IN RE: K.L.W. (2025)

OPINION

Dismissed and Opinion filed November 13, 2025

K.L.W. was adjudicated for aggravated robbery in January 2023 and committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) for a determinate sentence of seven years. The juvenile court probated the sentence and placed him in his mother's care. After K.L.W. allegedly violated the terms of his probation by, among other things, committing a new offense, the court conducted a transfer hearing under section 54.051 of the Family Code on March 28, 2025. Tex. Fam. Code § 54.051 (“Transfer of Determinate Sentence Probation to Appropriate District Court”). After the hearing, the court erroneously signed an order under section 54.11 of the Family Code transferring K.L.W. from TJJD to the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to serve the remainder of his sentence. Id. § 54.11 (“Release or Transfer Hearing”). K.L.W. appealed, challenging the court's dispositional order. See id. § 56.01(c)(2).

On August 27, 2025, this court sent a letter to the parties, notifying them that the appeal was subject to dismissal because the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order the juvenile's transfer under section 54.11 absent the required referral from TJJD under the statute. We provided the parties an opportunity to file a response demonstrating meritorious grounds for continuing the appeal. On August 29, 2025, the State filed a response, explaining that the juvenile court had withdrawn its March 28 order and entered a new dispositional order dated August 29, 2025. In the substituted order, the court found that it retained jurisdiction under section 51.0412 of the Family Code and ordered the transfer of the juvenile's determinate sentence probation to the district court. Id. § 51.0412 (“Jurisdiction Over Incomplete Proceedings”).

On September 4, 2025, this court sent a second letter requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the proper disposition of the case under the original March 28 order and whether the juvenile court had authority to withdraw it and enter a new order on August 29. Both parties filed supplemental briefs. K.L.W. contends that the March 28 order was erroneous and required correction, the case was stayed while on appeal, the juvenile court retained plenary power to enter the August 29 order, and the court erred in transferring his determinate sentence probation to the district court. Conversely, the State argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to enter the March 28 order but retained jurisdiction to issue the August 29 order because the proceeding was not yet complete. The State further asserts that the appeal should be dismissed because the August 29 order is not an appealable order.

After reviewing the record and procedural history, we conclude that the March 28 order was void because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a hearing and enter an order under section 54.11 without a referral from TJJD or other specified entities to trigger its jurisdiction. We further conclude that the court retained jurisdiction under section 51.0412 of the Family Code to withdraw the original order and issue the appropriate order transferring the determinate sentence probation to district court. See id. § 51.0412. As an order entered under section 54.051 is not appealable, we do not reach the merits of K.L.W.'s appeal and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See id. § 56.01(c).

Background

On September 6, 2022, the State filed a petition alleging K.L.W. engaged in delinquent conduct as a juvenile by committing the offenses of aggravated assault and aggravated robbery. Several months later, he was adjudicated for the offense of aggravated robbery, and after a disposition hearing was held, he was committed to TJJD and sentenced to seven years confinement. His determinate sentence was probated for seven years, and the juvenile court placed him in his mother's care. On March 17, 2025, the State filed a second amended motion to revoke K.L.W.'s determinate sentence probation and transfer the determinate sentence to district court. The motion alleged K.L.W. violated the terms of his probation by committing aggravated robberies and other technical violations, including not attending school and missing curfew.

On March 28, 2025, the parties appeared for a hearing for what they believed was a transfer hearing under section 54.051, and during the hearing, the following exchange occurred:

The Court: Since being on probation, looks like [K.L.W.] has since been indicted in Harris County for the offense of murder, offense of aggravated assault occurring in two separate transactions is what the allegation is; and he's still currently on this probation. In Cause No. JV24309 we are here on a motion of the State to consider the matter of the disposition—not the disposition of but whether the probation should be transferred or kept in the juvenile system. Y'all agree with that characterization?

[Prosecutor]: And that he would be discharged on his birthday[.]

The Court: So he would be discharged on his birthday or transferred to the adult system.

[Prosecutor]: Correct.

The Court: That's a better characterization. I agree with that. What about you, Mr. Clayton?

