and instead dismissed her claims. We agree and reverse the final judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Diana Schaumburg owns real property in Harris County. In 2021, Schaumberg hired Matilde Hernandez d/b/a Room by Room Home Renovations to address water damage to her home from a severe winter storm. Hernandez was to be paid out of insurance proceeds from Schaumburg's home insurance policy. However, Hernandez filed a lien in the real property records asserting she was not paid significant amounts due under the contract. The lien on Schaumburg's property was filed in 2023.

Schaumberg discovered the lien in June 2025 while in the process of attempting to sell her home. On June 19, 2025, Schaumburg filed a Motion for Judicial Review of Documentation or Instrument Purporting to Create a Lien or Claim in the 189th District Court. She also contemporaneously filed a summary motion to remove an invalid or unenforceable lien pursuant to Property Code Section 53.160, which was assigned to a different district court. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 53.160.¹

In this proceeding, Schaumburg sought review of the lien under Government Code section 51.901, which allows for ex parte review by the trial court of a fraudulent lien. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 51.901. The trial court did not rule on Schaumburg's motion.² The trial court sent a notice of intent to dismiss Schaumburg's case and ultimately, in October 2025, dismissed Schaumburg's case for want of prosecution. Schaumburg appeals that dismissal.

II. ANALYSIS

Schaumburg raises three issues on appeal. In her first issue, Schaumburg argues the trial court erred in dismissing her case for want of prosecution because the trial court had a ministerial duty to review the lien documentation to determine if the lien was fraudulent pursuant to Section 51.903. Schaumburg's second and third issues both raise legal questions, but do not allege any error on the part of the trial court.³ See Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (concluding that appellant's issues on appeal did not meet the requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure because “they do not point out any error allegedly committed by the trial court”). Further, the record does not reflect that Schaumburg presented to the trial court or received a ruling on her second and third issues. Therefore, we overrule her second and third issues. We consider only Schaumburg's argument that the trial court erred in dismissing her request for relief, without ruling, under Section 51.903.

A. Applicable law

Section 51.903 was enacted in 1997. See Act of May 10, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 189, § 14, sec. 51.903, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1045, 1053 (codified at Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 51.903). It was intended to create “an expedited judicial process that permits someone aggrieved by the fraudulent filing to obtain an expedited legal process to obtain a court order declaring the filing to be fraudulent[.]” E.g., David Powers Homes, Inc. v. M.L. Rendleman Co., Inc., 355 S.W.3d 327, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Senate Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1185, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997)).

Section 51.903 provides an expedited procedure for a person with an interest in real property to file a motion requesting that a court determine if a filed instrument asserting a lien is fraudulent. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 51.903. The court's finding may be made solely on review of documents appended to the motion and without hearing testimony. Id. at 51.903(c). “The court's review may be made ex parte without delay or notice of any kind.” Id. A Section 51.903 motion may be heard and ruled upon by any district judge with jurisdiction over real property matters in the county where the purportedly fraudulent instrument was filed. Id. Section 51.903 also provides suggested language for both movants and reviewing courts to ensure compliance with the statute. See id. § 51.903(a), (g).

The trial court's review is necessarily limited because a Section 51.903 proceeding is “conducted ex parte, without any testimonial evidence, and without notice of any kind.” In re Tu Nguyen, 456 S.W.3d 673, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). The trial court may not address any substantive evidentiary claims. See e.g., Cardenas v. Wilson, 428 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Under the fraudulent lien statute, the trial court does not rule on the validity of the underlying claim creating the lien or rule on any substantive evidentiary claim.”). The trial court also may not address the underlying validity of the lien. In re Purported Liens or Claims Against Samshi Homes, L.L.C., 321 S.W.3d 665, 667–68 & n. 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (holding that trial court may not rule on validity of underlying lien or other claims between the parties).

A trial court's findings are reviewed de novo because the trial court is charged with determining whether the lien is fraudulent as a matter of law. In re Tu Nguyen, 456 S.W.3d at 675. Here, we have no findings because the trial court did not rule on Schaumburg's motion.

