JOHN DEERE CONSTRUCTION FORESTRY COMPANY v. RODRIGUEZ (2025)

OPINION

Appellant John Deere Construction & Forestry Company (John Deere) appeals the judgment of partition in kind by the trial court arguing that it was not supported by legally or factually-sufficient evidence. John Deere intervened in the partition suit to enforce its lien on real property owned by the appellees. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that John Deere lacks standing and therefore dismiss this appeal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I. Background

In 2015, Richard Rodriguez and his wife, Irma Rodriguez, filed a partition suit against Erasmo Benitez, his wife Oralia, Juan Benitez, his wife Yolanda, and various other family members.¹ In his petition, Richard asks the trial court to partition property that Richard purchased with Erasmo in 1992.

Richard and Erasmo, who are cousins, purchased 46.39 acres (the “Rodriguez-Benitez land”) in Travis County in 1992.² According to the petition, the two men had an understanding “that Richard Rodriguez would own the southeast half of said 46.39 acres and Erasmo Benitez would own the northeast half of said tract. Thus, their agreement constituted an oral partition of the 46.39 acres.” However, Richard and Erasmo never reduced their agreement to writing or filed the partition in the deed records. According to the petition, on the same day the land was purchased, Richard and Erasmo orally partitioned 11.54 acres of Erasmo's 23.195 acres to Juan, Erasmo's brother. There is also no written documentation of this transaction. Although not pertinent to the question of John Deere's standing, the Rodriguez-Benitez land was intended to be further divided among other family members. Some of these transfers were recorded in the Travis County real property records.

Erasmo had a business venture, which resulted in significant debts. On September 6, 2011, John Deere received a judgment against Erasmo and Marisbelda Jaimes, another family member, in the amount of $77,893.08 (the business-debts judgment). On October 20, 2011, John Deere obtained a judgment lien on Erasmo and Marisbelda Jaimes's property by filing an abstract of its business-debts judgment in the real property records. In February 2014, John Deere sought and received a writ of execution on its business-debts judgment. The record reflects that several other creditors had judgment liens against real property owned by Erasmo.

The partition action brought by Richard and Erma in 2015 was intended to legally separate the real property owned by Richard and Erma from that owned by other family members, particularly Erasmo, so that title to their land would not be clouded by the debts of the other family members. John Deere was served with a copy of Richard and Erma's Third Amended Original Petition in June 2017. John Deere filed its plea in intervention shortly thereafter arguing that it was a proper party to the partition proceeding because it had a judgment lien on the real property at issue.

A trial on the merits was held in February 2023. At the trial, the Benitez family argued that John Deere lacked a judiciable interest in the proceedings because its judgment lien had expired. In response, John Deere argued that its lien was valid and it had a justiciable interest in the partition proceedings. It further argued that the Rodriguez-Benitez land should be partitioned in halves between Richard and Erasmo, the two owners of record, rather than in accordance with the alleged subsequent oral partitions. John Deere further argued that its lien attached to the half of the real property owned by Erasmo.

After making a letter ruling, the trial court rendered a declaratory judgment of partition in kind in October 2023. Although the trial court determined that John Deere's lien was valid, the court concluded that it only attached to 3.855 acres of land. John Deere timely appealed the trial court's judgment of partition in kind.³

II. Standing

The Benitez family argues, both here and at trial, that John Deere does not have standing, or a justiciable interest in the claim, because the business-debts judgment and the corresponding abstract of judgment had both expired by the time of trial in the partition action. John Deere asserts that neither the business-debts judgment nor its abstract of judgment were dormant; therefore, John Deere maintains that it lacks neither standing nor a justiciable interest.

Although the Benitez family did not appeal or separately challenge the final judgment in the partition dispute, they raise the issue of standing on appeal. “Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Because subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case, it is never presumed and cannot be waived. Id. at 443–44. Questions of standing are subject to de novo review. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020). To establish standing, a person must show a personal stake in the controversy. The M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 707–08 (Tex. 2001) (quoting In the Interest of B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996)).

Although the trial court made no findings of fact specifically about the validity of John Deere's lien, both the trial court's judgment of partition in kind and its findings contemplate that John Deere had an interest in the real property and, therefore, standing. The findings of fact state:

11. On October 26, 2011, an abstract of judgment was recorded in favor of John Deere Construction & Forestry Company in the amount of $77,893.08 against Erasmo Benitez, Marisbelda Jaimes, EBC Construction, LLC, and Robert Tomlinson. [ ]

19. To the extent that those transfers as set forth in the above paragraph 18 exceeded Erasmo Benitez's possessory interest arithmetically by 0.013 acre, the Court finds that Erasmo Benitez had transferred all of his 23.195 possessory acres as reconciled by documented evidence already identified in the above paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 10, and l7.

24. The 2.600-acre tract that was conveyed to Marisbelda Jaimes and Salvador Jaimes by warranty deed and recorded on September 27, 2001, was subsequently transferred to EBC Construction, LLC by a separate deed and, therefore, the Intervenors’ asserted liens attached to this tract. However, the priority of the two Intervenors’ liens, among other potential lienholders’ claims, is not before this Court.

