IN RE: DOLCEFINO COMMUNICATIONS (2026)

OPINION

This is the second mandamus proceeding in our court brought by Dolcefino Communications, LLC d/b/a Dolcefino Media, arising out of its effort to obtain access to currently sealed court records in a divorce case. In the first mandamus proceeding, we held that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider and rule on Dolcefino Media's petition in intervention and motion to unseal, and we conditionally granted mandamus relief to that limited extent. In re Dolcefino Commc'ns, LLC, No. 14-25-00555-CV, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 2471307, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, orig. proceeding). After we issued our opinion, the trial court held a Zoom hearing on the motion to unseal, in which the parties and Dolcefino Media participated. The court ruled that all court orders in the divorce shall be unsealed; but it otherwise refused to unseal any court records, without stating reasons.

Dolcefino Media challenges this order on several grounds. In short, it claims a right of access to court docket entries, reporter's records of public hearings, hearing notices, and pleadings for relief, based on the common law and the Texas and United States Constitutions. As we observed in the first proceeding, Texas generally recognizes a common-law right of public access to court records, applicable in civil cases. The parties agree that trial courts have discretion to limit access after balancing relevant competing interests. A court abuses its discretion when it denies public access to presumptively public court records without balancing the relevant competing interests. Also, if a court refuses public access after weighing the competing interests, then the reasons for doing so must be clearly articulated in the record. Because the record does not demonstrate compliance with these requirements, we conclude the court abused its discretion regarding the categories of court records that are the subject of Dolcefino Media's petition. We conditionally grant the petition for mandamus in part and direct the trial court to vacate its October 27, 2025 order in part to the extent it denies public access to the court records at issue. While continued sealing may be appropriate, the court must balance the relevant interests and, to the extent those interests favor continued sealing of any court records or categories of court records at issue, explain its reasons for refusing public access. Dolcefino Media's motion for temporary relief is denied as moot.

Background

We described the relevant background of this dispute in our first opinion. See Dolcefino Commc'ns, ––– S.W.3d at –––– – ––––, 2025 WL 2471307, at *1-2. The crux of the matter emanates from an agreed sealing order (the “Agreed Sealing Order”) signed on February 4, 2021 in the divorce between Jay Keith Sears and Debra Louise McLeod. After the parties operated under the Agreed Sealing Order for four years, Dolcefino Media intervened in April 2025 to challenge the order. In a Motion to Unseal, Dolcefino Media sought an order: (1) vacating the Agreed Sealing Order; (2) unsealing all documents in the proceeding; and (3) stating that all documents in the matter be designated for public viewing on the district clerk's online records portal. The trial court declined to rule on the petition in intervention and the Motion to Unseal on jurisdictional grounds. Dolcefino Media sought mandamus relief in this court, and we conditionally granted limited relief and held that the trial court had jurisdiction to “consider and decide the extent to which access ought to be allowed.” Id. at ––––, 2025 WL 2471307, at *6. We issued our opinion on August 28, 2025.

The trial court scheduled an oral hearing on the Motion to Unseal for September 30, 2025, but granted a continuance at Sears's request. Dolcefino Media filed a motion to reset the hearing. On October 16, 2025, the court issued a notice of hearing on Dolcefino Media's motion to reset to occur by Zoom on October 27, 2025. The copy of the notice of hearing in our record contains log-in information for the hearing participants, though the recipients of the notice are unclear. It is undisputed that Dolcefino Media received a copy of the notice of hearing. The record does not indicate whether the public generally would have had knowledge of the hearing or the ability to watch remotely.

According to a verification by Wayne Dolcefino included in the mandamus record, relator and its attorney appeared in the courtroom on October 27, 2025 at the designated time for the hearing, but were ordered by the court to leave the courtroom. Relator's attorney then appeared by Zoom and participated in the hearing remotely.¹ The court announced that it would unseal all signed orders in the divorce action but denied the motion to unseal all other records at issue. That day, the court signed a written order stating:

On this day, this Court considered the Motion to Unseal Records heard on September 30, 2025 in this cause and finds that said motion should be GRANTED in part as set forth herein.

