MARIA DE LOS ANGELES RODRIGUEZ INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF GABRIEL VELA DECEASED AMANDA LOPEZ VELA AND JOSE VELA v. OGT LLC DELAWARE LLC AND ENLINK MIDSTREAM OPERATING LP (2025)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed October 27, 2025

Maria de los Angeles Rodriguez, individually and as the administrator of the estate of Gabriel Vela, deceased, Amanda Lopez Vela, and Jose G. Vela ² appeal the trial court's judgment ordering that they take nothing on their claims and causes of action against OGT, LLC, Delaware G&P, LLC, and EnLink Midstream Operating, LP. In three issues, appellants argue the trial court erred when it denied appellants' rule 248 motion and granted OGT's rule 248 motion, the trial court abused its discretion in precluding appellants from cross-examining OGT's liability expert, and the cumulative error doctrine entitles appellants to a new trial. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

We take the following factual allegations from appellants' seventh amended original petition, the live pleading in the case:

Delaware and EnLink LP (collectively “EnLink Defendants”) own and operate a midstream facility near Mentone, Texas. Anticipating an increase in supply and demand, EnLink Defendants made plans to expand their facilities at the Lobo III plant (the “Lobo III Project”). EnLink Defendants selected OGT as its electrical contractor for the Lobo III Project with a scope of work that included the installation of electrical equipment and associated wiring. Vela, an apprentice electrician, was employed by OGT and was assigned to work— unsupervised—on the Lobo III Project. On the morning of May 4, 2019, while working unsupervised on the installation of electrical equipment and associated wiring at the Lobo III facility, and while in the course and scope of his employment with OGT, Vela was electrocuted and perished on that day. At all relevant times, EnLink Defendants were in operational control of the facilities. EnLink Defendants had the right of control and exercised actual control over the injury-causing work. At all relevant times, John Van Allen, an employee of ACI 3, was working for EnLink as its on-site safety representative.

Based on these factual allegations, appellants asserted against ACI and EnLink Defendants claims of negligence and gross negligence that caused Vela's wrongful death. Specifically, appellants alleged multiple failures on the part of ACI and EnLink Defendants to enforce safety rules and programs and failure to ensure or require that OGT workers, including Vela, were properly licensed and supervised. The petition alleged that ACI and EnLink Defendants “knew or should have known that OGT was incompetent and not careful,” and “Vela relied on [ACI and EnLink Defendants] to provide a safe work place with sufficient safety rule [sic] and protocols to keep him safe.” The petition further alleged:

The acts and omissions of the [ACI and EnLink Defendants] increased Vela's risk of harm. Each of these acts and omissions, singularly or in combination with others, constitute negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence, which proximately caused Vela's death and Plaintiff's damages.

As to OGT, the petition alleged OGT was grossly negligent by failing to, among other things, provide Vela with proper supervision, training, and instruction.

Vela's parents, Amanda and Jose, intervened in the lawsuit. Their claims arose from the same factual context and asserted wrongful death claims against the same defendants. In March 2022, Rodriguez and intervenors filed a rule 248 motion to determine issues and motion to exclude evidence. The motion requested that the trial court “resolve through pretrial order a question of law—specifically, whether Gabriel Vela's injury-causing work legally required the on-site supervision of a master or journeyman electrician.” The motion cited rule 248 as follows:

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 248 states that “[W]hen a jury is demanded, questions of law, motions, exceptions to pleadings, and other unresolved pending matters shall, as far as practicable, be heard and determined by the court before the trial commences, and jurors shall be summoned to appear on the day so designated.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 248 (emphasis added).

The question of law the motion sought to have determined was whether section 73.10(11) of the administrative code required that an electrical apprentice like Vela have on-site supervision from a master or journeyman electrician and whether any legal exemption applied to the on-site supervision requirement. The motion anticipated that OGT might rely on several exemptions under the Occupations Code, including statutory exemptions 8, 9, 14(A), and 14(B). See TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 1305.003(a)(8), (9), (14)(A), (14)(B).

