MOFFETT v. STATE (2026)

OPINION

Appellant Cameron Moffett pled guilty to two counts of Sexual Assault of a Child and one count of Indecency with a Child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.011; 21.11. The issue of punishment was tried to a jury. The jury sentenced appellant to twenty years in prison on all three offenses, and the trial court ordered that appellant's sentences in each of the cases run consecutively. In a single issue, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress evidence arising from the search of his laptop. We conclude the trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background 1

The following facts are drawn from the Motion to Suppress hearing and trial in this case. Appellant was the live-in boyfriend or fiancé of the mother (“Mother”) of the complainant, M.A. Mother became suspicious of appellant abusing M.A. when her automobile's electronic display (connected to appellant's phone via Bluetooth) showed a text from M.A. to appellant asking, “Why did you tell Mark we fucked?” When Mother demanded an explanation from appellant, he claimed to believe that M.A. sent him the message by accident while trying to send it to some unknown person. Mother tried to confront M.A., but appellant would not let Mother talk to M.A. alone. Mother's suspicions grew when she found a bottle of sexual lubricant in M.A.’s closet. Both M.A. and appellant claimed to know nothing about the lubricant.

After the family moved to a new house, Mother was looking through the garage when she found another bottle of the same brand of sexual lubricant in appellant's toolbox. This time when she confronted appellant about it, he claimed that it was for his own use. Later that same day, while appellant was away, Mother looked for information regarding her suspicions.

Appellant owned an Apple MacBook laptop, which allowed multiple users to create separate profiles on the single device. Both appellant and M.A. maintained profiles on this computer. M.A.’s profile on the laptop was connected to her phone, and M.A.’s text messages would appear in a texting app on the laptop when the computer was logged in with her profile. Mother used a password hint to enter M.A.’s profile on the laptop. From there, she accessed M.A.’s text messages on the laptop's text app. A search of M.A.’s text messages revealed a conversation between M.A. and appellant regarding their history of sexual intercourse. Mother took photos of the messages and confronted M.A., who admitted that she had been having sex with appellant.

Mother showed police the photos of the text messages. She later turned over M.A.’s current phone and one of her older phones to police for forensic examination.

Appellant subsequently filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging that Mother's search of M.A.’s profile on his laptop constituted a violation of Texas Penal Code § 33.02. Appellant testified at the hearing and claimed that he denied Mother access to the laptop. Mother testified that she had access to the laptop, she could log into the laptop as a guest if she wanted to, and that M.A. would give her M.A.’s passwords on request. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, stating:

[A]lthough [Mother] did not have a legal property interest in the laptop, she had actual authority, common authority to search her daughter's profile on the laptop. It's not as if she was trying to access any of the content connected to the Defendant's profile or account. And in the alternative she didn't have actual authority, she had apparent authority, which as the case law has stated that, it's a common, I think, understood expectation and social norm that parents have shared access to property of their children to ensure their safety and welfare. And in this case, the mother was given access to the child's phone. It's understandable that the child might at times be resistant to that access but she had continual, if even at times it was intermittent access to the phone, she had knowledge of the log in information and the password information for her daughter's account. And the laptop, she was able to access that freely. She paid, at least and at a minimum in part, if not in whole, for the service on the phone that her daughter used and she obviously had become accustomed to monitoring her child's—the information that was contained on the phone, which is connected, I think, with the—which is the same information that is obtained from the laptop because it's all shared between the iPhone and any profile that's created with that same number on an Apple computer or laptop.

The trial court did not issue written findings of fact or conclusions of law. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of Sexual Assault of a Child and one count of Indecency with a Child and proceeded to a jury trial on punishment. The jury assessed punishment at twenty years’ imprisonment in each case, and the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

At a suppression hearing, a trial judge is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); State v. Staton, 599 S.W.3d 614, 616 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref'd). We give almost complete deference to the trial court in its determination of historical facts, especially if they are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor, and we give the trial court the same deference as to its rulings on applications of the law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact, if resolution of those questions depends on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). But for mixed questions of law and fact that do not fall within that category, we may conduct a de novo review. Id.; see also Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d at 545. When, as here, the trial court does not make written findings of fact, we assume that the trial court made implicit findings that support its ruling, provided those implied findings are supported by the record. State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and we uphold the ruling on any theory of law supported by the evidence. Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Brown v. State, 212 S.W.3d 851, 867 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet ref'd) (op. on reh'g).

Discussion

In his sole issue on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the incriminating text message exchanges between himself and M.A. because the challenged evidence was obtained in violation of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 38.23(a). Under this rule, “[n]o evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a). Specifically, appellant argues that Mother violated Texas Penal Code § 33.02(a), which states “A person commits an offense if the person knowingly accesses a computer, computer network, or computer system without the effective consent of the owner.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.02(a). Because appellant challenged the admissibility of the text messages under article 38.23(a), he bore the burden to establish that Mother illegally obtained the evidence. See Mayfield v. State, 124 S.W.3d 377, 378 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd).

Appellant argues Mother did not have his consent to access his computer or M.A.’s cell phones. To support this argument, appellant points to his testimony from the suppression hearing that Mother was not allowed access to his computer or the profiles on it, as exemplified by the fact that Mother had to use a password hint to access M.A.’s profile. He also argues that Mother had no permission to access M.A.’s phones because they were purchased by appellant and operated under appellant's account. Mother testified, however, that she was never told that she could not use the laptop, she did not attempt to access appellant's profile or text messages, and that her search was limited to M.A.’s profile and messages.

