COREY WAYNE GRIFFIN v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2025)

OPINION

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed December 12, 2025

Appellant Corey Wayne Griffin was charged by indictment for the murder of his wife or alternatively for the aggravated assault of her. The State abandoned the murder charge before jury selection began and proceeded solely on the aggravated assault charge. The jury found Corey guilty of the first-degree felony offense of aggravated assault family violence causing serious bodily injury with a deadly weapon, see TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(b)(1)(A), and assessed his punishment at confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, as well as a $10,000 fine. On appeal, Corey argues the trial court erred in (1) refusing to suppress electronic customer data pertaining to his cell phone because the warrant was not based upon probable cause; (2) admitting hearsay statements by the deceased victim under a theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing because the evidence was insufficient to establish his intent to prevent her testimony in court; and (3) admitting photographs of injuries the victim sustained several weeks before her death because the sponsoring witness did not have personal knowledge of the injuries and could not authenticate the photographs. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

The evidence at trial showed Corey and his wife, Chelsie Griffin, had a tumultuous relationship. They had been married for sixteen years and had two children together. In the months leading up to her death, she filed for divorce and a protective order, and he was arrested for harassing her. He was out on bond when he drove overnight from Pecos to their home in Royse City where he waited for Chelsie to arrive home. When she did, he brutally beat, strangled, and shot her, leaving her dead on their kitchen floor. The manner of death was determined to be homicide caused by a gunshot wound and blunt force injuries to her head.

Corey fled the scene and was found later that afternoon in Chelsie's car parked at Chandler's Landing Marina in Rockwall. Bystanders called police believing someone was unconscious in the vehicle. Paramedics arrived and noticed blood on his shirt. He told them some of the blood was his, and some was his wife's; he had no visible injuries. Corey had Chelsie's purse in his lap and a handgun between his legs hidden beneath the purse. Ballistics testing later confirmed the handgun was the same gun that caused the gunshot wound to Chelsie's head.

ADMISSION OF AT&T CELL-SITE LOCATION DATA

In his first issue, Corey argues the trial court erred by refusing to suppress electronic customer data related to his cell phone because the warrant authorizing the release of such data was not supported by probable cause. The State responds the facts contained within the four corners of the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the cell phone and the murder investigation to establish probable cause.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Ordinarily, appellate courts review a ruling on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to the historical facts found by the trial court and reviewing de novo the trial court's application of the law. Bordelon v. State, 673 S.W.3d 775, 784 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.) (citing State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). However, when the trial court evaluates probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant, there are no credibility determinations, and the trial court is constrained to the four corners of the affidavit. Id. Accordingly, we apply a highly deferential standard of review to the trial court's issuance of a warrant, given the constitutional preference for searches to be conducted pursuant to a warrant. Id.; see also State v. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d 122, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); State v. Garcia, Nos. 05-22-01107-CR, 05-22-01108-CR, 2024 WL 1089477, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 13, 2024, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular location. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 130. This is a flexible, non-demanding standard. Id. The duty of reviewing courts is to ensure a magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Id. Reviewing courts must give great deference to a magistrate's probable cause determination, including a magistrate's implicit findings supporting reasonable inferences, and not invalidate a warrant by interpreting it in a hyper-technical rather than commonsense manner. Id. Even in close cases, we give great deference to probable cause determinations to encourage police officers to use the warrant process. Id.

In determining whether an affidavit provides probable cause to support a search warrant, we examine the four corners of the affidavit to see if it recites sufficient facts to support conclusions that (1) a specific offense was committed, (2) the property or items to be searched for or seized constitute evidence of the offense or evidence that a particular person committed it, and (3) the evidence sought is located at or within the thing to be searched. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.01(c).

Article 18B.354 governs search warrants issued for electronic customer data held in electronic storage. Id. art. 18B.354. To obtain such data from a provider of an electronic communications service, a peace officer must submit an application for a warrant to a district judge. Id. art. 18B.354(a). The sworn affidavit accompanying the search warrant application must provide:

(b) ․ sufficient and substantial facts to establish probable cause that:

(1) a specific offense has been committed; and

(2) the electronic customer data sought:

(A) constitutes evidence of that offense or evidence that a particular person committed that offense; and

(B) is held in electronic storage by the service provider on which the warrant is served under Article 18B.355(c).

Id. art. 18B.354(b). That is, “[t]here must be some factual basis in the affidavit providing a fair probability that law enforcement could expect to find inculpatory location information evidence from the carrier indicating that a specific person committed a particular offense.” Stocker v. State, 656 S.W.3d 887, 906–07 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022), rev'd on other grounds, 693 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).

B. Applicable Facts

On February 26, 2023, Officer Andrew Mason submitted two separate probable cause affidavits: one to access Corey's cell phone recovered from Chelsie's home the day of the crime (State's Exhibit No. 572) and a second directed to AT&T for certain electronic customer data held in electronic storage for cell phone number (XXX) 910-XXXX between the dates of January 25, 2023, and February 16, 2023 (State's Exhibit No. 573).

On appeal, Corey challenges the probable cause affidavit supporting the AT&T search warrant.¹ It stated, in relevant part, the following:

It is the belief of affiant that at the above-described [AT&T] premises is the following electronic customer data and property or items: Property or items of the accused, constituting evidence tending to show that a particular person committed an offense, to wit: MURDER, TX PENAL CODE 19.02 ․

․

2. Affiant is aware AT&T may provide information relevant to my investigation in that based on my experience, AT&T maintains records of incoming and outgoing calls, incoming and outgoing text and multimedia messages, data usage, subscriber information, and call detail records including cell tower information which, according to Affiant's experience with criminal investigations, may be pertinent to whether, when, how, and with what motive said user committed the alleged offense of murder.