IT IS ORDERED that all Order(s) entered in Cause No. 20-08-26306 and styled In the Matter of the Marriage of Jay Keith Sears and Debra Louise McLeod are unsealed pursuant to TRCP 76(a)1. Certified copies of such records will be available for the public by the District Clerk upon payment of the clerk's fees.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court Clerk take notice of this Order and institute procedures to ensure that Court personnel comply with the terms of this Order.

Dolcefino Media challenges the October 27, 2025 order.

Standard of Review

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available only when the relator shows both that (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion; and (2) no adequate remedy by appeal exists. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts; thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. at 840.

Analysis

Dolcefino Media asks this court to vacate or modify the October 27, 2025 order because it violates the “common law of unsealing,” the Public Information Act, and the Texas and United States Constitutions “to the extent that it does not unseal docket entries, transcripts of public hearings, hearing notices, and pleadings for relief.” He also requests that we hold that the October 27, 2025 “court closure violated constitutional access rights” and that we “prohibit future closures absent motion, findings, and adherence to procedural safeguards.”

A. A court must balance the competing interests before sealing court records.

We begin with Dolcefino Media's reliance on a general common-law right to access court records and documents. The common law provides an appropriate framework to analyze the continued sealing of the court records at issue because the special procedures of rule 76a do not apply to them. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(a)(3); Gen. Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. 1998).² As we observed in the first mandamus proceeding, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the general common-law right to copy and inspect public records, including judicial records and documents. Dolcefino Commc'ns, ––– S.W.3d at ––––, 2025 WL 2471307, at *5 (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978)). Our state's supreme court and intermediate appellate courts have applied Nixon’s reasoning to recognize a common-law right of public access to state court records generally, including in civil cases.³ The public's general right of access to judicial proceedings is a “ ‘fundamental element of the rule of law,’ is recognized under the common law, constitutionally guaranteed, and incorporated into our procedural rules requiring court proceedings and court records to be open to the public.” Baker, 687 S.W.3d at 294 (footnotes omitted).

But the common-law right of public access is “ ‘not absolute.’ ” Id. at 294 n.25 (quoting HouseCanary, Inc., 622 S.W.3d at 267 n.10); see Dolcefino Commc'ns, ––– S.W.3d at ––––, 2025 WL 2471307, at *6. The parties agree on this point. A court has discretion to limit access to court records when “competing rights or interests outweigh the public's interest.” Baker, 687 S.W.3d at 294. Like access to court records, public access to court proceedings is subject to “reasonable limitations imposed to protect countervailing interests.” In re M-I, L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d 569, 577-78 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); see Dallas Morning News v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 842 S.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (public access to court exhibits is subject to limits). Interests weighing against public disclosure may be particularly acute in divorce cases like this one. Quoting Nixon, the Dallas Morning News court stated:

It is uncontested, however, that the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, and access has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes. For example, the common-law right of inspection has bowed before the power of a court to insure that its records are not “used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal” through the publication of “the painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case.” ․ Similarly, courts have refused to permit their files to serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption ․ or as sources of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing․ [Citations omitted, emphasis added.]

Dallas Morning News, 842 S.W.2d at 658-59 (emphasis added) (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306).

