HAWKINS v. STATE (2026)

SUBSTITUTE OPINION 1

Appellant Desmond Hawkins appeals his conviction for capital murder resulting in his life sentence without parole. In three issues, he challenges the trial court's refusal to exclude evidence of GPS data collected from his ankle monitor, the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial following testimony suggesting appellant's affiliation with a gang, and the sufficiency of the evidence (connecting appellant to the murder) to support the conviction as charged. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Against the backdrop of this capital murder case are two other murders and one attempted murder. The first murder, of which we know little, other than that appellant was charged with committing it, is important to this case because appellant was required to wear a GPS ankle monitor device as a condition for his release on bond. On October 20, 2020, there was an attempted murder of Menuell Solomon. The attempt on Solomon's life is relevant to this appeal for two reasons: first, Solomon identified to the police one of his would-be murderers, and second, Solomon was the victim of the second other murder, which occurred six-days later at the same place as the first attempt on his life. The second murder is relevant to this case because it occurred at the same time and place as the murder for which appellant was charged, convicted and now appeals.

On October 26, 2020, as Solomon was arriving at his townhome, three armed and masked men came through a hole in the fence that appeared to have been made to gain access to Solomon's townhome complex. One of the three assailants ran to the vehicle and shot Solomon, sitting in the driver's seat of his car, through the front windshield.

A crew of apartment maintenance men were the first to approach the scene after the gunshots were heard. They found Solomon in the driver's seat. They also discovered, still breathing in the passenger seat, the complainant in this case—eleven-year old, D.S., Solomon's stepson, shot in the head and torso, laying on top of Solomon's chest. The crew tried to assist the boy until EMS arrived. Two days later at the hospital, Sumicek was pronounced dead as a result of his gunshot wounds.

A ring camera from a couple of houses down from Solomon's and a surveillance camera installed at an apartment complex adjacent to Solomon's home captured images law enforcement used to investigate the crimes on October 20 and October 26. The Houston Police Department's Officer Cody Jarboe, who investigated the offenses occurring on both dates, testified about the differences between the suspects involved:

Q. ․did the suspects appear to be the same people from the 20th and the 26th?

A. No.

Q. What sort of differences did you note between those individuals?

A. The individuals on the 20th appeared to be older, African American males and larger in height and also weight. The individuals from the 26th who were the shooters, appeared to be younger, skinnier, and shorter.

Based on information obtained from witnesses and the surveillance cameras, the police determined the shooters on October 26 arrived in two cars that parked at the adjacent apartment complex: a white Camry and black Pontiac. The police determined the black Pontiac was driven by Johnny Smith. Through researching an HPD database, police discovered where Johnny Smith lived and his known associates, which included appellant. The investigators discovered appellant was ordered to wear an ankle monitor and from the surveillance noticed that one of the three men had a bulge at his left ankle that could be an ankle monitor. Researching appellant's Instagram posts, the police came to believe that appellant pictured himself in images wearing the same jeans and shoes that appeared to be worn by the man with the bulge in his left ankle. Based on the similarity of jeans worn by appellant in his Instagram posts with those pictured by surveillance cameras of one of the shooters, the police obtained GPS monitoring records through a search warrant. The GPS monitoring records placed appellant in the area of the shooting, several hours before it took place, moving within the area at the time it took place, and northbound back towards his house immediately after the shooting.

Before and during the trial, appellant's trial counsel sought to suppress evidence of the GPS monitoring data, arguing that the affidavit relied upon to secure the warrant contained testimony the affiant knew to be false at the time, and that the warrant did not otherwise provide probable cause. Although appellant's trial counsel secured testimony from the investigating officer casting doubt on the veracity of the statements he made to identify appellant in support of the search warrant, the court denied the motion based on the court's own interpretation of the identifying evidence.

After the jury found appellant guilty as charged, he was sentenced to life in prison without parole.