3. Probable Cause Statement:

a. On February 16, 2023, around 12:08 hours, Affiant, was monitoring the Royse City Police Department radio transmissions when Affiant heard Rockwall County Communications dispatch Royse City Officers to a Welfare Check at [the Griffins' address]․

․

c. As reported to Affiant by Royse City Police Chief Kirk Aldrige, at approximately, 12:50 PM, prior to Royse City Officers announcing or confirming information of a deceased female, Kenneth [Corey's father] asked Chief Aldridge if the victim was deceased. According to Chief Aldridge, this exchange occurred while Royse City Officers were inside the home conducting their initial interior sweep. Chief Aldridge told Affiant that when questioned as to why he would think the victim might be deceased, Kenneth stated that his wife (Corey Wayne Griffi[n]'s mother, Eva Griffin) had received a call from “someone” earlier indicating that.

d. Affiant arrived on scene at approximately 1:20 PM, and immediately made contact with Kenneth Griffin․ Affiant entered the house at [the Griffins' address], and observed a wallet with identifying contents belonging to the victim's estranged husband, Corey Wayne Griffin inside the residence. Additionally, Affiant observed a cell phone that rang when officers called Corey Wayne Griffin's phone number as provided by family members․

․

j. Through my training and experience, affiant knows that person(s) who are engaged in activity related to the offense of murder often utilize their cell phones to communicate with other accomplices or acquaintances about the offense, to help establish a motive or to help establish an alibi. Affiant further knows that cell phones contain other information related to determining locations visited, timelines of activities, etc. of the person with control of and/or carrying the cell phone on his person, who is, in this case the person suspected of committing the offense of murder, namely Corey Wayne Griffin. Affiant believes that based on my knowledge, training and experience, and the facts as set forth in this affidavit; there is probable cause to believe that the Gray Apple iPhone (newer model with three cameras) inside the red and black “SHIELD” case, pictured above, and seized from the murder scene, located at [the Griffins' address], will provide information described above.

The magistrate issued the search warrant on February 27, 2023.

C. Analysis

We begin our discussion by considering whether Corey preserved his issue for review. On October 18, 2023, Corey filed a boilerplate motion to suppress arguing “[a]ny tangible evidence seized in connection with this case was seized without warrant, probable cause or other lawful authority” in violation of his constitutional rights, and therefore, should be suppressed at trial. He did not specifically challenge the affidavit's failure to comply with article 18B.354. The trial court did not rule on the motion before trial.

During trial, Corey objected that there was “no nexus established between those phone records and the Corey Griffin phone and the offense in question” and referred the trial court to Baldwin. See 664 S.W.3d 122. On appeal, Corey makes two specific challenges regarding the probable cause affidavit supporting the AT&T search warrant: (1) the affidavit “does not recite any facts that makes location information relevant to the investigation of the crime,” and (2) the affidavit “does not specify that the requested location information was even held by the carrier to whom the warrant was directed,” meaning it included no facts alleging that Corey owned an AT&T phone or had a customer account with AT&T; therefore, there was no factual basis from which a magistrate could reasonably conclude that AT&T would possess electronic customer information constituting evidence of the crime.

“There is no requirement under our jurisprudence that a party, in order to preserve error [on] appeal on an evidentiary issue, must make sure the appellate argument comports with any related motion to suppress when there is an actual trial objection that comports with the appellate argument.” Gibson v. State, 541 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Thus, an appellant's argument need only comport with the trial objection. Id. And the objection at trial must have been sufficient to make the trial judge aware of the basis of the objection. Id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). This rule encompasses the concept of “party responsibility.” Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The complaining party bears the responsibility of clearly conveying the particular complaint to the trial judge, including the precise and proper application of the law as well as the underlying rationale. Id. at 463–64. In making this determination, we consider the context in which the complaint was made, and the parties' shared understanding at that time. Id. at 464.

After reviewing the relevant portions of the record, we conclude Corey's objection that “the affidavit does not support issuing of the search warrant because there was no nexus established between those phone records and the Corey Griffin phone and the offense in question,” was not sufficiently specific to make the trial court aware of the alleged deficiencies he now raises on appeal regarding the release of location information and the lack of any nexus between the cell phone, an AT&T phone number, and any AT&T customer accounts. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Considering the context in which Corey made his objection, his brief reference to “phone records” did not apprise the trial court or the State that he was specifically objecting to “Cell site information” and “Cell [s]ite locations,” which were two different categories of information described in the probable cause affidavit and separate from “Call detail records.”²

Corey's objection made no reference to article 18B.354, the relevant statute at issue. Instead, he cited Baldwin to support his objection, and that case did not involve the application of article 18B.354. Baldwin addressed the nexus between cell phones and criminal activity as well as boilerplate language in probable cause affidavits regarding the use of cell phones among criminals to support warrants issued pursuant to article 18.0215(c)(5). 664 S.W.3d at 130, 134 (approving of the use of such boilerplate language in affidavits for warrants to search cell phones when the language is “coupled with ‘other facts’ ” such as use of the phone before, during, or after the offense). Corey has not argued on appeal that the AT&T affidavit failed to establish a nexus between the offense and the phone itself.³ By citing Baldwin and objecting to the lack of nexus between his phone records, his cell phone, and the offense, Corey did not make the trial court sufficiently aware that he was objecting to the AT&T affidavit based on the specific arguments he raises on appeal regarding his location information and that such information would be held by AT&T. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

To be clear, our opinion should not be read to require that an objection at trial must include a reference to the precise statute in order to preserve an argument for appellate review. Our decision that Corey failed to preserve an argument regarding a lack of specificity to show his phone was under an AT&T plan and thus AT&T would have records pertaining to his phone takes into account the entire context in which the trial court considered his objections. At no point did Corey make clear to the trial court that the probable cause affidavit failed to establish that his phone was under an AT&T plan or that AT&T would have records regarding his phone. Thus, his issue raised on appeal does not comport with his trial objection.

Because Corey's trial objection was not sufficiently specific to make the trial court aware of the alleged deficiencies he now raises on appeal and his arguments do not comport with the grounds he urged at trial, he has preserved nothing for review. See Bekendam v. State, 441 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

We acknowledge, however, that Corey's issue statement is broader than his narrowed argument regarding location data. Corey's issue statement is as follows: “The trial court erred in refusing to suppress electronic [customer] data pertaining to Appellant's cellphone because the warrant purporting to authorize the release of such data was not based upon probable cause.” To the extent this language in Corey's brief comports with his argument at trial regarding a lack of nexus between the phone records and the offense, we conclude the four corners of the affidavit set out a sufficient nexus.

