MCCARTNEY v. MCCARTNEY (2025)

OPINION

In this appeal of a final divorce decree, appellant Ashley Sadie McCartney argues that the trial court erred by (1) granting a reimbursement claim in favor of her ex-husband, appellee Thomas Francis McCartney, (2) reducing the total amount of Ashley's spousal maintenance below the amount agreed to by the parties in a post-nuptial marital property partition and exchange agreement, and (3) conditioning Thomas's agreed obligation to pay Ashley spousal maintenance on several contingencies that are not contemplated by the agreement.

We reject Ashley's first two issues but agree with her third. We therefore modify the court's final decree to remove certain conditions to Ashley's right to receive spousal maintenance. We affirm the court's final decree of divorce as modified.

Background

Ashley and Thomas married in 2006. On June 4, 2020, they signed a Marital Property Partition and Exchange Agreement (the “Agreement”). Under the Agreement, two properties—one in League City, Texas and one in Milam, Texas—became Ashley's sole and separate property, effective June 4, 2020. Ashley agreed that she would be “solely responsible for all debt associated” with these two properties, “including but not limited to all payments for principal, taxes, insurance, and homeowner's association dues.” However, Thomas paid the mortgage and HOA dues on the League City property and the mortgage, insurance, and taxes on the Milam property from July 2020 until the date of divorce, from his community property income.

In 2022, the couple ceased living together and Thomas filed a petition for divorce. After a bench trial, the trial court granted the divorce and appointed Ashley and Thomas joint managing conservators of their three children. The court acknowledged and enforced the Agreement but divided all other property pursuant to Thomas's proposed property division.

In the divorce decree, the court ordered Ashley's separate estate to reimburse the community estate for the following:

1. Payments towards the property [in] League City Texas 77573 in the total amount of $161,899.00

2. Payments towards the property [in] Milam, Texas 75959 in the total amount of $55,478.00

3. Two months payments that were in arrears towards the property [in] Milam, Texas 75959 in the total amount of $2,336.00

4. Joint checks deposited to Respondent's [Ashley's] sole account by forgery in the amount of $5,786.00

The court further ordered that the “balancing payment” for the reimbursement from Ashley's separate estate to the community estate would be paid by reducing the total amount of spousal maintenance Thomas promised to pay in the Agreement. The court also conditioned the continuation of spousal maintenance payments on four contingencies that would trigger termination.

Ashley filed a timely request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 296. Our record does not indicate that the trial court timely filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id. Ashley did not file a notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 297, but she did file a request for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 298. On April 11, 2024, the court signed and filed additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, as Ashley requested. Relevant to the issues before us, and seemingly inconsistent with the court's earlier judgment, the court's additional conclusions of law include a ruling that, under Family Code section 3.410, Thomas gave up any right of reimbursement he may have had against Ashley's separate estate by signing the Agreement.

This appeal timely followed.

Issues Presented

In each of her appellate complaints, Ashley asserts that the divorce decree conflicts with the Agreement's terms. In her first and second issues, Ashley argues that the trial court erred in awarding Thomas reimbursement for the expenditures listed in the decree and offsetting Thomas's spousal maintenance obligations based on those reimbursements. In her third issue, Ashley argues that the divorce decree erroneously conditions Thomas's duty to pay Ashley spousal maintenance on several contingencies not contemplated in the Agreement.

Partial Record

Before considering Ashley's arguments, we address a procedural question Thomas raises based on the status of the reporter's record. Thomas argues that we should presume the record supports the trial court's judgment, and therefore affirm it, because Ashley requested only a partial reporter's record and failed to include in her request (or otherwise file) a statement of points or issues that she intended to present on appeal.

At or before the time for perfecting an appeal, the appellant must request the court reporter to prepare the reporter's record. Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(b)(1). The request must designate the portions of the proceedings and exhibits to be included. Id. An appellant may request a partial reporter's record. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(c). However, when requesting only a partial record, “the appellant must include in the request a statement of the points or issues to be presented on appeal and will then be limited to those points or issues.” Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(c)(1).