II. Motion To Suppress

In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court reversibly erred and violated his Fourth Amendment right when it refused to suppress evidence of GPS location data reported from his ankle monitor. Specifically, he argues that the State had obtained the data through a warrant that lacked probable cause when viewed after excising certain statements in the affidavit that appellant asserted were made with a reckless disregard for the truth. The State counters that appellant lacks standing to assert this complaint because, as the State contends, even though the police sought and obtained a warrant to secure the data, a warrant was unnecessary to comply with Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections. We first consider whether we may address the State's point.

A. Standard of Review

As a threshold matter, our court may address whether appellant had standing to challenge the lawfulness of the search. To challenge a search and seizure under the United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution or the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a party must first establish standing. Pham v. State, 324 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd) (citing Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). A person has standing to challenge the reasonableness of a search or seizure under a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy theory if (1) the person has a subjective expectation of privacy in the place or object searched, and (2) society is prepared to recognize that expectation as “reasonable” or “legitimate.” Wiltz v. State, 595 S.W.3d 930, 934 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref'd). The defendant who challenges the search has the burden to establish standing. See State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Villarreal, 935 S.W.2d at 138.

In his Reply brief, appellant contends that the State failed to argue in the trial court that a warrant was unnecessary, thus waiving the challenge. In certain circumstances, the State may forfeit standing issues “through its assertions, concessions, and acquiescence in the course of litigation.” State v. Klima, 934 S.W.2d 109, 110 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see also Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1646, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981)); see e.g., State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“At the suppression hearing, the State specifically limited its argument to one theory of law: that there was probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest and warrantless search. Because the State did not present its other theory (that even if the warrantless arrest was illegal, it did not taint the search pursuant to the warrant) to the trial court, the State cannot rely on that theory on appeal.”). While appellant's motion to suppress and the suppression hearing was centrally focused on the question of probable cause to support the warrant, when responding to the challenge to the warrant as lacking probable cause, the State asserted its position a warrant was not required in the first instance because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy to the GPS records. Specifically, the prosecutor noted:

Now, I -- I know that there's a whole lot of disagreement about what is required for ankle monitor records but it is the State's position that we don't need a search warrant to get ankle monitor records for a defendant who is on bond for capital murder.

Specifically because I don't think there's an actual Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in ankle monitor records that are disclosed to the Court.

Putting that aside though, that's a moot point because it doesn't matter because the officers actually did go and get a warrant.

With respect to the last “moot point” comment, the prosecutor was indicating to the trial court that he would focus attention on addressing appellant's probable-cause challenge to the warrant. The trial court did not consider the standing issue, and made statements on the record indicating that it found the affidavit sufficiently supported by probable cause.

It is not fatal to the State's standing argument that the trial court did not consider the standing issue. See Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). As a reviewing court we may properly sustain the trial court's denial on the ground that the evidence failed to establish standing as a matter of law, even though the record does not reflect that the issue was ever considered by the parties or the trial court. Id.; Randolph v. State, No. 14-18-00647-CR, 2020 WL 548317, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 4, 2020, pet. ref'd) (addressing the question whether appellant had established standing to challenge the admission of evidence seized under a search warrant—regardless of whether the magistrate had probable cause to issue the warrant, when he failed to present any evidence at suppression hearing to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy).

Although we defer to the trial court's factual findings and view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we review the legal issue of standing de novo. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Two distinct theories of search can support a defendant's claim to standing: an “intrusion upon property” theory or a “reasonable expectation of privacy” theory. Wiltz v. State, 595 S.W.3d 930, 934 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref'd).

B. Did appellant have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the monitoring data collected pursuant to his release on bond?

Following a separate murder charge, appellant had been released on bond, subject to certain conditions including the requirement that appellant wear an ankle monitor. Significantly, Bond Condition No. 9 states:

Defendant is required to submit to GPS monitoring to be installed within 02 calendar days of the defendants release on bond. Defendant must sign any required agreements, comply with all required equipment and maintenance services, and comply with monitoring protocols, as instructed by the supervising agency. Defendant will observe an initial curfew from 5:00 PM until 5:00 AM, seven days per week. Defendant to pay all necessary fees and costs directly to the electronic monitoring vendor.