Although not directly related to article 18B.354, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recently addressed the nexus between cell phones and criminal activity as well as the use of boilerplate language in affidavits supporting such warrants. See Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 130; Stocker v. State, 693 S.W.3d 385, 387–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). Because the parties relied on Baldwin in the trial court and on appeal, we provide a brief discussion.

Officers discovered Baldwin's cell phone during a consensual search of his vehicle as part of a murder investigation. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 124. He refused to consent to a search of the phone, and officers applied for a search warrant. Id. In the supporting affidavit, an officer alleged facts connecting Baldwin's vehicle to the murder and provided “generic, boilerplate language about cell phone use among criminals.” Id. at 124, 134. Noting the paucity of case law concerning such boilerplate language, the Court agreed with lower courts that have approved of its use in affidavits for warrants to search cell phones when the language is “coupled with ‘other facts’ ” establishing probable cause. Id. at 134. However, the Court stressed that the affidavit in question contained “no facts ․ that tie [Baldwin's] cell phone to the offense” and “nothing about the phone being used before or during the offense.” Id. at 134–35. The Court concluded:

[T]he magistrate erred by substituting the evidentiary nexus for the officer's training and experience and generalized belief that suspects plan crimes using their phones. The boilerplate language in itself is not sufficient to provide probable cause in this case, nor does the remaining affidavit set forth details in sufficient facts to support probable cause. Considering the whole of the affidavit, there is no information included that suggest[s] anything beyond mere speculation that [Baldwin]'s cell phone was used before, during, or after the crime.

Id. at 135.

Here, the opposite is true. Although the affidavit included boilerplate language, it also included “other facts.” The boilerplate language provided that, based on Detective Mason's training and experience, people who are engaged in activity related to the offense of murder often utilize their cell phones to communicate with other accomplices or acquaintances about the offense, to help establish a motive, or to help establish an alibi. He further stated cell phones often contain other information related to determining locations visited and timelines of activities of the person suspected of committing murder. Detective Mason stated that he was aware AT&T

may provide information relevant to my investigation in that based on my experience, AT&T maintains records of incoming and outgoing calls, incoming and outgoing text ․ messages, data usage, subscriber information, and call detail records including cell tower information which ․ may be pertinent to whether, when, and how and with what motive said user committed the alleged offense of murder.

In addition to the boilerplate language, Detective Mason stated in the affidavit that he received information that Kenneth (Corey's father) asked if Chelsie was dead prior to Royse City Officers announcing or confirming information of Chelsie's death. Chief Aldridge told Detective Mason that when questioned as to why he would think Chelsie was deceased, Kenneth stated that Eva (Corey's mother) had received a call from “someone” earlier indicating “that.” Detective Mason stated that he arrived on the scene at approximately 1:20 pm and immediately made contact with Kenneth. Kenneth said he did not know his son's whereabouts. After the conversation, Detective Mason entered the home and found a wallet belonging to Corey and a cell phone “that rang when officers called Corey Wayne Griffin's phone number as provided by family members.” He observed Chelsie's lifeless body lying on the kitchen floor “covered in blood, with apparent signs of an egregious assault.”

We must defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have made. Id. at 130. The facts within the four corners of the affidavit specifically tied Corey's cell phone to Chelsie's murder. The information from Kenneth that “someone” called Eva indicating that Chelsie had been murdered before the officers discovered her body provided “some sort of corroboration” to any conclusory statements. See, e.g., id. at 132 (stating there must be “some sort of corroboration to the conclusory statement when a magistrate makes a probable cause determination”). Kenneth's statement was not a random coincidence, but instead a specific fact connecting Corey to the cell phone, which he left at the crime scene on the kitchen counter above Chelsie's dead body. The affidavit further stated that Corey “gave some information regarding his whereabouts and activities before and after his time at the victim's residence on February 16, 2023, but failed to mention communicating with his family members, specifically his mother Eva during that time.”

While a magistrate may not baselessly presume facts that the affidavit does not support, a magistrate is permitted to make reasonable inferences from the facts contained within the four corners of the affidavit. See Foreman v. State, 613 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Probable cause is about “fair probabilities, not near certainties.” Wells v. State, 714 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The magistrate could have reasonably inferred that Corey used his cell phone to communicate with Eva before or after the suspected criminal activity under investigation and described in the affidavit. The location information related to the call, which AT&T held in electronic storage, would likewise be related to determining Corey's locations visited and timelines of activities in the hours leading up to the murder. As such, considering the affidavit as a whole, while viewed in the light most favorable to the magistrate's ruling, we conclude that the affidavit contained sufficient particularized facts to allow the magistrate to determine probable cause for a warrant to search Corey's phone records because the data sought “constitutes evidence of that offense or evidence that a particular person committed that offense.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18B.354(b)(2)(A). Thus, the trial court did not err by overruling Corey's objection and denying his motion to suppress. See Llanas v. State, 711 S.W.3d 766, 772–73 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, no pet.) (applying Stocker and concluding affidavit provided magistrate with a substantial basis to find that probable cause existed to believe that searching defendant's cell phone was likely to produce evidence in the investigation of the drive-by shootings). We overrule Corey's first issue.

ADMISSION OF VICTIM'S STATEMENTS UNDER FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING

In his second issue, Corey challenges the admission of statements Chelsie made in an application for protective order, which she filed approximately three weeks before her death, over his hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections. Through Chelsie's divorce lawyer, the State offered the application and Chelsie's supporting affidavit, including photographs depicting damage to the home and injuries to herself, as State's Exhibit No. 132. In her affidavit, Chelsie made the following statements about Corey:

I am terrified that he will hurt me or the children. I am aware of his use of steroids, marijuana[,] and alcohol. This weekend he came to the home late at night, I was already in bed, he was intoxicated and made his way into my bed. All night he picked on me, pulled my hair, threw pillows around the room and tore up the bedroom. He broke some property. We had the police out again due to his behavior. He then told me[,] “If you keep messing with me, you're going to get it[.”]

I have been with Corey for years and have experienced years of physical and mental abuse. On Saturday night he told me not to have the doors locked to the home or my bedroom, he then looked at me and said[,] “If I come back and the doors are locked, I'll break them down[.”] I was worried and called the police; they came out and I made a report.