If the appellant complies with rule 34.6(c), the appellate court “must presume that the partial reporter's record designated by the parties constitutes the entire record for purposes of reviewing the stated points or issues,” even if “the statement includes a point or issue complaining of the legal or factual insufficiency of the evidence to support a specific factual finding identified in that point or issue.” Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(c)(4). However, if the appellant does not comply with rule 34.6(c) by failing to submit a statement of the points or issues to be presented on appeal, “we must presume that the omitted portions of the record are relevant and would support the judgment.” Dewolf v. Kohler, 452 S.W.3d 373, 394 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Under the force of the presumption, the appellate court must affirm the trial court's judgment against a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002).

This presumption does not apply in some circumstances. For example, the failure to include a statement of points or issues when requesting a partial reporter's record does not raise a presumption against the appellant when the issue on appeal turns on a question of law.¹ For questions of law, a reporter's record is unnecessary. See White Lion, 2019 WL 7341670, at *3.

With one exception discussed below, Ashley's appellate issues present questions of law and do not require reference to the reporter's record. We may dispose of her issues regardless of her failure to file a statement of points or issues for appeal. See id.; see also Garcia v. Hartwig Moss Ins. Agency, Ltd., No. 01-20-00420-CV, 2022 WL 1250564, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Analysis

I. Did the trial court err in granting reimbursement to the community estate from Ashley's separate estate?

In her first issue, Ashley challenges the part of the judgment ordering her separate estate to reimburse the community estate based principally on the community funds used to pay the mortgages on Ashley's separate property houses. She appears to make two arguments in support of this issue. First, Ashley claims that, although Thomas used his community property income for the mortgage payments, he was really paying “with Ashley's one-half of community property money.” Because Thomas paid the mortgages with “Ashley's half” of community property money, Ashley seems to reason, there should be no duty on her part to reimburse any other estate.

We overrule Ashley's first argument because it is evidence-based and requires reference to the reporter's record. Given that Ashley requested only a partial reporter's record and failed to submit a statement of the issues to be presented on appeal, we must presume that the omitted portions of the record are relevant and would support the judgment. See Dewolf, 452 S.W.3d at 394.

In the second part of her first issue, Ashley cites Family Code section 3.410. That section provides:

A premarital or marital property agreement, whether executed before, on, or after September 1, 2009, that satisfies the requirements of Chapter 4 is effective to waive, release, assign, or partition a claim for economic contribution, reimbursement, or both, under this subchapter to the same extent the agreement would have been effective to waive, release, assign, or partition a claim for economic contribution, reimbursement, or both under the law as it existed immediately before September 1, 2009, unless the agreement provides otherwise.

Tex. Fam. Code § 3.410 (emphasis added).

Ashley does not substantively discuss this section in her appellant's brief. However, based on her trial court filings and clarifications communicated to us during oral argument, Ashley contends that a party to a marital property agreement releases reimbursement claims as a matter of law by operation of section 3.410 just by signing the agreement, no matter its terms. Separately, she continues, two provisions of this Agreement effectively released Thomas's reimbursement claims.

Thomas responds that section 3.410 does not eliminate all reimbursement claims when spouses sign a marital property agreement. Rather, the Family Code's reimbursement provisions allow spouses to release or waive such claims, but Thomas and Ashley did not release any reimbursement claims here because the Agreement does not mention reimbursement claims at all. According to Thomas, the trial court merely reconstituted the community estate by acknowledging the well-recognized right to reimbursement based on the use of community funds to pay the mortgages on Ashley's separate property, and then the court divided the reconstituted community estate consistent with the Agreement.

A. Standards of Review and Applicable Law

1. Property Divisions Generally

Trial courts are afforded wide discretion in dividing marital property upon divorce. Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. 1998); Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).² On appeal, we presume the trial court properly used its discretion and will reverse only when the trial court clearly abused that discretion, and only if the error materially affects the court's just and right division of the property. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 732-33 (Tex. 1985). To establish a clear abuse of discretion, the complaining party must show that the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably and without reference to any guiding principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004).

