IN RE: THE COMMITMENT OF RUSSELL LEE LAIRD (2025)

OPINION

Affirmed and Opinion filed October 21, 2025

The State filed a civil petition to commit appellant Russell Lee Laird for involuntary treatment and supervision as a sexually violent predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 841.001–.151. The jury found that appellant is a sexually violent predator. The trial court rendered a final judgment based on the jury's verdict and signed an order of civil commitment. Laird appeals the trial court's final judgment and order of civil commitment in a single issue. Laird argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's implied finding that he suffers from a behavioral abnormality as defined in the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (the Act). See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.002(2). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The State of Texas filed a petition alleging that appellant Russell Lee Laird is a sexually violent predator in need of continued treatment and supervision. The case eventually went to trial before a jury. Two witnesses testified during the trial, Stephen Thorne, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, and Laird. We summarize their testimony in reverse order.

Laird was fifty-six when his civil commitment trial began and he had spent the last twenty-five years in prison. Prior to his imprisonment, Laird was employed, married with children, educated, and involved in his church. Laird also enjoyed strong support from his family. During this time period, Laird was convicted for sexual offenses against five children aged fourteen and younger.

Laird has a conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a ten-year-old girl and four convictions for indecency with boys by sexual contact. The offense dates range from 1991 to 1999. Laird admitted to the offenses with each of the boys, but denied that he had sexually assaulted the girl even though he pled guilty to the charge. Laird blames all of his sexual offending on curiosity and low self-esteem. Despite his admitted crimes, Laird denied being sexually attracted to children.

In 1991, Laird was newly married and had two young children. Laird claimed that he befriended two neighborhood boys, ages eleven and thirteen. Laird described himself as a big brother or mentor to the two boys. A year after meeting the boys, Laird sexually offended against both. Although Laird denied many of the details the boys reported, he admitted putting his hands down one of the boy's pants and fondling the boy's penis. With regard to the other boy, Laird testified that the touch was accidental and nonsexual. Laird explained that he was curious how the boy's penis compared to his own. Laird testified that afterwards he felt bad, wrong, and ashamed. Laird testified that he also felt remorse and he was certain that he would never do it again.

Laird was charged with indecency with each of the two boys by sexual contact and convicted by a jury. Laird was placed on probation for ten years and underwent two years of sex-offender treatment. During that time Laird spent time alone with his young children and stepson. Laird believed it was okay to be around the children in his household because they were not in “the same offending pool of the people he had offended against.” In fact, Laird testified that he saw no problem being alone with his children and stepson during his probation. Laird also testified that if he got out of prison, he did not believe it would be a problem if he re-established a relationship with his children and then spent time with his grandchildren. Once again Laird explained it was not a problem because his grandchildren were “not in that group of individuals that [he] had offended against.”

Laird's probation was eventually revoked for multiple reasons.

A ten-year-old girl who lived in Laird's neighborhood sometimes came over to Laird's house to play. Laird pled guilty to aggravated sexual assault of the girl and was sentenced to serve five years in prison. Laird denied committing this offense during his trial testimony.

Laird volunteered to work with the youth at his church to, as he described it, “be a positive influence on the youth.” Laird volunteered even though he was a registered sex offender and still on probation for the two above-described indecency convictions. Laird believed that it was a safe thing for him to do because he was never the only adult present.

Laird met another boy while volunteering with the youth group. Laird described the relationship that developed as “a big-brother-type relationship.” Laird eventually sexually offended against the boy even though he testified that he was not attracted to the boy. During his trial Laird denied many of the details that the boy reported, but Laird did admit exposing himself to the boy, putting his hand down the boy's pants, and fondling the boy's penis. Laird testified that he felt ashamed after committing the offense but he did not recall how he felt during the offense. Laird knew then that it was stupid for him to have overstepped his boundaries. Laird was certain at that time that he would never sexually offend again. But he did.

Laird claimed that he befriended a neighborhood boy who was twelve or thirteen years old. Six or seven months later, Laird sexually offended against the boy. Laird fondled the boy's penis. In his statement to police, Laird called the boy a liar when he reported him. Laird stated during his deposition that he thought the boy was willingly engaging sexually with him. By the time of his commitment trial, however, Laird had figured out that his actions with the boy were criminal.