Early in 2021 we were having issues with our marriage; I was mentally exhausted and drained and expressed to Corey that I was over it. He then went and got a gun, loaded it and cocked it, then gave it to me and said “do it[.”] This was eye opening and worrisome.

Often, when we argue he will push me leaving bruises on my body (see photos from November 28, 2022) and throw items around the home, he will also call me names such as (whore, dumb bitch) and harass me and my friends and family until I respond. He has pushed me and left bruises about 10 times – with about 3 of those resulting in him placing his hands around my neck. He has punched me in the face, busting my lip. He has interfered with calls to law enforcement. He threatens me all the time.

Currently, I believe he is using drugs. I have asked for drug testing. He acts erratically. He is also drinking heavily. Last night, from 7pm until 4:30am, he was removing things from the house and throwing them away. He took all of the money from the joint account.

I am worried for my safety as well as my children's safety when around him. I do not feel safe and I need protection in my own home.

The State argued the evidence was admissible under the theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and the trial court agreed. Defense counsel requested findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue, which the trial court made after the trial had concluded. Neither party objected to the findings below or otherwise requested amended findings.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh'g). We reverse a trial court's ruling only if it is outside the “zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. If a trial court's decision is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, we will uphold it. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ․ to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Confrontation Clause bars the admissibility of testimonial hearsay statements unless the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross examine the witness. 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). Generally, testimonial hearsay statements would include (1) ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent that declarants would reasonably expect to be used to prosecute; (2) statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; and (3) statements that were made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe that the statements would be available for use at a later trial. Id. at 51–52. Here, there is no dispute that Chelsie's application for protective order, filed three weeks before her murder, and accompanied by her affidavit testimony detailing past abuse and harassment, constitutes a testimonial statement under Crawford.

Forfeiture by wrongdoing is an exception to Crawford that allows admission of testimonial statements when it is shown that the defendant engaged in conduct designed or intended to prevent the witness from testifying against him. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359–61 (2008). In Texas, this exception has been codified in article 38.49 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and provides in relevant part:

(a) A party to a criminal case who wrongfully procures the unavailability of a witness or prospective witness:

(1) may not benefit from the wrongdoing by depriving the trier of fact of relevant evidence and testimony; and

(2) forfeits the party's right to object to the admissibility of evidence or statements based on the unavailability of the witness as provided by this article through forfeiture by wrongdoing.

(b) Evidence and statements related to a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of a witness or prospective witness are admissible and may be used by the offering party to make a showing of forfeiture by wrongdoing under this article, subject to Subsection (c).

(c) In determining the admissibility of the evidence or statements described by Subsection (b), the court shall determine, out of the presence of the jury, whether forfeiture by wrongdoing occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. If practicable, the court shall make the determination under this subsection before trial using the procedures under Article 28.01 of this code and Rule 104, Texas Rules of Evidence.

(d) The party offering the evidence or statements described by Subsection (b) is not required to show that:

(1) the actor's sole intent was to wrongfully cause the witness's or prospective witness's unavailability;

(2) the actions of the actor constituted a criminal offense; or

(3) any statements offered are reliable.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.49.

In Giles, the statute under which the trial court admitted the victim's statements was “a provision of California law that permits admission of out-of-court statements describing the infliction or threat of physical injury on a declarant when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the prior statements are deemed trustworthy.” 554 U.S. at 357. In determining whether the theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing, accepted by the California Supreme Court, was an exception to the Confrontation Clause established at the time of its adoption, the Supreme Court explained the history of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception and that the evidence could not just show that the defendant caused the person to be absent, “as in the typical murder case involving accusatorial statements by the victim,” but must also show the defendant caused the absence with the intent to prevent the witness from testifying. Id. at 358–68. Thus, merely showing that the victim was dead by the defendant's hand was insufficient to show the defendant's intent was to prevent the witness from testifying against him. Id. However, in rejecting the dissent's suggestion that a different rule should apply for domestic-violence cases and in explaining that there could be evidence of intent that the State did not present and the trial and appellate courts did not consider in Giles because they did not believe it was relevant to the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing inquiry, see id. at 362, 376–77, the Supreme Court explained:

The domestic-violence context is, however, relevant for a separate reason. Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Where such an abusive relationship culminates in murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—rendering her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to testify.

Id. at 377.

B. Analysis

Corey argues on appeal that the State presented no evidence of a specific intent to prevent Chelsie from testifying against him and, thus, did not meet the requirements for an exception under a theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing to the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible. According to Corey, although the State showed Chelsie was unavailable due to Corey's actions, the State did not show he acted with intent to render her unavailable from testifying against him. “There was no evidence that [Corey] sought to dissuade her from filing for divorce, or that he tried to compel her to testify in any particular manner.” While Corey acknowledges the State admitted a number of harassing messages from him to Chelsie, he contends that none of them reference court proceedings or Chelsie's anticipated testimony and, in fact, they indicate Corey was done with the marriage and would not challenge her claims to the children or marital property. He also asserts that there was no evidence of any imminent hearings or appearances in the divorce case and no evidence of any pending criminal cases or other court proceedings. We disagree.

We do, however, agree that the State's argument to the trial court, and on appeal, did not specifically address Corey's intent to prevent Chelsie from testifying in a separate proceeding but focused more on showing how Corey procured her unavailability. The trial court also did not make any specific findings as to Corey's intent in procuring Chelsie's unavailability as a witness. The trial court's pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law are as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

․

3. During the course of the Defendant's jury trial, the State proffered evidence of an affidavit of the decedent, Chelsie Loren Griffin, that had been signed in support of application for a Protective Order (included in State's Exhibit 132) prior to her death. The State argued that Corey Wayne Griffin engaged in wrongdoing that was intended to and did procure the unavailability of Chelsie Loren Griffin, and therefore, the Defendant forfeited his right to object to the admissibility of the affidavit.

4. Outside the presence of the jury at a hearing conducted on August 7, 2024, which was the third day of the trial, the State requested the Court to consider all of the evidence that had been admitted up to that point in support of their motion under Article 38.49 and requested the admission of the decedent's affidavit into evidence.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Although it was not practicable to make the determination of forfeiture by wrongdoing before trial, based on the evidence presented between August 5th and August 7, 2024, the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence their claim of forfeiture by wrongdoing under section 38.49 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, that the Defendant, Corey Wayne Griffin, wrongfully procured the unavailability of a witness (i.e. Chelsie Loren Griffin) and therefore forfeited his right to object to the admission of the decedent's affidavit.

