MOSS TCM v. HOLZWORTH (2025)

OPINION

In this case, we resolve two related appeals arising out of the probate proceeding for the estate of Sylvia Bumstead. In appellate-court case number 14-24-00226-CV, appellant Taylor C. Moss, individually and as trustee of the TCM Trust, raises three issues on appeal primarily challenging the trial court's rendition of an agreed judgment following a jury trial. Although Moss argues that he withdrew his consent to a Rule 11 agreement before rendition of the final judgment, we conclude the record does not support his contention. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In appellate-court case number 14-24-00365-CV, Moss challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.001–.011. He further argues that: (1) the trial court erred by not observing the stay required by Chapter 51 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and (2) all proceedings after his appeal of the denial of the motion to dismiss are void. We conclude that the TCPA did not apply to the motion for sanctions filed by appellees and that the trial court did not err in denying Moss's motion. Because Moss did not preserve error, if any, related to the stay of proceedings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as challenged on appeal.

I. Factual Background

The legal dispute between Taylor Moss and Taylor's mother, Carol Bumstead Moss, and Taylor's aunts, Debra M. Holzworth and Kathryn S. Marcotte (collectively referred to as the Beneficiaries) over the estate left by Moss's grandparents has been going on for more than five years and is well documented. We quote pertinent background information detailed in an opinion written by our sister court addressing an appeal by Moss of a temporary injunction order:

In summary, this case involves three generations of the Bumstead family. Richard C. and Sylvia M. Bumstead, possessing a substantial estate, created several trusts and various business entities to hold and manage their assets. Richard and Sylvia's primary real estate assets included: (1) a 15-acre tract of land located at 14200 West Hardy Road, Houston, Texas (the Hardy Road Property); (2) a two-hundred-acre tract of property located at 2435 Wolf Road, Huffman, Texas (the Homestead); and (3) a 1,437-acre tract of land located at 2435 Wolf Road, Huffman, Texas, excluding the Homestead (Wolf Road Property). The two main business entities that they created were Ridescka, Ltd. (Ridescka) and Wolf Trot Properties, LLC.

Richard and Sylvia had three daughters: Debra, Kathryn, and Carol. Carol had two children: Taylor and Lindsay Moss. Richard passed away suddenly in 2012. As a result of his death, the structure and funding of the family's trusts changed. Taylor began assisting his grandmother Sylvia, who was in ill health, with the family properties. In 2013, Sylvia created the TCM Trust for Taylor and in 2014 allegedly transferred the Hardy Road Property to that trust. Neither Sylvia nor Taylor disclosed that transfer to Debra, Kathryn, or Carol. The beneficiaries dispute the validity of that transaction. When Taylor graduated from college in 2015, Taylor began residing with Sylvia at the Homestead. During this period, Sylvia and Taylor made several changes relative to the family trusts and entities which the beneficiaries allege were inconsistent with the terms of the family trusts and the foundational documentation for the family business entities. The beneficiaries were not involved in the decision-making processes or informed regarding the changes. Taylor began acting as trustee and managed the family's assets and businesses. In approximately 2019, the beneficiaries discovered that Sylvia had transferred the Hardy Road Property to Taylor's trust. In 2019, Sylvia passed away. The beneficiaries sought information from Taylor regarding the family's assets but were unsatisfied with his responses and became concerned about his management of the family properties. The beneficiaries requested Taylor to fund the trusts that resulted from Sylvia's death; however, Taylor refused to do so in the absence of a release of liability.

On November 13, 2019, Debra, Kathryn, and Carol filed suit against Moss. They sought declaratory relief, an accounting, the imposition of a constructive trust, the removal of Taylor as alleged trustee, and temporary injunctive relief. They alleged causes of action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, undue influence, trespass, conversion, and money had and received. This pleading and its exhibits span more than seven hundred pages of the clerk's record. On February 21, 2020, the beneficiaries filed a first amended petition reiterating the foregoing causes of action and including, inter alia, causes of action for statutory fraud and the breach of the duty of full disclosure.