In addition to Laird's two years of sex-offender treatment while on probation, he also completed a nine-month treatment program in prison. Despite participating in these two programs, Laird denied ever being sexually attracted to children. During his trial, while Laird initially denied having sexual fantasies about his victims, he did eventually admit to having them. Laird testified that he never set out to sexually offend against anyone and claimed he was never searching for victims.

Laird was questioned about what his life would be like once he is released from prison. Laird stated that he did not believe he was at risk of reoffending sexually. Laird identified his high-risk situations as being unsupervised around young people and he stated that he would not place himself in that position in the future. Laird also testified that he still believes he is safe to be around children so long as there are other adults around. Laird further testified that, to protect himself, he would not work with another church youth group.

Laird testified that his mother and father have been supportive of him and he planned to live with his father upon his release from prison. Laird admitted that his father suffers from dementia and sometimes he remembers things, and sometimes he does not. Laird also testified that he has a large family and they have also been supportive. Laird planned to be around his entire large family, including their children, once he is released from prison.

Laird was questioned about his triggers for reoffending during his commitment trial. Laird testified that his self-esteem is higher now than it was when he offended. Laird stated that his sexual desire is almost non-existent and he has “no sex drive now.” Laird testified that he does not believe he is at risk of reoffending sexually. Laird also testified that he does not have a conscious attraction to young boys. Despite having this belief, Laird testified that he needs safeguards to be in place in order for him to be around children. Finally, Laird testified that he needs continued sex-offender treatment.

Dr. Stephen Thorne also testified during Laird's commitment trial. Thorne is a licensed psychologist whose practice is mostly forensic in nature, which means he applies the field of psychology to the legal system.¹ The Texas Department of Criminal Justice retained Thorne to determine whether Laird meets the legal criteria as having a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Thorne has made this determination in over 400 cases in the past eighteen to nineteen years. Thorne was later retained by the Special Prosecution Unit to testify at Laird's commitment trial. After reaching his initial opinion, Thorne continued to receive and review records pertaining to Laird.

Thorne reviewed the records from Laird's five convictions for sexually offending against children. Thorne also conducted a video interview with Laird. Four of Laird's victims were under the age of fourteen, the fifth was fourteen. The offenses occurred over a seven-year time period. Thorne detailed the pertinent facts of each conviction as revealed in the records he reviewed. Having already summarized those incidents above, we do not repeat the details here. According to Thorne, Laird was placed on probation for sexually offending against the first two boys. Thorne testified that Laird violated the terms of his probation in various ways, including sexually reoffending multiple times. Thorne also pointed out that, in addition to the sexual offenses, Laird had other criminal cases.

Thorne also explained the concept of grooming as it relates to sexual offenses as the process by which a perpetrator gains access to children. According to Thorne, this could be through the child's family, church, or the child's neighborhood. It is through the grooming process that the perpetrator gains the child's trust. Thorne opined that Laird groomed each of his victims. Thorne believed that, for Laird to avoid reoffending, he must stop grooming children.

Thorne identified the research-based risk factors and protective factors for Laird sexually reoffending. According to Laird, the two most predictive risk factors are a history of sexual deviancy and a history of non-sexual criminal behavior. Thorne, when addressing the second risk factor, stated that Laird had criminal cases for public intoxication, shoplifting, and theft of services.

Thorne testified that Laird is sexually deviant, which means he has engaged in illegal and inappropriate sexual behavior with under-aged individuals. Laird was convicted of sexually offending against four different boys. Thorne explained that research shows sex offenders who abuse boys reoffend at a higher rate than those who only abuse girls. According to Thorne, research also shows sexually abusing boys is “a greater level of deviancy” as it relates to reoffending. Thorne also explained that Laird's history of not sexually offending during his twenty-five years in prison is not uncommon for people who sexually abuse children because there are no children in prison. This history of not offending during the period of Laird's incarceration does not mean that Laird's urges or fantasies have gone away. Thorne explained that sexual deviance is a chronic condition that does not go away and Laird will have to manage it for the rest of his life.

While on probation Laird sexually offended against three more children. According to Thorne, “research suggests that difficulties or failure to successfully complete probation or parole, what they call mandatory supervision, is actually, statistically, the number one thing that correlates with sexual re-offending.”

Laird's victims were all extra-familial. Thorne testified that research suggests that people who offend outside of the family have higher rates of reoffending than those who only have incest victims and lower rates of reoffending than those who sexually offend against strangers, i.e. people they have never seen before. Laird's victims were considerably younger than Laird, which, according to Thorne, is another risk factor for sexually reoffending. In addition, Thorne testified that displays of remorse and regret have not been shown through research to have a relationship with reoffending.

