TATUM v. NOBLE (2026)

OPINION

Wonisha Tatum appeals the default protective order obtained against her by Daphne Noble. Although most of Tatum's issues rest on factual assertions that are not supported by the record, one issue requires us to answer a question of law arising from an unusual factual scenario. Tatum was served with notice that the application for protective order would be heard in the 280th District Court at a certain date and time, but after the case was called, the trial judge recused herself sua sponte and the case was transferred to the 245th District Court, where the hearing continued. Although Tatum did not appear in either court, she contends that the 245th District Court erred in rendering a default protective order against her because she had no notice of the hearing before that court. We conclude that Tatum, having already failed to appear at the hearing for which she had been formally served with notice, was not required to be formally served with a new notice that the same hearing would be reconvened in a different court. We overrule this issue, and all other issues preserved for appellate review, and we affirm the trial court's order.

I. Background

On April 11, 2025, Noble filed an application for a protective order against Tatum in the 280th District Court of Harris County. Three days later, the presiding judge, the Honorable Damiane D. Curvey, signed a temporary ex parte protective order setting the hearing for 9:00 a.m. on May 2, 2025. Tatum was served on April 24, 2025, and the documents served notified her to appear for the hearing before 280th District Court.

Tatum then filed a judicial complaint against Judge Curvey, but did not move to recuse her.

When the case was called for hearing, Tatum failed to appear. Nevertheless, Judge Curvey did not render a default judgment against Tatum but instead voluntarily recused herself to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Judge Curvey asked the Honorable Susan Brown, Presiding Judge of the Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, to assign another judge to hear the case. Judge Brown transferred the case to the 245th District Court, the Honorable Angela Lancelin presiding. The hearing then moved to Judge Lancelin's courtroom. After confirming that Tatum had failed to appear, Judge Lancelin asked her bailiff to step outside the courtroom and call Tatum's name “just to ensure that the 280th has not directed her over here and that she has gotten lost.” After the bailiff called Tatum's name three times without a response, Judge Lancelin proceeded with the hearing. Noble testified and offered documentary evidence in support of her application, and Judge Lancelin signed a default protective order granting Noble the relief she requested.

Tatum filed a motion to stay enforcement of the protective order, timely followed by a motion set aside the protective order entirely. In both motions, Tatum asserted that she was improperly served in the case, but she identified no improprieties. In the latter motion, which is in substance a motion for new trial, Tatum additionally argued that she was denied the opportunity to appear and defend herself because she had no notice of the hearing. Tatum offered no evidence in support of either motion.

The trial court allowed the motion for new trial to be overruled by operation of law, and Tatum timely appealed.

II. Issues Presented

Tatum, who appears pro se, lists eight appellate issues and discusses a ninth issue in the “facts” section of her brief. We have reordered the issues to first address jurisdictional issues, followed by Tatum's due-process complaints, then her issues concerning obstruction of access to the courts, and finally, her miscellaneous allegations of misconduct.

As reordered, Tatum argues that the default protective order must be reversed for the following reasons: (a) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Noble's application for a protective order was materially incomplete; (b) the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Tatum because she was improperly served; (c) rendition of a default protective order violated Tatum's due-process rights because she had no notice of the hearing; (d) the trial court violated appellate deadlines and Tatum's right to due process and by failing to serve her with a copy of the protective order; (e) a temporary protective order unlawfully obstructed her constitutional right of access to the courts; (f) a court clerk “obstructed [Tatum's] access to appeal by providing false contact information in two separate appeals”; (g) Tatum was denied a fair trial due to judicial bias and improper influence; (h) she was denied a fair trial due to fraud on the court; and (i) Noble has engaged in a pattern of harassment, defamation, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution.

III. Jurisdictional Issues

We begin our analysis, as we must, with Tatum's challenges to the trial court's jurisdiction. Her first issue concerns the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction and her second issue concerns personal jurisdiction.

Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court's power to hear a particular type of lawsuit, while personal jurisdiction refers to the court's power to bind a particular party. CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding). Both are essential to a court's authority to render a binding judgment. Id. Whether a trial court has subject-matter and personal jurisdiction are both questions of law, which we review de novo. Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Livanos v. Livanos, 333 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (personal jurisdiction).

A. Incomplete Administrative Forms Did Not Deprive the Trial Court of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.

According to Tatum, the district court clerk should have rejected Noble's application for protective order as materially incomplete, and because the application instead was filed and docketed, the trial court's protective order was rendered “without foundation or jurisdiction.”

