IN RE: GRAYSON MILL OPERATING (2026)

OPINION

Relators/defendants Grayson Mill Operating, LLC, Grayson Mill Energy, LLC, and Grayson Mill Williston, LLC (collectively the “Grayson Mill Parties”) assert that Respondent the Honorable Erica R. Hughes (“Respondent”) clearly abused her discretion in denying their motion to reconsider their motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens (“FNC”) grounds under section 71.051 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. They argue that the Respondent abused her discretion by impliedly determining that (1) the Texas-resident exception to the forum non conveniens statute applies, and (2) the claims of real parties in interest/plaintiffs Eddie Fool and Steven Ledger (collectively the “Real Parties”) against the Grayson Mill Parties should not be dismissed under section 71.051(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. This case raises an issue of apparent first impression in this court: whether courts may determine whether a plaintiff is a “legal resident of [Texas]” for purposes of the Texas-resident exception based on a plaintiff's residency status after the plaintiff files suit. In this case, the Real Parties first became residents of Texas after they filed suit and after two of the Grayson Mill Parties had filed an FNC motion. We conclude that courts may not determine whether a plaintiff is a “legal resident of [Texas]” for purposes of the Texas-resident exception based on a plaintiff's residency status after the plaintiff files suit and that the Respondent clearly abused her discretion in denying the motion to reconsider the Grayson Mill Parties’ motions to dismiss for forum non conveniens. We grant mandamus relief and order the trial court to dismiss the Real Parties’ claims against the Grayson Mill Parties under the FNC doctrine.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Real Parties were badly injured in a wellsite explosion in Williston, North Dakota in 2023. A third employee, Ethan Gibney, was also injured in this explosion, and he filed suit against the Grayson Mill Parties in North Dakota. The Real Parties filed suit in Harris County, Texas against Grayson Mill Operating, LLC and Grayson Mill Energy, LLC in January 2024. Those two defendants filed a motion to dismiss on FNC grounds on June 4, 2024. On September 18, 2024, the Real Parties added another defendant, Grayson Mill Williston, LLC, which filed its own FNC motion on October 28, 2024. The Real Parties asserted that the trial court should deny the FNC motions based on the Texas-resident exception and based on a balancing of the six factors under section 71.051(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051(b) (West, Westlaw through 2025 2nd C.S.). On December 5, 2024, Judge Mike Engelhart denied the FNC motions, without specifying whether his denial was based on the Texas-resident exception or on a balancing of the six factors under section 71.051(b). Thus, the trial court impliedly denied the FNC motions on both grounds. See Douglas v. Redmond, No. 14-12-00259-CV, 2012 WL 5921200, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 27, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Judge Engelhart's term ended on December 31, 2024, and the Respondent assumed the bench on January 1, 2025. All of the Grayson Mill Parties filed “Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens” (“Motion to Reconsider”), which the Respondent heard and denied on June 25, 2025, without specifying any basis for the denial of the motion. Thus, the Respondent also impliedly determined that reconsideration should be denied on the ground that it was proper to deny the FNC motions based on either the Texas-resident exception or on a balancing of the six factors under section 71.051(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See id. The Grayson Mill Parties have filed a mandamus petition seeking to overturn the denial of their FNC motions.

II. Issues and Analysis

Because there is no adequate remedy by appeal when a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens is erroneously denied, mandamus relief is available if the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying the motion. In re Weatherford Int'l, LLC, 688 S.W.3d 874, 879 (Tex. 2024). “As a general rule, the forum non conveniens decision is committed to the trial court's sound discretion and may be set aside only for a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting In re Mahindra USA, Inc., 549 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2018)) (internal quotations omitted). Texas recognizes two types of forum non conveniens analyses. Statutory forum non conveniens applies to personal-injury or wrongful-death actions. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051(i) (West, Westlaw through 2025 2nd C.S.); In re Weatherford Int'l, LLC, 688 S.W.3d at 879. Common-law forum non conveniens applies in all other types of actions. See In re Weatherford Int'l, LLC, 688 S.W.3d at 879. We apply the statute to the Real Parties’ personal-injury claims.

Under the statute if a trial court finds that in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties a claim or action would be more properly heard in a forum outside Texas, “the court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens and shall stay or dismiss the claim or action.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051(b). When all factors weigh in favor of a claim being heard in a forum outside Texas, the trial court clearly abuses its discretion by denying a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. See In re Weatherford Int'l, LLC, 688 S.W.3d at 880. However, “if the plaintiff is a legal resident of [Texas]” the court may not stay or dismiss a plaintiff's claim under section 71.051(b) (“Texas-resident exception”). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051(e) (West, Westlaw through 2025 2nd C.S.).