Thorne then turned to Laird's protective factors, which he explained meant factors that decrease Laird's risk of reoffending. Thorne continued that research indicates that Laird's age at the time of his commitment trial is a protective factor. Laird was fifty-six years old at the time of his commitment trial. Thorne stated that Laird's other protective factors are social support from his parents, his employability, and his lack of obvious psychological disorders. Laird's non-use of drugs and alcohol at the time of his sexual offenses also weighs in his favor because “sex offenders who are under the influence of something when they commit the sexual offense are thought to have higher levels of - - of recidivism.” Successful completion of a treatment program, which Laird achieved, is considered a protective factor. Thorne opined that, considering Laird's previous history of sexual offending, some of the protective factors, which were present at the time of his sexual offending, did not work for Laird.

Thorne diagnosed Laird with pedophilic disorder, nonexclusive. Thorne explained this diagnosis means Laird is attracted to prepubescent children and adults, male and female. Prepubescent means children under the age of thirteen. Since one of Laird's victims was fourteen, and therefore would not fall under the pedophilic umbrella, Thorne added a V code of sexual abuse of a child. According to Thorne, a “V code” is given for a condition that is related to why the person is being treated or evaluated by a professional. According to Thorne, Laird's pedophilic disorder is a chronic condition he will have for the remainder of his life. Thorne explained the condition does not go away and the hope is that Laird will develop the tools to manage it. Thorne opined that, on the question of Laird's sexual deviance, his pedophilic disorder could be the congenital or acquired condition that has affected Laird's emotional or volitional capacity and which predisposes him to commit sexually violent offenses.

Thorne did not diagnose Laird with a personality disorder but gave him a V code of adult antisocial behavior. Thorne explained this V code means Laird has engaged in non-sexual antisocial behavior but does not meet the diagnostic criteria for the disorder. While in prison, Laird received more than two dozen disciplinary cases for non-sexual behavior.

Laird completed two years of sex-offender treatment while on probation. The therapist running the program was concerned that, in retrospect, Laird might be a sociopath who was able to say what he thought people wanted to hear. The therapist who ran the program had erroneously thought Laird would not sexually reoffend. Laird also completed a nine-month sex-offender treatment program in prison. Notes from that program indicate, while not using the term sociopath, a concern that Laird says what others want to hear.

Thorne expressed concern that Laird has not internalized what he has learned in his sex-offender treatment programs. Laird's continued denial of a sexual attraction to children and his denial of a future risk of reoffending demonstrate that he has failed to internalize the concepts of treatment. Thorne also expressed concern that, after nearly three years of sex-offender treatment, and after spending more than twenty years in prison, Laird still speaks as if one of his young victims had initiated the sexual offense by pulling down his pants. Based on what Laird has said, Thorne does not believe Laird has the tools necessary to manage his sexual attraction to children.

Thorne performed psychological testing on Laird. One of the tests, the Static-99R is an actuarial measure of risk. This test does not measure ability to control behavior and it does not indicate whether a person has a behavioral abnormality. Laird received a +3 score, which falls in the range of average-risk of sexually reoffending when compared to other known sex offenders. The average sex offender scores a +2. Thorne tested Laird for psychopathy using the Hare PCLR. Laird received a score of fourteen, indicating he is not a psychopath.

Finally, Thorne testified about whether Laird has a behavioral abnormality as defined in the Act.² See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.002(2). Thorne opined that, based on his education, training, experience, and the procedures he employed in his review, Laird has a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Thorne further opined that Laird's volitional capacity has been affected to the degree he is predisposed to commit sexually violent offenses and is a menace to the health and safety of another person.

Thorne testified that most documented sex offenders are not rearrested or reconvicted of another sexual offense. Thorne continued that Laird was one of the exceptions to that statistic. When asked if Laird fit into the “small but dangerous group of individuals, sexually violent predators” who are “not amendable to traditional treatment modalities,” Thorne opined that he did. Thorne explained that the reason for his conclusion was that Laird had received two years of sex-offender treatment and had still reoffended three different times.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the case was submitted to the jury. The jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that Laird is a sexually violent predator. The trial court adjudged Laird as a sexually violent predator and signed an order civilly committing Laird for treatment and supervision the same day. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that he is a sexually violent predator because the State failed to prove that he “suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.”³

I. Standard of review and applicable law

The commitment of a person as a sexually violent predator is a civil proceeding. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 645–53 (Tex. 2005). The Act requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is a sexually violent predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.062(a); In re Commitment of Harris, 541 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). A person is a sexually violent predator if he (1) is a repeat sexually violent offender, and (2) suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.003(a); In re Commitment of Weisinger, No. 14-22-00210-CV, 2023 WL 7498195, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating the “Supreme Court of Texas has clarified that the two statutory elements — repeat sexually violent predator and behavioral abnormality — are the only factors courts should consider in a sufficiency review.”). The Act requires evidence of both repeat past sexually violent behavior and a present condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future. In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 678 (Tex. 2020).

