ELECTRIC RED VENTURES LLC LC v. RDF AGENT LLC (2025)

OPINION

This is an appeal of a domesticated New York judgment in favor of appellee RDF Agent, LLC, against appellants, Electric Red Ventures, LLC, Monzer Hourani, and Manfred Company, LC (the “Venture Parties”) under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 35.001 et seq. The main question is whether a foreign judgment creditor abandons its right to domesticate the judgment in Texas under the UEFJA when it previously sought to dismiss the judgment debtor's separate lawsuit on res judicata grounds based on the foreign judgment. We hold that it does not. Thus, the trial court correctly rejected the Venture Parties’ argument that RDF could not invoke the UEFJA because it had elected instead to domesticate the foreign judgment under common law procedures.

In two additional issues, the Venture Parties contend that the trial court erred because the New York judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit in Texas, and because the court allowed UEFJA domestication without an evidentiary hearing. We hold, however, that the New York judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in Texas and that appellants have not shown any harmful error by rendition of judgment without an evidentiary hearing.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Background

This case arises out of a financing arrangement between the parties for the development of an approximately $230 million multifamily-real-estate project in Arizona.

Electric Red Ventures, LLC is organized under Arizona law and maintains its principal place of business in Arizona. Manfred Co., L.C. is a Texas limited liability company with its principal place of business in Houston. Monzer Hourani is the CEO of Manfred Co. and Electric Red Ventures. RDF is a Delaware company with its principal place of business in New York.

The parties agreed to the Summary of Indicative Loan Terms and Conditions (the “Term Sheet”), which set out the proposed loan terms for the Arizona project in July 2021. Monzer Hourani signed the Term Sheet (1) as CEO of Electric Red Ventures, the “Borrower,” (2) as CEO of Manfred Co., a “Guarantor,” and (3) in his individual capacity as a second “Guarantor.”

In March 2022, RDF sent a demand letter to the Venture Parties claiming that they breached the Term Sheet by: (1) “failing to timely secure the equity for the Project necessary to close the Loan,” and (2) breaching the Term Sheet's exclusivity provision by “pursu[ing] or contact[ing] persons other than [RDF] in respect of financing the Project.” The letter demands liquidated damages in the amount of $2.3 million as well as RDF's out-of-pocket costs, which totaled $350,000.

After receiving RDF's demand letter, the Venture Parties sued RDF in Texas in April 2022 arguing RDF fraudulently misrepresented that it would assist Venture Parties in locating and securing equity as required by the Term Sheet and would not enforce the Term Sheet's liquidated damages provision. The Venture Parties also sought declaratory relief with respect to the parties’ rights and obligations under the Term Sheet, including that the Venture Parties did not breach their obligations under the Term Sheet and the Term Sheet's liquidated damages provision was an unenforceable penalty. We refer to this lawsuit as the “Venture Suit.”¹

Shortly after the Venture Parties filed the Venture Suit, and before RDF was served with process in that suit, RDF filed a lawsuit for breach of contract in New York against the Venture Parties (the “New York Suit”). Both lawsuits continued simultaneously, although the New York court was the first to reach a judgment.

In July 2023, the judge in the New York Suit granted RDF's motion for summary judgment, ruled the Venture Parties had breached the Term Sheet and that the liquidated damages clause was not an unenforceable penalty. This ruling was reduced to a final money judgment of $3,397,093.14 against all three Venture Parties jointly and severally in early August 2023.

Before the New York court entered a final judgment, RDF filed a motion for summary judgment in the Venture Suit on July 12, 2023 seeking to dismiss that suit on res judicata grounds. In its motion, RDF argued that the Venture Suit should be dismissed because the New York court's summary judgment foreclosed all of the Venture Parties’ affirmative claims. RDF supplemented its motion for summary judgment after the New York court entered a final judgment in August 2023. RDF filed a certified copy of the final New York judgment in the Venture Suit. RDF did not file any counterclaims in the Venture Suit or assert any claims for affirmative relief.

On August 16, 2023, RDF filed a “Notice of Domestication of a Foreign Judgment” in Harris County district court (under a separate cause number than the Venture Suit). In this suit, RDF invoked its right to domesticate the New York judgment in Texas under the UEFJA. We refer to RDF's lawsuit as the “UEFJA Suit.”² RDF's initial pleading in the UEFJA Suit complies on its face with the UEFJA requirements, and the Venture Parties do not contend otherwise. In the prayer, RDF prayed “that the exemplified copies of the judgment be filed in accordance with the law and that said judgment be domesticated having the same force and effect as if rendered in this State.” Within thirty days of August 16, the Venture Parties responded and filed a motion asking the trial court to strike the Notice of Domestication. The Venture Parties argued that RDF had already filed a common-law action in Harris County district court—in the Venture Suit—seeking to enforce the New York judgment. Both parties agree that Texas prohibits “both statutory and common law recognition of the same judgment.” However, RDF asserted that it had not elected common law enforcement. Separately, but on the same day that they filed the motion to strike, the Venture Parties filed a timely motion for new trial or alternatively motion for an evidentiary hearing.

