AUBREY FLOYD HART SR v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2025)

OPINION

Appellant Aubrey Floyd Hart Sr. was indicted for failure to comply with the Texas Sex Offender Registration Program (TSORP) registration requirements, a second-degree felony.¹ See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102(b)(3). The indictment contained two enhancement paragraphs alleging that Hart had previously been convicted for two prior felony offenses, felony rape and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (authorizing the enhancement of a felony offense to be punished with a sentencing range of 25–99 years if defendant has been finally convicted of two prior felony offenses). The jury found Hart guilty of failure to register as a sex offender, found each enhancement paragraph “true,” and sentenced him to ninety-nine years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division. Hart argues: (1) that the trial court erred when it provided an “on or about” jury instruction over his objection which resulted in “some harm”; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's conviction “because the State failed to establish that [Hart] intended to change his address at least seven days before the date alleged in the indictment.” We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 6, 2023, a grand jury returned an indictment alleging that Hart “while knowing that he was required to register under Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because of a reportable conviction based upon [s]exual [a]ssault, and while intending to change address, fail[ed] to comply with a requirement of Chapter 62, by failing to report in person not later than the seventh day before the intended change of address to the local law enforcement authority designated as [Hart's] primary registration authority by the Texas Department of Public Safety [(DPS)], namely, the Burnet Police Department [(BPD)], and by failing to provide the [BPD] with [Hart's] anticipated move date and new address” on or about February 21, 2023. The case proceeded to a jury trial at which the following evidence was adduced.

Leslie Hart Junior (Bo) testified that Hart is his paternal uncle. He resided at 308 Julie Street in Burnet, Texas and co-owned Hartlepool, a roofing business, with his father. He further testified that Hart began residing with him “around April or May of 2022.” Bo testified that he was aware law enforcement was looking for his uncle and was present when Hart was arrested for a different offense on February 13, 2023. He knew there was a court order after Hart's arrest that prohibited Hart from going back to 308 Julie Street. Bo stated that he bonded his uncle out of jail on February 14 and picked him up using Hart's truck. He admitted that he helped gather Hart's belongings and placed them in his truck.

Bo last spoke with Hart on February 15, but Hart did not disclose where he was going. Bo testified that he eventually found out Hart was living in Missouri. He discovered that Hart created a Facebook page using Hart's own picture, but with the name “Leslie Hart” and claiming that he worked at “Hartlepool,” seemingly pretending to be Bo's father. The Facebook page also included “Lives in St. Louis, Missouri.” Bo confirmed his father did not have a Facebook account and has never resided in St. Louis, Missouri.

Bo testified that Hart “checked in” on Facebook on April 11th at “Flamingo Bowl” in St. Louis, Missouri. He further testified that his father provided this information to law enforcement so that they could locate Hart. Eventually, Hart was arrested and contacted Bo from jail. Bo testified that Hart knew he had a warrant for his arrest, and they were looking for him. He stated that “[a]fter [Hart] was incarcerated in St. Louis he said that ․ Texas may not come and get him because it's a sanctuary state.” On redirect, Bo admitted Hart left him a voice message “[m]aybe three weeks, a month” after February 15 requesting that he forward his personal mail to an address located in “St. Joseph, Missouri.”

BPD Investigator Christine Cummings testified that she is a former investigator who handled cases involving crimes against persons. On February 13, 2023, Investigator Cummings heard a dispatch call for service to 308 Julie Street and self-dispatched. After investigating the scene, she obtained an arrest warrant for Hart and subsequently arrested and transported him to county jail. Investigator Cummings testified that the following day there was a court order in place prohibiting Hart from returning to 308 Julie Street. Hart was made aware of the court order and acknowledged it with his signature. That same day, he bonded out of jail. Cummings testified that there was a second warrant issued for Hart on February 15 because he was required to report as part of his sex offender registration. Eventually on April 11, 2023, United States Marshals located Hart in St. Louis, Missouri.