In July 2022, OGT filed its response to the rule 248 motion. The response asserted that exemption #9 did apply to Vela's work. Id. § 1305.003(a)(9). The response argued further that Rodriguez and intervenors' motion sought to relieve them of an essential element of their cause of action: proof by clear and convincing evidence that OGT acted with gross negligence. The response argued that Vela was an OGT employee at the time of his death, and OGT was covered by a worker's compensation policy. Citing section 408.001 of the labor code, OGT asserted that only Rodriguez had “a viable cause of action against OGT, and that cause of action [was] limited to one for gross negligence.” The response complained that the motion should be denied; nevertheless, the response requested that the trial court enter an order finding that the section 1305.003(a)(9) exemption applied to Vela's work and determining “that OGT's electrical workers were not required to hold any particular licensure from the State of Texas, nor were they required to be supervised by a licensed journeyman or master electrician.”

In July 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the rule 248 motion. Counsel for Rodriguez and intervenors reiterated that rule 248, “not often used,” provided that “when a jury is demanded, questions of law shall as far as practicable be heard and determined by the Court before the trial commences.” Counsel argued the motion involved “a question of law, and we can't be in trial arguing about what the law is.” Counsel noted that OGT relied on exemption #9 and argued a response.

Counsel complained further that OGT had, the day before the hearing, filed a supplemental response in which it argued exemption #14 applied in this case. Counsel stated that he had therefore filed a response later in the day. The trial court stated that it did not “intend to consider any late filings, period,” and counsel agreed that he did not “need to address” either the supplemental response or OGT's response.

Counsel for OGT, Rodriguez, and intervenors made arguments about the applicability of exemption #14. Counsel for Rodriguez and intervenors also observed that OGT appeared to be “saying, Judge, don't rule on this right now,” but “at the final pretrial” the parties “all agreed that this was an issue of law that needed to be decided before we started the trial, so we're not arguing to the jury what the law is.”

On July 19, 2022, the trial court signed an order granting Rodriguez and intervenors' rule 248 motion. In the order, the trial court found, “as a matter of law, that Texas law required Gabriel Vela's injury-causing electrical work to be performed under the on-site supervision of a journeyman or master electrician.” In accordance with that finding, the court ordered “the exclusion of any evidence, arguments, or statements at trial” in contravention of that finding.

In August 2022, OGT filed a rule 248 motion asking the trial court to “find the applicability of” exemption #14(B) “to the work of OGT at issue in this lawsuit” and to exclude any evidence as to the licensure status of OGT's electrical workers or any evidence that such workers “had to be supervised by an onsite master or journeyman electrician.”

Rodriguez and intervenors filed a response that characterized it as “nothing more than a motion asking the Court to reconsider and vacate its July 19 order granting [Rodriguez and intervenors'] Rule 248 motion.” The response noted OGT's statement in its motion that the trial court had “previously ruled on the applicability of [exemption #9], but has not heard argument, nor made any ruling as to the applicability of [exemption #14]” and argued that this statement was “just not true.” The response pointed out that, subsumed within the trial court's determination that “Texas law required Gabriel Vela's injury-causing electrical work to be performed under the on-site supervision of a journeyman or master electrician” was a finding that none of the statutory exemptions found in section 1305.003 of the occupations code, including exemption #14, applied to Vela's work. The response asserted that the trial court had “complete discretion to deny OGT's motion upon recognizing it for what it really is—a motion to reconsider argument that was previously before the Court through Claimants' Rule 248 motion filed on March 22, 2022.” The response argued further that, although the trial court had discretion to deny OGT's rule 248 motion without considering its merits, the motion lacked merit for several reasons.

OGT filed a reply supporting its rule 248 motion reasserting its contention that exemption #14(B) applied to it and had not yet been determined by the trial court. OGT pointed out that, at the July 2022 hearing, the trial court considered only the application of exemption #9 and stated that it was not going to take up the applicability of exemption #14(B) at that time. Second, OGT addressed Rodriguez and intervenors' argument relating to the underlying master service agreement (MSA). Third, OGT argued that Rodriguez and intervenors were attempting to “graft additional limitations upon” exemption #14(B) and made its own arguments about the interpretation of the exemption.