[Defense Counsel]: I do agree with that, Judge.1

Patrick Okafor, a juvenile probation officer with the Brazoria County Juvenile Justice Department, was the only witness to testify. He testified that K.L.W. was given a seven-year determinate sentence probation in January 2023 that was then transferred to Harris County where K.L.W. lived with his mother. Okafor listed the numerous ways K.L.W. violated the conditions of his probation. One such violation was for violating state laws. Okafor also testified K.L.W. was currently in jail on charges for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated robbery, and capital murder. Okafor averred that each of these new offenses was committed after curfew and while K.L.W. was on probation. Okafor testified that K.L.W. was not performing well as a probationer and, when asked by the State whether K.L.W. should be transferred or released, Okafor recommended that he be transferred.

Although the record shows that the parties appeared for a transfer hearing under section 54.051, the juvenile court nevertheless entered a dispositional order under section 54.11, transferring K.L.W. from TJJD to TDCJ, stating in relevant part:

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th day of MARCH, 2025, came to be heard the above-numbered and entitled cause pursuant to Section 54.11, Texas Family Code, on the issue of commitment to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (hereinafter referred to as “TJJD”), transfer to the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice of [K.L.W.] (hereinafter referred to as “Respondent”)[.] ․ Pursuant to and in full accordance with Section 54.11, Texas Family Code, after due notice had been issued on all parties as required, came and appeared at the time required the Petitioner by LESA TROMBLEY, Prosecuting Attorney, and announced ready for this hearing. And thereupon also came the Respondent, who appeared in person with his attorney CHASE CLAYTON, and Respondent's mother[.] All parties announced ready for this hearing. Then, after hearing the pleadings of all parties and considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the recommendations of the Brazoria County Juvenile Justice Department, and other factors pursuant to and in full accordance with Section 54.11, Texas Family Code, the Court found the following:

1. That ․ this transfer/release hearing was held prior to the 60th day after the date the Court received the referral.

2. The Respondent has not completed his sentence[.]

3. That Respondent had been detained for 234 days for this offense from June 6, 2022, to January 26, 2023, and should be given time credit from that date.

4. That at the time of this transfer/release hearing Respondent is in the custody of Harris County Jail, where he has been indicted for Capital Murder on January 8, 2025, by the Grand Jury of Harris County, Texas.

5. That Respondent is still in need of rehabilitation and the welfare of the community requires transfer.

6. That Respondent displayed a deadly weapon to wit: firearm[.]

7. That it is therefore in the best interest of the Respondent, and the public at large, that Respondent be transferred to the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in accordance with Section 54.11, Texas Family Code, to serve the 7-year Determinate Sentence.

However, the record shows that K.L.W.'s determinate sentence probation was not revoked during the hearing and that a 54.11 hearing was not held.

Analysis

On appeal, K.L.W. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by transferring him to the custody of TDCJ, arguing that the court's findings were based on “assumptions and conclusions.” As stated, we do not reach the merits of this contention. Rather, after reviewing the record and applicable law, we address two questions of law, which we review de novo: (1) whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter the March 28 order under section 54.11 without a referral from TJJD; and, if not, (2) whether the court retained jurisdiction to enter the August 29 order under section 54.051. See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004) (“Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law.”). We note that neither party initially raised the issue of the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction to enter the dispositional order under section 54.11, but subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and we must consider our jurisdiction, even if we must do so sua sponte. See Freedom Commc'ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 623–24 (Tex. 2012); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993) (stating that subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived).

I. The Juvenile Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Enter the March 28 Order under Section 54.11.

As discussed, the record shows that the juvenile court conducted a transfer hearing under section 54.051 but erroneously entered an order transferring K.L.W. from TJJD to TDCJ under section 54.11. When a judgment is rendered in writing and then signed, it becomes the official judgment of the court. Harrington v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). The written judgment controls over any conflicting recitals in the reporter's or clerk's records. See Lopez v. Brown, 356 S.W.3d 599, 603 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). We must therefore determine whether the juvenile court had the authority to enter the order under section 54.11. In doing so, we first outline the applicable standard of review and governing law before applying the relevant grammatical principles to section 54.11 and assessing the court's jurisdiction to enter the first order.