Matter of Bumstead Family Irrevocable Tr., No. 13-20-00350-CV, 2022 WL 710159, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg, Mar. 10, 2022, pet. denied) (Bumstead I).¹ The Bumstead I opinion goes into more detail with respect to each of the disputed transactions and Moss's involvement with his grandmother in changing the ownership or disposition of the family trust assets, though those details are not necessary to address the legal issues before us. In Bumstead I, our sister court affirmed the order of the trial court, which: (1) suspended Moss's powers as trustee of the Bumstead Living Trust, the Bumstead Family Trust, the Survivor's Trust, and the Sylvia M. Bumstead Revocable Trust; (2) appointed an independent receiver for the foregoing four trusts; and (3) ordered Moss to provide an accounting for all four of the trusts at issue.²

In 2023, the case was tried to a Harris County jury. The jury unanimously found that Moss committed fraud in numerous transactions including in his appointment as co-trustee and successor trustee of the Bumstead Living Trust, the Survivor's Trust, the Bumstead Family Trust and the Revocable Trust, as well as in his management of the trusts. The jury also found that Sylvia Bumstead lacked sufficient mental capacity at the time of the disputed transactions and that she agreed to transfer various properties to Moss and appoint Moss as co-trustee and successor trustee as the result of undue influence.

After the jury verdict was read, the parties agreed to settle the case by Rule 11 agreement and release the jury instead of trying the Beneficiaries’ punitive damages claims to the jury. The parties then entered into a settlement agreement that incorporated and expanded on the terms of the Rule 11 agreement. The settlement agreement between the parties called for two different agreed judgments to be rendered. In the first agreed partial and non-appealable judgment, the trial court declared the following documents and/or transactions null and void:

a. The Warranty Deed for the Hardy Road Property dated December 17, 2014 and filed on or about January 16, 2018;

b. The Designation of Co—Trustee Under the Bumstead Living Trust dated May 20, 2015;

c. The Designation of Successor Trustee Under Bumstead Living Trust dated 20, 2015;

d. The Certification of Trust for the Bumstead Living Trust dated May 20, 2015;

e. The Wolf Trot Properties, LLC Unanimous Written Consent of the Members to Act without meeting dated May 20, 2015; and

f. the Revocable Trust Agreement dated March 6, 2019.

The first judgment unwound nearly all of the financial transactions by and between Moss and Bumstead between 2014 and 2019 and returned control of the trusts and trust assets back to the Beneficiaries. The first judgment was severed and made final on November 6, 2023. The Rule 11 and settlement agreements required Moss to pay certain amounts to the Beneficiaries and turn over assets by December 31, 2023. If Moss did not comply with the deadlines in the agreements, the parties agreed to the form and terms of a second, final judgment on which judgment would be rendered by the trial court.

After Moss did not make the first required payment, the Beneficiaries filed a motion for entry of an agreed final and non-appealable judgment on January 9, 2024 and requested an emergency hearing on the motion. Two days later, on January 11th, the trial court heard the motion, and granted the motion. The signed final judgment was dated January 12th, but not entered by the clerk until January 18th.

II. Rendition of Final Judgment

In appellate-court case no. 14-24-00226-CV, Moss presents the following three issues for review: (1) the trial court erred by excluding an audio recording of a meeting between Sylvia Bumstead and one of her lawyers at which Moss and the Beneficiaries were present; (2) the trial court signed and/or rendered the second, final judgment (on the jury's damages award) after Moss withdrew his consent to the parties’ Rule 11 agreement rendering the judgment void; and (3) the probate judge sitting by assignment erred by denying Moss's recusal motion, thereby rejecting Moss's argument that the second, final judgment on damages was not signed on January 12, 2024 as indicated in the record.

A. Waiver of right to appeal

Moss argues that the withdrawal of his consent to the Rule 11 agreement was effective, precluding the rendition of the second final judgment, and therefore remand for a new trial is required. However, we conclude that Moss voluntarily relinquished his ability to withdraw consent to the Rule 11 agreement when he agreed to and asked the trial court to render the first final judgment.

Moss entered into a Rule 11 agreement agreeing to void certain real estate transactions he spearheaded or was involved with and also agreed to pay the Beneficiaries $5,500,000 in damages as well as attorneys’ fees. The Rule 11 agreement also contemplated his nonperformance and called for the rendition of judgment in one of two forms depending on whether Moss met his initial payment obligations. However, after Moss failed to make the initial settlement payment, the Beneficiaries did not seek their remedy through a breach of contract action based on the signed settlement agreement. Instead, they sought enforcement solely through the parties’ Rule 11 agreement.

But before Moss attempted to withdraw his consent, Moss and the Beneficiaries agreed to a partial judgment on the real property transactions, which was signed by the trial court. This partial judgment was severed and made final.

