HOUSTON CLASSICAL INC v. RICHARDS (2025)

OPINION

Appellant Houston Classical Inc. d/b/a Houston Classical Charter School is an open-enrollment charter school, offering instruction to students from kindergarten through eighth grade. Appellee Kimberley Richards is the former Director of Operations for Houston Classical. She sued Houston Classical for retaliation under section 261.110 of the Family Code, alleging that she was terminated after reporting an incident of child abuse involving Houston Classical's founder and CEO. Houston Classical filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that section 261.110’s protections were not available to Richards because she did not qualify as a “professional” under the statute.

Houston Classical brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of its plea, alleging in two related issues that charter schools are immune from suit and liability and that governmental immunity has not been waived because Richards (1) is neither licensed or certified by the state nor an employee of a facility licensed, certified, or operated by the state, and (2) does not have direct contact with children in the normal course of her official duties. See Tex. Fam. Code § 261.101(b).

The resolution of this appeal depends on whether Richards qualifies as a “professional” under chapter 261 of the Family Code. Concluding that immunity has not been waived, we reverse the trial court's order denying Houston Classical's plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing Richards’ claims against Houston Classical for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Background

Deyvis Salazar is the founder and CEO of Houston Classical, an open-enrollment charter school in Houston. Richards, the former Director of Operations for the school, claims she was terminated after reporting what she believed was an incident of child abuse involving a first-grade student and Salazar. In January 2024, she sued Houston Classical, alleging the following facts in her petition:

In October 2022, Plaintiff witnessed an incident involving Salazar and a first grade student in which Salazar caused the student to fall. A few days later, Plaintiff observed the same student holding his arm and crying. When Plaintiff inquired what happened, a colleague who witnessed the event replied that Salazar “did it again.” Specifically, that Salazar had grabbed the child roughly by the arm, causing the child to hold his arm and cry. Under Texas law, Plaintiff reasonably believed she was required to report this incident to Child Protective Services (“CPS”). So she did, and without telling Salazar that she had done so. She also informed the principal, Madelyn Marrs, who had similarly made a report to CPS. After Salazar became aware of the CPS investigation, he confronted Marrs and demanded to know whether she had filed a report. Marrs admitted she had. Marrs also told Salazar that Plaintiff had filed a report as well, and thereafter she began to cooperate with Salazar's scheme to dispose of the CPS investigation and retaliate against Plaintiff. Shockingly, Salazar even suggested to Marrs that she should make a material misrepresentation to CPS when they interviewed her and that if she “got in trouble lying” to CPS, then Salazar would “get [her] a lawyer.” Salazar would later admit, in his own words, that it made him “angry” that Plaintiff had filed a report with CPS. Further, he confessed that he felt “betrayed” by Plaintiff's actions. Unlike Marrs, Plaintiff showed no remorse for filing her report with CPS, and she never attempted to pacify Salazar's ever increasing sense of hostility and resentment at being an accused “child abuser.” CPS closed its investigation of Plaintiff's report on December 5, 2022. Shortly afterward, on February 13, 2023, Salazar terminated Plaintiff's employment in retaliation for her filing her CPS report.

As stated above, Houston Classical filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that, as an open-enrollment charter school, it enjoys the same governmental immunities afforded to traditional public schools. It maintained that Richards was therefore required to establish subject-matter jurisdiction by pleading a valid waiver of immunity. Houston Classical argued that she could not do so because the waiver in section 261.110 of the Family Code applies only to a “professional” as defined by chapter 261 and that Richards does not fall within that definition. Richards responded that she qualified as a “professional” under the statutory definition because she was an employee of a facility operated by the state and who, in the normal course of official duties or duties for which a license or certification was required, had direct contact with children. She therefore claims she was protected from termination for reporting child abuse to the appropriate authorities because sovereign immunity is waived.

Discussion

I. Standards of Review and the Law

A. Governmental Immunity & Family Code Chapter 261

Governmental immunity exists to protect subdivisions of the State from lawsuits for money damages and deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims unless immunity has been waived by the legislature. City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. 2011). An open-enrollment charter school is a governmental unit, see Tex. Educ. Code § 12.1056(b), and our supreme court has held that an open-enrollment charter school is entitled to governmental immunity to the same extent as a school district, see El Paso Education Initiative, Inc. v. Amex Properties, LLC, 602 S.W.3d 521, 529–30 (Tex. 2020). See also Tex. Educ. Code § 12.1056 (“[A]n open-enrollment charter school or charter holder is immune from liability and suit to the same extent as a school district.”).