The trial judge was the sole trier of fact and judge of both appellant's and Mother's credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress. See Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190. The trial judge was entitled to disregard appellant's testimony and instead credit Mother's testimony. Mother's testimony and case law supports the trial court's comments on the record that Mother possessed, at the very least, the ability to vicariously consent to the search of M.A.’s computer profile and cell phone.

The facts of this case are similar to those in Alameda v. State, 181 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005), aff'd, 235 S.W.3d 218, (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In that case, the appellant filed a motion to suppress audio recordings obtained through a wiretap set up by the complainant's mother after she began to suspect inappropriate behavior between her minor daughter and appellant. Id. at 774. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that “as long as a parent has a good faith, objectively reasonable basis for believing that the taping of telephone conversations is in the best interest of the parent's minor child, the parent may vicariously consent to the recording on behalf of the child.” Id. at 778.

As relevant here, the court of appeals highlighted the impact of the role of parents in protecting their children on a child's privacy interests, noting:

Parents have the statutory duty of care, control, and protection of their children. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 151.001(a)(2). They also have the right to make “decisions of substantial legal significance concerning [their] child.” Id. § 151.001(a)(7). For example, the court of criminal appeals has held that a child has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom, that a parent has a right to be in the child's bedroom, and that a parent could consent to the search of his or her child's bedroom. Sorensen v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532, 534–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Jacobs v. State, 681 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd).

Id. at 779.

Although Alameda was based on a wiretap statute as opposed to the computer privacy statute at issue in this case, we find the rationale of the Alameda court persuasive in this instance as well. Here, the trial court could have determined that the text messages were properly obtained by Mother, when she vicariously consented to the search of M.A.’s electronic devices in an effort to exercise her responsibility to protect her daughter from harm.

Appellant did not carry his burden to show the text messages were wrongfully obtained. The evidence shows that Mother vicariously consented to the search of M.A.’s computer profile. Because the trial court's concluded that Mother's search of M.A.’s computer profile and cell phone did not violate Texas Penal Code section 33.02(a), the trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to suppress. We overrule appellant's sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

CONCURRING OPINION

I agree with the Court's decision and analysis and write separately to address the constitutional dimensions of the parent–child relationship as they relate to Mother's accessing the internet profile and text messages of her minor daughter, M.A.

Appellant moved under article 38.23(a) of the code of criminal procedure to suppress text messages Mother obtained by accessing M.A.’s profile text messages on appellant's laptop. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23 (“No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.”). Because appellant challenged the admissibility of the text messages under article 38.23(a), he bore the burden to establish Mother illegally obtained the evidence. See Mayfield v. State, 124 S.W.3d 377, 378 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd). Appellant urges that Mother's actions in accessing his laptop to obtain M.A.’s text messages were illegal because Mother violated section 33.02(a) of the penal code in doing so. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.02 (“A person commits an offense if the person knowingly accesses a computer, computer network, or computer system without the effective consent of the owner.”). Accordingly, appellant bore the burden to establish Mother accessed the evidence “without the effective consent of the owner” and did so “knowingly.” Id.

The parties dispute whether Mother accessed appellant's laptop without effective consent and did so knowingly. They offered conflicting testimony on these points at the suppression hearing. The trial court was free to credit Mother's testimony that she was given access to appellant's laptop, and the trial court concluded, as to “the laptop, she was able to access that freely.” See Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding a trial judge “is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony” when entertaining a motion to suppress) (citations omitted).

The parties also dispute whether Mother accessed M.A.’s profile—and M.A.’s text messages—on appellant's laptop without effective consent and did so knowingly. The trial court found in the suppression hearing that Mother had actual authority to access M.A.’s profile and, alternatively, had apparent authority to do so based on the “understood expectations and social norm that parents have shared access to property of their children to ensure their safety and welfare.” I write separately to acknowledge the constitutional grounding of that norm.

Our Supreme Court “has repeatedly recognized that parents have a fundamental interest in making decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children.” State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 228 (Tex. 2024); see also In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (“One of the most fundamental liberty interests recognized is the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children.”); Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976) (“The natural right which exists between parents and their children is one of constitutional dimensions.”). For its part, the United States Supreme Court recognized in Troxel v. Granville that “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme] Court [of the United States].” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality op.) (grounding protection of this liberty interest within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); cf. id. at 91-92, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is an unalienable right “retained by the people” under the Ninth Amendment); In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 177 (Tex. 2018) (Blacklock, J., dissenting) (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Thomas, J., concurring), for the suggestion that “the Privileges and Immunities Clause may be the more appropriate place to look” for constitutional recognition of parental rights).

Turning back to the trial court's determination in this case, we view the evidence in the light that most favors the trial court's ruling, and we uphold the ruling on any theory of law supported by the evidence. Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The evidence—including evidence that Mother was motivated to access M.A.’s text messages based on Mother's concerns about M.A.’s safety and welfare—supports the trial court's implied determination that Mother had, at a minimum, apparent authority to access M.A.’s text messages based on constitutionally grounded “understood expectations and social norm that parents have shared access to property of their children to ensure their safety and welfare.” I would conclude that, for this reason also, appellant failed to establish that Mother knowingly accessed M.A.’s text messages “without the effective consent of the owner.” Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

Opinion by Justice Breedlove