In a legal sufficiency review we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the elements required for commitment. Id. We may not, however, ignore “undisputed facts that do not support the finding.” In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 674. The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. In re Commitment of Harris, 541 S.W.3d at 327. We presume the jury resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 674.

II. The evidence is legally sufficient.

Here, the charge asked the jury to determine whether Laird was a sexually violent predator. The trial court instructed the jury that a person is a sexually violent predator if the person “suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.003(a). The trial court further instructed the jury that a “ ‘behavioral abnormality' means a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting his emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes him to commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent he becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person.” Laird argues the State failed to prove he suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence in the future.⁴ Laird's sufficiency argument is that the State failed to offer enough evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he has a behavioral abnormality as defined in the Act. We disagree.

Laird points out several pieces of evidence from the record in support of his insufficient evidence argument: (1) Laird scored only a +3 on the Static-99R placing him in the average rather than high risk range of sexually re-offending; (2) Thorne did not diagnose him with an antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy, or as a sociopath; (3) Thorne determined that Laird did have protective factors present such as his age, he had no stranger victims, he has some parental support, he has no obvious psychiatric illnesses, no drug or alcohol addictions, and he had favorable employment prospects; (4) Laird was granted parole; (5) there was no evidence he used violence in his previous sexual offenses; (6) the State did not present evidence that Laird “sexually molested any other children than those” at issue in his criminal convictions; and (7) he was not disciplined for sexual misconduct while imprisoned. Laird compares these bits of evidence plucked from his trial record with evidence presented in other civil commitment cases in which the appellate court affirmed the sexually violent predators' civil commitment orders. Laird then argues that the evidence of behavioral abnormality was far worse in those other cases than in his own thereby making the evidence legally insufficient. The Texas Supreme Court has rejected this approach to measuring the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a civil commitment order. See In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 674 (rejecting comparison between an appellant and other adjudicated sexually violent predators “that were more sustained and egregious than” the appellant as a proper factual sufficiency review standard).

In making his legal sufficiency argument Laird ignores the significant evidence, detailed above, supporting the jury's finding that he is a sexually violent predator. In his trial testimony Thorne indicated the most important indicators that Laird has a behavioral abnormality are that he sexually reoffended multiple times after (1) he was initially caught and placed under supervision, and (2) he went through two years of sex-offender treatment. Thorne also found Laird's history of non-sexual criminal offenses significant in establishing that Laird has a behavioral abnormality. Thorne additionally stated the fact that Laird still denied being sexually attracted to children after serving more than twenty years in prison and participating in two years and nine months of sex-offender treatment was also significant in his determination that Laird has a behavioral abnormality. In addition, Thorne testified that in the process of developing his opinion that Laird has a behavioral abnormality as defined in the Act, he took all of Laird's protective factors into account and still concluded Laird has a behavioral abnormality. Based on this evidence, as well as the other record evidence detailed above, the jury could have reasonably found beyond a reasonable doubt that Laird had a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence.

Laird's focus on specific parts of the evidentiary record or the lack of additional evidence in the record does not render the evidence supporting the jury's finding legally insufficient. See In re Commitment of Dever, 521 S.W.3d 84, 87 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (stating the Act establishes what the State must prove, not how the State must go about proving it). First, Laird's +3 score on the Static-99R, which means he has an average risk of reoffending when compared with other sex offenders, does not establish that the evidence is legally insufficient. Thorne explained that the Static-99R should not be considered in isolation, but only in conjunction with other factors. Thorne testified that he considered multiple factors in the formation of his opinion that Laird has a behavioral abnormality as defined in the Act.