“Immunity from liability bars enforcement of a judgment against a school district, and immunity from suit bars prosecution of a suit brought against it.” El Paso Educ. Initiative, 602 S.W.3d at 526; see also Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). While governmental immunity can be waived, we defer to the Legislature to do so by statute. Williams, 353 S.W.3d at 134. Without such a waiver, however, the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed, and the claims alleged against the governmental unit are barred. Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. 2023).

The Family Code promotes “a strong policy to protect children from abuse by requiring ‘a person having cause to believe that a child's physical or mental health or welfare has been or may be adversely affected by abuse or neglect by any person’ to ‘immediately make a report’ to the proper authorities.” Scott & White Mem'l Hosp. v. Thompson, 681 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. 2023) (quoting Golden Spread Council, Inc. No. 562 of Boy Scouts of Am. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Tex. 1996)). Specifically, Chapter 261 provides:

An employer may not suspend or terminate the employment of, discriminate against, or take any other adverse employment action against a person who is a professional and who in good faith: (1) reports child abuse or neglect to: (A) the person's supervisor; (B) an administrator of the facility where the person is employed; (C) a state regulatory agency; or (D) a law enforcement agency; or (2) initiates or cooperates with an investigation or proceeding by a governmental entity relating to an allegation of child abuse or neglect.

Tex. Fam. Code § 216.110(b). It also creates a narrow waiver of sovereign immunity for those individuals. Id. § 261.110(f) (“Sovereign immunity is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this section.”). But the protections afforded extend only to “professionals” as defined by the statute:

“[P]rofessional” means an individual who is licensed or certified by the state or who is an employee of a facility licensed, certified, or operated by the state and who, in the normal course of official duties or duties for which a license or certification is required, has direct contact with children. The term includes teachers, nurses, doctors, day-care employees, employees of a clinic or health care facility that provides reproductive services, juvenile probation officers, and juvenile detention or correctional officers.

Id. § 261.101(b). Therefore, to invoke the protections of Chapter 261, Richards must qualify as a “professional” with respect to the adverse action she challenges. If she does not, her suit cannot withstand Houston Classical's plea. It is undisputed that Richards does not satisfy the licensure or certification requirement of the statutory definition; therefore, the analysis turns on whether she is an employee of a facility licensed, certified, or operated by the state and has direct contact with children. See id.

B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Generally, governmental immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction, see Houston Belt & Terminal Railway v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016), and therefore may be properly asserted through a plea to the jurisdiction, see Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004). Texas law has long recognized well-established principles governing pleas:

A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit. The claims may form the context in which a dilatory plea is raised, but the plea should be decided without delving into the merits of the case. The purpose of a dilatory plea is not to force the plaintiffs to preview their case on the merits but to establish a reason why the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims should never be reached.

Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000); see also Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.

A plea to the jurisdiction can take two forms: (1) a challenge to the plaintiff's pleadings regarding the allegations of jurisdictional facts, or, as in this case, (2) an evidentiary challenge to the existence of jurisdictional facts. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. Thus, the plea may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018).

When the plea challenges the plaintiff's pleadings, we must determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction to hear and decide the case; in this regard, the plaintiff bears the burden to allege such facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. 2020); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. Therefore, we must accept as true all factual allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings, construe them liberally in the pleader's favor, and look to the pleader's intent. Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2015).

Alternatively, when the plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we must move beyond the pleadings and consider evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues, even if the evidence implicates both subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits of a claim. Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 770–71 (citing Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 555). In such cases, the standard of review mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment. Id. at 771 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225–26). Therefore, if the plaintiff's factual allegations are challenged with supporting evidence that is necessary to the consideration of the plea, the plaintiff must raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction and avoid dismissal. Id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 221). In determining whether a material fact issue exists, “we must take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the plaintiff's favor.” Id. We cannot, however, disregard evidence that is necessary to show context; nor can we disregard evidence and inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff if reasonable jurors could not. Id. (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 811–12, 822–23, 827 (Tex. 2005)).

C. Statutory Construction

While chapter 261 provides a definition for “professional,” it leaves the phrase “a facility licensed, certified, or operated by the state” undefined. Thus, we turn to statutory interpretation to resolve this meaning. In doing so, our fundamental goal when reading statutes “is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent.” Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012). To do this, we look to and rely on the plain meaning of a statute's words as expressing legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied or is apparent from the context, or the plain meaning of the words leads to absurd or nonsensical results. Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 2014). Words and phrases “shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Id. (citing Tex. Gov't Code § 311.011). We presume the Legislature “chooses a statute's language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen.” TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). In that vein, we take statutes as we find them and refrain from rewriting the Legislature's text. Entergy Gulf States v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Tex. 2009).

II. Analysis

We begin our analysis with an overview of open-enrollment charter schools. We then discuss the parties’ arguments and address the merits of the issues presented.