The following week, on September 22, 2023, RDF filed a motion to transfer its UEFJA Suit to the 129th Judicial District Court where the Venture Suit was pending. On September 26, 2023, and before any rulings on the Venture Parties’ motions in the UEFJA Suit, the civil trial division administrative judge transferred the UEFJA Suit to the 129th Judicial District Court. As of September 26, 2023, both lawsuits were pending before the same judge, but they were not consolidated.

On November 9, 2023, the trial court denied the Venture Parties’ motion to strike the Notice of Domestication in the UEFJA Suit. The court did not rule on the motion for new trial within 75 days after the Notice of Domestication was filed, and thus the motion was overruled by operation of law on October 30, 2023. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).³ The Venture Parties filed the instant appeal.

Several months later, in July 2024, the trial court in the Venture Suit granted RDF's res judicata motion for summary judgment and dismissed the suit. We are told the Venture Parties did not appeal that judgment. Thus, the issues before us pertain to the Venture Parties’ assertions of error in the UEFJA Suit.

II. Analysis

A. RDF did not elect common-law enforcement

In their first issue, the Venture Parties argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion to strike and/or vacate RDF's petition for domestication of a foreign judgment because RDF “domesticated a single New York foreign judgment twice[.]” The Venture Parties urge this court to reverse, vacate and dismiss on that basis alone.

1. Applicable law

UEFJA is codified in chapter 35 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and provides a means by which an authenticated copy of a foreign judgment may be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction in Texas and become enforceable as a Texas judgment. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 35.003(c); see Walnut Equip. Leasing Co. v. Wu, 920 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex. 1996). The United States Constitution requires each state to afford full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of every other state. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. A filed, authenticated foreign judgment “has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for ․ enforcing ․ a judgment as a judgment of the court in which it is filed.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 35.003(c).

The prefatory note to the 1964 revision of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act states that the uniform act “provides the enacting state with a speedy and economical method of doing that which it is required to do by the Constitution of the United States” and also “relieves creditors and debtors of the additional cost and harassment of further litigation which would otherwise be incident to the enforcement of the foreign judgment.” Unif. Enf't. of Foreign Judgments Act eds. note, 13 pt. 1 U.L.A. 157 (1964).

The UEFJA also recognizes the right of a judgment creditor to bring “an action to enforce a judgment” instead of proceeding under Chapter 35. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 35.008. This optional approach, referred to as common-law enforcement, allows a creditor to file a petition as a plaintiff initiating the action; the judgment debtor, as defendant, can assert his defenses; and a judgment results. Wolf v. Andreas, 276 S.W.3d 23, 25–26 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, pet. withdrawn); Moncrief v. Harvey, 805 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no pet.). By recognizing that a foreign judgment creditor retains the right to invoke common-law procedures to domesticate a foreign judgment, the legislature has indicated that a common law action and Chapter 35 are alternative methods for domestication.

2. Characterization of RDF's summary-judgment motion

The Venture Parties argue that RDF sought common-law domestication of its New York judgment when it filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the Venture Suit based on res judicata. RDF acknowledges that a judgment creditor may not domesticate a foreign judgment under common law and the UEFJA simultaneously. However, RDF maintains that it never elected common-law domestication of the New York judgment. Instead, it argues its summary judgment motion did not constitute a request for common-law domestication of the New York judgment but rather sought merely to dismiss the Venture Suit. RDF supports its argument by citing the language of section 35.008 which states common-law enforcement is commenced by bringing an “action” or a new suit.

Chapter 35 describes the optional procedure as “an action to enforce a judgment.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 35.008. “The term ‘action’ is generally synonymous with ‘suit,’ which is a demand of one's rights in court.” Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex. 1995); see also Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 563–64 (Tex. 2014) (an “action” is a judicial proceeding, either in law or in equity, to obtain certain relief at the hands of the court). For the following reasons, we conclude that RDF, by filing a res judicata motion for summary judgment in the Venture Suit, did not “bring an action to enforce” the New York judgment in that suit.