BPD Lieutenant Brandon Bertelson testified that he has worked with the department for approximately fourteen years and is assigned as a registrar for sex offenders. He explained that he is “the individual that our offenders would come to do their ․ verifications.” Lieutenant Bertelson testified that he attended trainings through the DPS for the sex offender registry program. He stated that he gathers and enters the information into a database so that it is accurate and validated across the state and nationwide. The following colloquy occurred:

[Prosecutor]: Okay. I want to talk just generally about some of the different requirements that sex offenders are required to do as far as verification and registration[.]

[Lieutenant Bertelson]: So typically the way it will happen is I'll receive notification from another agency that an offender is moving into my jurisdiction. That offender will then in turn also make contact with me and I typically set up an appointment with them to come in and sit down face-to-face so I can validate the information in our system. That typically looks like coming in, sitting down face-to-face with me in my office. I'll look at getting their phone number, vehicle, residence, online identifier information, and then next of kin, and things like that.

[Prosecutor]: Okay. How often in general do sex offenders have to verify their information with you?

[Lieutenant Bertelson]: ․ It depends on their offense or how many offenses they have․ Some could be [thirty] day[s] based on the commitment order. Some could be [ninety] day[s], quarterly typically with the degree of offenses or two offenses, and then others could be annually or yearly.

[Prosecutor]: And so tell the jury what a verification appointment looks like?

[Lieutenant Bertelson]: So it's typically they'll come in and then, ․ we go over the information that's basically in their profile. I'll look at their address, their phone number, their vehicle information, next of kin information, internet identifiers, work, school, if they're attending college․ I just basically gather information to basically be able to be accurate in the system.

[Prosecutor]: Okay. And do you do anything as far as making sure they know when to follow[ ]up for their next verification appointment?

[Lieutenant Bertelson]: Yes, ma'am. We typically set an appointment date at that time whenever they leave annually or [ninety] day[s], whichever it should be.

[Prosecutor]: And what ․ if something happens when it gets close to their [ninety]-day appointment date and they can't make that specific day? Is there the ability to contact you and set up a new appointment?

[Lieutenant Bertelson]: As long as they make contact with me typically I can extend it to meet the needs of what they have. A lot of times often offenders have jobs or they have circumstances that I can't say this date is it, so they'll have to ․ push it back and make accommodations to help them out, but as long as they make contact and set the appointment or let me know, then, yes, there is some maneuverability to the date.

․

[Prosecutor]: Okay. I want to talk to the jury a little bit about appointments that have to be made when there is a status change before a verification appointment is set; is that fair?

․

[Lieutenant Bertelson]: So if it's to their job, typically within seven days they need to contact me and let me know that they are changing jobs or they've lost their job. It'll just basically be changing their status to unemployed [un]til they find another job.

[Prosecutor]: And is that seven days prior to the change, seven days after the change, or something different?

[Lieutenant Bertelson]: It would be something different with that because of the circumstances around the job. If you lose your job, you couldn't possibly know seven days before, right? So it's just within that seven-day window you've got to let me know, hey, I've lost my job to layoffs or whatever it is.

[Prosecutor]: Okay. I want to talk specifically about the requirements for notifying you of a change of address.

․

What is the requirement under Chapter 62 for a sex offender who changes a residence or changes address?

[Lieutenant Bertelson]: So in order for them to change their residence they are required to let me know seven days before the move. Once they have made that notification, they'll have time to make that move. It ․ starts the clock for me to within three days make notification to wherever it is they're moving if it's outside of my jurisdiction․

[Prosecutor]: So just so that we're clear, an offender has the intent to change their address or the intent to move?

․

Seven days before that change is when they are required to notify you?

[Lieutenant Bertelson]: Yes[.]

[Prosecutor]: Okay. What about in circumstances where there is an unexpected change in address just like there may be an unexpected change in their job situation?