Second, while it is true Thorne did not diagnose Laird with an antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy, or as a sociopath, Thorne did give Laird a “V code” for adult antisocial behavior. Thorne explained that “antisocial behavior” means engaging “in reckless, illegal behavior, rule violations, things that disregards [sic] laws or the rights of others.” Thorne continued that Laird's “V code” for adult antisocial behavior is a risk factor for nonsexual adult antisocial behavior which was significant in his determination that Laird has a behavioral abnormality. See In re Commitment of Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296, 306 (Tex. 2012) (stating that a diagnosis of a person's mental health may inform an assessment of whether that person has a behavioral abnormality under the Act). With respect to the fact that Thorne did not diagnose Laird as a psychopath or sociopath, Thorne explained the lack of these diagnoses was not a major factor in the development of his opinion because most people in prison do not suffer from those mental disorders. This lack of a diagnosed personality disorder does not mean the evidence is legally insufficient. See In re Commitment of Lewis, 495 S.W.3d 341, 347 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, pet. denied) (reasoning that a mental disorder is not a prerequisite to commitment under the Act).

Third, Laird points out the various protective factors Thorne determined Laird had. Except for Laird's age, each of the protective factors Laird mentions were present at the time he sexually offended multiple times and they did not prevent Laird from committing those sexual offenses. The jury could have considered that Laird sexually reoffended even when the specified protective factors were present when it found him to be a sexually violent predator. Turning to Laird's age, Thorne did testify that research reveals a statistical reduction in sexual offending at age fifty and an even greater reduction at age sixty. Thorne, however, also diagnosed Laird with pedophilic disorder. Thorne testified that pedophilic disorder is a chronic condition that does not go away and Laird will have to deal with it for the remainder of his life. Thorne testified he did not believe that Laird had developed the tools to deal with his chronic condition. The jury could have considered this testimony when it determined that Laird is a sexually violent predator even though he is now fifty-six years old. See In re Commitment of Weisinger, No. 14-22-00210-CV, 2023 WL 7498195, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 14, 2023, no pet) (mem. op.) (observing the Act contains no age limit and appellant's age does not negate his behavioral abnormality); In re Commitment of Tryon, 654 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. denied) (holding that advanced age, standing alone, is not enough to reverse a jury's verdict). We conclude that the presence of the protective factors Laird emphasizes does not render the evidence legally insufficient. See In re Commitment of R.E.A., No. 14-22-00742-CV, 2024 WL 807238 at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that protective factors present in that case were “not so significant that the jury could not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Alexander is a sexually violent predator”).

Fourth, Laird argues that he has been granted parole and this determination means he does not present a risk to society, which renders the evidence legally insufficient. Laird testified that he is both parole eligible and he has been granted parole. When asked what the “possibility of being released back into the community” meant to him, Laird answered that “everything has been approved pending the outcome of this [trial].” The possibility of parole does not impact the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's sexually violent predator finding because, as Laird testified, it was still only a possibility at the time of his commitment trial.

Finally, Laird argues the evidence is legally insufficient because the State did not present evidence (1) that he used physical violence in his previous sexual offenses; (2) that Laird sexually offended against additional children; and (3) that he was not disciplined for sexual misconduct while imprisoned. None of these arguments establish that the evidence is legally insufficient. First, sexual offenses against children are defined as physically violent acts. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.001(6) (defining various sexual offenses against children, including indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault of a child, as violent offenses). Second, Laird does not dispute that he has more than one sexually violent offense conviction, which is all the Act requires. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.003. Finally, Thorne explained that it is not unusual for child sexual predators to not engage in sexual misconduct in prison because there are no children in the prison population. Therefore, the fact Laird did not have any sexual misconduct infractions while imprisoned does not establish the evidence is legally insufficient.

Having rejected Laird's arguments raised in his single issue on appeal, we overrule that issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled appellant's issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgment and order of civil commitment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Laird has not challenged Thorne's qualifications in this appeal; we therefore do not include a summary of the evidence detailing his credentials and experience.

2.   Thorne explained during his testimony that “behavioral abnormality” is a legal term, not a medical diagnosis.

3.   Laird is represented by appointed counsel in this appeal. Laird filed pro se briefs attempting to raise additional issues. We need not consider these pro se briefs because Laird is not entitled to hybrid representation. See In re Commitment of Black, 594 S.W.3d 590, 594 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.) (holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not consider Black's pro se filings because he was represented by appointed counsel).

4.   Laird does not challenge the evidence supporting the first element of the State's burden, that he is a repeat sexually violent offender.

Chad Bridges Justice