The first reason is based on the fundamental difference between an affirmative claim for relief or judicial remedy and an affirmative defense. A “claim” includes the assertion of any existing “right to payment or to an equitable remedy.” See Jaster, 438 S.W.3d at 564; Izen v. Laine, 614 S.W.3d 775, 791 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (citing “claim,” Black's Law Dictionary 281–82 (9th ed. 2009) (defining claim as including “[t]he assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy”)). As this court stated in Izen, a claim for affirmative relief asserted by a party in a defensive posture is “a cause of action, independent of the plaintiff's claim, on which the claimant could recover compensation or relief, even if the plaintiff abandons or is unable to establish his cause of action.” Izen, 614 S.W.3d at 791; Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Estate of Blackmon ex rel. Shultz, 195 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). Generally, a claimant may recover affirmative relief only upon asserting a cause of action or a claim in a proper pleading. See id.; Tex. Fire & Cas. Underwriters v. Blair, 130 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Tex. App.—Austin 1939, writ dism'd judgm't cor.). A claim or action to domesticate a foreign judgment constitutes an affirmative claim for a judicial remedy, namely enforcement of the foreign judgment in Texas. See Wu, 920 S.W.2d at 286; Moncrief, 805 S.W.2d at 23.⁴

Res judicata, however, is an affirmative defense, not a claim for affirmative relief. The nature of an affirmative defense is one of confession and avoidance. Izen, 614 S.W.3d at 790–91; see Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989). An affirmative defense does not advance the claims of the party asserting it; it instead defeats the opponent's claim by establishing an independent reason why the plaintiff cannot recover. Izen, 614 S.W.3d at 791; Fawcett v. Grosu, 498 S.W.3d 650, 663 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (“An affirmative defense is defined as ‘a denial of the plaintiff's right to judgment even if the plaintiff establishes every allegation in its pleadings.’ ”) (quoting Hassell Constr. Co. v. Stature Commercial Co., 162 S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)). If the defendant is doing nothing more than resisting the plaintiff's recovery, the pleading cannot be construed as requesting affirmative relief. Lipsey v. Lipsey, 660 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. App.—Waco 1983, no writ). Here, a review of RDF's summary-judgment motion reveals that it requested only a dismissal of the Venture Suit on res judicata grounds but did not request affirmative relief in the form of domestication of the New York judgment.

There is another obvious reason why we cannot reasonably construe RDF's motion seeking dismissal of the Venture Suit as “bring[ing] an action to enforce” the New York judgment. The trial court's judgment dismissing the Venture Suit on res judicata grounds did not result in domesticating the New York judgment so that it became enforceable in Texas. It merely dismissed the Venture Parties’ claims. The point of domestication is to make a non-Texas judgment enforceable in Texas. Here, domestication of the New York judgment would not occur unless and until a Texas court recognizes the New York judgment by one of two domestication procedures. See Mintvest Capital, Ltd. v. Coinmint, LLC, 693 S.W.3d 834, 840–41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.); Dynaresource de Mexico S.A. de C.V. v. Goldgroup Res. Inc., 667 S.W.3d 918, 924 n.5 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.). The sole domestication procedure invoked in this dispute is the UEFJA, which RDF invoked by filing the UEFJA Suit. RDF's res judicata summary-judgment motion in the Venture Suit did not invoke any domestication procedure. Assuming RDF had not filed the UEFJA Suit, once the trial court dismissed the Venture Suit for res judicata reasons, RDF would be left holding only a New York judgment, unenforceable in Texas.

The Venture Parties rely on a case in which this court previously concluded that a common-law action to enforce a foreign judgment was brought by filing a motion in an ongoing Texas proceeding between the parties. In Brown v. Lanier Worldwide, this court explained that “by seeking enforcement of the Georgia judgment in the district court action, Lanier elected to pursue enforcement through a common-law action.” 124 S.W.3d 883, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). The dispute between the parties over a copy machine used in a law practice went to arbitration and the arbitration award was confirmed by a Georgia state court. Id. at 891. Just as here, there were parallel proceedings in Texas and Georgia because Brown was a resident of Texas. Once the Georgia judgment was final, Lanier “filed a motion to domesticate its judgment in the Texas district court action where Brown L.L.P.’s suit was pending.” Brown, 124 S.W.3d at 892. However, Lanier Worldwide is distinguishable from the facts before us as Lanier specifically filed a motion to domesticate its judgment, pursuing common-law enforcement of its judgment in the Texas district court action and did not initiate a claim or request relief under the UEFJA. Further, because both parties were in agreement that Lanier had elected common-law enforcement of its foreign judgment, the procedure utilized by Lanier was not at issue in the trial court or on appeal. We conclude that this case cannot be read so broadly, as the Venture Parties urge, to suggest that this court intended to change the statutory requirements for bringing an action for common-law enforcement.