A. Did the trial court clearly abuse its discretion by impliedly determining that it was proper to deny the FNC motions because the Texas-resident exception applies?

A trial court may not stay or dismiss a plaintiff's claim under section 71.051(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code “if the plaintiff is a legal resident of [Texas].” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051(e). Under their second issue the Grayson Mill Parties argue that the Texas-resident exception applies only to plaintiffs who are legal residents of Texas at the time of the incident giving rise to their injury or at the time they file suit.¹ The Real Parties argue that the Texas-resident exception applies to plaintiffs who are Texas residents when the trial court rules on the FNC motion. In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. See Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). If possible, we must ascertain that intent from the language the Legislature used in the statute and not look to extraneous matters for an intent the statute does not state. Id. If the meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, we adopt the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision's words. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997). We must not engage in forced or strained construction; instead, we must yield to the plain sense of the words the Legislature chose. See id.

The term “legal resident of [Texas]” is not defined in section 71.051 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051. Therefore, courts must give this term its “common, ordinary meaning unless a more precise definition is apparent from the statutory context or the plain meaning yields an absurd result.” Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018). In determining a term's common, ordinary meaning, courts usually start by examining dictionary definitions. Id. In today's case the Real Parties do not contend that either of them was a legal resident of Texas on or before the date that suit was filed. In addition, whatever the common, ordinary meaning of the term “legal resident of [Texas]” may be, that meaning would not address the point in time at which courts determine whether a plaintiff is a “legal resident of [Texas].” In this context, we need not and do not address what the common, ordinary meaning of this term is.

Section 71.051 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code is silent as to when courts should gauge a plaintiff's residency for purposes of the Texas-resident exception. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051. The parties have not cited and research has not revealed a case from the Supreme Court of Texas or from this court that addresses this issue. The determination of the second issue turns on the legal standard: when is legal residency to be determined for the purposes of the Texas-resident exception? “A trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to apply a statutory requirement properly because courts have no discretion in determining what the law is or applying it to the facts.” In re Chefs’ Produce of Houston, Inc., 667 S.W.3d 297, 300 (Tex. 2023). If the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard in deciding when residency is determined for the purposes of the Texas-resident exception, that would constitute an abuse of discretion. See id.

There is no question but that the Real Parties were not residents of Texas when the accident occurred. Real party in interest Fool's affidavit states that his apartment lease in Williston expired on July 31, 2024. Fool states that he suffered second and third degree burns over 42% of his body, that Williston lacked adequate medical facilities for burns, and he decided to move to Houston to avail himself of the Texas Medical Center. He signed a lease in Iowa Colony, Texas on July 24, 2024, and lived there as of the date of his affidavit.

Real party in interest Ledger's affidavit is somewhat similar. He too suffered severe burns that covered more than 34% of his body. Although he doesn't state where he lived prior to the accident, he implies that he lived in Delta, Colorado. He too decided to receive medical care at Texas Medical Center. On September 5, 2024, he executed a lease for an apartment in Katy, Texas where he lived as of the date of his affidavit.

Everyone agrees that neither of the Real Parties was a resident of Texas when the accident occurred or when suit was filed. The record is a bit murkier with respect to residency when the FNC motions were filed. Neither of the Real Parties was a Texas resident when the first two Grayson Mill entities filed their FNC motion on June 4, 2024. When the third entity, Grayson Mill Williston, LLC filed its FNC motion on October 28, 2024, both of the Real Parties had moved to Texas. And, of course, both of the Real Parties were Texas residents when the trial court denied the FNC motions.

