ANDRE WOODS JR v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2026)

OPINION

A jury found appellant, Andre Woods, guilty of the murder of Iris Franks and assessed punishment at ninety-nine years' confinement. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. In eight issues, Woods challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support that he knowingly or intentionally caused the victim's death in this case (issue 1); challenges the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide (issues 2 and 3); and challenges the trial court's admission of five autopsy photographs Woods claims were prejudicial (issues 4 through 8).

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A grand jury indicted Woods for murder. The indictment alleged that, on or about July 31, 2022, Woods intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Franks by stabbing her with a deadly weapon (a knife, a box cutter, or a sharp object). The case was tried to a jury.

A. Passerby Yarnesa Johnson

Yarnesa Johnson testified that on July 31, 2022, she was driving to work in the early morning when she saw a body lying in the road, so she stopped and called 911. As she awaited emergency personnel, she observed the body and noticed that it was “banged up.” According to Johnson, the body's “chest was laid open.” By Johnson's account, the body was so maimed she thought “it was a male because it was just cut open, really, really bad.” Upon inspection, she realized the body was that of a female. While she was on the stand, the State played Johnson's 911 call for the jury. In the call, Johnson is heard initially telling the 911 operator that the body was “a male,” but then she said, “Oh my God, no, it's a female.” Johnson told the 911 operator, “I don't think they are breathing.”

B. Sergeant Kristin Alvarado

Dallas Police Department Sergeant Kristin Alvarado was among emergency personnel that responded to the 911 dispatch early that morning. She arrived at the scene where Frank's body lay in the road. Sergeant Alvarado recalled that the body appeared to have cut marks on the neck and chest, the shirt was torn, and blood was on the body. Other officers arrived shortly after.

C. Officer Michael Ray Gonzales

Dallas Police Department Officer and Crime Scene Investigator Michael Ray Gonzales also arrived on scene. Because there were “massive” injuries to the body but very little blood on the scene, it was apparent to him that Franks had been injured somewhere else and that her body had been “dumped” where it was found. As he photographed the scene, Officer Gonzales noticed a handwritten motel receipt between the toes of Franks's right foot.

D. Motel Manager Timothy Fredenberg

Timothy Fredenberg, the manager of the nearby motel, identified the receipt found on Frank's body as associated with the motel and with Woods. Fredenberg identified Woods in open court as a person who stayed at the motel beginning on or before July 21, 2022, and paid through August 3, 2022. Fredenberg said there are video cameras at the motel.

E. Detective Ronald Kramer

Dallas Police Department Homicide Detective Ronald Kramer testified that he spoke with Fredenberg and confirmed the number of the motel room associated with the receipt, and that the occupant provided Woods's driver's license. According to Detective Kramer, as he approached the room to investigate, he could “smell an overpowering odor” of bleach, and he noted bleach stains outside the door of the room. Detective Kramer took pictures of the room which were published to the jury. While at the hotel, Detective Kramer saw Woods driving his vehicle into the parking lot. By Detective Kramer's account, Woods looked “directly at” him and other officers, and “quickly circled the motel parking lot and drove out onto the service road.” From there, Detective Kramer said that he and fellow officers pursued Woods and radioed for uniformed patrol officers to assist in making a stop. By Detective Kramer's account, when Woods passed a marked patrol vehicle that had responded to the call, Woods accelerated, attempted to turn, lost control of his vehicle, and “slammed into the guardrail,” jamming “his vehicle up against the guardrail where it was inoperable.”