At a subsequent hearing on OGT's rule 248 motion, the trial court stated that the hearing was to determine “legal issues regarding the Occupations Code Section 1305.003, Subsection A, 14(b)(2).” OGT argued that exemption #14(B) applied and, if the trial court agreed, the case could be “tried as a negligence and gross negligence case, and the experts can do what experts do, which is talk about the law and the industry and their experience.” As to the issue of whether the trial court had already decided whether exemption # 14(B) applied, OGT argued the trial court at the July 2022 hearing expressly stated it would not consider OGT's arguments regarding exemption #14 because that issue was raised in a late-filed pleading. OGT also reiterated its arguments about the applicability of exemption #14.

In response, Rodriguez and intervenors argued their original rule 248 motion “addressed the only three possible exemptions of the 23 that we thought defendants might bring up just in the entire universe,” including exemption # 14(B). Rodriguez and intervenors again maintained that OGT's attempt to argue the application of exemption # 14(B) was thus a motion for reconsideration because it had previously been raised in Rodriguez and intervenors' original rule 248 motion. Rodriguez and intervenors responded to OGT's arguments about the applicability of exemption #14.

On August 30, 2022, the trial court signed an order granting OGT's rule 248 motion, found that exemption # 14(B)(ii) provided “an exemption from the licensure and on-site supervision requirements that would otherwise have governed the electrical work performed by OGT,” and vacated its July 19, 2022, order.

On October 31, 2022, a jury trial began on Rodriguez' and intervenor's claims. During the testimony of OGT's retained expert, B. Don Russell, Rodriguez and intervenors made an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury concerning the requirement that Vela be supervised by a journeyman or master electrician. Russell testified that Vela “should have been supervised” and further testified about whether the exemption applied to new construction. Russell testified that the Texas Occupations Code had a “specific supervision requirement” in addition to industry standards, no exemption to this requirement applied, and Vela was not “being supervised in accordance with the requirements of Texas law at the time of his electrocution.” Following an incident involving an “arc flash,” a report was created that contained a list of “lessons learned.” Among the “lessons learned” was that “pulling wire into an energized cabinet would be a very dangerous thing, shouldn't be done.” There was also a “discussion about all future work would be with the cabinets deenergized,” and such a measure would have been “[v]ery feasible.” Despite this offer of proof, Rodriguez and intervenors were not permitted to question Russell about violations of the Texas Occupations Code's supervision requirements in the presence of the jury.

Forest Smith was designated as an expert by OGT, and the designation stated Smith would “testify and offer opinions as to the cause of the occurrence, the work and actions undertaken by Gabriel Vela and the role those played in this occurrence, and the applicable standards of care in the electrical engineering industry.” The designation noted that Smith's “mental impressions and opinions, as well as the basis for them, are in his report previously produced as Exhibit N and made available for examination through deposition.”

Smith testified on direct examination that, among other things, that Vela “was working inside a cabinet that was not assigned,” Vela “removed isolation barriers,” and “that led to direct contact.” Vela was “not following the work plan,” and if Vela “had followed the plan to do that task on that day,” the accident would not have occurred. Smith testified that the training that had been given to Vela was “absolutely” appropriate for “the tasks that he was going to do that day.” When asked “what level of supervision” Smith believed was “required for the task” that Vela was assigned, Smith testified “[n]ot a high level of supervision because this was wireman-type work,” and Vela had “20 to 25 years” of experience being an electrician.

On cross-examination, when counsel for EnLink began to ask Smith whether he had been provided with the reports of other experts that had been designated in the case, the trial court sent the jury out on a break. Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court noted that there had been “a question raised” and asked Rodriguez and intervenors' counsel to “go ahead and state what your objection is or what you're trying to ask this particular expert.” Counsel responded that he wanted to cross-examine Smith “based upon the findings of the other three liability experts.” Counsel briefly summarized the other experts' findings that “it was the responsibility of OGT to inform and train their employees about hazards”; the “standard for supervision” was “to have a journeyman or master electrician supervise the work of apprentices”; “had the equipment been deenergized by OGT prior to allowing employees to work within the cabinet, the incident would not have occurred”; and OGT's workplace did not adhere to applicable industry standards. Counsel argued that he had a right to “vigorously cross-examine an expert on both the things that he received as well as the things that he -- that he relied on as well as the things that he rejected.”