2. Marital Property Agreements

Spouses may agree to partition or exchange between themselves all or part of their community property. Tex. Fam. Code § 4.102. To be valid, such agreements must be written. Id. § 4.104. Courts interpret marital property agreements in divorce decrees under the law of contracts. See Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986); Olmstead v. Napoli, 383 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). The construction of an unambiguous contract is a question of law we review de novo. Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 449-50 (Tex. 2015). Neither party here contends the Agreement is ambiguous.

Our primary concern in construing an unambiguous contract is to ascertain the parties' intent as expressed in the instrument itself. Marriage of I.C. & Q.C., 551 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tex. 2018). Objective manifestations of intent control, not the unexpressed subjective intent of the parties. See id. Parties to a contract intend that each clause should have an effect. See Heritage Res. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996). Contract terms should be given their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning unless the agreement shows that they are intended in a different or technical sense. See id. We must examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless. El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 389 S.W.3d 802, 805 (Tex. 2012). Regarding marital property agreements specifically, courts construe them narrowly in favor of the community estate. See, e.g., Fischer-Stoker v. Stoker, 174 S.W.3d 272, 278-79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Byrnes v. Byrnes, 19 S.W.3d 556, 558 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).

Thus, in the divorce context when a marital property agreement is at issue, the trial court has broad equitable discretion to divide the community marital estate, subject to the parties' agreement, which the court must apply as written.

3. Reimbursement Claims

Along with these principles, this case requires us to apply the law applicable to reimbursement. Reimbursement is an equitable right that arises when the funds or assets of one marital estate are used to benefit and enhance another marital estate without the first estate receiving some benefit. Willmore v. Quigley, No. 14-12-00060-CV, 2013 WL 2296187, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 23, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). Reimbursement is purely an equitable doctrine and is not available as a matter of law but lies within the trial court's broad discretion. Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982); Zamiatowski v. Zamiatowski, No. 14-12-00478-CV, 2013 WL 1803604, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 30, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial court's discretion in evaluating a claim for reimbursement is as broad as its discretion to effect a just and proper division of the community estate. Willmore, 2013 WL 2296187, at *3; see also Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1988) (“In the final analysis, great latitude must be given to the trial court in applying equitable principles to value a claim for reimbursement.”).

Family Code section 3.402 codified many reimbursement claims existing at common law. See Tex. Fam. Code § 3.402(a).³ The Legislature has not codified all common-law grounds for reimbursement, but the statute should not be read as the exclusive list of reimbursable claims. See Nelson v. Nelson, 193 S.W.3d 624, 632 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.). Therefore, a claim for reimbursement recognized at common law is generally still viable as long as it is not specifically classified as non-reimbursable under the current reimbursement statutory scheme. See Tex. Fam. Code § 3.409 (listing non-reimbursable claims). This interpretation is consistent with the equitable nature of reimbursement claims and the mandate that the trial court balance all the facts, circumstances, and equities of the particular matter before it. See id. § 3.402(b)⁴ ; Penick, 783 S.W.2d at 197.

Under Texas law, a community marital estate is entitled to reimbursement for community property funds used to enhance the separate property of one of the spouses. Anderson v. Gilliland, 684 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. 1985); McCann v. McCann, 22 S.W.3d 21, 23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Texas common law has long-recognized the right of a community marital estate to reimbursement from a spouse's separate estate for community funds spent on reducing the mortgage of the spouse's separate property house. When community estate funds are used to benefit a spouse's separate estate, a trial court abuses its discretion in refusing to reimburse the community estate. See Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723, 731 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

B. Application

Here, no party disputes that a community marital estate generally has a reimbursement right against a spouse's separate property estate for the types of payments at issue. Thus, the community marital estate is entitled to reimbursement from Ashley's separate estate for the mortgage payments on her separate property homes absent some legal bar. Ashley's argument is that Thomas released any right to assert a reimbursement claim by signing the Agreement. Reimbursement claims may be released by marital property agreements that satisfy the requirements of Chapter 4 of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code § 3.410.