A. Standard of Review and Governing Law

Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case. Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022). The subject matter jurisdiction of Texas courts is derived exclusively from the Texas Constitution and statutory law. See id. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or waiver, a judgment is void and never final if the issuing court lacked jurisdiction. See id. We are reluctant to conclude that a statutory requirement affects a court's jurisdiction absent clear legislative intent to that effect. See City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Tex. 2009).

The March 28 order was entered under section 54.11 of the Family Code, which outlines the procedural and substantive prerequisites for a court to conduct a transfer or release hearing. The statute provides:

On receipt of a referral under Section 244.014(a), Human Resources Code, for the transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice of a person committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department under Section 54.04(d)(3), 54.04(m), or 54.05(f), on receipt of a request by the Texas Juvenile Justice Department under Section 245.051(d), Human Resources Code, for approval of the release under supervision of a person committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department under Section 54.04(d)(3), 54.04(m), or 54.05(f), or on receipt of a referral under Section 152.0016(g) or (j), Human Resources Code, the court shall set a time and place for a hearing on the possible transfer or release of the person, as applicable.

Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11(a). Because the juvenile court entered the order without first receiving a referral from TJJD—and it appears no published opinion from this court has addressed whether such a referral is required—we review the statute's language to determine whether the legislature intended such a referral to be a jurisdictional requirement for the court to conduct a section 54.11 hearing.

We review statutory construction issues de novo. See Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. 2018); Redus v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 698 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied). Our objective in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. See Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). If possible, we must ascertain that intent from the language in the statute and not look to extraneous matters. Id. If the wording of the statute is unambiguous, we adopt the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision's words and do not engage in forced or strained constructions. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997). We presume that every word was deliberately chosen and that excluded words were intentionally excluded. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981).

B. Application of Grammatical Rules to Section 54.11

The purpose of a transfer or release hearing under section 54.11 is to determine whether a juvenile who has been committed to TJJD under a determinate sentence should be released under supervision, returned to TJJD, or transferred to TDCJ to complete their determinate sentence. See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11(a), (i)–(j). We note that subsection (a) of the statute contains three parallel conditional phrases, each beginning with “on receipt.” Although we limit our analysis to the first conditional phrase referencing section 244.014(a) of the Human Resources Code, we see no reason why the same analytical framework would not apply to the remaining phrases referencing sections 152.0016(g), 152.0016(j), or 245.051(d) of the Human Resources Code since they also lead with the phrase “on receipt.” Parsing the text of the statute according to the rules of grammar, the statute can be divided into the introductory clause and the main clause. The introductory clause consists of:

On receipt of a referral under Section 244.014(a), Human Resources Code, for the transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice of a person committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department under Section 54.04(d)(3), 54.04(m), or 54.05(f)[,]

and the main clause provides:

the court shall set a time and place for a hearing on the possible transfer or release of the person, as applicable.

We first break down the introductory clause. The phrase “on receipt of a referral” is an adverbial phrase that modifies “shall set,” providing the conditions under which the court sets the hearing. Stated differently, the referral is the triggering event for the hearing, i.e., a statutory condition that must occur before the court can schedule a hearing. See id. § 54.11(a); see also Webster's New World English Grammar Handbook 95, 200 (2d. ed. 2009) (discussing adverbs and adverbial phrases). The phrases “under Section 244.014(a), Human Resources Code” and “for the transfer” are adjectival phrases that modify “referral.” See Webster's New World English Grammar Handbook at 85, 200 (discussing adjectives and adjectival phrases). The phrases “to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice” and “of a person” are adjectival phrases that modify “transfer.” See id. The phrases “to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department” and “under Section 54.04(d)(3), 54.04(m), or 54.05(f)” are adjectival phrases that modify “committed,” which functions as an attributive adjective modifying the word “person.” See id. at 86 (explaining the role of attributive adjectives).