A. Open-Enrollment Charter Schools

The Texas Constitution authorizes the legislature to “establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.” Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1. In 1995, the legislature enacted chapter 12 of the Education Code, authorizing the establishment of open-enrollment charter schools. See Tex. Educ. Code § 12.105. Its purposes for doing so included: (1) improving student learning, (2) increasing the choice of learning opportunities within the public school system, (3) creating professional opportunities that will attract new teachers to the public school system, (4) establishing a new form of accountability for public schools, and (5) encouraging different and innovative learning methods. Id. § 12.001(a). The purpose of charters was to “ensure[ ] the fiscal and academic accountability of persons holding charters issued under this chapter.” Id. § 12.001(b).

Open-enrollment charter schools, as their name suggests, are

[g]enerally open to the public for the instruction offered. They are tuition-free and usually operated by private, tax-exempt nonprofits under contract—the charter—with the Commissioner of Education. Generally, open-enrollment charter schools are “subject to federal and state laws and rules governing public schools”, but they are subject to the Education Code and rules adopted under it “only to the extent the applicability to an open-enrollment charter school ․ is specifically provided.” This gives them greater flexibility in providing education. They have “the powers granted to schools” by law except the power to tax. They are generally entitled to state funding and services as if they were a school district. Open-enrollment charter schools are “part of the public school system of [the] state.”

Neighborhood Centers Inc. v. Walker, 544 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Tex. 2018). The legislature has expressly provided that “[i]n matters related to operation of an open-enrollment charter school, an open-enrollment charter school or charter holder is immune from liability and suit.” Tex. Educ. Code § 12.1056(a); see also El Paso Educ. Initiative, 602 S.W.3d at 528–30.

B. Argument and Analysis

In its plea and on appeal, Houston Classical argues that, as an open-enrollment charter school, it does not operate under a license or certification and is not operated by the state, so Richards cannot be considered a “professional” because she is not an employee of a facility licensed, certified, or operated by the state. In her response to Houston Classical's plea and on appeal, Richards contends that Houston Classical, as an open-enrollment charter school, is an “arm of the state” and therefore qualifies as a facility operated by the state; that the legislature has interpreted the term “professional” to include all school employees; and that, even if she is not a “professional,” she has created a fact issue sufficient to defeat Houston Classical's plea.

As mentioned above, the term “professional” is statutorily defined, but the phrase “a facility licensed, certified, or operated by the state” is not. The first principle used to analyze the meaning of words in a statute is that “[w]ords not statutorily defined bear their common, ordinary meaning unless a more precise definition is apparent from the statutory context or the plain meaning yields an absurd result.” Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018). In determining a term's common, ordinary meaning, “we typically look first to dictionary definitions.” Id.

The term “facility” is defined as “something (such as a hospital) that is built, installed, or established to serve a particular purpose.” Facility, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/facility (last visited October 23, 2025). Open-enrollment charter schools, though not explicitly labeled as “facilities” by the legislature, plainly qualify under the common meaning of the term because they are established for the purpose of, among other things, improving student learning, increasing the choice of learning opportunities within the public school system, and encouraging different and innovative learning methods. See Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d at 838; see also Tex. Educ. Code § 12.001(a). Our inquiry, however, does not end here; we must also examine whether open-enrollment charter schools are “licensed, certified, or operated by the state.”

The term “licensed” is defined as “having a valid license required to engage in a particular business, occupation, or activity.” Licensed, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/licensed (last visited October 23, 2025). Black's Law Dictionary defines “license” as a “privilege granted by a state or city upon the payment of a fee, the recipient of the privilege then being authorized to do some act or series of acts that would otherwise be impermissible.” License, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The term “certified” is defined as “having earned certification,” certified, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/certified (last visited October 23, 2025), and Merriam-Webster defines “certify” as, inter alia, “to recognize as having met special qualifications (as of a governmental agency or professional board) within a field,” certify, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/certify (last visited October 23, 2025). Open-enrollment charter schools, however, are not licensed or certified by the state. Instead, they operate under a charter with the Commissioner of Education, which serves as a contract rather than a license or certification. See El Paso Educ. Initiative, 602 S.W.3d at 529; Tex. Educ. Code § 12.112 (“A charter for an open-enrollment charter school shall be in the form of a written contract signed by the commissioner and the chief operating officer of the school.”).

Indeed, the legislature has consistently designated facilities and occupations for which certification or licensure is required. See Tex. Educ. Code § 21.003 (“A person may not be employed as a teacher ․ by a school district unless the person holds an appropriate certificate or permit issued.”); Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 241.021 (“A person or governmental unit ․ may not establish, conduct, or maintain a hospital in this state without a license.”), 244.003 (“[A] person may not establish or operate a birthing center in this state without an appropriate license.”); Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 42.041(a) (“No person may operate a child-care facility or child-placing agency without a license issued by the department.”); and Tex. Occ. Code § 301.251(a) (“A person may not practice or offer to practice professional nursing or vocational nursing in this state unless the person is licensed.”). Conversely, open-enrollment charter schools require no such authorization. See Walker, 544 S.W.3d at 750.