To release a claim effectively, the releasing instrument must “mention” the claim to be released. Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. 1991). Claims not clearly within the subject matter of the release are not discharged, even if they exist when the release is executed. Id.

Ashley directs us to two sections by which she contends Thomas released reimbursement claims:

9. If the marriage between Ashley and Thomas ends by divorce, the parties agree that all community property save and except tax-deferred retirement accounts addressed in paragraph 8, shall be divided equally, without regard to either party's separate property, earning ability, fault in the break-up of the marriage or any other basis.

․

Representations and Warranties of Thomas McCartney:

․

K. I understand that by executing this Agreement I may be adversely affecting my inheritance rights and property and that I am permanently surrendering rights to income and property I would otherwise have under Texas law.

These provisions, however, do not mention, much less explicitly release, reimbursement claims of any estate.

Our reading of the Agreement is consistent with relevant, persuasive appellate court decisions. For example, the El Paso Court of Appeals has held, in a similar situation, that a marital property agreement did not bar a claim for reimbursement to the community estate:

A marital agreement should be interpreted according to the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument. The Trust Indenture involved in this case does not mention “reimbursement,” nor does it contain a release or waiver of such a claim. In fact, there is no provision in the agreement that specifically addresses the issue of future wages and/or time, toil, talent and effort of either spouse. Instead, the agreement only refers to community property and/or other rights to the separate property of Roy, Sr. Reimbursement, however, is not a property right, it is an equitable claim that arises upon dissolution of the marriage through death, divorce or annulment.

We find that the language of the Trust Indenture cannot be construed as a bar to Appellant's claim for reimbursement [to the community]. There is no manifestation of intent to exclude such a claim.

Pearce v. Pearce, 824 S.W.2d 195, 200 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied).

More recently, the First Court of Appeals held that the following language in a premarital agreement did not waive the wife's reimbursement rights against the community estate:

(2) Except as otherwise expressly provided, each of the parties hereby waives, relinquishes, conveys, quitclaims, bars, discharges, surrenders and releases, and hereby agrees to waive, relinquish, convey, quitclaim, bar, discharge, surrender and release, to the other all of the following:

(a) Any and all of his or her right, title and interest of every kind and description, which he or she may have, acquire, enjoy or be seized by reason of, or on or after, their marriage, as the wife, husband, widow or widower of the other party, in the separate property of the other party, whether real, personal and mixed and wherever located․

Jimenez v. Jimenez, No. 01-23-00087-CV, 2025 WL 1160683, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 22, 2025, pet. filed) (mem. op.). Because reimbursement to the community estate was not mentioned anywhere within the agreement, and because courts construe premarital agreements narrowly in favor of the community estate, the Jimenez court declined to conclude that the paragraphs above waived the wife's reimbursement rights to the community estate. Id.

In contrast, the following language in a marital property agreement was effective to waive a husband's claim for economic contribution:⁵

Any payment or contribution by one of us to satisfy the debts or otherwise benefit the separate estate of the other shall not give rise to a claim for reimbursement or an interest in any property purchased by those payments unless we otherwise agree in writing. Any right of reimbursement that may arise during our marriage for payments or contributions made to the other's separate estate to the extent any payment is made by one for the benefit of the other shall be presumed to be a gift to the other party's separate estate.

Stoker v. Stoker, No. 01-07-00056-CV, 2008 WL 4837084, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 6, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (emphasis added). The court concluded that this paragraph expressly provided that any payment to benefit the separate estate of the other would not result in a claim for reimbursement. Id.