OGT objected to counsel's proposed cross-examination of Smith on three grounds. First, OGT argued that Smith prepared his report before receiving any of the other experts' reports, so Smith “wouldn't have relied upon them to prepare his report, and they wouldn't have influenced his report.” Second, OGT asserted that Smith was designated as an expert “specifically on certain topics and opinions to give in this case” and was not proffered for “these other opinions” or “these other experts.” Third, OGT characterized counsel's attempt to cross-examine Smith as a way to get into “topics and issues” that were not before the court “because there was already an agreement among counsel that they were to decide -- they were not going to call these witnesses.” The trial court sustained OGT's objection and ruled that Smith would be “limited to his opinions that he's given here in court today and were noticed to give.”

Following the trial court's ruling, counsel for Rodriguez and intervenors questioned Smith regarding, among other things, Vela's qualifications for performing the work to which he was assigned, Vela's lack of experience working with the equipment at issue, and OGT's failure to provide Vela with required protective equipment.

Following the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found that the negligence of EnLink, OGT, and Vela proximately caused Vela's injury. The jury also found that Vela was 51% responsible for his injury. The jury found that the harm to Vela did not result from gross negligence attributable to EnLink or OGT. Because the jury assessed more than 50% responsibility to Vela, Rodriguez and intervenors were barred from recovering actual damages. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 33.001, 33.011(1). Thus, on June 6, 2023, the trial court signed a take-nothing judgment against Rodriguez and intervenors. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In their first issue, Rodriguez and intervenors argue the trial court committed harmful error when it denied their rule 248 motion, granted OGT's rule 248 motion, and precluded them from presenting evidence and argument regarding the requirement that Vela be supervised by a journeyman or master electrician. In their second issue, Rodriguez and intervenors argue the trial court committed harmful error when it precluded them from “cross-examining OGT's liability expert, Forest Smith, regarding his review and disregard of contrary opinions held by EnLink's and Applied's liability experts.” In both issues, Rodriguez and intervenors complain that the trial court's erroneous exclusion of evidence affected the jury's apportionment of liability between OGT, EnLink, and Vela.

We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Fleming v. Wilson, 610 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Tex. 2020). “To reverse a trial court's judgment based on the exclusion of evidence, we must find that the trial court did in fact commit error, and that the error was harmful.” Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 666 (Tex. 2018). Here, the trial court disallowed cross-examination of Russell that was beyond the scope of matters on which he was designated to testify and maintained its ruling on OGT's rule 248 motion by repeatedly excluding evidence that Vela was not supervised by a journeyman or master electrician in violation of the Texas Occupations Code.

If a trial court abuses its discretion and erroneously excludes evidence, then we consider whether the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. JBS Carriers, Inc. v. Washington, 564 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Tex. 2018); TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1. That standard does not require the complaining party “to prove that ‘but for’ the exclusion of evidence, a different judgment would necessarily have resulted.” JBS Carriers, Inc., 564 S.W.3d at 836 (quoting State v. Cent. Expressway Sign Assocs., 302 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. 2009)). Exclusion is likely harmless if the evidence was cumulative or if the rest of the evidence was so one-sided that the error likely made no difference in the judgment. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 668. However, exclusion of the evidence is likely harmful if it was “crucial to a key issue.” Id. Even “if the exclusion of evidence is crucial to a key issue, it is ‘likely harmful,’ not conclusively or per se harmful.” Id. (quoting Cent. Expressway Sign Assocs., 302 S.W.3d at 870). When determining whether the exclusion of evidence was harmful, we review the entire record and apply the same standard—whether the erroneous exclusion of evidence probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment—even when the excluded evidence related to a key issue. Id. at 668–69.