Additional bond conditions required that appellant not commit crimes, not contact persons in connection with the case, and stay within a restricted geographic area. These bond requirements, which appellant has not challenged, would present the reasonable belief that law enforcement could track his activity at any time to determine whether he was complying with the limitations. Appellant was provided a device which tracked his whereabouts, and that information was sent to a third-party that collected data continuously as to his movements.

The State does not dispute that the original imposition of continuous GPS monitoring on appellant constituted a Fourth Amendment search. See Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 308–09, 135 S.Ct. 1368, 191 L.Ed.2d 459 (2015). The State also agreed appellant would have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the collection of the GPS monitoring information which revealed his detailed movements. Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 311, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018). However, the State points out that the record does not show that appellant objected to the GPS bond condition in the trial court when it was imposed in the separate case. See Smith v. State, 993 S.W.2d 408, 410–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). Nor does the record show that the appellant availed himself of his appellate remedy to file a writ of habeas corpus to appeal any denial of an objection to the ankle monitor in that other proceeding. See, e.g., Anderer v. State, 7 S.W.3d 245, 246 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999) (appellant properly brought forth issue for appeal by objecting in trial court to the condition's imposition, filing a writ of habeas corpus, & then appealing the denial of relief), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We agree with the State that the record indicates appellant waived any Fourth Amendment challenge to the imposition of the GPS monitor and collection of the monitor's GPS data.

Thus, the issue is simply whether appellant had a reasonable expectation that, while wearing the ankle monitor under the uncontested bond conditions, his detailed movements for a given 24-hour period would be kept private from law enforcement agencies investigating a crime within the same jurisdiction of the monitoring court. The record of proof on the precise issue is relatively sparse, because as discussed above, the parties were focused on the warrant such that neither party presented evidence on the subject of appellant's reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the ankle monitor. This does not prevent our review. Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d at 671 (“The reviewing court may properly sustain the trial court's denial on the ground that the evidence failed to establish standing as a matter of law, even though the record does not reflect that the issue was ever considered by the parties or the trial court.”)

The record does not show that the retrieval of the GPS monitoring data intruded upon an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. Appellant was on notice that his physical movements were subject to GPS monitoring to ensure his compliance with the conditions of his pretrial release, and he was also on notice that his pretrial release could be revoked if he engaged in criminal activity. We cannot conclude that the HPD's request for a single-day of appellant's movements in the course of his pretrial release period (that could ordinarily last between several months to over a year), revealed the quantity or quality of information that intruded upon an objective expectation of privacy in “the whole of their physical movements.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 310, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018) (holding request for seven days of historical cell site location data to determine if cell phone owner was involved in criminal activity constituted an unreasonable search). Though we have found no other court in our state to confront the precise issue, others across the country have determined the sharing of location data between law enforcement agencies of a person required to wear an ankle monitor as a bond condition is not contrary to one's reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 484 (D.C. 2019) (holding defendant “had no objectively reasonable expectation that [probation authorities] would withhold the GPS tracking data from the police”); see also Commonwealth v. Govan, 496 Mass. 124, 142, 259 N.E.3d 370 (2025) (holding a twenty-minute inquiry into whether the defendant, wearing an ankle monitor during a pretrial release, was in the immediate vicinity of the crime scene followed by a subsequent warrantless inquiry into the defendant's precise whereabouts for an hour (after receiving an affirmative answer to the first inquiry) did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Massachusetts Constitution).

Accordingly, because appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that the data collected by one law enforcement agency to continuously track his movements might be shared in part with another law enforcement agency for the purpose of investigating his movements on the day of a crime, appellant did not have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation, and thus the trial court's denial of appellant's motion was not erroneous.

We overrule appellant's first issue.

III. Motion for Mistrial

Appellant's second complaint concerns the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial during the testimony of one of the State's law enforcement witnesses. Appellant and the State had an agreed motion in limine that the State would refer to appellant as an “associate” of Johnny Smith and not reference “membership of a gang”—more specifically, the Ralph gang. A detective testified that after the murders occurred on October 26, he had had locations checked based upon investigative leads from the October 20 attempted murder of Solomon:

Q. You mentioned that while you were gathering evidence at the scene, you were communicating with your team and you sent your team to some locations that -- that y'all had been to based on your investigation from the 20th; is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. Can you tell me if one of those locations was an apartment complex?