Here, the parties made clear that the Agreement “is everything Ashley and Thomas agree to about marital property.” As in Jimenez and Pearce, and unlike Stoker, the Agreement does not mention reimbursement claims. Thus, the subject of reimbursement claims—including their potential release—is not part of the parties' agreement. Ashley's argument fails. See Jimenez, 2025 WL 1160683, at *7; Pearce, 824 S.W.2d 195; accord, e.g., In re Est. of Baker, 627 S.W.3d 523, 526 (Tex. App.—Waco 2021, no pet.) (because no premarital or marital property agreement existed between Mr. Baker and Mrs. Baker, Mrs. Baker was entitled to assert her claim for reimbursement, and the trial court had statutory authority to grant a claim for reimbursement).

The community marital estate is distinct from the spouses' separate marital estates. See Tex. Fam. Code § 3.401(4). Even if we construed the Agreement as releasing reimbursement claims by each spouses' separate estates against each other, that would not be sufficient to release reimbursement claims on behalf of the community estate. See, e.g., Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (holding that postnuptial agreement waived husband's and wife's claims for reimbursement against each other's separate estates but not claims against the community). As the Moroch Court stated: “By referring to—and waiving and releasing—some reimbursement claims but not others, the document makes clear that not only is there no waiver of Christy's claim against the community estate, but also that she is not estopped from asserting that claim.” Id. The plain language of the Agreement before us does not release the spouses' reimbursement claims against each other, much less reimbursement claims on behalf of the community marital estate.⁶

Separately, Ashley urges that, regardless of the Agreement's terms, the parties released all reimbursement claims they otherwise would have had simply by signing it, by operation of Family Code section 3.410. We think Ashely's reading of the statute untenable. Section 3.410 merely clarifies that marital property agreements executed in compliance with chapter 4 of the Family Code are effective to waive or release reimbursement claims to the same extent such agreements could do so before the Legislature enacted in 2001 and amended in 2009 the statutory scheme governing claims for economic contribution and reimbursement. See Tex. Fam. Code § 3.410 (“A premarital or marital property agreement ․ that satisfies the requirements of Chapter 4 is effective to waive, release, assign, or partition a claim for economic contribution, reimbursement, or both, under this subchapter to the same extent the agreement would have been effective to waive, release, assign, or partition a claim for economic contribution, reimbursement, or both under the law as it existed immediately before September 1, 2009, unless the agreement provides otherwise.”); see also Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 838, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 768, § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 2009. In other words, we continue to construe and enforce marital property agreements as contracts, as courts have historically done. See McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1984) (Texas courts generally interpret marital property agreements like other written contracts). Nothing in section 3.410 alters this general principle.

Construing section 3.410 as categorically waiving all reimbursement claims any time spouses execute a marital property agreement, as Ashley urges, could, for example, result in unrepresented parties giving up reimbursement rights without any notice whatsoever. Take the instance when a couple obtains a marital property agreement form online and signs it without consulting an attorney. If the form agreement fails to mention reimbursement claims, Ashley's reading of Texas law would require a court to hold that the parties released all potential reimbursement claims by the community estate even though the parties could not have understood they were doing so. We decline to read this Agreement as supplanting the entire body of spousal rights without a clear expression of that intent in the document itself.

Adopting Ashley's position, moreover, would bring this court into conflict with at least three other courts of appeals, as discussed. If Ashley is correct that the execution of a marital property agreement releases all reimbursement claims even if the document does not expressly say so, then Jimenez, Stoker, Pearce, and Moroch are wrong.

Ashley also cites in support of her position the trial court's additional conclusion of law number five, which states:

Under the express provisions of Section 3.410 of the Texas Family Code, THOMAS FRANCIS MCCARTNEY voluntarily, through his Marital Agreement with ASHLEY SADIE MCCARTNEY, gave up any right of reimbursement he might have otherwise had, and is barred by estoppel from making any such claim.

This conclusion of law does not compel us to sustain Ashley's first issue. To begin with, it states that Thomas gave up his reimbursement rights; it does not state that the community estate released any reimbursement rights. Because the only reimbursement claim at issue is to the community estate, we need not consider the effect or validity of this conclusion.

We conclude that this conclusion does not warrant reversal for an additional reason. When a conflict exists between a trial court's judgment and subsequently issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, the later findings of fact and conclusions of law generally control. See City of Laredo v. R. Vela Exxon, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 673, 678 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). An appellate court presented with such a conflict may modify the judgment to resolve the conflict but should not do so if the findings of fact or conclusions of law are incorrect. Id. A trial court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court. See Pegasus Energy Grp. v. Cheyenne Petroleum Co., 3 S.W.3d 112, 121 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied). An erroneous conclusion of law does not require reversal if the trial court ultimately rendered the proper judgment. Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 293, 299 (Tex. 2018). For the reasons stated, we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that Thomas gave up any reimbursement rights. We are not bound by the court's conclusion number five, and we need not modify the judgment.

We overrule Ashley's first issue.

II. Did the trial court err by altering Thomas's spousal maintenance obligations?

In her second issue, Ashley contends that the trial court impermissibly altered the Agreement's spousal maintenance terms, which provide:

11. If the marriage ends by divorce after the tenth (10th) anniversary of the parties' marriage, Thomas will pay to Ashley spousal maintenance in the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000) per month for a total of one hundred and twenty (120) payments, totaling six hundred thousand dollars ($600,000), beginning on the first day of the month immediately after the date of divorce and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter. This obligation may be prepaid in whole or in part after the date of divorce. This provision regarding spousal maintenance applies regardless of which party files for divorce and is enforceable as spousal maintenance to the full extent permitted under the Texas Family Code and as a contract.

In the final divorce decree, the court stated:

The Court finds that pursuant to the terms of the June 4, 2020 Marital Property Partition and Exchange Agreement and the rulings of this Court, that Thomas Francis McCartney shall [pay] as spousal maintenance the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) per month to Ashley Sadie McCartney, with the first payment being due on February 1, 2024, and a like amount being due on the first day of each consecutive month thereafter until the earliest of one of the following events occurs:

1. A total of four hundred and fifty-five thousand dollars ($455,000.00) has been paid;

2. death of either Petitioner or Respondent;

3. remarriage of Ashley Sadie McCartney; or

4. further orders of the Court affecting the spousal maintenance obligation, including a finding of cohabitation by Ashley Sadie McCartney․

The Court finds that the parties agreed in that Rule 11 Agreement filed with the Court on November 30, 2023, and it is therefore ORDERED that, Thomas Francis McCartney will receive a credit against funds he will pay to Ashley Sadie McCartney in the amount of $15,000.00.

The Court finds and it is therefore ORDERED that the balancing payment for the reimbursements from Respondent's separate estate [to the community estate] and the credit for the benefit of Petitioner described above shall be paid by Respondent to Petitioner by reducing the total spousal maintenance in the amount of $600,000.00 described in the Marital Property Partition and Exchange Agreement executed June 4, 2020 to a total amount of spousal maintenance of $455,000.00 to be paid by Petitioner to Respondent.

Ashley raises two complaints: (1) the court impermissibly reduced Thomas's spousal maintenance obligation based on the reimbursements to the community estate and the credit owed to Thomas; and (2) the “contingencies for termination of Thomas' ongoing obligation to pay spousal maintenance” are not contemplated in the Agreement.

Ashley does not cite any authority for the proposition that a court may not reduce one spouse's award by an amount owed to the other spouse. Contrary to Ashley's contention, the court did not rewrite the terms of the Agreement. Rather, the court acknowledged the Agreement's terms and granted Thomas an offset or credit against the total amount of spousal maintenance owed to Ashley as a result of its reimbursement ruling. This is permissible. Because reimbursement is an equitable doctrine, a court of equity must consider all facts and circumstances when determining what is fair, just, and equitable. Penick, 783 S.W.2d at 197. Reimbursement “is not merely a balancing of the ledgers between the marital estates,” id. at 198, but the court has broad discretion to consider any offsetting factors when valuing the reimbursement claim. Id. Thus, it was within the trial court's discretion to divide the estate in the manner it did. See Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001; accord also Jourdan v. Jourdan, No. 04-10-00402-CV, 2011 WL 1850233, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 11, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]e hold the credit is against Michael's obligation to Dawn pursuant to the terms of the agreement ․ The credit merely acknowledges that Michael has paid a certain amount, which the trial court credited against his obligations to Dawn.”).