There are at least four possible points at which residency could be determined for the purposes of the Texas-resident exception:

1. When the accident occurred;

2. When suit is filed;

3. When the FNC motion is filed; or

4. When the FNC motion is ruled on.

The Real Parties argue that number 4 is the applicable test, i.e., when the FNC motion is ruled on. The Grayson Mill Parties argue that either number 1 or 2 is the applicable test, i.e., either when the accident occurred or when suit is filed. No one is arguing that when the FNC motion is filed is the proper test.²

There is not a great deal of authority deciding the proper test of residency for the purposes of the Texas-resident exception. However, in Owens Corning v. Carter, the Supreme Court of Texas certainly suggested that the proper test for residency is when the lawsuit is filed. See 997 S.W.2d 560, 577 (Tex. 1999). In that case, five non-resident plaintiffs brought personal injury claims alleging asbestos exposure. See id. at 565. The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of various statutes including section 71.052 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (now repealed) which dealt with asbestos claims. See id. at 568–84. Section 71.052 had a forum non conveniens provision and also contained an exception for Texas residents: section 71.052(a)(1) provided that section 71.052 applies only if “the plaintiff was not a resident of this state at the time the claim arose.” Id. at 577. The court observed, however, that “unlike ․ section[ ] 71.051, the plain language of section 71.052 makes no distinction between residents and nonresidents at the time of filing.” Id. The court went on to say that “section 71.052 is plain: a plaintiff's residence at the time of filing is simply not a consideration under section 71.052. Had the Legislature intended Texas resident plaintiffs to be immune from dismissal, it could have included such language in section 71.052, as it did in section[ ] 71.051(e).” Id. at 577–78. The Supreme Court of Texas thus implied that section 71.051(e) referred to a plaintiff's residency at the time suit is filed. See id.

In Lopez v. Fluor Corporation, the Fifth Court of Appeals, relying on Owens Corning, ruled that residency is to be determined at the time suit is filed:

Appellants suggest the relevant time period for assessing legal residency is some time after filing suit, but appellants offer no supporting authority. We have found no according support. To the contrary–for forum non conveniens purposes–we evaluate whether a plaintiff was a “legal resident” of Texas “at the time of filing.”

No. 05-19-00970-CV, 2022 WL 1222823, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Real Parties argue that the statements in Owens Corning and Lopez are obiter dicta. Even if that is the case, the Real Parties point to no case holding that the Texas-resident exception is triggered if the Real Parties move to Texas subsequent to the time the accident occurred and subsequent to filing suit.

If the Texas-resident exception applied when a plaintiff moves to Texas after the accident and after suit is filed, there is the potential for mischief. A plaintiff could wait to see if an FNC motion is filed and then quickly move to Texas to avoid application of the FNC statute. As the Grayson Mill Parties note, if the time of deciding the FNC motion is the applicable standard, a defendant would want the trial court to rule quickly on the FNC motion while the plaintiff would try to delay hearing the FNC motion until plaintiff had time to gather his things and move to Texas. But the test advocated by the Real Parties could cut against a plaintiff. Suppose a plaintiff had lived in Orange, Texas his entire life but was working in Louisiana where the accident occurred. If the plaintiff continued to live in Orange when suit was filed, but moved to Lake Charles, Louisiana a week before the trial court ruled on the FNC motion to care for his dying mother, would anyone seriously contend that the Texas-resident exception was inapplicable? Nevertheless, the test argued by the Real Parties—that residency under section 71.051(e) is decided at the time the FNC motion is ruled on—would dictate that result.

An analogous situation is the determination of residency for purpose of federal diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. Federal district courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ․ citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “It has long been the case that ‘the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought.’ ” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570, 124 S.Ct. 1920, 158 L.Ed.2d 866 (2004) (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539, 22 U.S. 537, 6 L.Ed. 154 (1824)). For more than two centuries, the Supreme Court of the United States has adhered to the time-of-filing rule, i.e., diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction is determined at the time suit is filed. “This time-of-filing rule is hornbook law (quite literally) taught to first-year law students in any basic course on federal civil procedure.” Grupo, 541 U.S. at 570–71, 124 S.Ct. 1920 (footnote omitted). The fact that the parties’ citizenship may change during the pendency of the suit does not affect diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. “Jurisdiction is unaffected by subsequent changes in the citizenship of the parties.” Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1112, 1 L.Ed.2d 1205 (1957); Clarke v. Mathewson, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 164, 171, 9 L.Ed. 1041 (1838); Morgan's Heirs v. Morgan, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 290, 297, 4 L.Ed. 242 (1817)). The Grupo court noted that the time-of-filing rule eliminates “[u]ncertainty regarding the question of jurisdiction” and avoids judicial waste. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 582, 124 S.Ct. 1920. Moreover, the time-of-filing rule discourages manipulative behavior. Neff v. Bank of America, N.A., No. A-14-CV-00901-LY-ML, 2015 WL 3651484, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jun. 11, 2015).