Detective Kramer said that he detected an “overpowering smell of bleach” emitting from Woods' vehicle when he approached, “before we ever really even got close to it.”¹

Detective Kramer reviewed video captured from the motel's surveillance cameras showing that Woods and Franks parked at the motel around 4:20 a.m., the couple walked toward the entrance of the motel room, and about “30 minutes later [Woods can be seen] carrying [Franks's] body out.” Detective Kramer described contents of video (as well as video stills) played for the jury from the motel's security system. According to Detective Kramer, Woods can be seen dropping Franks's body as he dragged her body to his car, putting her body on the hood of the vehicle, opening the passenger side door of his vehicle, removing a shirt from Franks's body, draping the shirt over his car seat, and apparently placing Franks's body in his vehicle. Detective Kramer further described how Woods went back to the room, retrieved a purse and other personal items, and placed them in the vehicle. According to the time stamp on the video, Woods was in the motel parking lot just before 4:25 a.m. At 4:25 a.m., Woods “backed up and then left the location with the victim in his vehicle.”

Detective Kramer stated that the video further showed that roughly 30 to 35 minutes after Woods left, Woods returned to the motel and went back into his motel room. From there, Woods went back and forth between his room and vehicle and placed more items in the vehicle's trunk. Nearly an hour after he returned, Woods drove away from the motel.

F. Crime Scene Analyst Syndee Thornburg

Crime scene analyst Syndee Thornburg investigated areas at the motel on the morning of Woods's arrest. Thornburg said that she first focused on blood and a piece of an earring found in the parking lot as well as a blood trail leading up onto the sidewalk. Thornburg then moved her investigation into the motel room. According to Thornburg, the room was in a disheveled state. Thornburg collected different items from the room including socks, a grocery bag, an e-cigarette, and a butter knife. Thornburg also photographed the room. The photographs, depicting the state of the room including scattered blood-drop stains, bleach stains, and a white substance on the carpet, were published for the jury as Thornburg described the contents of the photographs. Some of the photographs showed what appeared to be blood stains on the door frame, on the walls of the room, on parts of the bed, and on the room's refrigerator and microwave. One photograph showed that police found a piece of paper, titled “Employee Report Card,” that appeared to have droplets of blood on it and that also had the name “Andre Woods” on it.

Thornburg testified that she took buccal swabs of Woods's saliva while he was in the hospital and photographed injuries to Woods's hands. Thornburg also photographed the interior and exterior of Woods's vehicle. According to Thornburg, possible blood drops and a white substance were found throughout Woods's vehicle that were similar to blood and a white substance found in the motel room. Receipts linking Woods to his motel room and appearing to have blood stains on them were also found in Woods's vehicle. Thornburg also described other items found in Woods's trunk, including a mattress cover, sheets, and clothing that appeared to have blood on them and Franks's purse with correspondence addressed to Franks inside. Thornburg described photographs of the trunk's interior showing further blood stains.

Thornburg described items found in the motel room and Woods's car that Thornburg said were capable of causing serious bodily injury or death: a butter knife, two box cutters, and a screwdriver.

G. Medical Examiner Dr. Grant Herndon

Dallas County Medical Examiner Dr. Grant Herndon testified. Herndon performed the autopsy on Franks's body. While Herndon testified, the State utilized photographs from the autopsy as demonstratives as Herndon described what he found. According to Herndon, Franks had suffered two “sharp force injuries,” one to her neck and another to her chest. As to the neck injury, Herndon said that the cut spanned “pretty much the entire width of her neck, and that it cut through multiple muscles.” Specifically, Franks had been cut through her jugular vein, her trachea, and esophagus. Herndon said that he found two fragments of “a metal-cutting implement wedged within the trachea” of Franks's neck and the fragments were consistent with what could have been a box cutter. Herndon opined that the injury to Franks's neck would have been fatal. When asked whether the injuries would have been caused by the same instrument, Herndon said, “Can be, yes.”

Herndon also described bruising and scrapes to Franks's face. In addition to these blunt force injuries, Herndon said that Franks's autopsy revealed scrapes, bruising, and lacerations to her nose, eyes, lips, and neck. Herndon said that these bruises indicated either strangulation or blunt force trauma and that there had been more than one impact to Franks's face in various areas. Herndon said that x-rays of Franks's body showed two spots in her neck that were fragments of “whatever cutting implement” had been used.