A. The judgment

John Deere received its business-debts judgment against Erasmo and Marisbelda Jaimes on September 6, 2011. A creditor may take action or enforce its judgment so long as the judgment is not dormant. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 31.002, .006, 34.001. The Civil Practice and Remedies Code defines a dormant judgment as a judgment for which “a writ of execution is not issued within 10 years after the rendition of a judgment.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 34.001. Similarly, if a writ of execution was issued “within 10 years after rendition of a judgment but a second writ is not issued within 10 years after issuance of the first writ, the judgment becomes dormant[.]” Id. However, dormant judgments may be revived by “scire facias or by an action of debt brought not later than the second anniversary of the date that the judgment becomes dormant.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.006.

A writ of execution on business-debts judgment was issued on June 2, 2014, less than ten years after the business-debts judgment was rendered.⁴ Therefore, John Deere's business-debts judgment was not dormant and was enforceable at the time of the trial on partition.⁵

B. The lien

A judgment lien is derivative of the underlying judgment, but has its own separate statutory rules and duration. To create an enforceable judgment lien against real property owned by the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor must comply with the requirements of Chapter 52 of the Texas Property Code. Rogers v. Peeler, 271 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied); see Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 52.001—.043. A judgment creditor must secure an abstract of the judgment, and record it in the county records. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 52.001, .002. Properly recorded and indexed, the abstract “constitutes a lien on and attaches to any real property of the defendant” that is not exempt. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 52.001. The purpose of an abstract of judgment is to create a lien against the judgment debtor's real property and to provide notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers of the existence of the judgment and lien. Olivares v. Birdie L. Nix Trust, 126 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied). Once recorded, a “judgment lien continues for 10 years following the date of recording and indexing the abstract, except that if the judgment becomes dormant during that period the lien ceases to exist.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 52.006(a). John Deere's abstract of judgment was filed and recorded on October 26, 2011. Without any extension, the judgment lien therefore expired in October 2021, two years before trial.

A judgment lien, once expired, cannot be extended. See Burton Lingo Co. v. Warren, 45 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1931, writ ref'd) (“as to the particular lien which comes into existence by the recording and indexing of an abstract of judgment, that lien, when once it terminates by the expiration of the ten-year period, can never be extended”). “Our conclusion that the law as it now exists permits more than one lien furnishes an all-sufficient reason for the absence of any provision for extending a lien.” Id. at 753. The controlling statute in effect at the time of the Burton Lingo opinion is substantially similar to the statute at issue here. Id. at 751–52; see generally In re Rippstein, 195 F. App'x 200, 202–03 (5th Cir. 2006). We have found no statutory authority for extending John Deere's lien beyond ten years. Rather, Texas law allows creditors to protect their interests by filing a successor or second lien so long as the judgment remains alive, and not dormant.

Relying on Olivares v. Birdie L. Nix Trust, John Deere argues that because it intervened in the partition proceeding before its judgment lien expired, its interest had vested and cannot be extinguished by the passage of time. 126 S.W.3d 242, 250 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied). Olivares is inapplicable here. In Olivares, the court acknowledged that “the judgment lien created by the abstract of judgment expired before the trial court ordered payment to [appellee] from the registry.” Id. However, Olivares involved a condemnation proceeding, and the court concluded that because the judgment lien was still in effect during the condemnation proceedings and when the condemnation award was deposited, the court must consider “the nature of [appellee's] interest in the condemnation award, and whether the subsequent dormancy of [appellee's] judgment affected that interest.” Id. Restated: Olivares involved a condemnation award existing before the expiration of the judgment lien. Here, there is no allegation that the trial court made any determination or award affecting the Rodriguez-Benitez land before the judgment lien expired.

Further, Olivares does not stand for the proposition that the filing of an enforcement action extends or tolls the ten-year duration of a judgment lien. Such a conclusion would run counter to the purpose and statutory intent for judgment liens. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 52.001 (statute specifically mentions a “first or subsequent abstract of judgment” contemplating a subsequent abstract is necessary to extend a lien beyond ten years); see generally Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 13.002 (“An instrument that is properly recorded in the proper county is ․ notice to all persons of the existence of the instrument”).

John Deere further notes that the trial court cited two cases in support of the conclusion that John Deere's actions sufficiently complied with applicable law to prevent dormancy of the business-debts judgment. See Smith v. Adams, 333 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); R. B. Spencer & Co. v. Harris, 171 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1943, writ ref'd). Beginning with Harris, the appellate court considered only whether the underlying judgment was dormant. Harris, 171 S.W.2d at 394. In fact, Harris specifically addresses that there was a valid judgment lien based on two different abstracts of the judgment, which were not in dispute (other than by virtue of the alleged dormancy of the judgment). Harris does not support John Deere's proposition that its judgment lien had not “become dormant” or expired by virtue of its intervention.