Because the trial court did not find Corey procured Chelsie's unavailability with the specific intent to prevent her from testifying against him at a separate proceeding, the dissenting opinion concludes that this Court cannot uphold State's Exhibit No. 132's admission under the theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing. But on appeal, we are to affirm the trial court's ruling if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong or incomplete reason for its ruling. De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344; Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Thus, we look to whether the evidence in the record, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, supports the trial court's decision that forfeiture by wrongdoing occurred. While the State could have presented its argument more succinctly, and the better practice would have been for the trial court to make specific findings regarding Corey's intent, we conclude the record supports, by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court's admission of State's Exhibit No. 132 under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.49(c) (providing trial court shall determine whether forfeiture by wrongdoing occurred by a preponderance of the evidence).

Under article 38.49, the trial court is permitted to consider the proffered statements when determining their admissibility under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception. Id. art. 38.49(b). In addition to describing previous abusive acts in her affidavit supporting her application for protective order, Chelsie stated, “He has interfered with calls to law enforcement. He threatens me all the time.” This is some evidence that Corey was preventing Chelsie from seeking help and protection as contemplated in Giles. 554 U.S. at 377.

Additionally, before the State began its argument on why the evidence should be admitted under forfeiture by wrongdoing, the prosecutor proffered “all of the evidence that has been submitted in trial up to this point.” This evidence further supports the trial court's ruling. First, there is evidence, independent of Chelsie's application for protective order, that details years of domestic violence. In the notes application of Corey's phone, detectives found the following message, dated July 12, 2020, which appeared to be directed toward Chelsie: “I'm sorry for putting my hands on you[.] I'm sorry I go for the throat on saying mean things to you and the[y're] not true.” The State also presented multiple text messages from Corey to Chelsie that were disturbing, harassing, or threatening in nature. For example, on January 25, 2023, Corey texted: “Good luck getting nothing, thank your lawyer for dragging his feet[.]” And on February 15, 2025, he texted, “This is on your hands[.] You took my kids from me, my house, my life!!! This is on you[.] Explain that to our children. [Y]ou can't hide that from them[.] Go f - - - yourself!!”

Chelsie and Corey's thirteen-year-old daughter testified that her parents argued a lot. Corey was mean to her mother. He would yell at her and call her many “rude” names, such as “slut” and “whore.” She also saw her father physically hurt her mother by slamming the console on her hand two or three times while they were sitting in their car in a Dairy Queen parking lot. Her mother had opened the console to find napkins, and her father was upset that her mother spilled something. While the divorce was pending, Corey “would always show up at [their] house” even though he was not supposed to. On one occasion, he came over and decided to spend the night. When Chelsie realized he was spending the night, she locked herself in her room. Corey banged on the door, yelled at her, and threatened to break down the door if she did not open it. Their daughter further testified she was scared Corey was going to hurt them.

Chelsie's older brother, Brian Bishop, also testified about the abuse. He explained he did not see his sister much while she was with Corey. He believed that Corey played a role in Chelsie being distanced from the family. However, he started to spend more time with her after she separated from Corey, and his relationship with her dramatically improved. He even accompanied her to her appointments with her lawyer because it was hard for her to talk about the abuse. Things became more intense between Corey and Chelsie toward the end of January 2023. On one occasion, Bishop even called the police to check on her.

Officer Evan Fletcher testified that he was dispatched to Chelise's home on January 21, 2023, after she called the police. She was stressed, anxious, and tense when he arrived. Although Officer Fletcher determined that an offense had not occurred that evening, he advised Chelsie to take her children and go stay somewhere else for the night. Chelsie did not seem likely to follow that advice, and so he advised her to call the police if Corey returned and it became an issue.

Officer Fletcher was also dispatched to the home on February 16, the day of Chelsie's murder. When he arrived, he noticed the doorbell camera was missing and the wires were exposed. A video, which the parties stipulated was from January 25, showed Corey kicking the doorbell camera. In response to being asked why he was upset in finding Chelsie in that manner on February 16, Officer Fletcher explained, “I mean, we had dealt with her, you know, that time prior. Some other officers had interactions with her. We were aware of the situation.”

Detective Mason was also called to the scene and testified to the following information regarding the ongoing domestic abuse:

I immediately recognized the address when it came out as a welfare check over the radio. We had been dealing with this home and the defendant and the victim for a couple of months now at that point. And, so, I was aware of the home and aware that there had been previous family violence calls, welfare concerns, welfare checks that had been requested out at this location.

I knew that we had actually had a previous case out there that resulted in an arrest of [Corey] for harassment.

Second, while we agree with Corey that there is no direct evidence that Chelsie was scheduled to testify against him in an imminent hearing, there is evidence that Chelsie filed for divorce in November 2022, three months before her murder; that she filed for a protective order and was issued a temporary restraining order in January 2023, less than a month before her murder; and that Corey was arrested for harassing her. As to the pending divorce, the legal assistant at her divorce attorney's office testified that she communicated with Chelsie more frequently than she normally communicated with clients. She explained that Chelise “just did not know how to handle everything. It was a lot. It was constant push from her ex. It was constant communication. She just didn't know how anything - - everything she did or didn't do was always going to be scrutinized by him. She was just terrified.” The legal assistant further explained that Chelsie's mother or brother accompanied her to the appointments because Chelsie needed someone helping her understand what they needed from her and to help her be accountable: “[a]lmost be her second brain and her second ears.”

Bishop testified that he did not believe, “for the longest time,” that Chelsie and Corey would reconcile. That changed the day before the murder when Chelsie told him “she would rather reconcile the marriage th[a]n to put up with everything that she's going through.” Bishop did not approve and told Chelsie the family would not approve either. However, in an effort to help his sister, he offered to call Corey and talk to him about reconciling. Chelsie could not call directly because of the temporary restraining order in place.