For purposes of reviewing harm, we will assume without deciding that Vela required supervision by a licensed journeyman or master electrician and that no exemption applied. Specifically, we will assume that the trial court erred in 1) granting OGT's Rule 248 motion; 2) denying Rodriguez and intervenors' Rule 248 motion; and 3) excluding evidence regarding the Texas Occupations Code's supervision requirement and of Smith's review of opinions held by EnLink's and Applied's liability experts; and we will evaluate any such error for harm. As stated above, any error in the exclusion of the testimony is reversible only if we conclude the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1).

In this case, the purported harmful error pertains to the proportion of liability assigned to Vela. In their argument as to harm, Rodriguez and intervenors argue that, if the jury had known “that Texas law required on-site supervision over Vela's injury-causing work,” that knowledge “would have certainly played a role” in how the jury measured Vela's percentage of responsibility. Similarly, Rodriguez and intervenors argue that, if they had been allowed to cross-examine Smith concerning the opinions of the other experts, that “could have given the jury cause to apportion less than the 51% responsibility it attributed to Vela.” As Rodriguez and intervenors characterize the disputed issues at trial, there were four such disputed issues:

(1) whether Vela had the requisite knowledge to perform the injury-causing work safely and competently without the benefit of on-site supervision,

(2) whether Vela's electrocution stemmed from his performance of electrical work that deviated from the workplan prescribed to him by OGT,

(3) whether Vela knew or should have known that the cabinet he was working on at the time of his electrocution was energized, and

(4) whether Vela himself negligently removed a shield from the cabinet that could have potentially prevented him from touching the energized wires that led to his electrocution.

In their brief, Rodriguez and intervenors assert that these issues were “heavily disputed at trial,” and they do not disagree that they were able to vigorously prosecute their case; nevertheless, the jury attributed 51% of responsibility to Vela. Conclusory statements of what the jury could have done, in and of themselves, are insufficient to establish harm. Rodriguez and intervenors do not support with evidence or argument their appeal to the “self-evident truth” that the jury would have differently apportioned responsibility in this case if the law and evidence they sought to introduce had come before the jury.⁴

Moreover, even if the trial court had agreed that the occupations code required Vela to be supervised ⁵ by a journeyman or master electrician, the effect of OGT's failure to provide such supervision would have been submitted to the jury in the form of a negligence per se instruction.⁶ Generally, negligence per se is a common-law tort concept in which a person's expected standard of conduct is defined by a statute instead of the reasonably-prudent-person test usually found in “pure” common-law negligence claims. Thomas v. Uzoka, 290 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); see Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. 1997). When negligence per se is submitted, the jury is not asked to decide whether the person acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances, because the statute itself identifies the appropriate standard of conduct as a matter of law. Thomas, 290 S.W.3d at 444-445; Goode v. Bauer, 109 S.W.3d 788, 791 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, pet. denied) (“The effect of declaring conduct as negligence per se is that the conduct constitutes negligence as a matter of law.”). Instead, unless an excuse for the statutory violation is proffered, the jury need decide only (1) whether the statute was violated and, if so, (2) whether the statutory violation was a proximate cause of the injury. Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. 1979); Thomas, 290 S.W.3d at 444.

Negligence per se is not a separate cause of action that exists independently of a common-law negligence cause of action. Thomas, 290 S.W.3d at 445. Rather, negligence per se is merely one method of proving a breach of duty, a requisite element of any negligence cause of action. Id. A negligence per se instruction does not affect the jury's apportionment of responsibility among various causes of a plaintiff's injuries. Id. Negligence per se may substitute for proof that a legal duty was breached; however, it does not compel the jury to conclude that the statutory violation was a proximate cause of the damages claimed. Id. at 445–46; see Carter, 584 S.W.2d at 278 (indicating that, even when negligence per se is submitted, a jury must still decide whether statutory violation was a proximate cause of the claimed damages).