We next address whether charter schools are “operated by the state.” As an intransitive verb, the term “operate” means “to perform a function: exert power or influence,” “to produce an appropriate effect,” “to perform an operation or a series of operations,” or “to follow a course of conduct that is often regular.” Operate, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/operate (last visited October 23, 2025). The term may also be used as a transitive verb, “meaning to “bring about, effect,” “to cause to function: work,” or “to perform an operation on.” Id.¹ In the phrase “a facility licensed, certified, or operated by the state,” the term “operated” is used as a transitive verb because the verb acts on the direct object—facility.² Applying this meaning in the context of “a facility operated by the state,” the statute creates a relationship of operation between the state (the actor) and the facility (the patient). Specifically, if a facility is operated by the state, it means the state is the one performing the action of operating.

Our supreme court has recognized that open-enrollment charter schools are “generally entitled to state funding and services as if they were a school district” and are “part of the public school system of the state,” see Walker, 544 S.W.3d at 750, but the “typical charter-holder is a private, nonprofit organization,” see El Paso Educ. Initiative, 602 S.W.3d at 529–30 (emphasis added). The legislature expressly authorized the Commissioner of Education to “grant a charter on the application of an eligible entity for an open-enrollment charter school” and defined “eligible entity” as an institution of higher education, a private or independent institution of higher education, an organization that is exempt from taxation, or a governmental entity. Tex. Educ. Code § 12.101(a). Open-enrollment charter schools function as an “arm of the State government,” but the state itself is generally not an eligible charter holder; instead, the state delegates authority to other governmental entities or nonprofit organizations to operate them. See id.; see also El Paso Educ. Initiative, 602 S.W.3d at 529–30. While the state exercises regulatory oversight, such as granting and revoking charters, it does not control day-to-day operations, such as hiring personnel or directing instruction. See Tex. Educ. Code §§ 12.101, 12.115.

In short, open-enrollment charter schools are publicly funded but privately operated. See El Paso Educ. Initiative, 602 S.W.3d at 529–30, Walker, 544 S.W.3d at 750; see also Tex. Educ. Code § 12.101. As a result, they fall outside the scope of facilities that are licensed, certified, or operated by the state for purposes of section 261.101 of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code § 261.101(b).³ We therefore conclude that Richards is not entitled to the liability protections of Chapter 261 because she does not qualify as a “professional” under section 261.101(b). Accordingly, we sustain Houston Classical's first issue and do not reach its second issue regarding whether she had direct contact with children.⁴

Conclusion

Having concluded that immunity has not been waived, we reverse the trial court's order denying Houston Classical's plea to the jurisdiction, and we render judgment dismissing Richards’ claims against Houston Classical for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

FOOTNOTES

1.   If a sentence has a verb that shows action of some sort but does not have a direct object, that verb is known as an intransitive verb. See Webster's New World English Grammar Handbook 46 (2d. ed. 2009). Transitive verbs are verbs that pattern with direct objects. See Webster's New World English Grammar Handbook 45 (2d. ed. 2009). They show an action that is “passed on” to the direct object, and in effect, serve as a transition between the subject (the actor) and the direct object (the thing acted upon, sometimes called the patient). Id.

2.   Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary defines “operate” as “to direct, put into action, or maintain the functioning of, esp. by direct personal effort; to engage, use, and control (a machine, computer, equipment, etc.).” Operate, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). It also defines the term as “to manage or conduct the affairs of; to direct or superintend .” Id.

3.   Richards’ argument that section 38.004 of the Education code or section 103.1401(b) of the Texas Administrative Code expands the statutory definition of “professional” in section 261.101(b) to include all school employees is erroneous. Both statutes impose reporting requirements for school employees, but they do not redefine who qualifies as a “professional.” See Tex. Educ. Code § 38.004(a); 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 103.1401(b)(1). Interpreting either statute as expanding the statutory definition would exceed legislative intent and contradict the plain language of section 261.101(b). See Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 443 (noting that the statute must be enforced as it is written, and the reviewing court must “refrain from rewriting text that lawmakers chose.”).

4.   To the extent that Richards alleges that she created a fact issue regarding whether she had direct contact with children, all elements of the statutory definition of “professional” are required to invoke Chapter 261 protections. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 261.101(b), 261.110(b). Because the first prong of the two-prong definition was not satisfied, we do not consider the evidence supporting the second one. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

Maritza Antú, Justice