B. Analysis

When a motion is properly pending before a trial court, the act of considering and ruling on it is ministerial. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). The record reflects that Schaumburg filed a motion compliant with Section 51.903 that was supported by the affidavit of her attorney. Schaumburg set her motion for hearing before the trial court. However, the record reflects that the trial court, instead, dismissed her case.

The trial court had a ministerial duty to rule on Schaumburg's motion. Although Section 51.903 repeatedly uses the word “may” to describe the power of the trial court, this language gives authority to the trial court to hear and decide whether the purported lien is fraudulent without notice and a response from the party who filed the lien. See Dallas Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. 2005) (statute that uses the word “may” is permissive rather than mandatory unless there is something in the statute to show a legislative intent that “may” is mandatory.); see also Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington Eng'g, Ltd., 536 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Tex. 2017) (statute's use of “may” does not permit trial courts to make decisions in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner). The use of the word “may” in Section 51.903 does not create discretion in the trial court to decide whether it wishes to allow a movant access to the expedited proceeding created by the Legislature. Section 51.903 does not relieve the trial court from its ministerial duty to consider and rule on a properly filed motion. We conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing appellant's Section 51.903 proceeding without ruling on her motion. To hold otherwise would frustrate the purposes of Section 51.903 and allow trial courts to determine whether a movant has access to a proceeding under Section 51.903. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (statutes are to be construed with the presumption of a just and reasonable result and that the entire statute is intended to be effective); see also City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625–26 (Tex. 2008) (“[W]e construe the statute's words according to their plain and common meaning ․ unless such a construction leads to absurd results.”).

We sustain Schaumburg's first issue.

C. Request for suspension of consideration

Although she was not a party to the proceedings below, Hernandez (the purported lienholder) filed a letter with this court asking that this court suspend consideration and ruling on this appeal until she can retain counsel. However, today's ruling does not impair any of Hernandez's interests. On remand, Schaumburg may present her Section 51.903 motion to the trial court again and Hernandez may appear in that proceeding.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the final order of the trial court dismissing appellant's Section 51.903 action and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Schaumburg's Section 53.160 proceeding was assigned to the 125th District Court. According to a letter filed by Schaumburg on December 31, 2025, the 125th District Court issued an order removing the lien. Hernandez appealed from that order pro se. Hernandez's motion for emergency relief was denied and her appeal dismissed by the First Court of Appeals because there was no final judgment over which our sister court had jurisdiction. See Hernandez v. Schaumburg, No. 01-25-01052-CV, 2026 WL 363034, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 10, 2026, no pet. h.). To the extent that the relief sought in this case might be moot given the actions of the trial court in the Section 53.160 proceeding, the parties may resolve any such questions in the trial court on remand.

2.   Schaumburg filed two petitions for writ of mandamus arising from the trial court's failure or refusal to rule, which this court denied, explaining that Schaumburg had not demonstrated entitlement to mandamus relief. In re Schaumburg, No. 14-25-00542-CV, 2025 WL 1914667, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 11, 2025, no pet.); In re Schaumburg, No. 14-25-00825-CV, 2025 WL 2835497, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 7, 2025, no pet.). Although she did not demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief, this court's previous denial of Schaumburg's request for mandamus should not be understood as a holding that trial courts can ignore and refuse to provide the expedited review and remedy created by Legislature.

3.   Schaumburg's second and third issues appear in her briefing as follows:• Notwithstanding the express language of the statute, if the homeowner is required to notify the purported lienholder that she has filed a motion pursuant to section 51.903, should informal service be found to suffice, especially given that the purpose of the statute is to provide a quick and free mechanism for homeowners to address fraudulent liens?• Must an affidavit purporting to create a lien on a homestead be filed with a contract to constitute “a document or instrument provided for by the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States”?

Tonya McLaughlin Justice