The first final judgment includes the following language:

15. The Parties agreed to mediate and arbitrate any dispute regarding the interpretation and/or performance of the Rule 11 Agreement with mediator/arbitrator, Jeffrey H. Uzick, including any disputes related to or arising from the Rule 11 Agreement, including, but not limited to, the terms and finalization of this Agreed Partial and Non-Appealable Judgment and the Final Judgment(s) contemplated by the Rule 11 Agreement for entry in the above entitled and numbered cause.

16. The above findings and the below Orders, are based upon the Verdict and/or the Rule 11 Agreement, [incorporated by reference] are supported by the preponderance of credible evidence and/or by clear and convincing evidence, and are adopted by this Court in full as part of its final findings of fact, and, where applicable, final findings on questions of mixed law and fact, and final conclusions of law.

․

24. The Agreed Partial and Non-Appealable Judgment is final with respect to the matters contained herein and Mr. Moss waives any and all of his rights to appeal this Agreed Partial and Non-Appealable Judgment.

25. This Agreed Partial and Non-Appealable Judgment does not resolve all claims pending before the Court. Therefore, the Court retains jurisdiction to enforce this Agreed Partial and Non-Appealable Judgment, to enter any final judgment consistent with this Agreed Partial and Non-Appealable Judgment and/or the Parties’ Rule 11 Agreement, and to enter and enforce any arbitration award consistent with the Parties’ Rule 11 Agreement.

A party may revoke its consent to a settlement agreement at any time before judgment is rendered on the agreement. Quintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. 1983); Samples Exterminators v. Samples, 640 S.W.2d 873, 874–75 (Tex. 1982). A judgment rendered after one of the parties revokes its consent is void. Samples, 640 S.W.2d at 875. Here, Moss argues that he withdrew his consent to the Rule 11 agreement before a final judgment was rendered on the damages he owed the Beneficiaries. However, Moss's argument ignores the fact a final judgment was already rendered that was based on the Rule 11 agreement at issue. Although the order severing the first judgment acknowledges that the Beneficiaries’ claims for damages, pre and post-judgment interest and allocation of attorney's fees remained pending, the trial court specifically rendered the first agreed judgment on the basis of the parties’ Rule 11 agreement. The first final judgment specifically contemplates that the only matters outstanding were finalizing the terms of the final judgment, and provides that conflicts in finalizing terms would be resolved by mediation or arbitration (and not through withdrawal from the Rule 11 or settlement agreements).

Therefore, we conclude that when the first final judgment was rendered, Moss surrendered his right to withdraw his consent to the Rule 11 agreement. See DHI Holdings, LP v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 650 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied) (“A party's consent to the trial court's entry of judgment waives any error, except for fundamental error, contained in the judgment, and that party has nothing to properly present for appellate review.”). To hold otherwise would disincentivize settlement in contentious litigations such as this one. See Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269, 280 (Tex. 1995) (“Settlements are favored because they avoid the uncertainties regarding the outcome of litigation, and the often exorbitant amounts of time and money to prosecute or defend claims at trial.”).

We hold that Moss could no longer revoke his consent to the Rule 11 agreement on and after November 6, 2023 and that he waived any appellate issue with respect to the rendition of the second final judgment.

We overrule issue two.

B. The recusal motion

In issue three, Moss argues that the statutory probate judge assigned to hear his motion to recuse committed reversible error, “which was predicated on whether the ‘Agreed’ Judgment was or was not signed and entered by the Probate Court prior to Appellants’ withdrawal of consent.”³

Moss filed a motion to recuse on February 6, 2024 seeking to have Judge Jerry Simoneaux recused from the proceeding because: (1) Judge Simoneaux was a witness as to a material fact at issue—the date the final judgment was signed—and should have been recused and (2) Judge Simoneaux had a personal bias against Moss. However, Moss does not raise the allegation of bias on appeal and focuses instead on his argument that Judge Simoneaux backdated the judgment to prevent Moss from withdrawing his consent.

Although the final agreed judgment reflects it was signed on January 12th, the clerk did not enter the judgment on the docket until January 18th—reflected by its date stamp. Moss filed his withdrawal of consent to the Rule 11 agreement late on the evening of January 17th. Because the final judgment was entered first thing in the morning on January 18th, before his withdrawal of consent was accepted, Moss challenges the date the final judgment was signed.

Given that we have already concluded that Moss could not have withdrawn his consent to the Rule 11 agreement on January 17th, this issue is moot. We conclude the probate court did not err in denying the motion to recuse on April 10, 2024.⁴

We overrule issue three.