We do not attempt to identify the universe of relevant interests at play here, as that task is best left to the parties and the supervising trial court. Whatever they are, the trial court is required to balance them. See M-I, L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d at 577-78. Sears agrees that the trial court has not yet balanced the relevant competing interests. He contends that before any unsealing can occur, the parties and non-parties must first be entitled to fully assert privilege and confidentiality protections. Further, Sears asserts that Dolcefino Media must also respond to outstanding discovery requests so that the trial court can have the full benefit of that information before ruling whether or not to make certain matters public. Sears also appears to oppose further public access altogether on the grounds that the process to complete the necessary review of all the privacy and confidentiality interests across the entire case file would be extraordinarily burdensome and expensive. Be that as it may, a balancing of the relevant interests must occur, and the trial court made its October 27, 2025 ruling without conducting it. We also observe that some or much of Sears's concern may involve unfiled discovery, which is not at issue in this proceeding. By its petition, Dolcefino Media seeks access only to “docket entries, transcripts of public hearings, hearing notices, and pleadings for relief.” Our decision is limited to those categories of court records.

We hold that because the trial court denied access to the identified categories of court records without balancing the competing interests, it abused its discretion.⁴ See id. Once the trial court conducts the required balancing, it may well be within its discretion to conclude that continued sealing is appropriate. But it must balance the relevant interests as to the categories of court records to which Dolcefino Media seeks access. See id. at 578. To the extent Dolcefino Media requests us to direct the trial court to unseal certain records now, it would be premature for us to do so before the trial court has had the opportunity to balance the relevant interests and rule. See HouseCanary, Inc., 622 S.W.3d at 267.⁵

B. The reasons for sealing must be clearly articulated in the record.

Dolcefino Media also asserts that the October 27, 2025 order constitutes an abuse of discretion because it lacks any fact findings stating that the confidentiality interests outweigh the public's right of access. It argues that findings are required so that a reviewing court can determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in sealing presumptively open court records.

The parties have not cited a controlling case addressing directly whether a trial court must make fact findings in deciding to limit access to civil court records under the common law. But related and persuasive authority provides helpful guidance. For example, although rule 76a’s sealing procedures do not apply to the records at issue, the rule provides a useful analogy relevant to court sealing orders under the common law. The rule does not require the court to make factual findings per se,⁶ but it does require courts to balance the public's interest against an individual litigant's personal or proprietary interests in privacy and to state the “specific reasons” for finding and concluding whether the required showing has been made. Tex. R. Civ. P. 76a(6).

Additionally, a notable new addition to our civil rules is relevant. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21d. That rule permits trial courts to conduct certain hearings electronically, upon “reasonable notice to the public of how to observe the court proceeding.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 21d(f)(1). The court must allow the public an opportunity to observe court proceedings electronically, unless the court determines that it must close the proceeding “to protect an overriding interest, considered all less-restrictive alternatives to closure, and made findings on the record adequate to support closure.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 21d(f)(2) (emphasis added).⁷

Also very persuasive, federal circuit courts of appeals applying the common law of sealing court records in civil cases require trial courts to state reasons for sealing. E.g., June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Phillips, 22 F.4th 512, 519, 521 (5th Cir. 2022); Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d 410, 419 (5th Cir. 2021); Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2016).⁸ In the Fifth Circuit, a district court abuses its discretion in sealing or unsealing documents when it fails to identify and apply the proper legal standard and “when it fails to provide sufficient reasons for its decision to enable appellate review.” June Med. Servs., 22 F.4th at 519; see Le, 990 F.3d at 419.

A clear, recorded articulation of reasons for limiting public view of judicial records or court proceedings is also the norm in criminal cases under constitutional principles. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9-10, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984))⁹ ; Express-News Corp., 787 S.W.2d at 452.¹⁰

We endeavor to construe these principles uniformly so that an order sealing civil judicial records based on the common law will be subject to meaningful appellate review just as other sealing orders are. If sealing is warranted in a civil case under the common law, then the reasons for it should be clearly articulated in the record, as is the common standard in other sealing contexts. This imposes no burden greater than that already required under the related circumstances mentioned. A failure to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion. We agree with Dolcefino Media that the October 27, 2025 order was an abuse of discretion to the extent the court did not include in the record any reasons explaining why the balancing of relevant competing interests justified continued sealing of the court records at issue.