I. Defendant's trial testimony

Woods testified in his defense. Woods began by testifying that he had mental capacity issues including bipolar disorder and that the cause of this disorder was that he had been shot in the head when he was younger. As a result, according to Woods, he lived his life “paranoid,” he suffered extreme insomnia, and he typically “couldn't be around anybody.” Woods said that he had been drinking alcohol all day on the day leading up to the murder and that he had driven from the motel to run an errand when he encountered Franks and she got into his car. Woods indicated that he had picked up Franks to pay for sex. Once back in his room, he and Franks discussed payment. According to Woods, when he showed Franks the contents of his wallet, she indicated that he did not have enough money, and this led to a “disagreement.”

Woods testified he then asked her to leave, and Franks asked him to drop her off somewhere. He declined, and “that's when she started to act out” and “she kind of started swinging on” him. Woods agreed with counsel's questioning that he felt threatened. Woods said that from there he pulled out a box cutter from his pocket. According to Woods, Franks then tried to wrestle the box cutter from him, and the two of them ended up on the ground with Woods on top of Franks. Woods said that he first “cut her chest” while the two wrestled for the box cutter. Franks then fell to the floor, and according to Woods, he then “kind of went for the throat” by “slicing her ․ more than once.” Woods agreed that he had “lost control” when he attacked Franks. He also agreed to the State's question that he was “in full control” the second time he cut her while he was on top of her on the floor. Woods also said that at some point during the struggle, he hit Franks multiple times. Upon realizing Franks was dead, Woods said that he panicked, picked Franks up, and took her body to his car. From there, Woods said that he dumped Franks's body and returned to the room to clean it.

Woods testified he drove back to the motel and saw the police, so he turned back around and entered the freeway. Woods said that as police pursued him, he tried to “pull off a stunt and drive fast and get off on the first exit,” and that was when he wrecked his vehicle.

Woods agreed that he gave a different story of the events in his recorded statement to police, including stating that he had punched Franks multiple times ² before drawing the box cutter from his pocket. Woods also agreed that he told investigators that he was being “aggressive” because he wanted Franks out of his room. Woods said that at the time police interviewed him, he was intoxicated.

Woods made several concessions as he testified at trial. Woods said that after he knew Franks was dead, he had gone for a drive to reflect because he was “scared.” Woods admitted that he later dumped Franks's body and returned to clean up the motel room with bleach, wrap Franks's things into bags, and place them in his trunk. Woods also admitted that he attempted to evade police when they pursued him after he had returned to the motel. Woods testified that the actions he took after Franks had died, including evading police and cleaning up the motel room, where all done with the purpose of hiding that he had killed her and because he did not want to go to jail for murder. Woods agreed that he was responsible for Franks's death but testified that he had done so because she had threatened him.

J. The indictment

The State indicted Woods for intentionally and knowingly causing the death of Franks by “stabbing deceased with a knife and box cutter and sharp object a deadly weapon,” and “further did unlawfully” intend to cause serious bodily injury to Franks by committing “an act clearly dangerous to human life, to-wit: by stabbing deceased with a knife and box cutter and sharp object, a deadly weapon, and did thereby cause the death of” Franks.

K. The Court's charge, jury verdict, and judgment

At the charge conference, the defense requested the jury to be instructed on manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. The trial court denied the inclusion of these lesser-included offenses, citing that they were inconsistent with a claim of self-defense. Consistent with the State's indictment, the court's charge to the jury was for felony murder. In the application paragraph of the jury charge, the jury was to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Woods had intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Franks by stabbing or cutting her with “a knife or box cutter or sharp object, a deadly weapon,” or the jury was to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Woods had committed an act clearly dangerous to human life by stabbing or cutting Franks with “a knife or box cutter or sharp object, a deadly weapon,” thereby causing Franks's death.