A. Yes. The apartment complex was the following day.

Q. And why did you go to that apartment complex the following day?

A. Specifically that complex had -- we learned about through the phone that we had obtained from the October 20th case. It was -- it was a complex that was in the area that had also been associated with other Ralph gang members. Also there are –

Defense Counsel: Judge, I will object. Can we approach?

THE COURT: You may.

(Proceedings at the Bench out of hearing of jury)

Defense Counsel: Judge, I object to the violation of the court order as it pertains to a motion in limine, any reference to any gang membership. I think the witness pretty clearly referred to Ralph gang members, other Ralph gang member clear implication that include our client and so.

THE COURT: That will be sustained.

Defense Counsel: I'd ask for an instruct[ion] to disregard and I further move for a mistrial.

THE COURT: The instruction to disregard will be given and the mistrial will be denied.

State: And, Judge, before we begin may I have a moment just to –

THE COURT: Yes, you may. (Proceedings resumed in hearing of jury)

THE COURT: At this time the jury will be instructed to disregard the statement -- last statements of the officer in this case.

A. Standard of Review

On appeal we review only the court's adverse ruling; we consider whether the court erred in failing to grant a mistrial. See Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 76–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (when the objection preceding the motion for mistrial is sustained “[t]he only adverse ruling—and thus the only occasion for making a mistake—was the trial court's denial of the motion for mistrial”).

Thus, the issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's request for a mistrial. See Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 738–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77. Mistrial is a remedy appropriate for a narrow class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors. Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, considering only those arguments before the court at the time of the ruling. Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The ruling must be upheld if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.; Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Because it is an extreme remedy, a mistrial should be granted “only when residual prejudice remains” after less drastic alternatives are explored. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d at 884-85 citing Barnett v. State, 161 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion for mistrial, we balance the following factors: (1) the severity of the misconduct—i.e., the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the detective's testimony; (2) the measures adopted to cure the misconduct—i.e., the efficacy of any instructions by the judge; and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct—i.e., the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction. Archie, 340 S.W.3d at 739; Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77. “Only in extreme circumstances, where the prejudice is incurable, will a mistrial be required.” Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77.

B. Did the trial court reversibly err when it denied appellant's request for a mistrial following the State's witness of the “Ralph gang”?

In this case, the severity of misconduct that prompted appellant's objection and led to his request for mistrial falls along the more moderate side of prejudicial. The remark was the only statement made in trial referring to any “gang” or gang membership. The detective's testimony—that the apartment complex was “associated with other Ralph gang members”—was not an unequivocal statement that appellant was in a gang. The jury might have believed the detective was referring to other people who were Ralph gang members. Yet the statement was still a clear violation of the motion in limine and it would not have been unreasonable for the jury to infer from the statement that appellant was a Ralph gang member. The court properly sustained the objection.

After sustaining appellant's counsel's objection, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the officer's statements. The instruction under these circumstances should have been adequate to dispel the harm. See Williams, 417 S.W.3d at 172 (instruction to disregard a comment generally cures its prejudicial effect); Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (juries are generally presumed to follow the trial court's instructions). Under similar circumstances, other courts have found the instruction to disregard to be sufficient. Bridgewater v. State, 905 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.) (holding any prejudice by state's witness violating order not to mention the word “gang” was cured by the court's instruction to disregard); See also Avila v. State, No. 11-03-00255-CR, 2004 WL 1404034, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 24, 2004, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“With respect to the evidence that was initially admitted and showed that appellant's gang was known to participate in various criminal activities, we hold that the trial court's instruction to disregard cured the error, if any, in the admission of such evidence․ A prompt instruction to disregard will ordinarily cure the error created by an improper question and answer, even one involving extraneous offenses.”); cf. Graham v. State, No. 14-18-00179-CR, 2019 WL 3132266, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 16, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Because the trial court gave a prompt and appropriate curative instruction to the jury to disregard Officer D'Eugenio's inadvertent reference to Appellant's offender card, the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion for mistrial.”).