Because apportionment of responsibility is a subsidiary question that goes to causation, it is similarly unaffected by a negligence per se instruction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(a) (Vernon 2008) (“The trier of fact ․ shall determine the percentage of responsibility ․ with respect to each person's causing or contributing to cause ․ the harm for which recovery of damages is sought[.]”) (emphasis added); id. § 33.011(4) (defining “percentage of responsibility” as percentage attributed to each party “with respect to causing or contributing to cause” claimed damages). Therefore, it cannot be said that inclusion of a negligence per se instruction would have altered the jury's decision to assign to Vela 51% of the responsibility for the underlying accident.⁷ See Thomas, 290 S.W.3d at 446. On this record, we are constrained to conclude that any error in the complained-of exclusion of evidence did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 668–69; Thomas, 290 S.W.3d at 445–46. We overrule Rodriguez and intervenors' first and second issues.

In their third issue, Rodriguez and intervenors argue that the cumulative error doctrine entitles them to a new trial. Specifically, they assert that “multiple errors, even if considered harmless when considered separately, may result in reversal and remand for a new trial if the cumulative effect of such errors is harmful,” citing EYM Diner L.P. v. Yousef, No. 05-19-00636-CV, 2020 WL 6883171, at *14 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 24, 2020, pet. dism'd).

To show cumulative error, an appellant must show that, based on the record as a whole, but for the alleged errors, the jury would have rendered a verdict favorable to it. Id. (citing Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 810 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ)). To make that determination, this Court considers all errors in the case along with the record as a whole to determine if the errors collectively were calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Id. (citing Lakeside Vill. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Belanger, 545 S.W.3d 15, 46–47 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied)). We have already concluded that, even assuming the trial court erred in this case as Rodriguez and intervenors alleged, those errors did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 668–69. We apply the same conclusion in our determination that no cumulative error occurred in this case. See Yousef, 2020 WL 6883171, at *14. We overrule Rodriguez and intervenors' third issue.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

JUDGMENT

Opinion delivered by Justice Goldstein. Justice Miskel participating.

In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.

Judgment entered this 27th day of October 2025.

FOOTNOTES

2.   To avoid confusion, we refer to appellants collectively as “appellants,” Maria de los Angeles Rodriguez is referred to individually as “Rodriguez,” decedent Gabriel Vela is referred to individually as “Vela,” and Amanda Lopez Vela and Jose G. Vela are referred to individually as “Amanda” and “Jose” and collectively as “intervenors.”

3.   Applied Consultants, Inc., was named as a defendant in the live pleadings but is not a party to this appeal.

4.   Similarly, Rodriguez and intervenors' claim that it was “conceivable that the exclusion of the argument and evidence in question impacted the jury's determination that the harm to Vela did not result from either EnLink's or OGT's gross negligence” is not sufficient to establish harm. The jury considered whether the harm to Vela resulted from the gross negligence of OGT or EnLink, and the jury found it did not.

5.   We refer to the definitions in the Texas Administrative Code for guidance on the requisite supervision. “General supervision” is the “[e]xercise of oversight by a master electrician” ․ “if performance by all classes of electrical licensees of electrical work bearing responsibility for the work's compliance with applicable codes under Texas Occupations Code, Chapter 1305.” See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 73.10(7). “On-Site Supervision” provides that “[c]ontinuous supervision of an electrical apprentice is not required, though the on-site supervising licensee is responsible for review and inspection of the electrical apprentice's work to ensure compliance with any applicable codes or standards.” See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 73.10(8).

6.   The submission of the negligence per se issue in this manner would have been consistent with appellant's claim of negligence per se raised in their petition.

7.   In reaching this conclusion, we again note that a question regarding the gross negligence of OGT and EnLink was submitted to the jury. The jury found no gross negligence. Even were we to assume that the jury would have answered that question differently if they had been instructed concerning the requirement that Vela be supervised by a journeyman or master electrician, there is no basis to conclude that answer would have altered the jury's decision to assign to Vela 51% of the responsibility for the underlying accident. See Thomas, 290 S.W.3d at 446.

BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN JUSTICE