The Court's charge also instructed the jury on self-defense. Specifically, the jury was instructed that Woods would have been justified in using force against Franks if he had reasonably believed that the force was immediately necessary to protect himself against Franks's use or attempted use of unlawful force against him. The charge instructed that if the jury found that Woods had acted in self-defense, then the jury was to find that Woods was not guilty of felony murder.

The jury unanimously found Woods guilty of murder. After a punishment hearing and a punishment charge was delivered to the jury, the jury assessed punishment at ninety-nine years' confinement. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the evidence

In his first issue, Woods argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense of murder, specifically, that he intentionally or knowingly caused Franks's death or that he intended to cause her serious bodily injury. As discussed below, we disagree.

1. Legal sufficiency review

A criminal conviction must be based on legally sufficient evidence. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1979)). When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Witcher v. State, 638 S.W.3d 707, 709–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Further, an appellate court is required to defer to the jury's credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight assigned to their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Witcher, 638 S.W.3d at 710.

An appellate court will consider all evidence when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, properly or improperly admitted, or submitted by the prosecution or defense. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Moore v. State, 717 S.W.3d 660, 665 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2025, no pet.).

2. Murder and intent

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Tex. Penal Code § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist, and a person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b).

Intent to kill is a question of fact determined by the factfinder from all the facts and circumstances in evidence. Robledo v. State, No. 05-20-00109-CR, 2022 WL 2900969, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Direct evidence of the elements of the offense, including of the culpable mental state, is not required. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury is permitted to make reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial, and circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of the actor. Id. at 14–15. Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish guilt. Id. at 15.

3. The evidence is sufficient to prove Woods intended to murder Franks.

Woods argues that the only direct testimony of events came from Woods himself, and he denied intending to kill Franks or cause her serious bodily injury. But the jury could have reasonably inferred the requisite intentional or knowing intent from the circumstantial evidence.

As the State points out, Woods lied to the police, at one point stating that he had only broken Franks's nose; however, he admitted at trial that he had cut Franks's throat and chest. Moreover, Woods further lied to the police by claiming that he had hit Franks two or three times at most. But the autopsy revealed that Franks had suffered multiple blunt force injuries to numerous areas of her body. And Woods told the police later that he had hit Franks twenty to thirty times. These inconsistent statements involving lying to the police are circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Woods intentionally and knowingly murdered Franks. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“Attempts to conceal incriminating evidence, inconsistent statements, and implausible explanations to the police are probative of wrongful conduct and are also circumstances of guilt.”).

Further, the nature and extent of the egregious injuries to Franks reflected Woods's intent. The evidence at trial showed that there were wounds to Franks's neck that spanned the entire length of her neck and that her neck muscles, carotid artery, jugular vein, and trachea were cut through. Franks's esophagus was completely severed, and her cervical spine had been impacted, and metal fragments were lodged in her trachea. The severity of these injuries demonstrated Woods's intent. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (intent may be “inferred from the extent of the injuries and the relative size and strength of the parties,” including evidence that the defendant “slashed the deceased's throat, broke several of her ribs, inflicted several bruises and lacerations, and caused a subscapular hemorrhage”); Amy v. State, No. 05–01–00160–CR, 2003 WL 124825, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 6, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (reasoning that severity of injuries inflicted demonstrated that acts were done intentionally rather than negligently or recklessly); see also Lopez v. State, 672 S.W.3d 915, 923 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2023, pet. ref'd) (“Intent to kill may also be inferred from the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted on the victim.”).