When Bishop called Corey and explained why he called, Corey told him that “he was freaked the f - - - out because [Bishop] was calling him” and did not have time and was too old “to roll around in the dirt.” Bishop did not think he was hostile toward him but more towards the situation. The phone call was not productive, and after talking with Chelsie again, he believed “there was a halt on everything.” Corey tried to call him back but, when he did not answer, he began to receive increasingly aggressive text messages. He told Chelsie about the messages and was on the phone with her on February 16, when she arrived home during her lunch break. Chelsie began screaming extremely loud, and the call “abruptly ended.”

The night before the murder, Corey sent his daughter text messages, which made her concerned that he might kill himself. He also texted her that she needed to talk to her mother because this was all her fault and “[s]he took everything from me,” including “[y]ou” and “Bubba.”⁴ His daughter told him she did not want to lose him, and he responded, “Baby you already have.”

One of the Griffins' neighbors testified that Corey called him the morning of the murder. They too discussed Chelsie and Corey reconciling, and Corey told him about Bishop's calling him regarding the reconciliation. Corey also told the neighbor that “he would reconcile with her just to slit her throat.”

Corey also sent threatening messages to Chelsie's divorce attorney on the morning of the murder. He accused the attorney of pursuing the divorce without investigating any of the grounds Chelsie alleged against him and accused the attorney of sleeping with Chelsie.

When Chelsie would not answer Corey's calls or texts the morning of her murder, Corey's text messages escalated in their harassing nature. A little over an hour before the murder he told her he was done with their relationship, he was leaving the country, she would never get another penny from him, and he would “sign over” his rights to the children. He also told her she could have the house and everything in it.

Although there was competing evidence regarding whether Chelsie and Corey were attempting to reconcile or whether Corey was willing to walk away from the marriage and leave her everything, the evidence shows at the time of Chelsie's murder, the divorce remained pending. We do not agree that the evidence shows he and Chelsie came to an agreement about the divorce proceedings or that their issues were resolved. See, e.g., Moshin v. State, 691 S.W.3d 193, 206–07 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet. ref'd) (rejecting appellant's argument that victim's decision to not attend trial was “made from an independent desire to no longer proceed with the prosecution” and to reconcile where record supported alternative inferences regarding her unavailability including evidence he prevented her from being there and evidence he “alternated professions of his love with insults, demeaning language, and accusations of infidelity”). Instead, the totality of the evidence demonstrates that Corey's instability was escalating, that he became deeply agitated and profoundly upset that Chelsie was seeking a divorce and trying to distance herself from him, and that he was erratic and losing control.

There was also evidence before the trial court that Chelsie's application for protective order had not been fully resolved at the time of her murder. She had been granted a temporary restraining order, which had then been extended, but a final hearing on whether to grant a protective order had not yet occurred. The record does not contain any other information about Corey's arrest for harassment in terms of whether the allegations had been submitted to the district attorney's office or whether formal charges were going to be brought against him. However, it is a reasonable inference that any further pursuit of a harassment case would have included Chelsie's participation as a witness against Corey.

As Corey's counsel acknowledges in his brief, “all of the acts of intimidation or coercion in [Chelsie]'s affidavit point to [Corey]'s desire to control her actions, to prevent her from locking him out, and to stop ‘messing with’ him.” Again, that is precisely the type of evidence that Giles suggested would support a finding that forfeiture by wrongdoing had occurred. See 554 U.S. at 377.

Brown v. State is also instructive. See 618 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Although in Brown, the Court of Criminal Appeals was focused on deciding whether the evidence supported a finding that the defendant actually caused the witness's unavailability, the Court discussed how the requisite intent to prevent a witness from testifying could be found when an abusive relationship ends in murder. Id. at 357–58. The Court explained,

[T]his is not a case where a defendant murdered the victim—an offense that would necessarily cause the victim to be absent from trial. The past commission of family-violence assault offenses does not, standing alone, show that a defendant caused the victim to be absent from trial. In a murder case, a prior history of family violence may show that the murder not only caused the victim's absence, but that it was designed to do so.

Id. at 358. The Court further explained that the State had not offered any evidence to show the defendant “issued any threats or engaged in conduct otherwise designed to control” the victim. Id.

The opposite is true here. The evidence shows Corey had threatened Chelsie numerous times and engaged in conduct to try and control her in their marriage and in her seeking a divorce. When he began to lose control and was restrained from being near her and facing divorce proceedings and a potential criminal harassment charge, he killed her. The evidence also supports a finding that on the day of her murder, Corey confronted Chelsie about their marriage, the situation escalated, he brutally assaulted her, and then he killed her so that she could not again call the police and report his abusive behavior. See Gonzalez, 195 S.W.3d at 125 (holding “that the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing may apply even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable” and concluding the evidence supported a finding that the defendant “committed burglary or robbery for financial gain and then murdered the two witnesses who could identify him”); Shepherd v. State, 489 S.W.3d 559, 574–75 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref'd) (relying on Gonzalez and concluding the evidence supported an inference that a part of the reason defendant shot the victim was to prevent her from testifying against him where he attempted to kidnap her and shot her when she tried to escape).

Therefore, we conclude that the record in this case shows by a preponderance of the evidence that Corey murdered Chelsie in part to procure her unavailability in the divorce case, the protective order case, the harassment case, or in a combination of any of the three. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.49(d)(1) (the State is not required to show that “the actor's sole intent was to wrongfully cause the witness's or prospective witness's unavailability”); Baxter v. State, No. 02-22-00258-CR, 2023 WL 8268292, at *17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 30, 2023, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding evidence of ongoing abusive and controlling relationship was sufficient for trial court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's actions were motivated, at least in part, to prevent wife from leaving him and to cut short the criminal investigation against him regarding his previous assault of her). Because the record supports the trial court's overall finding that the State met its burden and thus the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing applied, we believe we must uphold the trial court's ruling. Unlike Giles, the issue of forfeiture by wrongdoing was litigated in the trial court below. See People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 437 (Cal. 2007), rev'd by Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). In Giles, the trial occurred pre-Crawford and the trial court admitted the victim's hearsay statements under a rule of evidence that provided an exception for hearsay statements describing the infliction of physical injury on the declarant when the declarant was unavailable to testify and the statements were trustworthy. Id. The issue of forfeiture by wrongdoing and whether intent was an element of the doctrine did not become an issue in the case until appeal, which occurred post-Crawford. Id.