Another analogous situation is the determination of whether a trial court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. The Supreme Court of Texas has concluded that a court determining an objection to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, whether based on specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction, may not consider a defendant's contacts with Texas that occurred after the date on which suit was filed. See PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 169–70 (Tex. 2007); see also Nguyen v. Desai, 132 S.W.3d 115, 118–19 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (addressing hypothetical in which defendants, who did not reside in Texas during first lawsuit against them in Texas in which the trial court sustained their special appearance, are sued in Texas again by the same plaintiff asserting the same claims after the defendants became Texas residents).

The Grayson Mill Parties assert that the Real Parties moved to Texas solely for the purpose of availing themselves of the Texas-resident exception. The Grayson Mill Parties point to no evidence of such manipulation except the suspicious timing of the Real Parties’ moves. The Real Parties, on the other hand, testified in their declarations that they moved to Texas to avail themselves of superior medical care at the Texas Medical Center. We presume for the purpose of this appeal that the Real Parties’ moves were legitimate and not manipulative. Nevertheless, their moves do not change the fact that they were not “legal residents” of Texas when either their claims arose or when suit was filed.

The Real Parties argue that a trial court must determine whether a plaintiff is a legal resident of Texas at the time of the trial court's ruling on the FNC motion because section 71.051(e) uses the present tense. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051(e) (stating that a trial court may not stay or dismiss a plaintiff's claim under section 71.051(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code “if the plaintiff is a legal resident of [Texas].”) (emphasis added). The Real Parties do not cite any case that supports this proposition. The diversity-of-citizenship statute uses the present tense, and yet for more than 200 years courts have determined diversity of citizenship as of the date suit was filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (stating that federal district courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ․ citizens of different States.”) (emphasis added); Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 570, 124 S.Ct. 1920. Likewise, the legal standards for specific and general jurisdiction are stated in the present tense, and yet a trial court determining whether it may exercise personal jurisdiction based on specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction may not consider a defendant's contacts with Texas that occurred after the date on which suit was filed. See State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 412–13 (Tex. 2023); PHC-Minden, L.P., 235 S.W.3d at 169–70. We do not find the Real Parties present-tense argument persuasive.

The Real Parties also argue that their statutory interpretation is reinforced by the fact that although the Texas Legislature could have done so, it did not expressly state in section 71.051 that the statute does not apply if the plaintiff is a legal resident of Texas when suit was filed or when the plaintiff's claim accrued. But the Texas Legislature also could have expressly stated in section 71.051 that the statute does not apply if the plaintiff is a legal resident of Texas when the trial court rules on the FNC motion. The absence of an express statement does not weigh in favor of either side's statutory interpretation.

The diversity-of-citizenship and personal-jurisdiction rules encourage certainty and discourage manipulation. The only standard under section 71.051(e) that cannot be manipulated is to define legal residency at the time the claims accrued, or, in this case, at the time of the accident. Even if legal residency is determined at the time of filing, the plaintiff could still manipulate residency by waiting to file the lawsuit until he had moved to Texas and firmly established roots here. However, we need not delve into that possibility at this time since neither of the Real Parties were legal residents of Texas when the accident occurred or when suit was filed. We conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by impliedly determining that it was proper to deny the FNC motions because the Texas-resident exception applies. See In re Chefs’ Produce of Houston, Inc., 667 S.W.3d at 300; Lopez, 2022 WL 1222823, at *6–7. We sustain the second issue.

B. Did the trial court clearly abuse its discretion by impliedly determining that it was proper to deny the FNC motions based on the six factors under section 71.051(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code?

In this mandamus proceeding the Real Parties rely solely on the Texas-resident exception and do not argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Grayson Mill Parties’ FNC motions under section 71.051(b). However, in the trial court below, the Real Parties briefly argued that the six section 71.051(b) factors support denial of the FNC motion. Because as a matter of law the Texas-resident exception does not apply, in determining whether to grant the Grayson Mill Parties’ motions to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the trial court was required to consider whether:

(1) an alternate forum exists in which the claim or action may be tried;

(2) the alternate forum provides an adequate remedy;

(3) maintenance of the claim or action in the courts of this state would work a substantial injustice to the moving party;

(4) the alternate forum, as a result of the submission of the parties or otherwise, can exercise jurisdiction over all the defendants properly joined to the plaintiff's claim;

(5) the balance of the private interests of the parties and the public interest of the state predominate in favor of the claim or action being brought in an alternate forum, which shall include consideration of the extent to which an injury or death resulted from acts or omissions that occurred in this state; and