Lanier Worldwide, also, does not answer the question raised here of whether the filing of a res judicata summary-judgment motion to end an ongoing proceeding constitutes an election to pursue common-law enforcement of a foreign judgment. We conclude that it does not, as we have explained. The Venture Parties have not identified, nor have we found, any legal support for their argument that a judgment creditor that files a summary-judgment motion on the basis of res judicata to dismiss on ongoing proceeding will have invoked common-law domestication without requesting that relief.

The Venture Parties also rely on an opinion from our sister court to support their argument. See Myrick v. Nelson's Legal Investigating & Consulting, No. 04-08-00174-CV, 2009 WL 1353538 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 13, 2009, no pet.). However, Myrick distinguishable. In Myrick, a judgment creditor filed an abstract of a Utah judgment in Zapata County, Texas because the judgment debtor owned property in that county. Two years later, the Texas judgment debtor filed suit alleging slander of title and collaterally attacked the Utah judgment. The parties then engaged in depositions and motion practice. After participating defensively in the suit for nearly three years, the Utah judgment creditor attempted to invoke the UEFJA. The court explained that the judgment creditor's participation in the suit including answering the petition, participating in depositions and moving for summary judgment before invoking the UEFJA “amounted to an election to pursue enforcement of his judgment through a common law action.” Id. at *3. However, the holding in Myrick is narrow and its result is based on the unique facts before it, specifically that the judgment debtor had in fact conclusively established in the common-law action a ground why the Utah judgment should not be enforced in Texas—the judgment debtor had not been properly served with process in the Utah action. Thus, the court of appeals held that the Utah judgment was void. Id. at *4. We also do not agree that the Myrick court's conclusion that three years of defensive participation in a proceeding attacking a foreign judgment is tantamount to a common-law election can be expanded to apply here, where a judgment creditor merely asserted the foreign judgment as an affirmative defense to dismiss the judgment debtor's Texas lawsuit.

Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to strike RDF's UEFJA-enforcement action. We overrule issue 1.

B. New York judgment is entitled to full faith and credit

In their second issue, the Venture Parties also argue that the trial court erred by giving full, faith and credit to the New York judgment. Specifically, the Venture Parties argue that Texas had dominant jurisdiction over the issue raised in the New York judgment. They also make two primary arguments that Texas public policy favors not giving full faith and credit to the New York judgment: (1) “judgments pertaining to Texas real property should be adjudicated in Texas courts but New York has purported to adjudicate an interest in Texas real property”; and (2) “New York has adjudicated, with prejudice, Appellants’ affirmative claims after Appellants voluntarily dismissed them without prejudice.” The Venture Parties raised these issues before the trial court in their motion for new trial, which was overruled or denied by operation of law.

The trial court held a hearing, which included the Venture Parties’ arguments that the New York judgment should not be accorded full faith and credit. The hearing was actually a joint hearing, in which the trial court heard arguments on the motion to strike as well as RDF's motion for summary judgment based on res judicata. The motion for summary judgment and the motion to strike were filed in two different causes numbers or proceedings. However, they were pending in the same trial court.

The United States Constitution requires that full faith and credit be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Under this principle, Texas is required to enforce a valid judgment from another state. See Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1992). The party seeking to domesticate a foreign judgment in Texas has the initial burden to present a judgment that appears on its face to be a final, valid, and subsisting judgment. Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). The burden then shifts to the judgment debtor to prove that the foreign judgment should not be given full faith and credit. Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex. 1975). The presumption of validity can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Mindis Metals, 132 S.W.3d at 484. The laws of the state rendering the judgment determine its validity. Bard, 839 S.W.2d at 795.

There are five established exceptions to the general rule that Texas courts afford full faith and credit to judgments from its sister states: (1) a decree that is interlocutory; (2) a decree that is subject to modification under the law of the rendering state; (3) the rendering court lacks jurisdiction; (4) the judgment was procured by extrinsic fraud; and (5) the period for enforcing the foreign judgment has expired. Mindis Metals, 132 S.W.3d at 484–85; see e.g., Bard, 839 S.W.2d at 795 (full faith and credit not required when a decree is interlocutory or subject to modification under the law of the rendering state).