Such is not the case here. Although the element of intent was not expressly discussed below, the issue of whether intent was required had long since been settled, and we presume the trial court was aware of the law, both under Giles and article 38.49, when it made its ruling. It is clear from the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that the State requested, and the trial court considered, all the evidence that had thus far been submitted at trial when it determined whether the State met its burden under article 38.49. The evidence we have highlighted that supports a finding of intent was within this evidence considered by the trial court in reaching its decision. Therefore, we are not ignoring our mandate to give deference to the trial court's findings, nor are we disregarding any findings or making contradictory findings. Furthermore, this is not a situation in which statutory findings were required to be explicitly made in writing. We are simply detailing the evidence that supports the trial court's findings and conclusions that the State met its burden to show forfeiture by wrongdoing under article 38.49. We do not believe we are going outside of our bounds of appellate review in doing so. Corey's second issue is overruled.

ADMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPHS DEPICTING VICTIM'S PREVIOUS INJURIES

In his third issue, Corey agues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting two photographs (State's Exhibit Nos. 20 and 21) of injuries Chelsie sustained several weeks before her death because the sponsoring witness did not have personal knowledge of the injuries and could not authenticate the photographs. The State responds he failed to preserve his issue for review, or alternatively, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to make a “38.371 determination” regarding State's Exhibit Nos. 20 and 21. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.371(a) (article governing trials involving family-violence offenses). Officer Fletcher testified that he responded to a call from Chelsie's residence on January 21, 2023. When he arrived, Chelsie was “[s]tressed, tense, anxious.” He observed a mark on her hand that he believed was a scar. Officer Fletcher asked Chelsie about her relationship with Corey and if there had been any prior abuse in the relationship. The State made it “clear” that it was not asking him “to tell us what Chelsie told you about what happened that night.” Rather, the State proceeded to “talk to [him] about what [he] asked her.”

Officer Fletcher confirmed he asked Chelsie about the “relationship dynamic” and if there had been any prior abuse. He asked Chelsie if any evidence of the prior abuse existed, and she later emailed him two photographs. He confirmed that Chelsie sent him State's Exhibits Nos. 20 and 21, which were two color photographs depicting bruises on the upper portions of her arms taken on November 29, 2022.

At the conclusion of his testimony, Corey made the following objection:

[Defense Counsel]: ․ [S]he's artfully asked the questions, but it still requires hearsay. The questions presuppose that she has told him that Corey inflicted these, and based upon those questions, it creates the -- in the minds of the jury, that these -- that these bruises were caused by actions of Corey Griffin, certainly. That's the only reason they would be in there. And, so, it requires hearsay. It requires him to know what she has just told [him]. So it's the -- the form of the question doesn't say, what did she tell you, but the nature of the -- the nature of the question makes it clear that that's the only way he would know that. There's no other way he would know that.

The Court: That is a normal way to ask questions, isn't it, without asking someone what someone specifically said? I see it happen quite frequently.

[Defense Counsel]: If - - whether it's frequent, Judge - - I mean, we're talking about whether or not it calls for a hearsay response. And, so, by definition, he does not have personal knowledge as to who inflicted those. Other than, that's what she told him.

The State responded that asking Officer Fletcher what he said to Chelsie was not hearsay because the State asked him what she provided, physically, not what Chelsie told him. The trial court then asked, “Is that your only objection or you're also making an objection under relevance?” Defense counsel responded,

Well, it's - - I mean, my objection under 38.371 is the same objections I've made. But to articulate that, the - - the - - this does not bear on the relationship between the parties, and it - - it also requires the Court to make determinations that - - that the - - that the - - if - - 403(b) balancing test would also have to be done on this before - - before it's allowed.

The trial court overruled Corey's hearsay objection and determined the testimony was “relevant as it relates to what is allowed by article 38.371,” and “although it's certainly prejudicial to some extent, ․ the prejudicial effect is less than the probative value.” Officer Fletcher then testified before the jury about the same facts he provided in the 38.371 hearing, and the State introduced Exhibit Nos. 20 and 21 into evidence.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's decision whether to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Hart v. State, 688 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). We will not reverse the ruling of the trial court except where there has been a clear abuse of discretion falling outside the “zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. (quoting Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391).

B. Analysis

We begin by considering whether Corey preserved his issue for review. Corey presents his issue as challenging the admission of the photographs because Officer Fletcher did not have personal knowledge of the injuries depicted in the photographs, and he could not authenticate them. However, Corey did not object at trial that Officer Fletcher did not have personal knowledge to authenticate the photographs or present any other argument regarding a lack of authentication.

To preserve error for appellate review, the rules of appellate procedure require the record to show that the objection “stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see also Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The argument made on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial. Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339.

Corey objected at trial that the State was “artfully” asking questions that required hearsay responses. He did not object that the photographs were not properly authenticated. Corey has not challenged on appeal Officer Fletcher's alleged hearsay statements but challenges the admission of the photographs. His single reference that Officer Fletcher did not have personal knowledge as to who inflicted the wounds was said within the context of his hearsay objection. And the trial court specifically overruled “the objection based on hearsay.” Accordingly, Corey's objection was neither sufficiently specific nor apparent from the context to make the trial court aware he was objecting to authentication of the photographs based on Officer Fletcher's lack of personal knowledge or any other defect in authentication. Thus, Corey has not preserved his authentication issue for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339.

Even if Corey had preserved his issue, any error was harmless. The erroneous admission of evidence is non-constitutional error. Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Non-constitutional errors are harmful, and thus require reversal, only if they affect appellant's substantial rights. Id.; TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). This means that an error is reversible only when it has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373. If we have a fair assurance from an examination of the record as a whole that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect, we will not overturn the conviction. Id.

In making this determination, we consider: (1) the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence; (2) the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict; (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt; and (4) whether the State emphasized the complained of error. Id.

