PHILLIPS v. STATE (2025)

OPINION

Broderick Dwayne Phillips appeals the trial court's judgment of conviction for criminal trespass. In a single issue, Phillips contends his waiver of his right to a jury trial was not made knowingly and intelligently and was therefore constitutionally invalid. We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

BACKGROUND

On June 19, 2023, Saeed Shariff, the manager of a McKinney Valero gas station, issued a criminal trespass warning to Phillips, commanding him to leave the gas station and never return. McKinney Police witnessed the warning, and it was considered in force until rescinded. Phillips had a history of disturbing customers inside the station.

On December 30, 2023, McKinney Police responded to a silent alarm at the Valero. They also received calls about a disturbance inside. The callers stated that a man was yelling that he would have the police kill him when they arrived. According to Shariff, Phillips was being aggressive and calling Shariff names. When police arrived, Phillips was agitated and uncooperative. The police arrested Phillips, and he was charged with criminal trespass.

On the day of trial, Phillips signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial. Phillips's counsel also signed the waiver. Phillips waived the reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. He then stated he understood the effect of the signed jury trial waiver. The trial judge briefly admonished Phillips that the document waived his right to a jury trial and that the trial court would decide the case. Phillips agreed to this procedure, and the court approved his waiver of a jury trial.

The State then offered testimony from Shariff and the McKinney Police officers who responded to the June and December trespass calls. Phillips did not call any witnesses. The trial court found Phillips guilty, sentenced him to one day in jail, and gave him credit for prior time served (five or six days). Phillips was released, and this appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In a single issue, Phillips contends his jury waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently and was therefore constitutionally invalid. After reviewing the record, we disagree.

A. Error preservation and standard of review

On the threshold matter of error preservation, error must be preserved under Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellant Procedure. Tex. R. App. 33.1. Under that rule, the complainant must object and state the ground for the objection with sufficient specificity that the trial court knows what the complainant wants and why the complainant thinks he is entitled to it. Id. (a)(1)(A); Rios v. State, 665 S.W.3d 467, 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). However, Rule 33.1 does not apply to complaints about systemic requirements and prohibitions or waivable-only rights. See id. at 476–77. The right to a jury trial is a waivable-only right. See id. at 477. Therefore, Phillips can argue for the first time on direct appeal that he was denied his federal constitutional right to a jury trial. See id.

We affirm a determination of jury trial waiver where “the record shows that the defendant at least had sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of waiving his right to a jury” so as to establish that the defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. Id. at 482. “[T]he burden is on the State on direct appeal to develop a record showing an express, knowing, and intelligent waiver of a defendant's right to a jury.” Id. at 485. Whether there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused depends on the particular record on appeal. Id. at 479.

We presume harm if the appellant successfully asserts structural error based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. See id. at 485–86; Roundtree v. State, No. 05-22-01283-CR, 2024 WL 3022799, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 17, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

B. Applicable law – voluntary waiver of jury trial

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (applying the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee to the states); Rios, 665 S.W.3d at 478. A defendant has a limited right to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial in favor of a bench trial or guilty plea. Rios, 665 S.W.3d at 478. Waiver of a constitutional right requires an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of the right.” Id. at 479 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). A waiver will not be inferred from a silent record, and courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. See id. “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). Whether there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of a jury trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case. Id.²

Courts have considered numerous factors when determining whether a jury trial waiver was knowing and intelligent:

• whether the defendant knew about his right to a jury and the nature of the right,

• whether the defendant executed a written jury waiver,

• whether the trial court admonished the defendant about his right to a jury,

• the defendant's education and background and legal sophistication,

• the level of the defendant's involvement in his defense,

• his ability to understand courtroom discussion regarding waiver of a jury,

• the words and actions of the defendant,

• discussions with trial counsel about the right to a jury and representations of trial counsel,

• what language the defendant understands and the presence of an interpreter if not English,

• the lack of an objection before or shortly after the bench trial began, and

• whether there is a docket entry indicating that the defendant expressly waived his right to a jury on the record and that waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

Id. at 479–82 (bullet points added; footnotes omitted) (hereafter, the Rios factors). While a defendant need not understand every nuance of the right to trial by jury before waiving that right, a waiver cannot be knowing and intelligent unless “the record shows that the defendant at least had sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of waiving his right to a jury.” Id. at 482.

C. Application

Here, Phillips contends the Rios factors support that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial.

On the day of trial, the court and Phillips had the following exchange:

COURT: Do you understand what you're charged with?

PHILLIPS: Yes, sir.

COURT: Do you want the Information read to you or do you waive that?

PHILLIPS: I'll waive it.

COURT: To the Information, how do you plead?

PHILLIPS: Not guilty.

COURT: And I have this thing called a jury trial waiver. Do you understand what this document does?

PHILLIPS: Yes.

COURT: It waives your right to have a jury hear the case, and I'm going to hear the case. Are you okay with that?

PHILLIPS: Yes, sir.

COURT: Okay. I've approved the jury trial waiver.

While the interaction was brief, it supports that Phillips was aware of his right to a jury. See Jones v. State, No. 05-20-00476-CR, 2022 WL 17750551, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 19, 2022, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (similar dialogue between court and defendant regarding jury waiver); Mumphrey v. State, No. 06-23-00082-CR, 2024 WL 1186942, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 20, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (similar dialogue regarding jury trial waiver); see also Rios, 665 S.W.3d at 483 (a defendant need not understand every nuance of the right to a jury before waiving that right, so long as the record shows that he at least had sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of waiving that right).

The dialogue between Phillips and the trial judge indicates the court admonished Phillips. While the trial judge's admonishments were brief, our Court of Criminal Appeals has observed that, “[w]hile admonishments are preferred by many courts, numerous courts have held a colloquy regarding the waiver of a jury is unnecessary.” Rios, 665 S.W.3d at 479 n. 25.

