ARGUETA v. HARRIS COUNTY (2025)

OPINION

In this permissive appeal, appellant Dinora Maribel Ponce Argueta (“Argueta”) appeals the denial of her motion for summary judgment in the lawsuit filed by Harris County, Texas (“Harris County”). Harris County sued Argueta to recover damages to its vehicle after a collision with Argueta's vehicle. Argueta's insurer became insolvent after the accident, thereby triggering the Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Act (“Guaranty Act”). See generally Tex. Ins. Code Ann. ch. 462.¹ When a person's car insurance carrier becomes insolvent, the Guaranty Act bars claims brought by any “self-insurer” against the insured “to the extent of the applicable liability limits of the insurance policy written and issued to the insured by the insolvent insurer.” See id. §§ 462.201, 462.207(a)–(b). We granted Argueta's petition for permissive appeal to address an issue of first impression and determine the meaning of “self-insurer” under Insurance Code § 462.207. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(f); Tex. R. App. P. 28.3.

For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we hold that “self-insurer” in the Guaranty Act means a “self-insurer” as provided for in the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act (“Safety & Responsibility Act”). See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 601.124.² Furthermore, because the evidence Argueta attached to her traditional motion for summary judgment does not conclusively establish that Harris County was a “self-insurer” under the Safety & Responsibility Act and the Guaranty Act, we conclude the trial court did not err when it denied Argueta's motion for summary judgment and affirm the trial court's order.

I. Background

On March 10, 2020, Argueta's vehicle collided with a Harris County vehicle driven by Harris County Constable Danny Luna. Harris County filed a lawsuit against Argueta and asserted a negligence-per-se claim seeking to recover the damages to its vehicle. At the time of the collision, Argueta was insured by ACCC Insurance Company (“ACCC”), but ACCC subsequently became insolvent and thus was an “impaired insurer” under the Guaranty Act. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 462.004 (defining “impaired insurer” as “a member insurer that is subject to a final, non-appealable order of liquidation that includes a finding of insolvency issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in this state or in the insurer's state of domicile”).

In her first-amended answer, Argueta advanced a statutory defense under the Guaranty Act. See id. § 462.207(b) (“An impaired insurer's insured is not liable, and the ․ self-insurer ․ is not entitled to sue or continue a suit against the insured, for a subrogation recovery, reinsurance recovery, contribution, indemnification, or any other claim asserted directly or indirectly by a ․ self-insurer ․ to the extent of the applicable liability limits of the insurance policy written and issued to the insured by the insolvent insurer.”). Argueta then filed a traditional motion for summary judgment supported by evidence, arguing Harris County is a “self-insurer” under § 462.207 and is thus barred from pursuing its claim. Harris County filed a response asserting it was “uninsured” instead of “self-insured” as to damages to its vehicle but did not attach any supporting evidence. The trial court denied Argueta's motion for summary judgment and granted her request to file a petition for permissive appeal. We then granted Argueta's petition for this permissive appeal.

II. Scope of Appeal

When we accept a permissive appeal, we must “do what the Legislature has authorized and ‘address the merits of the legal issues certified.’ ” Elephant Ins., LLC v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Sabre Travel Int'l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 733 (Tex. 2019)). This includes “addressing all fairly included subsidiary issues and ancillary issues pertinent to resolving the controlling legal issue.” Id. Here, the controlling questions of law certified by the trial court are:

1) the issue of what evidence is required to establish whether an entity is self-insured (and whether Harris County, Texas was self-insured with regard to the damages to the vehicle at issue in this lawsuit) is a controlling question of law in this case as to which there is a substantial ground for a difference of opinion; [and] 2) Defendant did not establish that Harris County, Texas was self-insured with regard to the damages to the Harris County, Texas vehicle at issue in this lawsuit ․

III. Financial Responsibility on Texas Roads

In 1951, the Legislature enacted the Safety & Responsibility Act “to encourage safer use of motor vehicles on the streets and highways of Texas and to deny the privilege of driving to reckless and financially irresponsible persons by requiring security of owners and operators of motor vehicles following accidents and by providing for proof of financial responsibility for the future.” Gillaspie v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177, 179–80 (1953). Accordingly, Texas law requires every motorist on Texas roads to demonstrate proof of “financial responsibility.” Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 601.051; see id. § 601.002(3) (defining “financial responsibility” as “the ability to respond in damages for liability for an accident that ․ occurs after the effective date of the document evidencing the establishment of the financial responsibility; and ․ arises out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle”).

Generally, this financial responsibility is established when the driver has a motor vehicle liability insurance policy that complies with Transportation Code Chapter 601, which requires that policies cover damage and destruction of the property of others. Id. §§ 601.051(a), 601.071, 601.072; see also Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 1952.0515. The Transportation Code, however, does not require a driver in Texas to carry insurance covering damage to the driver's own vehicle. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 601.072; see also id. § 601.078 (providing that any excess additional coverage is not subject to Chapter 601).

This financial responsibility may also be established by being a “self-insurer.” Id. §§ 601.051(5), 601.124; see Hertz Corp. v. Robineau, 6 S.W.3d 332, 335 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (noting that the Safety & Responsibility Act allows “fleet owners to self-insure [and] was intended only to protect the public from judgment proof, negligent drivers”). A person with more than twenty-five motor vehicles registered under its name may qualify as a self-insurer by obtaining a certificate of self-insurance issued by the Texas Department of Public Safety (“TDPS”). Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 601.124(a).³ TDPS may issue this certificate of self-insurance if the person applies for the certificate and TDPS “is satisfied that the person has and will continue to have the ability to pay judgments obtained against the person.” Id. § 601.124(b). While such a certificate is in force, “the self-insurer will pay the same judgments in the same amounts as an insurer would be obligated to pay under an owner's motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued to the self-insurer if such policy were issued.” Id. § 601.124(c).

On the other hand, the Guaranty Act—at issue in this appeal—provides for the Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (“Guaranty Association”). The Guaranty Association's purposes are to: (1) provide a mechanism for the payment of covered claims under certain insurance policies to avoid excessive delay in payment; (2) avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders because of an insurer's impairment; (3) assist in the detection and prevention of insurer insolvencies; and (4) provide an association to assess the cost of that protection among insurers. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 462.001, 462.002; Harris County v. Williams, 981 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). Insurance Code Chapter 462 is to be liberally construed to implement these purposes. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 462.003. By assessing contributions from solvent member insurers, the Guaranty Association maintains a guaranty fund which assumes insolvent insurers’ obligations with respect to statutorily defined “covered claims,” limited to the lesser of the policy limit or $300,000. See id. §§ 462.201, 462.213; John H. Carney & Assocs. v. Tex. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 354 S.W.3d 843, 851 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. denied) (“The Guaranty Act's plain language limits ‘covered claims’ to unpaid claims of ‘insureds’ and ‘third-party claimants.’ ”).

While the Safety & Responsibility Act requires drivers on Texas roads to carry insurance to demonstrate financial responsibility and prevent financial losses from automobile accidents, the Guaranty Act provides a stop gap where the protection intended by the Safety & Responsibility Act falls short through no fault of the insured. See Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. v. Johnson, 879 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1993) (plurality op.) (“This court has recognized that the public policy behind the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety–Responsibility Act is to protect all potential claimants from damages resulting from automobile accidents.”); Stracener v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 777 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex. 1989) (“The Legislature had as its initial objective the protection of conscientious motorists from financial loss caused by negligent financially irresponsible motorists ․”). This is because the Guaranty Act provides protection to insured drivers and liability claimants through a guaranty fund subsidized by solvent member insurers. The receiver of an impaired insurer is able to use the fund to aid in paying “covered claims” when the impaired insurer's assets are insufficient. Nunez v. Autry, 884 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ). Thus, the Guaranty Act furthers this State's public policy of ensuring financial responsibility on Texas roads and of protecting drivers from the risk of financial loss from automobile accidents.

Relevant to this appeal, one section of the Guaranty Act provides:

(a) Any amount directly or indirectly due any reinsurer, insurer, self-insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as a subrogation recovery, reinsurance recovery, contribution, or indemnification, or otherwise, is not a covered claim.

(b) An impaired insurer's insured is not liable, and the reinsurer, insurer, self-insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association is not entitled to sue or continue a suit against the insured, for a subrogation recovery, reinsurance recovery, contribution, indemnification, or any other claim asserted directly or indirectly by a reinsurer, insurer, self-insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association to the extent of the applicable liability limits of the insurance policy written and issued to the insured by the insolvent insurer.

Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 462.207(a)–(b). Therefore, because Argueta's insurer became insolvent after the accident, Harris County's claim here is barred if Harris County is a “self-insurer” under the Guaranty Act. See id. § 462.207(b). “Self-insurer,” however, is undefined in the statute. See id. § 462.004.

IV. “Self-Insurer”

The first question before us is one of statutory construction requiring us to determine the meaning of “self-insurer” in Insurance Code § 462.207.

A. Standard of Review

The construction and interpretation of a statute's language is a question of law we review de novo. See Baumgardner v. Brazos River Auth., 714 S.W.3d 597, 601 (Tex. 2025) (per curiam); Maxim Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins., 642 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex. 2022). The truest manifestation of legislative intent is the literal text of the statute. Baumgardner, 714 S.W.3d at 601; see BankDirect Cap. Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W.3d 76, 86 (Tex. 2017) (“The text is the alpha and the omega of the interpretive process.”). Accordingly, we rely on the plain meaning of the statutory text, reading contextually to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence and giving undefined words their common, ordinary meaning unless a more precise definition is apparent from the statutory context or the plain meaning yields an absurd result. Baumgardner, 714 S.W.3d at 601; see also Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (“We presume the Legislature included each word in the statute for a purpose and that words not included were purposefully omitted.”); City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625–26 (Tex. 2008) (noting that we construe a statute's words according to their plain and common meaning unless the Legislature has prescribed a definition or the words have acquired a technical or particular meaning).

To determine a statutory term's common, ordinary meaning, we typically look first to their dictionary definitions and then consider the term's usage in other statutes, court decisions, and similar authorities. Am. Pearl Grp. v. Nat'l Payment Sys., L.L.C., 715 S.W.3d 383, 387 (Tex. 2025); Tex. State Bd. of Exam'rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass'n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. 2017). Additionally, when the Legislature has used a word in a statute in one sense and with one meaning, and subsequently uses the same word in legislating on the same subject-matter, its meaning in the subsequent statute will ordinarily be the same. Colorado County v. Staff, 510 S.W.3d 435, 452 (Tex. 2017). This rule applies when the words or phrases at issue are substantially the same and holds particular force where their meaning in the earlier act is clear. Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC, 601 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Tex. 2020).

B. Analysis

The Insurance Code does not contain a universal definition of “insured.” John H. Carney & Assocs., 354 S.W.3d at 851. Black's Law Dictionary does not define “self-insured” but defines “insured” as the person or entity that is covered or protected by an insurance policy; the person or entity whose insurable interest is protected by a contract with an insurer. Insured, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Merriam-Webster defines “self-insure” as to insure oneself. “Self-insure,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/declare. These definitions alone, however, do not yield a satisfactory definition of “self-insurer” for our purposes because a self-insurer does not provide insurance at all. See Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. v. Caltzonsing, 658 S.W.3d 384, 394 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2022, no pet.) (“The term ‘self-insurance’ is somewhat ambiguous.”); Hertz Corp. v. Robineau, 6 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (“The term ‘self-insurance’ is a misnomer ․”); 1A Couch on Ins. § 10:1 (3d 2024) (“In a sense, all risks not otherwise insured are ‘self-insured.’ ”). Accordingly, courts and legal scholars have concluded that self-insured involves the retention of risk of loss by the one on whom it is directly imposed by law or contract. Caltzonsing, 658 S.W.3d at 394; 1A Couch on Ins. §§ 10:1, 10:2.⁴

We also consider the context of “self-insurer” in the Safety & Responsibility Act because the term is used in the same context and subject-matter as the Guaranty Act. See Tex. Lottery Comm'n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010). As noted, both statutes address the financial responsibilities, risks, and liabilities faced by drivers on Texas roads and seek to minimize a driver's risk of loss due to negligent drivers.

In the Safety & Responsibility Act, Transportation Code § 601.124 provides that TDPS may issue a certificate of self-insurance to a person with more than twenty-five registered vehicles if (1) the person applies for the certificate, and (2) the department is satisfied that the person has and will continue to have the ability to pay judgments obtained against the person. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 601.124(a)–(b); see Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Banks Transp. Co., 427 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1968) (“The language of [former] Article 6701h, [§] 34(a) and (b) [now Texas Transportation Code § 601.124] makes it clear that to qualify as a self-insurer a person must meet two requirements: (1) have more than twenty-five motor vehicles registered in his name, and (2) be financially responsible.”). Thus, Chapter 601's definition of “self-insurer” includes the aforementioned retention of risk that would otherwise have been covered by legally-required insurance. See Caltzonsing, 658 S.W.3d at 394 (“[T]he certificate merely shows that the entity holding it is so financially reliable that it can satisfy any judgment against it, and it need not shoulder the expense of purchasing liability insurance for each vehicle in its fleet.”); Robineau, 6 S.W.3d at 336 (“A certificate of self-insurance merely shows that the state is satisfied that the holder has the financial wherewithal to satisfy a judgment against it within liability minimums set by the legislature.”).

Because Insurance Code Chapter 462 (the Guaranty Act) and Transportation Code Chapter 601 (the Safety & Responsibility Act) use the term “self-insurer” in the same subject area and in the same context, we conclude the term “self-insurer” in Insurance Code § 462.207 means a “self-insurer” as provided in Transportation Code § 601.124. See Nationwide Ins. v. Elchehimi, 249 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. 2008) (“Because Section 1952.104(3) and Chapter 601 address the same subject matter—motor vehicle insurance—the definition of motor vehicle in section 601.002 of the Transportation Code is persuasive, if not controlling.”).

Harris County argues it is self-insured as to its liability to others but is an “uninsured” motorist as to damages to its own vehicles. It thus argues its claim against Argueta is not barred because it is not “self-insured” under the statute. We are unpersuaded by this argument. Although drivers on Texas roads are required to carry liability insurance for the potential damages and losses they cause to other drivers and property, no driver is required by Texas law to carry any insurance at all for damages to its own vehicle. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 1952.0515; Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 601.071, 601.072. In other words, the purpose of the self-insurer certificate under the Transportation Code is to satisfy the legal requirement for drivers on Texas roads to demonstrate financial responsibility by carrying a minimum amount of liability insurance. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 157.042(a), (c), 601.072; Dairyland Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Childress, 650 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Tex. 1983) (“There is no question in our minds that the compulsory insurance requirement of the Texas motor vehicle safety laws implies that all potential claimants for damages resulting from automobile accidents are intended as beneficiaries of the statutorily required automobile liability coverage.”). This legally required insurance does not include coverage of damages to the driver's vehicle. Because the Guaranty Act addresses scenarios where the insurance required by law becomes unavailable following an accident, it would be unreasonable and absurd to conclude that “self-insurer” has different meanings under both Acts. See Tex. Lottery Comm'n, 325 S.W.3d at 635. As noted, a driver's status as a “self-insurer” as to their motor vehicle insurance depends on whether the driver has provided the coverage for the risk of loss required by Texas law for drivers on its roads. Because neither Act makes such a distinction and because the insurance required under Texas law and addressed by both Acts to advance their purposes is liability insurance as to other drivers and property, we reject this argument. “Self-insurer” under Insurance Code § 462.207 and Transportation Code § 601.024 relates to the insurance required by law to drive on Texas roads, which does not include coverage for damages to the driver's vehicle. Accordingly, we hold that “self-insurer” in Insurance Code § 462.207 means a “self-insurer” as provided for in Transportation Code § 601.124. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 462.207; Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 601.124; Nationwide Ins., 249 S.W.3d at 433.

V. “Claim”

Harris County also argues that the Guaranty Act does not bar its claim against Argueta because § 462.207(a) “does not apply” to its claim. Specifically, Harris County argues § 462.207(a) is inapplicable because its claim is not one for “subrogation recovery, reinsurance recovery, contribution, or indemnification, or otherwise ․”

As noted, § 462.207(a) provides: “Any amount directly or indirectly due any reinsurer, insurer, self-insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as a subrogation recovery, reinsurance recovery, contribution, or indemnification, or otherwise, is not a covered claim.” Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 462.207(a). However, we have previously concluded that a different subsection, § 462.207(b), bars Harris County's claim. See id. § 462.207(b). Nevertheless, we note § 462.207(b) contains the same language as § 462.207(a) of which Harris County complains:

An impaired insurer's insured is not liable, and the reinsurer, insurer, self-insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association is not entitled to sue or continue a suit against the insured, for a subrogation recovery, reinsurance recovery, contribution, indemnification, or any other claim asserted directly or indirectly by a reinsurer, insurer, self-insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association to the extent of the applicable liability limits of the insurance policy written and issued to the insured by the insolvent insurer.

Id. § 462.207(a)–(b).

When general words in a statute follow specific examples, the general words are to be restricted in their meaning to a sense analogous to the same kind or class as those expressly mentioned. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003); see Greater Hous. P'ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d 51, 61 (Tex. 2015) (“[T]he meaning of a word or phrase, especially one in a list, should be known by the words immediately surrounding it.”). Contrary to Harris County's argument, all of these terms in § 462.207(b)—subrogation recovery, reinsurance recovery, contribution, or indemnification, or otherwise—address the recovery of damages caused by the impaired insurer's insured.

Nevertheless, Harris County argues:

[t]hese types of actions, subrogation, reinsurance, contribution, and indemnity recoveries share a common class trait: They are actions brought by parties or entities that are neither the insured nor the third-party seeking recovery under the first party's insurance. It is clear the Legislature intended to preclude recovery under the Act if the action brought is by a person or entity who was not a purchaser of the insurance or the party seeking to recover damages against the purchaser of the insurance.

But this argument ignores the language of the statute that precedes the language relied on by Harris County: “An impaired insurer's insured is not liable, and the reinsurer, insurer, self-insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association is not entitled to sue or continue a suit against the insured ․” The presence of the word “self-insurer” along with the words “reinsurer,” “self-insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association” indicates that a “self-insurer” is more than just an uninsured third-party driver when it comes to recovering damages from an impaired insurer's insured. While “reinsurer, insurer, self-insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association” are parties that potentially pay out liability claims of the insured, the “self-insurer” status is unique in that the self-insurer also is the “insured” driver. When a reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association seeks subrogation recovery, reinsurance recovery, contribution, indemnification, it is seeking to recover damages suffered by an insured, as Harris County is doing as a “self-insurer” by seeking recovery to its own vehicle. Harris County's argument also ignores the interplay and effect of the term “self-insurer” and its definition on the subsequent words “subrogation recovery, reinsurance recovery, contribution, indemnification, or any other claim asserted directly by a ․ self-insurer ․ to the extent of the applicable liability limits of the insurance policy written and issued to the insured by the insolvent insurer.”

Again, viewing the statute's language as a whole, it is clear that “any other claim” applies to Harris County's claim as a self-insurer here because Harris County seeks to recover the damages it has to pay to its insured, itself, from the party that caused them, Argueta, an impaired insurer's insured. In sum, Harris County, a self-insurer, is directly bringing a claim here for damages caused by the impaired insurer's insured and seeking an amount of damages lower than the applicable liability limits of the insurance policy written and issued to the insured by the insolvent insurer. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 462.201, 462.207(a)–(b). Accordingly, we reject any argument that Harris County's claim is not barred by § 462.207(b).

We address next whether Argueta presented proof in support of her traditional motion for summary judgment conclusively establishing that Harris County is a “self-insurer.”

VI. Summary Judgment

Whether a movant's proof conclusively establishes that there is no genuine issue of fact is a question of law we review de novo. In re Molina, 575 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, orig. proceeding); Flack v. Hanke, 334 S.W.3d 251, 261 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied). To obtain a traditional summary judgment, the movant must produce evidence showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 551 (Tex. 2019). The nonmovant may raise a genuine issue of material fact by producing more than a scintilla of evidence establishing the existence of the challenged element. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d at 551. We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts arising from such evidence in the nonmovant's favor. Weekley Homes, LLC v. Paniagua, 691 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam). Even if the nonmovant does not file a response and the motion for summary judgment is uncontroverted, the movant must still carry her burden of proof. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).