Although the pictures were the only photographic evidence of Corey's previous abuse against Chelsie, the jury heard significant evidence regarding Corey and Chelsie's relationship, including other incidents of physical abuse. Their daughter testified that the family was in the car in the Dairy Queen parking lot, and Corey got upset when Chelsie spilled something. When Chelsie tried to get napkins from the middle console, Corey repeatedly slammed the console onto her hand. Detective Mason testified he was “aware that there had been previous family violence calls, welfare concerns, welfare checks” at their home and “a previous case ․ that resulted in an arrest of the defendant for harassment.” A neighbor testified Corey called him the morning of the murder and said he considered reconciling with Chelsie “just to slit her throat.” A note created on July 12, 2020, and extracted from Corey's cell phone said, “I'm sorry for putting my hands on you[.] I'm sorry I go for the throat on saying mean things to you and the[y're] not true.”

A CPS worker interviewed Corey in jail the day after the murder. She described Cory's demeanor as “very agitated” throughout the interview. “He was sharp with his words, with a sneer in his voice.” He banged his handcuffs against the table and threw papers around the room. When she asked him about past physical violence in the marriage, Corey denied any domestic violence. He admitted, however, that he had recently been arrested for harassment, and Chelsie was scared for her life. Corey told the CPS worker, “I'm glad she's f - - -ing dead.”

The State questioned Corey about a 2012 incident in which he visited Chelsie's family and they kicked him out of the house after punching Chelsie in the mouth. Corey denied the incident; however, his cousin testified that she “knew of abuse” and that Corey had admitted to abusing Chelsie.

Sam John, a marriage counselor, worked with the couple. John's July 7, 2022 therapy notes stated Corey “grabbed her by the face and pushed her back” and “smashed her phone.” He “emptied his gun and told her to blow her brains out.” Corey knew his actions were inappropriate, but “frustration is what triggers his anger.”

The pictures contained in State's Exhibit Nos. 20 and 21 also came in with State's Exhibit No. 132. Although the pictures here were in color, the bruises appear faint and are very minor injuries compared to the injuries Corey inflicted on Chelsie the day of the murder, which the jury not only saw through photographs but also through Officer Fletcher's body camera footage. In these pictures and footage, Chelsie is sprawled out on the kitchen floor lifeless. Blood can be seen on her face, arms, and hands. Her hair and denim jacket were completely saturated in blood. The images also showed blood splattered on the kitchen cabinets, the kitchen floor, and the hallway floor leading to the garage. There were also bloody handprints found in the dining room on a bench and a dining room chair. Smudges of blood on multiple beer cans throughout the kitchen and hallway looked “like they had been thrown or used in some type of assault.”

Officer Fletcher described Chelsie as “unrecognizable.” When Detective Mason was asked whether the picture showing Chelsie's face was what her face looked like when they encountered her that day, he responded, “Yes, ma'am. I'll never forget that.” He explained that a violent struggle had very obviously occurred. Detective Mason also testified there appeared to be bloody fingerprints “in a gripping manner” on her pant leg consistent with someone grabbing her by the leg and dragging her.

The medical examiner confirmed the violent nature of Chelsie's murder. She suffered a painful death, that was not immediate, at the hands of the man who had tormented her for years.

The gunshot wound to her head was not instantly fatal. Blood in her lungs indicated she continued breathing after Corey shot her. The amount was “significant,” and Chelsie likely felt the sensation of drowning or suffocating as she tried to breathe and inhaled her own blood. Chelsie also suffered blunt force injuries to her forehead, nose, upper lip, and the right side of her face. Part of her skull was fractured with hemorrhaging under the scalp. The injuries were consistent with Chelsie being struck repeatedly with the edge of a full can of beer, which officers recovered from the crime scene near her body. DNA testing confirmed her blood on the beer can. She also had petechial hemorrhages under her eyelids and damage to her neck muscles consistent with strangulation. Her arms were covered with defensive wounds indicating she was not only alive but still conscious after Corey shot her in the head and proceeded to bash her head and strangle her.

Significantly, the State did not emphasize the two photographs beyond introducing them. The entirety of Officer Fletcher's testimony about his welfare check on November 29, 2022, consisted of approximately ten pages in a multi-day trial with over 900 pages of reporter's record and 2,224 pages of exhibits. The State briefly showed Corey the photographs during his testimony, and he denied causing the bruises. And although the State referenced the November 2022 incident in closing, it did not refer to the pictures.

We are unpersuaded by Corey's reliance on Reese v. State, 33 S.W.3d 238, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), in which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that a single photograph can be harmful. In that case, the Court conducted a rule 403 harm analysis for an 8x10 colored photograph of the deceased victim in the casket with her unborn fetus swaddled in a blanket next to her with only his face showing. The unborn child was described as “miniature in form and his face is only a fraction of the size of his mother's hand.” Id. The court noted that society's “natural inclination is to protect the innocent and the vulnerable,” and the unborn child appeared “tiny, innocent, and vulnerable.” Thus, the contents of the photograph had an emotional impact that suggested the jury's decision be made on an emotional basis and not the basis of other relevant evidence introduced at trial. Id. Unlike the picture at issue in Reese, the two pictures here show faint bruises on a grown woman's arms and were unlikely to have a similar emotional impact suggesting the jury's decision be made on an emotional basis and not the basis of all the other evidence introduced at trial.

After examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance that any error in admitting the photographs in color did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373. Corey's third issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Corey's three issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

JUDGMENT

Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Clinton and Barbare participating.

Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 12th day of December 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In its brief, the State addresses the first affidavit (State's Exhibit No. 572) rather than responding to Corey's arguments related to the AT&T affidavit (State's Exhibit No. 573).

2.   For article 18B.354 purposes, “[e]lectronic customer data” means data or records from a service provider that contain:(i) information revealing the identity of customers of the applicable service;(ii) information about a customer's use of the applicable service;(iii) information that identifies the recipient or destination of a wire or electronic communication sent to or by a customer;(iv) the content of a wire or electronic communication sent to or by a customer;(v) any data stored with the applicable service provider by or on behalf of a customer; or(vi) location information.TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18B.001(7). Thus, the electronic customer data sought in an 18B.354 warrant is much broader than simply location information.

3.   Corey objected separately at trial to State's Exhibit No. 572, the probable cause affidavit to access his cell phone, based on a lack of sufficient nexus as contemplated by Baldwin. The trial court overruled his objection and motion to suppress. Corey has not challenged this ruling on appeal.

4.   “Bubba” is Corey and Chelsie's son.

CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE