IN RE: A.T. (2025)

OPINION

The trial court adjudicated A.T. a child engaged in delinquent conduct based on conduct constituting offenses of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery, which the grand jury had approved for determinate sentencing. The court ordered that A.T. be committed to the custody of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for fifteen years, with possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. A.T. appeals from the trial court's order of adjudication and judgment of disposition, arguing that (1) an error in the grand jury's certificate of approval means aggravated robbery was never approved for determinate sentencing and (2) insufficient evidence supports the court's deadly weapon finding. We affirm.

Background

On August 23, 2023, the State filed a petition alleging A.T. engaged in delinquent conduct, namely, conduct constituting aggravated kidnapping under penal code § 20.04 and aggravated robbery under penal code § 29.03. The petition recited the elements and identified the statutory provision for each offense.

Filed on September 6, 2023, a certificate of approval of juvenile petition by grand jury reflected that grand jurors,

after having been presented and inquiring into the Petition ․ filed on the 23rd day of August, 2023 in the 304th District Court, wherein [A.T.], is alleged to be a child engaged in delinquent conduct due to the commission of the offense(s) of: AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING W/DEADLY WEAPON AND AGGRAVATED ROBBERY in violation of Section 20.04 of the Texas Penal Code, do hereby find that there is probable cause to believe that said child did engage in such delinquent conduct ․ as set forth in the said Petition.

The foreman of the grand jury, however, signed the “DISAPPROVED” space on the certificate.

Two days later, the State filed a Notice of Grand Jury Approval, explaining that although grand jurors had approved the petition, the foreman mistakenly signed the certificate “DISAPPROVED.” The State filed the certificate without realizing the error. The State filed a new certificate reflecting grand jury approval of the petition that was otherwise identical to the above-described certificate.

A.T. filed a motion to suppress arguing he was arrested without probable cause and asserting that the “air gun” or “BB pistol” alleged is not a deadly weapon. He sought to suppress the “identification by the victim ․ after the client was arrested without probable cause” and “the evidence of BB gun described as a deadly weapon.” After conducting a suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

On August 22, 2024, the trial court held adjudication and disposition hearings. The court read the two counts in full as alleged in the petition, including the deadly weapon allegation. A.T. waived his rights orally and in writing and said he understood the two charges, which he affirmed were true. He affirmed he was pleading true for no other reason than that the charges were true and denied anyone forced him in any way to plead true. The court accepted A.T.'s pleas, entered findings of true, and found A.T. was a child who had engaged in delinquent conduct. The court also found that A.T. was “subject to a determinate sentence for the offenses of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery.”

After hearing disposition evidence, the court ordered that A.T. be committed to the custody of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for fifteen years, with possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Institutional Division under § 54.11 of the family code. The trial court's written order of adjudication and judgment of disposition reflects, among other things, a deadly weapon finding.

Discussion

A.T. first argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a determinate sentence on the aggravated robbery charge because such charge was never certified for determinate sentencing. And in his second issue, A.T. argues the trial court erred in making a deadly weapon finding because no evidence established that a BB gun could have caused death or serious bodily injury in the manner of its use. For the reasons explained below, we reject these arguments.

A. Certification of aggravated robbery

For delinquent conduct involving certain offenses, the State has the option to seek a determinate sentence, i.e., “one that has a maximum term of years depending on the offense's severity.” In re R.R., No. 05-23-01008-CV, 2024 WL 5198701, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2024, pet. filed) (mem. op.). A juvenile who receives such a sentence “may be held past his nineteenth birthday, when otherwise the Texas Juvenile Justice Department would ‘discharge [the juvenile] from its custody’ at that time.” Id.

Section 53.045 of the family code provides the procedure for certification for determinate sentencing. The prosecuting attorney refers the petition to the grand jury of the county in which the court in which the petition is filed presides if the petition alleges that the child engaged in delinquent conduct that includes the violation of, as pertinent here, § 20.04 of the penal code (aggravated kidnapping) and § 29.03 of the penal code (aggravated robbery). Tex. Fam. Code § 53.045(a). If the grand jury approves of the petition, the fact of approval shall be certified to the juvenile court, and the certification shall be entered in the record of the case. Id. § 53.045(d). If the State's petition is not approved by the grand jury, then the trial court is without jurisdiction to impose a determinate sentence. In re J.G., 195 S.W.3d 161, 180 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.).

Here, the State's petition, filed on August 23, 2023, alleged A.T. engaged in conduct constituting aggravated kidnapping under penal code § 20.04 and aggravated robbery under penal code § 29.03. The certificate of approval of the petition identifies the petition as having been filed August 23, 2023 and describes it as alleging A.T. is a child engaged in delinquent conduct “due to the commission of the offense(s) of: AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING W/DEADLY WEAPON AND AGGRAVATED ROBBERY in violation of Section 20.04 of the Texas Penal Code[.]” The certificate states that the grand jurors found there is probable cause to believe A.T. engaged in such delinquent conduct, “as set forth in the said Petition” and that the grand jurors approved “said Petition.”

Although the certificate did not recite the statutory provision for aggravated robbery as it did for aggravated kidnapping, we cannot conclude this omission means the grand jurors failed to certify aggravated robbery for determinate sentencing as A.T. contends. The certificate recited that grand jurors found there was probable cause to believe A.T. engaged in the delinquent conduct as set forth in the petition and that it approved the petition. The petition, as described above, alleged commission of aggravated robbery and identified its statutory provision, § 29.03 of the penal code. Moreover, the certificate identified the two offenses alleged in the petition, aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery.

A.T.'s argument appears to present a matter of first impression in this appellate district, though our sister court in Austin has considered a similar question in In re D.G., No. 03-12-00455-CV, 2014 WL 3732930, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin July 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.), which A.T. attempts to distinguish in his brief. There, the grand jury certificate of approval recited that the first amended original petition alleged commission of aggravated sexual assault and that the grand jurors approved the petition for determinate sentencing. Id. The first amended original petition, however, alleged commission of sexual assault. Id. at *4. The appellant argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the grand jury never approved sexual assault for determinate sentencing. Id. The court of appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that the certificate “explicitly indicates that the grand jury reviewed and approved the State's First Amended Original Petition Alleging Delinquent Conduct Seeking a Determinate Sentence that was ‘filed on the 8th day of February, 2012’ ” and “references the offense “as alleged in said First Amended Original Petition Alleging Delinquent Conduct Seeking a Determinate Sentence.” Id. Given that the referenced petition alleged the commission of sexual assault, the certificate reflected grand jury approval of that petition, which alleged sexual assault; “the reference to aggravated sexual assault of a child was merely a typographical error.” Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded the requisite grand jury approval had been given. Id.

We believe the reasoning applied in In re D.G. supports a conclusion here that the grand jury certification was sufficient to vest the trial court with determinate sentencing jurisdiction. In that case, the certificate not only omitted the pertinent statutory provision but misstated the offense alleged in the petition. Our sister court concluded this made no difference because it was clear which petition the certificate referred to and approved and thus which offense was approved for determinate sentencing. So too here, though here there was no misstatement of the offenses. Rather, the petition before us alleged commission of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery; the certificate identified the petition by the date of its filing, August 23, 2023, and by the same two offenses alleged in the petition; and the certificate reflected that the grand jurors found probable cause to believe A.T. engaged in delinquent conduct as alleged in the petition, which it approved for determinate sentencing.

The rationale of the Austin Court of Appeals is sound as applied to the facts before this Court.¹ Section 53.045 requires certification of the petition. That was done here. The certification states that the grand jurors found there is probable cause to believe A.T. engaged in delinquent conduct due to the commission of the two offenses, aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping with a deadly weapon; lists the penal code section for the aggravated kidnapping offense; and approves the petition alleging both offenses with their penal code sections. We hold the certificate approved for determinate sentencing the two offenses stated in the certification and as described in the petition. We overrule A.T.'s first issue.

B. Deadly weapon finding

A.T. next contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's deadly weapon finding. He argues “the trial court ignored the State's complete lack of evidence establishing that a deadly weapon was used by the appellant in making a deadly weapon finding in this case” and that the State had “two opportunities to meet its burden” but failed to do so. On this latter point, A.T. argues the State failed to present any evidence at the suppression hearing proving the airsoft or BB gun was a deadly weapon and that his guilty plea failed to support the deadly weapon finding because it “was silent on this essential matter.”

The State responds that A.T.'s judicial confession supports the trial court's findings. We agree. In juvenile cases, we apply the standard used in criminal cases in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. In re J.W., 198 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). Usually, this means we apply the standard discussed in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). However, in a case where the defendant has waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty, there is no requirement that the supporting evidence prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). Instead, the supporting evidence must simply embrace every essential element of the offense charged. Id.

A judicial confession standing alone is sufficient to sustain an adjudication of delinquency upon a plea of true even if the juvenile does nothing more than affirm that the allegations in the petition are true and correct. See In re R.A.H., No. 05-99-01226-CV, 2000 WL 1598767, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 27, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

Here, at the adjudication hearing, the court read the two counts alleged in the State's petition, including the deadly weapon allegation, and A.T. said he understood the allegations and affirmed they were true. He affirmed he was pleading true for no other reason than that the charges were true, and he denied anyone forced him in any way to plead true.

Thus, A.T. judicially confessed to engaging in delinquent conduct by committing the two offenses as alleged, including the deadly weapon allegation. Cf. Alexander v. State, 868 S.W.2d 356, 361 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no pet.) (“If a defendant pleads guilty to an indictment that includes an allegation that he used a deadly weapon, the trial court may make a deadly weapon finding.”); see also Miracle v. State, No. 05-11-00978-CR, 2012 WL 5383192, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 5, 2012, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (concluding judicial confession to indictment alleging use or exhibition of deadly weapon sufficed to support deadly weapon finding). Accordingly, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the deadly weapon finding made by the trial court.

In reaching this conclusion, we reject A.T.'s reliance on evidence adduced (or not adduced) at the hearing on his motion to suppress. First, we note that A.T.'s motion was styled “Motion to Suppress” and requested a hearing under “articles 28.01(6) and 38.22(6), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” Further, A.T. did not contend in the trial court and does not now contend that the suppression hearing was some kind of merits hearing permissible under the rules of civil procedure. See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.17(a) (providing that, with certain exceptions, “or otherwise when in conflict with a provision of this title, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure govern proceedings under” juvenile justice code). Thus, we will consider criminal law precedent in determining whether the suppression hearing has any relevance to the sufficiency issue before us. See In re M.I.S., 498 S.W.3d 123, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (criminal law precedent may be instructive in juvenile cases given that juvenile proceedings are “quasi-criminal”).

Such precedent is clear that a suppression hearing is for the limited purpose of addressing preliminary matters – it cannot be used to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support an element of the offense. State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 551–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Woods v. State, 153 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Therefore, in addressing this issue, we do not consider the suppression issues or evidence raised at the suppression hearing. A.T.'s second issue is overruled.

Conclusion

Having overruled A.T.'s two issues, we affirm the trial court's order and judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We do not have to consider for the purposes of this appeal if or to what extent a misstatement of the offense on the certificate undermines approval of a determinate sentence.

Opinion by Justice Lee