We overrule Ashley's second issue.

Ashley's third issue, however, is meritorious. The divorce decree orders Ashley's spousal maintenance to continue until the earliest of one of the following events:

1. A total of four hundred and fifty-five thousand dollars ($455,000.00) has been paid;

2. death of either Petitioner or Respondent;

3. remarriage of Ashley Sadie McCartney; or

4. further orders of the Court affecting the spousal maintenance obligation, including a finding of cohabitation by Ashley Sadie McCartney․

Thomas contends that the trial court's conditions were proper and permissible under Family Code section 8.056, which provides:

(a) The obligation to pay future maintenance terminates on the death of either party or on the remarriage of the obligee.

(b) After a hearing, the court shall order the termination of the maintenance obligation if the court finds that the obligee cohabits with another person with whom the obligee has a dating or romantic relationship in a permanent place of abode on a continuing basis.

Tex. Fam. Code § 8.056.

Our disposition of Ashley's challenge to the reimbursement ruling effectively disposes of her challenge to the first condition: that Thomas's obligation to pay spousal maintenance continues until a total amount of $455,000—instead of $600,000, as the Agreement provided—is paid. As explained, this provision merely enforced a term of the Agreement, as reduced by the court's discretionary reimbursement ruling.

We reach a different conclusion with respect to the remaining three conditions, which Ashley correctly observes are not stated in the Agreement. Thomas claims these conditions find support in Family Code Chapter 8, but that chapter applies only to court-ordered maintenance, not contractually agreed spousal-support obligations. See Dalton v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 131 (Tex. 2018). Texas law distinguishes between court-ordered spousal-maintenance awards under Chapter 8 and court-approved voluntary obligations under Chapter 7. Id. Chapter 8's enforcement provisions apply only to spousal-maintenance orders that a court enters “on the authority” of Chapter 8 and that meet that chapter's “other requirements.” Id. Absent express language indicating that Chapter 8 of the Family Code governs a contractual maintenance provision, courts will enforce the maintenance provision as a matter of contract law, independent of Chapter 8. See Lee v. Lee, No. 02-14-00064-CV, 2015 WL 601054, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 12, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding Chapter 8 did not apply to agreed decree's maintenance provision); Ammann v. Ammann, No. 03-09-00177-CV, 2010 WL 4260955, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 28, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); Kee v. Kee, 307 S.W.3d 812, 813-14 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (“Chapter eight does not apply to an alimony provision in a divorce decree that restates a parties' contractual agreement for alimony.”); McCollough v. McCollough, 212 S.W.3d 638, 647-48 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.).

We have no indication here that Ashley and Thomas desired their Agreement to be governed by Chapter 8. The Agreement does not cite Chapter 8, and the spousal maintenance provisions are notably inconsistent with Chapter 8's restrictions. For example, Thomas's agreed maintenance obligation would have violated Chapter 8 because it contemplates payments for a duration that exceeded the statutory limit at the time the Agreement was signed. See Tex. Fam. Code § 8.054(a)(1)(A) (West 2020) (duration of maintenance obligation may not exceed five years, if spouses were married for more than ten years but less than twenty years). The court's decree, moreover, omits any findings relevant to Chapter 8's applicability. According to Thomas, the imposition of the challenged conditions is supportable under Chapter 8 based on the Agreement's text providing that “[t]his provision regarding spousal maintenance ․ is enforceable as spousal maintenance to the full extent permitted under the Texas Family Code and as a contract.” (Emphasis added). But this language on its face does not purport to express an intent that Chapter 8 govern the spousal maintenance terms. Absent such an understanding clearly expressed in the Agreement, the spousal maintenance terms are enforceable only as a contract and not under Chapter 8.