As noted, for a person to be a “self-insurer” under Texas law as to liability claims against its motor vehicle operators, the person must obtain a self-insurer certificate from TDPS. Thus, Argueta may prevail on a motion for summary judgment by producing evidence conclusively establishing that Harris County has a self-insurer certificate from TDPS as provided for in Transportation Code § 601.124.

Argueta attached to her motion for summary judgment TDPS's crash report for the accident, noting that Harris County was “self-insured”; and Harris County's answers to her requests for admissions, admitting that it was self-insured “for liability claims arising out of the use of Harris County vehicles for Harris County business.” Argueta also attached excerpts from the deposition of Harris County's Executive Director of Human Resources and Risk Management, Holland Carrizal, where Carrizal testified that Harris County was self-insured regarding liability as to its constables at the time of the accident. Carrizal also testified how Harris County budgets for the risks associated with the liability of its drivers on Texas roads and how Harris County sets asides funds to prepare for these potential risks. Argueta, however, did not include any evidence showing that Harris County obtained a self-insurer certificate pursuant to Transportation Code § 601.124 or any evidence affirmatively providing that Harris County had such a certificate. Because we must resolve all doubts against the summary-judgment movant, we conclude Argueta's evidence failed to conclusively establish that Harris County possesses a self-insurer certificate from TDPS as provided for in Transportation Code § 601.124. See Weekley Homes, LLC, 691 S.W.3d at 915. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err when it denied Argueta's motion for summary judgment.⁵ See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).

VII. Conclusion

We hold that “self-insurer” in Insurance Code § 462.207 means a “self-insurer” as provided for in Transportation Code § 601.124 and affirm the trial court's order denying Argueta's motion for summary judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Legislature enacted Insurance Code Chapter 462 as part of a non-substantive re-codification of the Guaranty Act. See Act of June 17, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., H.B. 2017, ch. 727 (“[R]elating to a nonsubstantive revision of statutes relating to the Texas Department of Insurance, the business of insurance, and certain related businesses, including conforming amendments, repeals, and penalties.”); Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 30.001 (providing that Title 4 of the Insurance Code was enacted as part of a “topic-by-topic revision of the state's general and permanent statute law without substantive change”); John H. Carney & Assocs. v. Tex. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 354 S.W.3d 843, 844 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. denied). For ease of read of this opinion, we will refer to Insurance Code Chapter 462 as the Guaranty Act.

2.   The Legislature enacted Transportation Code Chapter 601 as part of a non-substantive re-codification of the Safety & Responsibility Act. See Act of May 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., S.B. 971, ch. 165 (“[R]elating to the adoption of a nonsubstantive revision of statutes relating to transportation, including conforming amendments, repeals, and penalties.”); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 1.001(a) (providing that the Transportation Code was enacted as part of a “topic-by-topic revision of the state's general and permanent statute law without substantive change”); Struna v. Concord Ins. Servs., Inc., 11 S.W.3d 355, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). For ease of read of this opinion, we will refer to Transportation Code Chapter 601 as the Safety & Responsibility Act.

3.   See also Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 157.042(a)(1) (“A county that has a population of more than 1.3 million and in which a municipality with a population of more than one million is primarily located shall insure its sheriff, constables, and full-time deputies of those officers against liability to third persons arising from the operation or maintenance of ․ county-owned or county-leased motor vehicle ․”); id. § 157.042(c) (“A county may elect to comply with the requirements of this section by self-insuring in accordance with Section 601.124, Transportation Code.”).

4.   The Supreme Court of Texas has cited the treatise Couch on Insurance as instructive guidance on insurance matters. See, e.g., USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 490 n. 12 (Tex. 2018); D.R. Horton-Tex., Ltd. v. Markel Intern. Ins., 300 S.W.3d 740, 743 & n. 2 (Tex. 2009); Mid–Century Ins. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 156–61 (Tex. 1999).

5.   Argueta also filed a response to Harris County's reply to her motion for summary judgment and attached additional evidence. On appeal, Harris County argues we are prevented from considering this evidence because it was filed without leave of court. We agree. See B.C. v. Steak N Shake Opers., Inc., 598 S.W.3d 256, 259–60 (Tex. 2020). Nevertheless, we note that the additional evidence attached to Argueta's response does not conclusively establish that Harris County possessed a self-insurer certificate pursuant to Transportation Code § 601.124.

Brad Hart, Justice