Woods's attempts to dispose of Franks's body and clean the motel room of evidence of the murder (as shown by, among other things, the consistent presence of bleach stains found in both the motel room and in his vehicle) also are circumstantial evidence of his intentional and knowing murder. See Thurston v. State, 465 S.W.3d 255, 256–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (Keller, P.J., concurring) (“And although there were no eyewitnesses to the killing to contradict appellant's self-defense claim, his disposal of the body suggests consciousness of guilt.”); Barron v. State, 630 S.W.3d 392, 405 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref'd) (reasoning that attempts to clean up and tamper with the crime scene after shooting two people tended to show a consciousness of guilt). His attempt to flee from the police is additional circumstantial evidence of his intentional and knowing murder. See Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 487; see also Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting that a “fact finder may draw an inference of guilt from the circumstance of flight”); Wilkerson v. State, 881 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that a finding of intent to kill may be inferred from evidence of flight from the scene).

The cumulative force of this circumstantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Woods intentionally or knowingly caused Franks's death or intended to cause serious bodily injury to her and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life, causing her death. See Dismuke v. State, No. 05-04-01856-CR, 2006 WL 3200113, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 7, 2006, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (circumstantial evidence sufficient to support jury's verdict of murder).

We overrule Woods's first issue.

B. Lesser-included-offense instructions

In his second and third issues, Woods argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. The State counters that, because Woods argued at trial that he acted in self-defense when he killed Franks, he acted intentionally and was not entitled to instructions based on reckless or negligent conduct. We agree that the record does not show the trial court abused its discretion by denying Woods's requested instructions regarding the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide.

We review a trial judge's refusal to submit a lesser included offense instruction for abuse of discretion. Chavez v. State, 666 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); see Reedy v. State, No. 05-23-00130-CR, 2024 WL 4784399, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 14, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction turns on a two-part test. Chavez, 666 S.W.3d at 776. A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense if (1) the lesser-included offense is included within the proof necessary to establish the offense charged; and (2) there is some evidence in the record that would permit a jury to rationally find that, if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser-included offense (the “guilty-only” requirement). See id.; Safian v. State, 543 S.W.3d 216, 219–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

Woods sought, and the trial court refused, instructions regarding the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. The State does not dispute that in this case manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide meet the first prong establishing Woods's entitlement to the lesser-included-offense instructions, with proof of these lesser offenses of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide subsumed within proof of the offense of murder. See Poynter v. State, No. 05-19-00882-CR, 2021 WL 2070332, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Assuming, without deciding, manslaughter is a lesser included offense in this case ․”); Piedra v. State, No. 05-23-00522-CR, 2024 WL 4719145, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 8, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of murder because the only difference in the offenses is that the lesser culpable mental state of criminal negligence suffices to establish its commission.”). Accordingly, we only address whether Woods satisfies the second, guilty-only step of the two-part inquiry.

To satisfy the second step of the analysis “there must be evidence from which a rational jury could find the defendant guilty of only the lesser offense.” Chavez, 666 S.W.3d at 776 (citing Guzman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 185, 188–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). That is, “[t]he evidence must establish that the lesser-included offense is a valid, rational alternative to the charged offense.” Bullock v. State, 509 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In making this determination, we examine all the evidence admitted at trial and consider the entire record, and “a statement made by the defendant cannot be plucked out of the record and examined in a vacuum.” Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals instructs that this “guilty-only requirement is met if there is affirmative evidence of a factual dispute that raises the lesser offense and rebuts or negates other evidence establishing the greater offense.” Chavez, 666 S.W.3d at 776 (emphasis added).

The key distinction between manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide, as requested by Woods, and murder, as charged, is the required culpable mental state. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 6.03(a)-(d) (defining applicable mental states), 19.02(b) (offense of murder), 19.04 (offense of manslaughter), 19.05 (offense of criminally negligent homicide). A person commits murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual or intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b)(1), (2). A person commits the offense of manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. Id. § 19.04. A person commits the offense of criminally negligent homicide if he causes the death of an individual by criminal negligence. Id. § 19.05(a).

As for the applicable mental states,

(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to ․ a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to ․ cause the result.

(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to ․ a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

(c) A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to ․ the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the ․ result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

(d) A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to ․ the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk ․ or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

Id. at § 6.03(a)-(d).