Continuing our breakdown of the statue, we turn to the main clause, which contains several noun and prepositional phrases. The phrase “the court” is a noun phrase. See id. at 367 (defining noun phrases). The word “shall” is an auxiliary verb—a verb combined with the main verb “to express various shades of meaning.” Id. at 53, 360. The word “set” is a verb, and the phrase “a time and place” is a noun phrase. See id. at 367, 372. The phrase “for a hearing” is an adjectival phrase modifying “time and place.” See id. at 85, 200. The phrases “on the possible transfer or release” and “of the person” are adjectival phrases with the former modifying “hearing” and the latter modifying “transfer or release.” See id. The phrase “as applicable” is an adverbial phrase. See id. at 95, 200.

We note that the statute contains only two adverbial phrases, which specify when and under what conditions the action must occur: (1) “on receipt of a referral” and (2) “as applicable.” See id. The phrase “on receipt of a referral” explains when the court must act, and the phrase “as applicable” describes whether the hearing is for a transfer or for a release. See generally Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11(a); see also Webster's New World English Grammar Handbook at 95, 200. The remaining phrases are adjectival, adding layered descriptions to the words modified. See Webster's New World English Grammar Handbook at 85, 200. Construing the statute to effectuate the legislature's intent, it is evident that a referral from TJJD under the appropriate statutory provision is a prerequisite to conducting a transfer hearing under section 54.11. See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11; see also White, 288 S.W.3d at 393; Allen, 15 S.W.3d at 527.

We therefore conclude that absent a referral from TJJD in the record, the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a hearing under section 54.11 and, correspondingly, had no authority to enter an order under that section. See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11; see generally Matter of D.R., No. 02-24-00334-CV, 2025 WL 1350035, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 8, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[T]he Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) requested by letter that the trial court transfer D.R. to TDCJ[.]”); Matter of K.P., No. 14-21-00709-CV, 2023 WL 142460, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 10, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The referral letter in this case properly invoked the juvenile court's jurisdiction to hold a release or transfer hearing[.]”); In re J.D.T., No. 14-20-00689-CV, 2022 WL 3205088, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that the referral letter from TJJD invoked the juvenile court's jurisdiction to hold a release or transfer hearing, which allowed its discretion to “fashion an order at the conclusion of the hearing”).

We are further persuaded that a referral from TJJD is a jurisdictional requirement for a transfer hearing because the transfer statute further provides that “[t]he hearing on a person who is referred from transfer ․ shall be held not later than the 60th day after the date the court receives the referral.” See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11(h). Hence, even if the court attempts to hold a transfer hearing under section 54.11 without a referral, it is procedurally invalid because it was not properly triggered by the statutorily required referral. Abdullatif v. Erpile, LLC, 460 S.W.3d 685, 694 n.10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“A judgment by a trial court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is void.”).

C. Application of Section 54.11 to This Case

We now return to the first question posed above: whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter the dispositional order under section 54.11 without a referral from TJJD. The answer is no. As discussed in detail above, section 54.11 contains specific jurisdictional prerequisites—most importantly, a referral from TJJD. See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11(a). The record, however, contains no such referral.² Without this essential jurisdictional element, the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a release or transfer hearing and consequently, had no authority to enter an order transferring K.L.W. from TJJD to TDCJ. Accordingly, the court's March 28 order is void because it is well-established that a judgment or order rendered by a court without jurisdiction or power to render it is a nullity. Lee v. Lee, 528 S.W.3d 201, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (citing Urbish v. 127th Judicial Dist. Court, 708 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding)).

II. The Juvenile Court Retained Jurisdiction under Section 51.0412 to Complete the Transfer Proceeding and Enter the August 29 Order under section 54.051.

Nevertheless, our inquiry does not end here. Ordinarily, we would declare the March 28 order void and vacate it because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order. See Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.”) (emphasis added); see also State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). Yet, the record reflects that the court, after being alerted to the problem by this court, recognized the defect and withdrew that order. See Mapco, 795 S.W.3d at 703. We therefore take no action regarding the void March 28 order. Having found the court's first order void, we also find that as a result, the case was still active before the court as the proceedings had not yet been completed. Still, we must determine whether the court retained jurisdiction to complete the transfer hearing under section 54.051 in view of section 51.0412 of the Family Code.