Apart from the one reference at issue no other evidence of gang membership was presented to the jury, and the record shows the jury was provided ample evidence supporting the conviction, including the surveillance footage and GPS monitoring data placing appellant at the scene at the relevant times.

Upon this record, balancing the three considerations, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it denied appellant's motion for a mistrial. Thus, even if the witness's “gang” remark was a violation of a prior motion in limine, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny the drastic remedy of a mistrial. See Archie, 221 S.W.3d at 700; Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884-85; Bridgewater v. State, 905 S.W.2d at 354.

Appellant's second issue is overruled.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his third issue, appellant complains that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of capital murder. He takes particular focus on the evidence to support his identification as the shooter or one of the assailants that was a party to the murder.

A. Standard of Review

In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The issue on appeal is not whether we, as a court, believe the State's evidence or believe that appellant's evidence outweighs the State's evidence. Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The verdict may not be overturned unless it is irrational or unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The jury “is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the strength of the evidence.” Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The jury may choose to believe or disbelieve any portion of the witnesses' testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). When faced with conflicting evidence, we presume the jury resolved conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Therefore, if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must affirm. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

We measure sufficiency to support a conviction by comparing the evidence presented at trial to “the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A hypothetically correct jury charge reflects the governing law, the indictment, the State's burden of proof and theories of liability, and an adequate description of the offense for the particular case. Id.

A person commits the offense of capital murder as charged if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual 10 years of age or older but younger than 15 years of age. See Tex. Pen. Code § 19.03(a)(9).

The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the person who committed the charged offense. Miller v. State, 667 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). A defendant's identity and criminal culpability may be proved either through direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences from that evidence. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Fang v. State, 544 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

B. Analysis/Facts

This case was based largely on admissible circumstantial evidence. The jury could not rely upon eyewitnesses to the murder, DNA evidence, or fingerprint evidence—as such evidence was not available. But nor was it required. Pena v. State, 441 S.W.3d 635, 641 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd) (absence of DNA or fingerprint evidence not required to support conviction in murder trial). The assailants were wearing masks and gloves—they did not want to be identified. However, appellant's GPS monitor placed him at the scene for the murder and also for the time period when the individuals were lying in wait. Appellant was associated with the owner of one of the vehicles in an HPD database, and he was at the scene when the vehicle was found the next day. After Solomon and Sumicek arrived in their car and were ambushed, appellant's GPS shows that he then left almost immediately and returned to north Houston for the remainder of the day. The jury was shown video images of a masked man carrying a pistol to and from where Sumicek and his stepfather were murdered and could have reasonably inferred based on GPS location data that appellant was the individual shown surveillance video images. The location data in this case, while vital to the State's case, was not the only evidence establishing appellant's involvement in the murder and was corroborated by the surveillance footage. See Wells v. State, 675 S.W.3d 814, 832 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023), aff'd, 714 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (holding cell phone location data, corroborated by video evidence establishing defendant's location and other evidence, was sufficient to support conviction); Johnson v. State, 682 S.W.3d 638, 650 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2024, pet. ref'd) (“Despite these evidentiary shortcomings, we conclude that the identity evidence in this case, which includes the CSLI [cell site location information] evidence, is sufficient.”) The jury was shown photos and heard testimony of the nature of Sumicek's gunshot wounds, one of which was directly to his forehead, which were sufficient to establish the element of intent. See Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

Upon the evidence in the record, we conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to show that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of D.S., who at the time was eleven years old (10 years of age or older but younger than 15 years of age). See Tex. Pen. Code § 19.03(a)(9); see Wells v. State, 675 S.W.3d at 832; see Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d at 581.

We therefore overrule appellant's third issue.

V. Conclusion

Having overruled each of appellant's three issues, we affirm the judgment and conviction.

Randy Wilson, Justice