Smith is not on point or persuasive because the controlling statute discussed by the court was substantially different than Property Code section 52.001 as it provided that a judgment lien shall not expire so long as the underlying judgment did not become dormant. 333 S.W.2d at 895 (“Appellants argue that the legislature did not, and could not, extend the duration of said liens. We think the law is to the contrary. If said judgment liens existed when the amendments became effective, and we hold they did, the legislature had authority to extend, and did extend, the duration of said liens.”). The amendments or version of the statute discussed by the Smith court provided:

When any Judgment has been so recorded and indexed, it shall, from the date of such record and index, operate as lien upon all of the real estate of the defendant situation in the county where such record and index are made, and upon all real estate which the defendant may thereafter acquire, situated in said county. Said lien shall continue during the life of the judgment; provided however, this Act shall not be retroactive as to liens that have become dormant prior to its enactment.

Act of May 8, 1935, 44th Leg., R.S., ch. 291, § 1, art. 5449, 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws 685, 685 (emphasis added).⁶ Therefore, Smith does not support John Deere's position either. We conclude that John Deere has no authority supporting its legal argument that its intervention in the partition proceeding stopped the expiration of its judgment lien.

At the time of the trial and judgment of partition, John Deere had a valid judgment but an expired judgment lien. Under Texas law, “no lien is created by the mere rendition of a judgment.” Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Banque Arabe Internationale D'Investissement, 747 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied); Burton Lingo, 45 S.W.2d at 751–52. An unsecured money judgment is simply an adjudication between a plaintiff and defendant that the defendant owes the plaintiff some amount of money. Under the business-debts judgment, John Deere had no priority over any other claimant as to the Rodriguez-Benitez land. See TST Impreso, Inc. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Trading (USA), Inc., No. 05-12-01551-CV, 2014 WL 348535, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 30, 2014, pet. denied). Therefore, without a valid lien against the Rodriguez-Benitez land, John Deere lost its justiciable interest in the partition proceeding. And without a justiciable interest in the partition proceedings, John Deere lacked standing in the trial court.

We hold that by the time of trial and rendition of the final order of partition, the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction over John Deere's petition and claims.

III. Conclusion

We dismiss this appeal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In this opinion, we will refer to the various parties by their first names as most of the parties are related to one another and many share a common last name.

2.   The Supreme Court of Texas ordered the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas to transfer this appeal (No. 03-24-00001-CV) to this court. Misc. Docket No. 23-9109 (Tex. Dec. 21, 2023); see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 73.001, .002. Because of the transfer, we decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis if our decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with the transferor court's precedent. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.

3.   Unlike most other proceedings, a partition case involves two or more final appealable orders. Estate Land Co. v. Wiese, 546 S.W.3d 322, 325–26 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); Fry Sons Ranch, Inc. v. Fry, No. 03 19 00684 CV, 2020 WL 6685772, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 13, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see generally Griffin v. Wolfe, 610 S.W.2d 466, 466–67 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam) (partition proceedings have “two final judgments and the first one is appealable as a final judgment”). “[A] partition proceeding is—at least—a two-step process.” Long v. Spencer, 137 S.W.3d 923, 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (citing Carr v. Langford, 144 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1940), aff'd. 159 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. 1942)); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 760 (court shall determine share or interest of each claimant and all questions affecting title to property); Tex. R. Civ. P. 761 (court shall determine whether property is subject to partition in kind). An appeal at each step “provides a practical way to review controlling, intermediate decisions before the consequences of any error do irreparable injury.” Long, 137 S.W.3d at 926. A partition order that disposes of all issues in a discrete phase of the proceeding must be appealed immediately under the usual time periods governing appeals; issues determined by the order cannot be attacked collaterally after a later order or judgment is signed. See Wiese, 546 S.W.3d at 325–26; Long, 137 S.W.3d at 925–26; see also Tex. R. App. P. 26.1 (prescribing deadlines for notice of appeal). The declaratory judgment of partition addressed the first step of the partition process and was therefore a final, appealable order. See Long, 137 S.W.3d at 925.

4.   The record does not reflect that a second writ of execution was issued.

5.   John Deere argues that its petition in intervention in the partition proceedings constituted an “action of debt” that would revive the judgment under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 34.001. While we agree that it would, the judgment was not dormant at the time of trial or rendition of a final judgment. See Hawthorne v. Guenther, 461 S.W.3d 218, 222 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied) (“An ‘action on debt’ is a new and independent suit that does not seek execution of the former judgment, but instead, seeks recovery of the full amount of the debt owed under the former judgment.”). Neither Guenther nor section 34.001 addresses the extension or duration of an expired judgment lien.

6.   In the following legislative session, the Legislature again amended article 5449 and reinstituted a ten-year duration for liens. The 1937 amendment specifically cited there was “confusion and uncertainty by reason of the [1935] amendment of said Article 5449 as to rights of judgment creditors and as to how long and under what conditions a judgment lien shall continue in existence.” Act of April 28, 1937, 45th Leg., R.S., ch. 273, § 2, 1937 Tex. Gen. Laws 553, 553 (repealed 1983 in non-substantive recodification).

Tonya McLaughlin, Justice