A person invokes the trial court's jurisdiction to issue a protective order by filing an application for the order. Tex. Fam. Code § 82.001. But the documents that Tatum identifies as “materially incomplete”—the “Consent to Publish to Registry page” and the “Protective Order Address Form”—are administrative forms that are not part of the application. Because these forms are not necessary to the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, the failure to complete them does not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. We overrule this issue.

B. Personal Jurisdiction Was Established by Uncontroverted Evidence of Proper Service.

Claims of defective service of process challenge the trial court's personal jurisdiction over the party sued. Livanos v. Livanos, 333 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). A default judgment cannot withstand a direct attack absent proof of proper service. Id. But the appellate record contains that proof.

The return of service is prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein. Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam). The notarized return of service shows that a process server personally served Tatum at 4:27 p.m. on April 22, 2025. At that time, Tatum received the citation, a notice of the application for protective order, a copy of the application for protective order and temporary protective order, and a show-cause order requiring Tatum to appear at the hearing on the application to be held before the 280th District Court at 9:00 a.m. on May 2, 2025. The citation included a warning that a default judgment could be taken and a protective order issued against Tatum if she failed to appear.

After the trial court issued the default protective order, Tatum asserted, both in her motion to stay enforcement and in her motion to set aside the protective order, that she was improperly served; however, she did not identify any improprieties in the service, and there is no evidence in the record that controverts the return of service.¹

We overrule this issue.

IV. Due-Process Issues

Under this heading, we group together Tatum's arguments that her due-process rights were violated because she was not served with notice of the protective-order hearing or of the signing of the protective order.

A. Tatum Was Personally Served with Timely Notice of the Hearing.

A trial court may render a family-violence protective order “that is binding on a respondent who does not attend a hearing if: (1) the respondent received service of the application and notice of the hearing; and (2) proof of service was filed with the court before the hearing.” Tex. Fam. Code § 85.006. The notice of an application for a protective order must contain, among other things, the name and location of the court and the date, time, and place of the hearing. Id. § 82.041(a)(3), (6). Whether notice of a protective-order hearing was properly served is a question of law, which we review de novo. Adimora-Nweke v. Yarbrough, No. 14-19-00426-CV, 2021 WL 1917832, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 13, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

In her motion to set aside the protective order, Tatum represented that she did not appear at the hearing because she “was unaware of the hearing date and did not receive the necessary documents timely.” She reurges that argument on appeal, but as previously discussed, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that she was personally served with notice of the hearing set for 9:00 a.m. at May 2, 2025, before the 280th District Court.

Tatum contends that she was required to be served with notice of the hearing in the 245th District Court, but this argument ignores the uncontroverted evidence that her notice of the hearing in the 280th District Court was correct: the case was called in the 280th District Court as stated in the notice, and Tatum failed to appear. The case's transfer after Tatum's non-appearance does not change those facts. Indeed, if a county has more than one district court—as Harris County does—then any of the county's district-court judges may hear and decide a matter pending in any of the county's other district courts, regardless of whether the case is transferred. Tex. Gov't Code § 74.094; Tex. R. Civ. P. 330(e). Similarly, a Harris County district-court judge can try a matter in his or her courtroom “or in the room of any other court.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 330(e). Inasmuch as the hearing began when the case was called in one court but concluded in another court, the hearing in the 245th District Court is effectively—and permissibly—a continuation of the hearing begun in the 280th District Court. The case was called, then the parties who were present for the hearing were notified of the adjournment and transfer, and the hearing reconvened in the 245th District Court.

We conclude that Tatum's failure to offer any evidence opposing the application was not due to an absence of notice of the hearing before the 245th District Court; it was due to her absence from the noticed hearing before the 280th District Court.

We overrule this issue.

B. Tatum Had Timely Notice of the Default Protective Order.

Tatum next asserts that she was deprived of due process because the trial court did not serve her with a copy of the default protective order.

Because the deadlines to file an appeal and various motions are calculated from the date the trial court signs the judgment or order at issue, the clerk of the court must immediately send the judgment or order to the parties. Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a. If a party adversely affected by the order, or that party's attorney, first receives notice or actual knowledge of the order 21–90 days after it was signed, the party can ask to have those deadlines reset so that they begin to run from the date that party or the party's attorney received such notice or acquired actual knowledge of the signing. Id. To do so, the party must file a sworn motion and prove the date that notice was received or actual knowledge acquired. Id.

Tatum did not file such a motion, because she had actual knowledge of the signed protective order no more than twenty days after it was signed. She filed a motion to stay its enforcement on the twentieth day after the trial court signed the order, followed by a timely motion for new trial and notice of appeal. Thus, the trial court did not find, and was not asked to find, that Tatum's notice of the order was delayed.