Accordingly, to be entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, there must be evidence from which a rational jury could find that a defendant behaved recklessly, that is, in such a way that he was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk toward the victim but was not aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause the victim's death. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(b), (c). To be entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide, the record must contain some evidence from which a rational jury could find that the defendant ought to have, but did not, perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk from his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint, but, again, the defendant was not aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause the victim's death. Id. § 6.03(b), (d); see Piedra, 2024 WL 4719145, at *5.

At trial, Woods testified that his conduct was not “part [of a] big master plan” and that his “actions, like, were reckless” concerning “how [he] behaved that day.” On appeal, Woods argues that this testimony constitutes some evidence from which a rational jury could find that, if he is guilty, he is only guilty of manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide and not murder. We disagree. First, we note that evidence of his “actions that day” being reckless and his lacking a “master plan” does not constitute evidence that his specific conduct at issue was reckless or criminally negligent as opposed to intentional or knowing. Second, Woods's own testimony contradicts any finding of recklessness or criminal negligence as opposed to intentional or knowing conduct; that is, Woods's testimony only rationally supports the conclusion that, if he is guilty,³ he is guilty of murder and not manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide.

Woods testified that his actions were part of an active altercation with Franks wherein he claims that she “swung and I swung ․ the next thing you know ․ the knife comes to play,” she tried to wrestle the knife from him, and he acted in response. Woods agreed that Franks was killed by cuts or stabs from a box cutter, admitted that he “slashed” Franks with the box cutter, and argued that he did so in self-defense. Woods testified that he twice asked Woods to leave and she refused and, during this argument, he pulled a knife—a box cutter—from his pants pocket. Woods confirmed he was “swinging” the knife “around” and he expressly denied doing so “carelessly.” As he and Franks “started wrestling,” Woods testified he “kind of got angry.” Woods admits he punched Franks, “sliced” her chest, and got on top of her. Woods recounts that Franks tried to take control of the knife “[b]ut I had control of the knife too, and I ended up slicing her” on the neck. Although Woods states he had control of the knife “too,” he later affirmatively concedes he “had control of the knife the entire time” and was “in full control” when he was on top of Franks and “sliced” her neck.

Woods's account of what occurred is supported by medical examiner Herndon's testimony regarding multiple sharp forced injuries and cuts to Franks's jugular vein, trachea, and esophagus. Herndon's testimony further revealed that Franks's body had scrapes, bruises, and lacerations to her nose, eyes, lips, and neck consistent with either strangulation or blunt force trauma. Herndon's testimony of multiple slashing wounds and blunt-force blows is consistent with Woods's testimony that he acted intentionally and not recklessly or with criminally negligent behavior.

On this record we conclude that Woods fails the guilty-only step: there is no affirmative evidence before us that raises the lesser offense of manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide and rebuts or negates evidence establishing the greater offense of murder. See Chavez, 666 S.W.3d at 776. A rational jury could not conclude from this record that Woods acted recklessly or with criminally negligent intent—guilty only of manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide, and we overrule Woods's second and third issues.

C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing admission of autopsy photographs.

In his five remaining issues (issues four through eight), Woods argues that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling his Rule 403 objections and allowing the State to introduce five autopsy photographs depicting Franks's head and skull in various states of dissection. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the complained-of photographs.

We review the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of a photograph under an abuse of discretion standard and will not reverse the trial court's ruling unless it falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. McDade v. State, 613 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.) (citing Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)). Relevant evidence is admissible unless specifically prohibited. Tex. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Tex. R. Evid. 401. A trial court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 403. Rule 403 governs the admissibility of photographic evidence alleged to be unduly prejudicial. Emery v. State, 881 S.W.2d 702, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). “Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.” Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Only if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence should a reviewing court find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

A photograph should add something that is relevant, legitimate, and logical to the testimony that accompanies it and that assists the jury in its decision-making duties. Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 491–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Sometimes this will, incidentally, include elements that are emotional and prejudicial. Id. If there are elements of a photograph that are genuinely helpful to the jury in making its decision, the photograph is inadmissible only if the emotional and prejudicial aspects substantially outweigh the helpful aspects. Id.