Other appellate courts have considered, and rejected, precisely the argument Thomas asserts here. In Lee, for instance, the court enforced only those spousal maintenance termination provisions that were included in the parties' property agreement but rejected enforcement of a Chapter 8 termination condition to which the parties had not agreed. Lee, 2015 WL 601054, at *3. The court in Ammann held similarly. Ammann, 2010 WL 4260955, at *3. We agree with those decisions.

Because the parties intended to, and by executing the Agreement did, create a contractual spousal maintenance agreement outside of the context of Chapter 8, Thomas's payment obligation is not court-ordered spousal maintenance governed by that chapter. The Agreement does not provide that Ashley's remarriage or cohabitation with another person would terminate Thomas's spousal maintenance obligations. See Lee, 2015 WL 601054, at *3. A trial court has no power under Family Code Chapter 8 to supply terms, provisions, or conditions not previously agreed upon by the parties when the parties have not expressed an intent that Chapter 8 should apply to their agreement. See Ammann, 2010 WL 4260955, at *3. We conclude therefore that the court abused its discretion by including terms in the order regarding spousal maintenance that were not agreed to by the parties.

We sustain Ashley's third issue.

Conclusion

We modify the final decree of divorce to delete the following contingencies that would terminate Thomas's spousal-maintenance obligation:

2. death of either Petitioner or Respondent;

3. remarriage of Ashley Sadie McCartney; and

4. further orders of the Court affecting the spousal maintenance obligation, including a finding of cohabitation by Ashley Sadie McCartney.

We affirm the judgment as modified.

FOOTNOTES

1.   White Lion Holdings, L.L.C. v. Insgroup, Inc., No. 01-18-00851-CV, 2019 WL 7341670, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 31, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re J.A.B., 13 S.W.3d 813, 815 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, no pet.); see also Tex. R. App. P. 34.1 (“The appellate record consists of the clerk's record and, if necessary to the appeal, the reporter's record.”) (emphasis added); Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 611 (Tex. 1983) (reporter's record was not necessary because the suit was for a declaratory judgment on the validity and enforceability of a divorce decree and involved only questions of law pertaining to the decree); Northside Pharmacy, LLC v. AMJ Inv., LLC, No. 14-19-00094-CV, 2021 WL 330067, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 2, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Even without a reporter's record, however, an appellate court can decide strict issues of law that do not require a review of the evidence.”); cf. Sam Houston Hotel, L.P. v. Mockingbird Rest., Inc., 191 S.W.3d 720, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (noting that reporter's record was required because issues required reference to evidence admitted at trial).

2.   The trial court “shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001.

3.   See also, e.g., Lucy v. Lucy, 162 S.W.3d 770, 775-76 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (“Family law practitioners have dealt with reimbursement for decades, although the magic word did not appear in the Texas Family Code until the Legislature created a statutory right of economic contribution in 2001.”) (citing Tex. Fam. Code tit. 1, ch. 3, subch. E, § 3.401 et seq., added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., R.S. ch. 838, § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 2001).

4.   The trial court “shall resolve a claim for reimbursement by using equitable principles, including the principle that claims for reimbursement may be offset against each other if the court determines it to be appropriate.” Tex. Fam. Code § 3.402(b).

5.   The Legislature introduced the concept of economic contribution into the Family Code in 2001. Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 838, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2001 (former Tex. Fam. Code §§ 3.401-3.407). The Legislature later repealed the economic contribution statutes and replaced them with the current, broader reimbursement system based on equitable principles. See Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 768, eff. Sept. 1, 2009.

6.   To be clear, the divorce decree did not grant reimbursement to Thomas's separate estate. The court ordered Ashley's separate estate to reimburse the community estate. Ashley overlooks this distinction. To the extent Thomas released a reimbursement claim on behalf of his separate estate, the Agreement does not release any reimbursement claims on behalf of the community estate. See Moroch, 174 S.W.3d at 859.

Kevin Jewell, Justice