(6) the stay or dismissal would not result in unreasonable duplication or proliferation of litigation.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051(b). Because section 71.051(b) uses the word “shall,” it “requires dismissal of the claim or action if the statutory factors weigh in favor of the claim or action being more properly heard in a forum outside Texas.” In re Weatherford Int'l, LLC, 688 S.W.3d at 880 (quoting In re General Elect., Co., 271 S.W.3d 681, 686 (Tex. 2008)) (internal quotations omitted). No single factor is dispositive. See In re Weatherford Int'l, LLC, 688 S.W.3d at 880. When all factors weigh in favor of a claim being heard in a forum outside Texas, the trial court clearly abuses its discretion by denying a motion to dismiss on FNC grounds. See id.

Under their third issue, the Grayson Mill Parties argue that all six factors favor dismissing the Real Parties’ claims on the basis of FNC. In support of their motions, the Grayson Mill Parties argued:

• Both Ledger and Fool were employed by Apex Well Servicing (USA), Inc. (“Apex”);

• Apex is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Canada;

• Williston, North Dakota is Apex's sole United States location;

• A third individual, Ethan Gibney, a resident of North Dakota, was also employed by Apex and was injured in the same accident;

• Gibney has filed suit in North Dakota and that suit is pending;

• The Real Parties and Gibney allege in their suits that the Grayson Mill Parties hired Truman Hackmann to supervise the North Dakota wellsite;

• Hackmann was not an employee of any of the Grayson Mill Parties; rather he was affiliated with Decca Energy, an independent contractor that Grayson Mill Operating hired to supervise the location;

• Hackmann is a resident of Montana;

• Hackmann was a witness to the accident;

• Grayson Mill Operating entered into a Master Service Agreement with Apex; Apex was to control, direct, manage and supervise the work performed at the wellsite;

• Apex conducted a preliminary investigation of the cause of the blowout;

• Shortly after the blowout, representatives of the Real Parties, Apex, Decca and various experts inspected the wellsite;

• Various pieces of equipment were collected and are being stored in Williston, North Dakota; and

• The Real Parties’ disclosures identified eleven North Dakota-based individuals (police and first responders) with knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the accident, four Apex employees, Gibney, and numerous other employees of the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources, North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance, and OSHA.

In opposition to the FNC motion, the Real Parties argued that the Grayson Mill Parties directed the operations in Williston from their Houston headquarters. The sole piece of evidence supplied by the Real Parties supporting that contention is a two page email shortly before the accident from a Grayson Mill employee approving the workover to replace a stuck pump with a new and different pump.

With respect to the six factors, the Real Parties did not even argue below with respect to the first, second, fourth, and sixth factors. There can be no question but that

• North Dakota is an alternate forum in which the Real Parties’ claims may be tried (first factor);

• North Dakota provides an adequate remedy (second factor);

• North Dakota can exercise jurisdiction over all the defendants (fourth factor); and

• Dismissal of the Texas suit would not result in unnecessary duplication or proliferation (sixth factor).

Thus, the first, second, fourth, and sixth factors favor dismissal. That leaves only the third and fifth factors.

The third factor, the substantial injustice factor, considers the location of documents, evidence and witnesses. See In re Greyhound Lines, Inc., 718 S.W.3d 250, 259 (Tex. 2025); In re Mantle Oil & Gas, LLC, 426 S.W.3d 182, 192 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding). Here, the sole Texas witness identified by the Real Parties is the author of the email described above. There are dozens of witnesses located in North Dakota, as well as the physical pieces of equipment retrieved in the wellsite inspection. Additionally, the Gibney lawsuit is being litigated in North Dakota. If the FNC motions are not granted, the Grayson Mill Parties will be required to litigate substantially similar suits in two different jurisdictions. The third factor favors dismissal.

The fifth factor involves balancing the public interests of the state and the private interests of the parties. This factor “shall include consideration of the extent to which an injury or death resulted from acts or omissions that occurred in this state.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051(b)(5).