1. Dominant jurisdiction

We begin with the Venture Parties’ first claim of error on the part of the trial court—that because the Texas proceeding was filed first the trial court should have denied full faith and credit to the New York judgment. The Venture Parties frame this argument as an issue of dominant jurisdiction voiding the New York judgment.

The doctrine of dominant jurisdiction does not apply to suits pending in other states. See Ex parte Jabara, 556 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, orig. proceeding). The common-law doctrine of dominant jurisdiction applies when “inherently interrelated suits are pending in two counties, and venue is proper in either county, the court in which suit was first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction.” In re Red Dot Bldg. Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Tex. 2016). In addressing suits pending in other states, Texas courts apply the doctrine of comity, which is “a principle of mutual convenience whereby one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another.” In re AutoNation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663, 670 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. 1986)).

The situation presented to the trial court at the time of the challenged ruling was not two parallel or interrelated ongoing proceedings.⁵ Instead, there was a final judgment in favor of RDF from a sister state. One of the exceptions to the full faith and credit doctrine occurs when the court rendering the foreign judgment lacked jurisdiction. However, that jurisdictional exception arises only if the court in a sister state lacked personal jurisdiction. Mindis Metals, 132 S.W.3d at 484–85 n.6 (“A defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of a sister state by demonstrating that (1) service of process was inadequate under the rules of the sister state; or (2) the sister state's exercise of in personam jurisdiction offends the due process of law.”); see also Myrick, 2009 WL 1353538, at *4. There is no recognized exception for a lack of “dominant jurisdiction.”

2. Public policy

The Venture Parties also argue the trial court should not have given full, faith and credit to the New York judgment because the judgment offends Texas public policy. Again, this is not one of the well-established exceptions to the general rule that Texas recognizes and respects judgments of other states. The Venture Parties offer a single case and quote to support their public policy argument: “The basic rule is that a court need not enforce a foreign law if enforcement would be contrary to Texas public policy.” Larchmont Farms, Inc. v. Parra, 941 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. 1997). But that sentence on which the Venture Parties rely addresses enforcement of foreign laws, not foreign judgments. There were no trespass to try title claims in either the Texas or New York proceedings, and the Venture Parties offer no authority for their position that it is contrary to public policy that Texas real property might be affected by a money damages award rendered in a sister state. They also offer no authority for the proposition that procedural differences in how voluntary dismissal of claims are handled between Texas and New York civil procedure becomes a public policy concern such that a foreign judgment should be disregarded.

Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in affording full faith and credit to the New York judgment. We overrule issue 2.

C. Evidentiary hearing

In their third issue, the Venture Parties argue that the trial court erred by declining to set an evidentiary hearing. The Venture Parties filed two different motions on September 14, 2023: (1) the motion to strike; and (2) the motion for new trial. The Venture Parties filed a notice of hearing on their motion to strike and the hearing was held on October 18, 2023. The record does not reflect that the Venture Parties requested an evidentiary hearing. There is nothing else in the record reflecting that the trial court denied a request for an evidentiary hearing on the Venture Parties’ motion for new trial. We conclude that this issue has not been preserved for appellate review. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

We overrule issue 3.

III. Conclusion

Having overruled all of the Venture Parties’ appellate issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as challenged on appeal.

FOOTNOTES

1.   RDF contested personal jurisdiction in the Venture Suit. It filed a special appearance, which was denied. This court affirmed, concluding that the trial court could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over RDF and the other appellants in the Venture Suit. RDF Agent, LLC v. Elec. Red Ventures, LLC, No. 14-23-00031-CV, 2023 WL 6160448, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 21, 2023, no pet.).

2.   The UEFJA Suit was assigned to the 234th Judicial District Court. The Venture Suit was pending in the 129th Judicial District Court.

3.   The Venture Parties timely appealed based on the motion for new trial being overruled by operation of law. Therefore, we consider the Venture's parties allegation of error as to both motions.

4.   RDF's substantive rights against the Venture Parties have already been adjudicated in New York. A claim to domesticate the New York judgment seeks only to have the judgment enforced in Texas. Moncrief, 805 S.W.2d at 23.

5.   The principle of comity requires courts to enjoin foreign suits “sparingly, and only in very special circumstances.” Christensen v. Integrity Ins. Co., 719 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Tex. 1986). Further, the Supreme Court of Texas has instructed that once a final judgment is reached in one of two parallel proceedings filed in two different states “the second forum is usually obliged to respect the prior adjudication.” Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Harper, 925 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex. 1986)). Therefore, “even if both proceedings continue, there should be only one judgment recognized in both forums.” Id.

Tonya McLaughlin, Justice