Additionally, Phillips signed a jury trial waiver. That written waiver is titled in bold, underlined, all-caps text: “JURY TRIAL WAIVER.” The waiver then states: “Now comes the undersigned defendant ․ and represents to the Court that he or she waives trial by jury and submits all issues of fact to the Court.” The waiver was also executed by Phillips's attorney.

The record does not reveal Phillips's education and background, nor his legal sophistication. However, Phillips affirmed he understood the charges against him and waived the reading of the information. The record suggests Phillips conferred with his attorney during trial and was at least somewhat involved in his defense. The record is silent as to whether discussions occurred between Phillips and his counsel regarding a jury trial waiver.

The record reflects Phillips speaks, reads, and understands English, and he did not require an interpreter before or during trial.³ Nothing suggests any language or comprehension barriers. Cf. Rios, 665 S.W.3d at 482–84. The trial judge directly asked Phillips if he understood the jury waiver and explained that it meant the court, rather than the jury, would hear the case. Phillips acknowledged the waiver, and nothing indicates he did not understand the discussion.

Phillips did not object—before or during trial—to proceeding without a jury. See Roundtree, 2024 WL 3022799, at *3; Johnson v. State, No. 06-24-00047-CR, 2024 WL 4249330, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 20, 2024, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Finally, the judge's trial docket entry indicates Phillips's jury trial waiver was approved, although there was no specific finding the waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. The trial court's judgment reflects that the case was a “Judgment of Conviction by Court—Waiver of Jury Trial.”

Phillips argues the Rios factors support that Phillips did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial. For the reasons set forth above, we disagree. Indeed, the facts of Rios provide a notable contrast to the current situation. Rios was a Mexican national and native Spanish speaker. Rios, 665 S.W.3d at 467. He spoke limited English, did not execute a jury waiver, was not admonished on the record about his right to a jury trial, was not provided an interpreter for the majority of his meetings with his trial counsel, and was not told that the trial judge had informed defense counsel that the court did not want to try the case. Id. at 482. Based on that record, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that Rios had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. Id. at 483. Our Court reached the same conclusion in another case, Hernandez v. State, decided post-Rios. See Hernandez v. State, 683 S.W.3d 586, 591–92 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, no pet.).⁴

The circumstances of Phillips's case are more akin to those in our recent decision in Wilson v. State, No. 05-24-00321-CR, 2025 WL 579967, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 21, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In Wilson, the record showed Wilson filed a pro se motion for a bench trial but was represented by counsel throughout proceedings. Wilson, 2025 WL 579967, at *7. Nothing indicated Wilson had an objection to proceeding without a jury at the time of trial. The record did not indicate that he lacked the ability to read, write, or speak English, or understand what was said at trial. Id. To the contrary, the record reflected that Wilson filed multiple pro se motions with the court, including an unsigned, handwritten motion to waive his right to a jury. Id. at *1, *7. Nothing in the record indicated that Wilson needed special assistance to understand the trial proceedings or make reasoned decisions. Id. Rather, “a reading of the record [demonstrated] that Wilson revealed an understanding of the charges against him, what was occurring during trial, and the trial court's rulings.” Id. at *5. Wilson was represented by counsel, and nothing in the record indicated he was deprived of legal advice as to his right to a jury trial or the pros and cons of waiving that right. See id. at *1. Under that record, we held that Wilson made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial. Id. at *8; see also Roundtree, 2024 WL 3022799, at *3–4 (defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right under similar circumstances as those in Wilson).

Phillips's case is more like Wilson and less like Rios and Hernandez. Here, Phillips signed and filed a waiver of his right to a jury trial. That, along with the judge's admonishment, indicate that Phillips was aware of his right to a jury. Those facts also indicate that Phillips was aware he was appearing for a bench trial. The record reflects that Phillips can read, write, and speak English and did not require an interpreter or special assistance for trial. Further, nothing in the record indicates that Phillips needed such assistance in order to understand the trial proceedings or make reasoned decisions. Phillips was represented by counsel at his bench trial. And, although the record is silent as to whether he and his counsel conferred regarding the jury trial waiver specifically, the record does suggest that Phillips conferred with his attorney during the trial. Finally, the judge's trial docket entry indicates that Phillips's jury trial waiver was approved.

When applying the Rios factors, the totality of the record establishes that Phillips made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to a jury and elected to proceed before the trial judge. See Wilson, 2025 WL 579967, at *8; Roundtree, 2024 WL 3022799, at *3–4; see also Jones, 2022 WL 17750551, at *5 (distinguishing Rios). We overrule Phillips's sole point of error.

CONCLUSION

On this record and considering the Rios factors, we conclude there was no denial of Phillips's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Phillips voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because this appeal involves an issue of constitutional law important to the jurisprudence of Texas, we issue this published opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4(b).

2.   Article 1.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure “sets out the requirements for a defendant to waive the right to a jury trial and the duties of the trial court.” Rios, 665 S.W.3d at 474; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.13(a). Phillips does not argue that these statutory requirements for jury waiver were violated. Accordingly, we conduct our analysis within the multi-factor constitutional framework set forth in Rios.

3.   A thirty-minute police body camera video admitted at trial showed Phillips communicating at length, in English, with police.

4.   In Hernandez, we held that the record did not show that Hernandez knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury. Even though Hernandez acknowledged that he understood the range of punishment and entered his not guilty pleas, and an interpreter was present at trial, the trial court did not admonish Hernandez about his right to a jury trial, no jury waivers were executed, and his waiver was never discussed in open court. Further, the record was silent with respect to Hernandez's education, background, and involvement in his defense, and he was silent during trial. Hernandez, 683 S.W.3d at 591–92.

Opinion by Justice Lewis