[Lieutenant Bertelson]: [I]t would just be a required change of status notification. They would just need to call me and let me know circumstances have arose that I'm going to have to switch addresses, I'll be staying at this place for a little bit.

․

[Prosecutor]: Okay. And as far as an unexpected or unanticipated change in address, how do you ․ verify that given the seven-day window? What does that look like?

[Lieutenant Bertelson]: As far as verifying where they're at? So essentially[,] they'll let me know where they're going to be and then ․ I would need to do a validation of that address. So whether that be me going and laying eyes on the location as, yes, that's where you're at or you coming to me with a piece of mail saying here's the new address.

Lieutenant Bertelson stated that an address or residence under Chapter 62 is where an individual “lay[s] their head that night.” The sex offender registry also includes “transient status.” Lieutenant Bertelson stated that communication is key “in reaching out to the registrar and advising them that [you are] going to have to move.” He confirmed that offenders must check in no matter their situation.

Lieutenant Bertelson testified that he was familiar with Hart and BPD has been his “primary registration authority” since July 2022. He further testified that he initially met with Hart and reviewed his information and registration duties. Hart read and initialed each registration duty. Lieutenant Bertelson stated that he scheduled a verification appointment with Hart on July 15, 2022, and Hart signed his registration duties which included a thumbprint. This document was admitted into evidence without objection and published to the jury. According to Lieutenant Bertelson, Hart's primary residence was 308 Julie Street in Burnet. He indicated the last time he had a verification appointment with Hart was in January 2023. Lieutenant Bertelson testified that Hart did not notify him in February 2023 that there was a court order prohibiting him from returning to the Julie Street address; however, he became aware of it through BPD. He further testified that Hart did not contact him with a new change of address. Lieutenant Bertelson stated there were “multiple seven-day periods” where Hart failed to report to him or make himself available. Lieutenant Bertelson testified that he is still Hart's primary registering authority because BPD is the “last agency to have validated data on him.”

Agent Kelsey Snyder testified that she is the sex offender coordinator for the United States Marshal Service in the Eastern District of Missouri. She explained that the Marshals are responsible for apprehending fugitives on felony arrest warrants. Agent Snyder testified that her primary duty is to investigate noncompliant sex offenders. She stated that the “State of Texas had a warrant and ․ they had information to believe that [Hart] was in Missouri and they sent us ․ a collateral lead asking us to locate and apprehend [Hart].” Agent Snyder testified that she was specifically searching for “Aubrey Hart” with an alias of “Leslie Hart.” She received information that he may be staying at a “crisis center” located in the downtown area she was familiar with. Agent Snyder met with the on-site manager who confirmed Hart was registered with an alias of “Leslie Hart.” A second manager was able to positively identify Hart. Agent Snyder testified that “[she] identified him by ‘Aubrey,’ ” and Hart “dropped his head” and she took him into custody. She stated Hart had “a large bag of property” on his person. Hart admitted to Agent Snyder that he had his truck nearby but did not recall where he parked it. He also stated that “he slept on church steps the night before but could not recall the location of the church.” Agent Snyder testified that they are not allowed to take personal property with them, so Hart's personal property stayed at the crisis center until he made other arrangements. According to Agent Snyder, there was no indication Hart had registered as a sex offender within the State of Missouri. She further opined that Hart was not cooperating with his reporting requirements by living under an assumed name and hiding his identity.

Following the presentation of evidence, the jury found Hart guilty of failure to register as a sex offender and assessed punishment at ninety-nine years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II. CHARGE ERROR

By his first issue, Hart contends that the trial court erred when it provided an “on or about” jury instruction over his objection which resulted in “some harm.”