Section 51.0412 provides that a court retains jurisdiction over a person who is a respondent in a motion for transfer of determinate sentence probation to an appropriate district if three conditions are met: (1) the petition was filed while the respondent was younger than 19 years of age, (2) the proceeding was not complete before the respondent became 19 years of age, and (3) the court enters a finding in the proceeding that the prosecuting attorney exercised due diligence in an attempt to complete the proceeding before the respondent became 19 years of age. Tex. Fam. Code § 51.0412.

The statute, however, does not define the term “complete.” Therefore, we turn to statutory interpretation to resolve the meaning, and in doing so, we bear in mind that our fundamental goal when reading statutes “is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent.” Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012). To do this, we look to and rely on the plain meaning of a statute's words as expressing legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied or apparent from the context, or the plain meaning of the words leads to absurd or nonsensical results. Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 2014). Words and phrases “shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Id. (citing Tex. Gov't Code § 311.011).

As an adjective, the term “complete” is defined as “having all necessary parts, elements, or steps.” Complete, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ complete (last visited November 4, 2025); see also Webster's New World English Grammar Handbook at 85. It is also defined as “fully carried out” and “brought to an end.” Complete, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/complete. Applying this meaning in the context of section 51.0412, it is clear that the term “complete” modifies “the proceeding,” and the proceeding, i.e., the motion for transfer of determinate sentence probation to an appropriate district court, must be “fully carried out” or “brought to an end.” Tex. Fam. Code § 51.0412; see also Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 389–90.

Here, the State filed a second amended motion to revoke K.L.W.'s determinate sentence probation and transfer to district court under section 54.051 before K.L.W.'s nineteenth birthday. See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.0412(1). On March 28, 2025, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the State's amended motion but entered an order under section 54.11 that same day. The proceeding, however, was not complete because, as state above, the March 28 order was void: the court lacked authority to transfer K.L.W. from TJJD to TDCJ to serve the remainder of his determinate sentence without satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of section 54.11. See id. § 54.11; see also id. § 51.0412(2); Metro. Transit Auth. v. Jackson, 212 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (concluding that because the judgment was void and the case remained ongoing, the trial court retained plenary power over the parties and jurisdiction to enter other orders when it signed the second order some months later); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 51.0412(2). Thus, the State's amended motion to revoke and transfer was not “fully carried out” or “brought to an end” on March 28.

In substituting the March 28 order with the August 29 order, the court found that it retained jurisdiction under 51.0412 and that the prosecuting attorney exercised due diligence in an attempt to complete the proceeding before K.L.W.'s nineteenth birthday. See id. § 51.0412(3). The juvenile court then ordered that K.L.W.'s determinate sentence probation be transferred to the district court and signed the corresponding order. Even though the court entered the second order several months after the hearing, it retained jurisdiction to do so under section 51.0412 because the original order was void, resulting in an incomplete proceeding. See id. § 51.0412; see also Jackson, 212 S.W.3d at 802. Section 56.01(c) enumerates juvenile orders that can be appealed. As the State correctly notes, an order transferring a determinate sentence probation is not subject to appeal. See id. § 56.01(c) (providing the circumstances under which an appeal in a juvenile case may be taken). Thus, the August 29 order entered under section 54.051 is not appealable.

Conclusion

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record makes clear from the exchange between the court and the parties that the hearing was limited to the question of transferring the determinate sentence probation to the district court. The hearing did not contemplate K.L.W.'s transfer to TDCJ or his release under supervision.

2.   Rule 34.5(c)(1) provides that “[i]f a relevant item has been omitted from the clerk's record, the trial court, the appellate court, or any party may by letter direct the trial court clerk to prepare, certify, and file in the appellate court a supplement containing the omitted item.” Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(c)(1). On our own motion, we ordered the trial court clerk to supplement the clerk's record, but the trial court clerk failed to certify the referral was an omitted item from the record.

Maritza Antú Justice