“Generally, the public interest factors to be considered are administrative difficulties related to court congestion, burdening the people of a community with jury duty when they have no relation to the litigation, local interest in having localized controversies decided at home, and trying a case in the forum that is at home with the law that governs the case.” In re General Elect., Co., 271 S.W.3d 681, 691 (Tex. 2008). In the trial court below, the Real Parties asserted that Texas has an interest in this case since the workover was approved by the Grayson Mill Parties in Texas. This case is not unlike In re Mantle Oil & Gas, LLC. See 426 S.W.3d at 185–98. In the Mantle Oil case, the plaintiffs argued that, even though the accident happened in another state, Mantle Oil made decisions regarding the operation of the well from its Texas headquarters and thus “Texas courts and juries have a significant interest in how [Mantle Oil] operates as a business.” Id. at 195 (internal quotations omitted). Nevertheless, our sister court determined that Louisiana had a stronger interest in adjudicating disputes arising out of the blowout of a well in Louisiana and thus the balance of the public interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal. Id. at 196. The same holds true here. North Dakota has a substantial interest in making sure that its workers are not harmed by oil and gas operations in North Dakota. See In re XTO Energy, Inc., No. 01-17-00652-CV, 2018 WL 2246216, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 17, 2018, orig. proceeding) (stating that “North Dakota's interest in the safety of individuals who are working within its borders and the conduct of companies doing business in the state is stronger than any interest Texas may have in this lawsuit simply because the corporate defendants are located in Houston.”) (mem. op.). The balance of the public interests weighs in favor of dismissal.

The private interests also support dismissal. “The private interest considerations generally are considered to be the ease of access to proof, the availability and cost of compulsory process, the possibility of viewing the premises, if appropriate, and other practical problems that make trial easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.” In re General Elec. Co., 271 S.W.3d at 691. Here, the ease of access to proof weighs in favor of dismissal since the vast majority of witnesses and the equipment retrieved from the well site are located in North Dakota. The balance of the private interests of the parties and the public interest of the state favors dismissal. See id.

Because each of the six factors favors dismissal, we conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by impliedly determining that it was proper to deny the FNC motions based on the six factors under section 71.051(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See In re Greyhound Lines, Inc., 718 S.W.3d at 257–61; In re Weatherford Int'l, LLC, 688 S.W.3d at 880. We sustain the third issue.³

III. Conclusion

The Respondent clearly abused her discretion by impliedly determining that reconsideration should be denied on the ground that it was proper to deny the FNC motions based on either the Texas-resident exception or on a balancing of the six factors under section 71.051(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by (1) denying the Motion to Reconsider (2) failing to grant the Grayson Mill Parties’ FNC motions, and (3) failing to dismiss all of the Real Parties’ claims in the trial court under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Grayson Mill Parties have no adequate remedy at law. Thus, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, and we direct the Respondent to (1) vacate the order denying the Motion to Reconsider, and (2) issue an order granting the Grayson Mill Parties’ FNC motions and dismissing all of the Real Parties’ claims in the trial court under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. We are confident the Respondent will act in accordance with this opinion. The writ of mandamus will issue only if the Respondent fails to do so.

CONCURRING OPINION

I concur with the court's opinion. It is undisputed that the time at which residency is to be determined for purposes of current Section 71.051(e) is a matter of first impression. I write separately to address a point briefed by the real parties — the Legislature could have easily added language that Section 71.051 does not apply if the plaintiff is a legal resident of Texas at the time of filing or at the time the claim accrues. Here, it did not do so. See generally Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 508 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (“A court may not judicially amend a statute by adding words that are not contained in the language of the statute. Instead, it must apply the statute as written.”).

Notwithstanding the plain language (or lack thereof) of Section 71.051, a trial court's erroneous legal conclusion, even in an unsettled area of law, is an abuse of discretion. Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 927-28 (Tex. 1996). I agree that there is a “potential for mischief” if a plaintiff's residency is determined after the incident giving rise to the suit or after suit is filed.

Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Under the Grayson Mill Parties’ first issue they argue that even at the time of the trial court's ruling, the Real Parties were not “legal resident[s]” of Texas within the meaning of section 71.051(e) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code because they had only temporarily relocated to Texas in a transparent attempt to invoke the Texas-resident exception. We presume, without deciding, that this argument lacks merit and that the Real Parties became legal residents of Texas on the dates that they allege.

2.   This is not surprising since, if the test is when the FNC motion is filed, such a test would cut both ways. Relators Grayson Mill Operating, LLC and Grayson Mill Energy, LLC filed their FNC motion prior to the time that the Real Parties moved to Texas, whereas Grayson Mill Williston, LLC filed its FNC motion after the Real Parties moved to Texas.

3.   We need not and do not address the first issue.

Randy Wilson, Justice

(McLaughlin, J., concurring).