Our analysis under rule 403 includes, but is not limited to, the following factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence, (2) the potential to impress the jury in some irrational yet indelible way, (3) the time needed to develop the evidence, and (4) the proponent's need for the evidence. Hernandez v. State, 390 S.W.3d 310, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Other rule 403 factors regarding photographic evidence include (5) the number of photographs offered, (6) their gruesomeness, (7) their detail, (8) their size, (9) whether they are in color or in black and white, (10) whether they are close-up, and (11) whether the body depicted is clothed or naked and whether the body has been altered since the crime in some way that might enhance the gruesomeness of the photograph to the defendant's detriment. Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 787; see also Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

Here, the five autopsy photographs that Woods complains of were photographs of a dissection of Franks's skull depicting a brain bleed and subdural hemorrhages. The photographs are in color and show Franks's head with the scalp retracted over her face or a portion of her skull removed. They also show her brain exposed and areas where bleeding had occurred beneath her scalp. One of the photographs showed bleeding on the muscles that worked her jaw.

The photographs were relevant to the State's case of rebutting Woods's claims that he had acted in self-defense, and they were relevant to show the State's case that Woods intentionally and knowingly murdered Franks given, in part, the repetition and severity of the injuries Woods inflicted. As the State points out, Woods was on trial for murder, and images of death and the tragedy of that death are part of a murder trial. The photographs' potential to impress the jury in some irrational and indelible way was minimal when placed against the backdrop of the other evidence of the murder in this case, Woods's own conduct, and the gruesome circumstances surrounding the murder.

The photographs were the size of standard paper (8.5 by 11 inches). The supporting witness, Medical Examiner Herndon, addressed the photographs in less than three pages of straightforward testimony as part of a several-volume trial transcript. While the photographs are undoubtedly powerful, that power is drawn more from the nature of the gruesome conduct the jury was called to assess than the photographs themselves. See Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“The photographs are gruesome in that they depict disagreeable realities, but they depict nothing more than the reality of the brutal crime committed.”). Though the photographs are in color, there is nothing in the nature that Woods has pointed out that would make that a relevant factor in determining whether they are overly prejudicial. Even though the photographs are close-up images of Franks's brain and portions of her exposed skull, the details present in the photographs were relevant to the State's case that Woods had murdered Franks rather than defended himself from her attack, showing the repetition and severity of Woods's blows and cuts. And the photographs totaled only five in number.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the complained-of photographs into evidence. See Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting twenty-three autopsy photographs of the unclothed deceased three-year-old victim depicting over 200 contusions and lacerations and additional internal autopsy examination photographs depicting the child's cracked ribs, fractured skull, and brain injuries that could not be seen from the external photographs); Tex. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we overrule Woods's issues four through eight.

III. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Woods's eight issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Dallas Police Department Officer Michael Marston also testified at trial. Officer Marston was the first officer to approach Woods's vehicle after Woods crashed into the railing. Officer Marston testified that he smelled bleach as he approached Woods's vehicle.

2.   Regarding the number of times he hit Franks, Woods's story varied. He admitted at times at trial that he had told investigators that he had hit Franks “20 to 30” times but at other times he stated that he hit Franks “less than 20” times. As to the magnitude of his punches, Woods said that he hit Franks “hard enough to hit.” He also agreed that he had hit Franks hard enough to cause the injuries found during the autopsy of Franks's body, including hematomas to her brain caused by blunt force trauma and two black eyes.

3.   Woods argued at trial that he acted in self defense. The trial court provided a self-defense instruction. On appeal, Woods does not challenge the self-defense instruction given by the trial court or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict as to self defense.

GINO J. ROSSINI JUSTICE