C. Dolcefino Media lacks an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal.

Additionally, we conclude Dolcefino Media lacks an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal, as the trial court's order under the present circumstances is not appealable interlocutorily. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014; In re B.H., No. 14-22-00068-CV, 2023 WL 5236040, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 15, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (interlocutory appeal not authorized from order unsealing documents).¹¹

Conclusion

We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus in part as set forth above and direct the trial court to vacate its October 27, 2025 order in part to the extent it denied Dolcefino Media's Motion to Unseal “docket entries, transcripts of public hearings, hearing notices, and pleadings for relief.” Dolcefino Media's prayer also includes a request that we “prohibit future court closures absent motion, findings, and adherence to procedural safeguards.” At present, we deny relief in this regard but note that compliance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21d is mandatory. We are confident that the trial court will comply with this court's decision, and the writ will issue only if it does not. Dolcefino Media's motion for temporary relief is denied as moot.

FOOTNOTES

1.   During the hearing, relator's attorney objected for the first time to participating remotely and asserted a right to participate in person in the courtroom. Dolcefino Media did not object to the remote format before the hearing.

2.   Access to documents in court files not defined as court records by rule 76a remain “governed by existing law.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 76a(9).

3.   Baker v. Bizzle, 687 S.W.3d 285, 294 & n.27 (Tex. 2024) (discussing common-law right of access to court records in divorce case); see HouseCanary, Inc. v. Title Source, Inc., 622 S.W.3d 254, 263-64 n.6, 267 n.10 (Tex. 2021) (trade secrets case); In re Daugherty, 558 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, orig. proceeding) (“We begin with the acknowledgement that the common law has long presumed a right of public access to inspect and copy all judicial records and documents.”) (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306); Tyler v. State, No. 05-05-01378-CR, 2008 WL 2738012, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 15, 2008, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication); Express-News Corp. v. MacRae, 787 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“The public's right to public trials under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution includes a presumption that judicial records will be open to inspection by the press and public.”) (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306); Ashpole v. Millard, 778 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ); see also In re Cook, 629 S.W.3d 591, 604-05 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (Schenck, J., dissenting) (stating that public's right of access to judicial proceeding is “grounded in the public's interest in understanding the basis for judicial decisions and assuring their fidelity to the rule of law” and applies to “materials filed with the court insofar as they might have played a role in a judicial decision”).

4.   We limit our discussion to the common-law right of access to court records as recognized in Texas jurisprudence and need not directly address Dolcefino Media's contentions based on the Texas and federal constitutions. We also do not discuss Dolcefino Media's arguments under the Public Information Act because that act is inapplicable to judicial records. See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 552.003(1)(B)(i); 552.0035(a).

5.   Much of Dolcefino Media's remaining arguments complain that the trial court failed to enforce the Agreed Sealing Order as written. We do not address these unpreserved contentions because Dolcefino Media never argued below that the Agreed Sealing Order should be enforced as written; it argued that the order should be vacated.

6.   Gen. Tire, Inc., 970 S.W.2d at 526; In re Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 267 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding).

7.   A party may object to the method of appearance for good cause. Tex. R. Civ. P. 21d(d). Here, Dolcefino Media neither cited this rule nor asserted an objection before the hearing.

8.   A “[f]inding that a document is a ‘judicial document’ triggers a presumption of public access, and requires a court to make specific, rigorous findings before sealing the document or otherwise denying public access.” Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 141 (quoting Newsday LLC v. Cty. of Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 167 n.15 (2d Cir. 2013)).

9.   “[T]he presumption [of public access] may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.” Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. 819.

10.   “This presumption of openness may be overcome by a countervailing interest, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial, but the reason for closure or sealing must be apparent and clearly articulated.” Express-News Corp., 787 S.W.2d at 452 (citing Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980)).

11.   The appeal procedure in rule 76a does not apply. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 76a(8).

Kevin Jewell, Justice