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the case. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14. The purpose of the trial court's jury charge is to instruct the jurors on all of the law applicable to the case. Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). The charge should include an application paragraph that explains to the jury how to apply the law to the facts. Perez v. State, 689 S.W.3d 369, 379 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2024, no pet.). It should also “contain an accurate statement of the law and must set out all the essential elements of the offense.” Id. (quoting Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (cleaned up)). If there is an alleged jury-charge error, we are required to engage in a two-step analysis. Id. “First, we determine whether the charge is erroneous. If it is, then we must decide whether the appellant was harmed by the erroneous charge.” Id. (quoting Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022)).

We examine the charge in its entirety when determining if there was error and not the charge statements in isolation. Id. After we determine there is harm, reversal is required “when the defendant properly objected to the charge and we find ‘some harm’ to his rights.” In Matter of E.O.E., 508 S.W.3d 613, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.) (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). When, as here, there is a proper objection, then we determine if there was some harm by examining if “the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure” his rights. Id. at 619–20 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.19). This includes examination of four factors including “(1) the entire jury charge, (2) the state of the evidence, (3) the jury arguments, and (4) any other relevant information as revealed by the record as a whole.” Sada v. State, 574 S.W.3d 524, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref'd).

B. Analysis

We start by examining the charge as a whole to determine if there was error. See Perez, 689 S.W.3d at 379. Here, the abstract portion of the charge provided the statutory definition of failure to register as a sex offender. The charge then instructed the jury regarding the applicable law in the case and statute of limitations as follows:

A person who has a reportable conviction or who is required to register as a condition of parole, release to mandatory supervision, or community supervision is required to register with the local law enforcement authority in the municipality where the person resides or intends to reside for more than seven days. If the person does not reside in a municipality, the person is required to register in any county where the person resides or intends to reside for more than seven days.

A person commits the offense of FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER if, while being a person required to register, he fails to comply with any requirement of [DPS], including: (1.) by failing to report in person not later than the seventh day before the intended change of address to the local law enforcement authority designated as [Hart's] primary registration authority by [DPS] and by failing to provide that local law enforcement authority with [Hart's] anticipated move date and new address.

․

You are instructed as the law in this case that the [S]tate is not required to prove the exact date alleged in the indictment, but may prove the offense, if any, to have been committed at any time prior to the presentment of the indictment, but within the period of limitations attached to the offense. You are instructed that there is a three-year period of limitations for the offense of FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER. You are further instructed that an indictment is presented when it has been duly acted upon by the Grand Jury and received by the Court. You are instructed that the burden is on the [S]tate to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense, if any, was committed at some time prior to the presentment of the indictment. You are instructed that the indictment in this cause was presented on the 6[th] day of June, 2023.

The application portion of the charge instructed the jury:

[I]f you unanimously believe beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Hart], on or about the 21[st] day of February 2023, and before the presentment of this indictment, in the County of Burnet, and the State of Texas, did then and there, while knowing that he was required to register under Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because of a reportable conviction based upon [s]exual [a]ssault, and while intending to change address, fail to comply with a requirement of Chapter 62, by failing to report in person not later than the seventh day before the intended change of address to the local law enforcement authority designated as [Hart's] primary registration authority by [DPS], namely, the [BPD], and by failing to provide the [BPD] with [Hart's] anticipated move date and new address, you will find [Hart] guilty of the offense of FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER, and so say by your verdict, but if you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit [Hart] of the offense of FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER, as alleged in the Indictment and say by your verdict “not guilty.”

Hart's complaint rests on the language “that the [S]tate is not required to prove the exact date alleged in the indictment” when instructing the jury about the applicable law to the offense. Hart's trial objection argued that this improperly broadened the chronological perimeter of the offense, which the trial court overruled. Hart's primary authority on appeal is Kelley v. State and Taylor v. State, which both found language like the language complained about here erroneous where it presents the jury with a much broader chronological perimeter than is permitted by law. See 332 S.W.3d 483, 488–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); 429 S.W.3d 865, 879–80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). However, the reasoning in both of those cases is inapplicable here.

The charge in Taylor was held to be improper because it involved the offense of aggravated sexual assault and permitted the jury to convict the defendant for conduct committed before he turned seventeen, which is impermissible under the Penal Code. See Taylor, 332 S.W.3d at 488. The “on or about” language in that charge did broaden the scope of time to allow the jury to consider improper evidence. Id. Meanwhile, in Kelley, the defendant was indicted for failure to timely report under the sex offender statute during a particular 90-day verification period set out under Article 62.058(a). See Kelley, 429 S.W.3d at 880; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.058(a). Because the evidence adduced at trial was not limited to the date range for which the indictment specified and the jury charge permitted conviction for acts committed after the date range for which he was charged, this too was held erroneous. See Kelley, 429 S.W.3d at 880. Though this was notably held to be harmless error because testimony and argument focused on the defendant's conduct that occurred in the applicable period, despite the additional evidence. See id. at 880–81.

As the State highlights in its brief, the facts here are most analogous to Herrell v. State, No. 02-16-00432-CR, 2018 WL 1865881, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 19, 2018, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The defendant in Herrell was charged with the same offense as Hart, that is, failing to timely report a change of address at least seven days prior to moving. See id; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.055(a). Likewise, that defendant complained of an “on or about” instruction akin to the one here that did not require the State to prove the exact date alleged in the indictment so long as there was evidence that the offense was committed within the statute of limitations and prior to presentation of the indictment. See Herrell, 2018 WL 1865881, at *7. But such argument failed because the instruction in Herrell did not permit the jury to convict him for an offense other than the one alleged in the indictment. Id. This is because the unit of prosecution for failure to comply with the address reporting “requirement is ‘one offense for each change of address.’ ” Id. at *8 (quoting Young v. State, 341 S.W.3d 417, 426–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Herrell was charged with only one change of address and evidence was presented regarding only one change of address. Id. at *8–9. We note that another sister court, the Tyler Court of Appeals, has also adopted this reasoning. See also Crawford v. State, No. 12-18-00214-CR, 2019 WL 2710744, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Likewise, here, Hart was indicted for changing addresses from 308 Julie Street to a crisis center in Missouri. The evidence adduced at trial all related to this single offense of leaving 308 Julie Street and never timely reporting his change of address. The evidence related to finding him in Missouri was merely presented in support of the fact that he left the Julie Street address. This evidence is also akin to Thomas v. State where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “on or about” language is often used and “a conviction is not rendered infirm merely because the State proved that the offense occurred on another day.” 444 S.W.3d 4, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). There is no variance here or improper conviction of Hart using evidence of a separate offense than the one he was charged with. See id.

Hart's argument is improperly focused on the fact that there was evidence of conduct past the reporting date adduced, which was not the sole reason why the jury charges were held improper in Taylor and Kelley. See 332 S.W.3d at 488–89; 429 S.W.3d at 879–80. This would only be improper if the indictment in this case specified a specific seven-day period that Hart failed to report and then allowed evidence of subsequent changes in address, thus expanding past the singular unit of prosecution used in this type of offense. See Young, 341 S.W.3d at 426–27. But the indictment here was not specific to a particular reporting period as the indictment in Kelley did. 429 S.W.3d at 879–80. Therefore, Hart was not convicted by improper evidence of a separate offense.

We follow our sister courts in Herrell and Crawford and conclude the jury charge did not present a much broader chronological parameter than permitted by law. See 2018 WL 1865881, at *1; 2019 WL 2710744, at *3. As a result, the charge was not erroneous, and we need not conduct a harm analysis. See Perez, 689 S.W.3d at 379. We overrule Hart's first issue.

III. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY

By his second issue, Hart contends the evidence is insufficient to “sustain the conviction for failure to register as a sex offender because the State failed to establish that [he] intended to change his address at least seven days before the date alleged in the indictment.” We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

To satisfy constitutional due process requirements, a criminal conviction must be supported by sufficient evidence. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we consider “all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hammack v. State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). This does not mean that the State is required to “disprove every conceivable alternative to defendant's guilt.” Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

In analyzing legal sufficiency, we “defer to the jury's credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the ‘sole judge’ of witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given testimony.” Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). We look to the “events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.” Hammack, 622 S.W.3d at 914 (internal quotations omitted). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination.” Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). “Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Further, circumstantial evidence is equally probative as direct evidence, and circumstantial evidence alone is “sufficient to establish guilt.” Id. We treat direct evidence and circumstantial evidence equally on appellate review. Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 482 (citing Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

We measure legal sufficiency by comparing the evidence produced at trial to the essential elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge. Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). We determine the essential elements by examining the hypothetically correct jury charge which should:

(1) Accurately set[ ] out the law;

(2) Be authorized by the indictment;

(3) Not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability; and

(4) Adequately describe the particular offense for which defendant was tried.

Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 482. “This list is ‘not necessarily exhaustive.’ ” Id. (quoting Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).

A hypothetically correct charge in this case would instruct the jury that a person commits the offense of failure to register as a sex offender if he “did then and there, while knowing that he was required to register under Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because of a reportable conviction based upon [s]exual [a]ssault, and while intending to change address, fail to comply with a requirement of Chapter 62, by failing to report in person not later than the seventh day before the intended change of address to the local law enforcement authority.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102(b)(3). To sustain a conviction, the jury had to “unanimously agree” upon this specific statutory failure. See Young, 341 S.W.3d at 425.

B. Analysis

Hart's primary argument that the evidence is insufficient relies on a dissenting opinion in Thomas, which is not controlling precedent. 444 S.W.3d at 11–12; see also Williams v. State, 848 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (explaining dissenting opinions are not precedent). Hart argues that because a court order barred him from returning to the address he was staying at, it was impossible for him to timely report a change of address seven days prior to moving. He argues the State instead used evidence of his failure to report his new address seven days after he moved to support his conviction under the first part of the statute. Cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.055(e)(1) with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.055(a). The parties do not dispute that the second part of the statute was not submitted to the jury.

However, Hart's argument ignores that the adduced evidence still shows he failed to timely report a change of address at least seven days prior to moving. We are empathetic to the fact that Hart could not have anticipated that a court order would forbid him from returning to the Julie Street address. But the testimony indicates that Hart moved to St. Louis at some point between posting bail on February 14, 2023, and being found in Missouri on April 11, 2023. As Bo testified, he picked up Hart from jail and didn't hear from him again. Other law enforcement officers including Investigator Cummings and Lieutenant Bertelson testified regarding Hart vanishing from Texas and never contacting them to report any change of address. Lieutenant Bertelson specifically testified that he was Hart's reporting officer but that Hart never made an attempt to notify him that he was leaving and moving to Missouri and that there were “multiple seven-day periods” in which he could have done so. Because the charged offense was not for the specific seven-day period prior to the court order barring him from returning to the Julie Street address, this is proper evidence of his failure to timely report. See id. art. 62.055(a).

Based on the testimony, the jury had sufficient evidence to deduce and determine that Hart violated the statute. The trial evidence showed he had changed addresses and was living in a new state under an alias. The jury could infer that Hart had no intention of reporting his change of address as he had plenty of time after being barred from Julie Street and moving to Missouri to report a change of address. As established in Green v. State, Hart could have reported his change of address as soon as possible after being forced to leave 308 Julie Street and there would be “no evidence that [Hart] intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly failed to comply with his reporting requirements.” 350 S.W.3d 617, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd). Instead, Hart hid his identity and never reported his change of address.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, “a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hammack, 622 S.W.3d at 914; see also Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 6. We overrule Hart's second issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Delivered and filed on the 26th day of August, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This case is before this Court on transfer from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin pursuant to a docket equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001.

CLARISSA SILVA Justice