We overrule this issue.

V. Issues Concerning Access to the Courts

In her next two issues, Tatum contends that various circumstances obstructed her constitutional right of access to the courts.

A. Tatum's Challenge to the Temporary Protective Order is Moot.

Tatum asserts, without explanation, that the temporary protective order initially rendered in this case unlawfully obstructed her constitutional right of access to the courts. That order was rendered moot when it was superseded by the final protective order, and we do not have jurisdiction to review a moot temporary order. In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 225 (Tex. 2021).

B. Tatum's Complaint That a Court Clerk Obstructed Her “Access to Appeal” Presents Nothing for Review.

In this issue, Tatum states that a court clerk “obstructed [Tatum's] access to appeal by providing false contact information in two separate appeals” “stemming from District Court 280.” She states that a court clerk provided incorrect contact information for her, Tatum, so that she “was not served properly with notices or pleadings,” which “obstructed [Tatum's] ability to respond, file documents, or participate meaningfully in appeals.”

Tatum does not identify the court served by the clerk to whom she refers, or the person or entity to whom the clerk provided incorrect contact information, or cases “stemming from District Court 280,” or “the two separate appeals” she mentions,² or why any of this renders the protective order in this case reversible.

Because this issue presents nothing for review, we overrule it.

VI. Issues Alleging Misconduct

Tatum's remaining issues are simply unsupported allegations of misconduct by Judge Curvey and Noble. Tatum argues that she was denied a fair trial due to judicial bias and improper influence “by Judge Curvey and her connections,” and by Noble's fraud on the court. She also alleges that Noble has engaged in a pattern of harassment, defamation, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. She identifies no support for these representations in the appellate record.

Regarding her allegation of judicial bias, Tatum contends that Judge Curvey “made comments on the record and took actions that demonstrated bias.” But the appellate record contains no transcript of any hearing before Judge Curvey, and Tatum identifies no biased action by Judge Curvey in this case. The only order Judge Curvey issued before recusing herself was a temporary order, but even that order was rendered moot just two weeks later. Tatum's argument about “improper influence” consists of the bare assertion that Judge Curvey has professional and personal connections with other judges and that she attended the same law school as two named judges, neither of whom were involved in this case. We overrule Tatum's issue concerning judicial bias and improper influence.

Tatum next contends that Noble committed fraud on the court by making false allegations, submitting a false return of service, intentionally misdirecting service, and defaming Tatum in pleadings. But as previously discussed, Noble's allegations were supported with uncontroverted evidence, and the record establishes that Tatum was properly served. As for Tatum's arguments that Noble also committed fraud on the court by cyberbullying and by withholding exculpatory evidence, Tatum did not preserve these arguments by raising them in the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (generally, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that that the complaint was raised in the trial court by a timely and sufficiently specific request, objection, or motion, on which the trial court ruled). We overrule Tatum's issue concerning fraud on the court.

In Tatum's final issue, she alleged that Noble has engaged in harassment, defamation, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. Because Tatum pleaded no such claims in this case, they are not at issue and present nothing for review. We overrule this issue.

VII. Conclusion

Having overruled all of the issues and arguments preserved for appellate review and within our jurisdiction to address, we affirm the trial court's default protective order.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because the parties appeared pro se both in the trial court and on appeal, it may be helpful to clarify what is meant by “the record.” In deciding the issues presented on appeal, the reviewing court relies on the “appellate record,” consisting of the clerk's record, and if necessary to the appeal, the reporter's record. Tex. R. App. P. 34.1. With exceptions inapplicable here, the reviewing court cannot consider documents that are not part of the appellate record and that instead appear only in an appendix to an appellate brief. WorldPeace v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 183 S.W.3d 451, 465 n.23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). In one such exception, an appellant can choose to rely on an appendix to the appellant's brief rather than a clerk's record, but to do so, the appellant must file such an election in the trial court within ten days after filing a notice of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 34.5a(a). No such election was made in this case. The scope of our review accordingly is confined to the certified clerk's record and reporter's record filed in this appeal.

2.   Although Tatum does not identify the “two separate appeals” to which she refers, they surely do not include this appeal, in which Tatum's ability to file documents and otherwise participate meaningfully cannot be said to have been obstructed. As we pointed out in our order of September 16, 2025, Tatum had by that time filed 44 motions, letters, or other miscellaneous documents in this Court, leading us to warn the parties “against further excessive filing.”

Tracy Christopher, Chief Justice