C. Trial court's exclusion of an audio recording

In issue one, Moss argues the trial court's refusal to admit the audio recording of a meeting between Sylvia Bumstead, her lawyer and the Beneficiaries constitutes “harmful and reversible error.” However, Moss waived his right to appeal the issue.

There were two final judgments rendered by the trial court. Both judgments included provisions by which Moss waived his right to appeal. The evidentiary issue which Moss now attempts to raise goes to the heart of both judgments rendered by the trial court. Therefore, we conclude that this issue has been waived and cannot be reviewed on appeal.

We overrule issue one.

III. Denial of TCPA Motion

In appellate-court case number 14-24-00365-CV, Moss raises four issues or questions. We combine issues one and four as they both address the trial court's denial of Moss's TCPA motion. In issue one, Moss asks whether the Beneficiaries’ motion for sanctions was the type of legal action which gave rise to Moss's right to file a TCPA motion. However, issue one presents no error on the part of the trial court and therefore nothing for this court to review. See Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (issues on appeal do not meet requirements of Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure if they do not point out any error allegedly committed by trial court). In issue four, Moss raises a corresponding issue of error and argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss on the merits.

Moss filed a TCPA motion seeking dismissal of the Beneficiaries’ motion for sanctions for filing a groundless motion to recuse because it was filed in response to his “rights under the TCPA.” Moss asserted the motion for sanctions was based on communications by Moss and Moss's counsel that were made in or pertaining to the underlying judicial proceeding and implicated his right to petition.

A. Applicability of the TCPA

In construing the TCPA and determining its applicability, we review statutory construction issues de novo. See Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). Similarly, whether the parties have met their respective burdens is a question of law that we review de novo. See Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019). Under the de novo standard, we “make an independent determination and apply the same standard used by the trial court in the first instance.” Fawcett v. Grosu, 498 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The purpose of the TCPA is to “encourage and safeguard” the constitutional rights to speech, petition, and association while also protecting the right to file and pursue “meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.002. The TCPA contemplates an expedited dismissal procedure when a “legal action” is “based on or is in response to a party's exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.003(a). Here, Moss argues that his motion to recuse was a communication made in or pertaining to a judicial proceeding and the Beneficiaries’ motion for sanctions was filed in response to that exercise of his right to petition.

To accomplish its objectives, the TCPA provides a three-step process for the dismissal of a “legal action” to which it applies. Montelongo v. Abrea, 622 S.W.3d 290, 295–96 (Tex. 2021). In the first step, the party filing a motion to dismiss under the TCPA bears the burden to demonstrate that there is a “legal action” that is “based on or is in response to,” as relevant to this appeal, the party's exercise of the right to petition. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.003(a), .005(b).

This court has previously held that the TCPA does not apply to a motion for sanctions. Cherian v. Berkley Court Condo. Owners Ass'n, Inc., No. 14-23-00697-CV, 2025 WL 454222, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 11, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (petition seeking declaratory action that the movant's previous lawsuit was frivolous was held to be a motion for sanctions to which TCPA did not apply); Patel v. Patel, No. 14-18-00771-CV, 2020 WL 2120313, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (interpreting pre-2019 amendment version of TCPA and holding that “TCPA does not apply to appellee's claim that appellants damaged him by filing a frivolous lawsuit because such a claim, to the extent based on rule 13 ․ is not a legal action under the TCPA”). Several of our sister courts of appeal have similarly concluded that the TCPA does not apply to a motion for sanctions based on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 or Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 10 because “a motion for sanctions does not assert an existing right and is not a right to receive payment or an equitable remedy[.]” Kinetic Content, LLC v. Dang, 695 S.W.3d 769, 775–76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, pet. filed) (motion for sanctions does not amend or add a claim); see Thuesen v. Scott, 667 S.W.3d 467, 474–75 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2023, no pet.); but see, e.g., KB Home Lone Star Inc. v. Gordon, 629 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.) (holding that a motion for sanctions under Rule 13 is a “legal action”). Cherian and Patel are both precedent of this court and we conclude they are applicable here.⁵

The Beneficiaries did not assert any new lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other judicial pleading. They did however file a motion for sanctions against Moss asserting Moss brought a groundless motion pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(h).⁶ The TCPA specifically provides that it does not apply to “a procedural action taken or motion made in an action that does not amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief” nor does it include “post-judgment enforcement actions.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001(6)(A), (C). Not only does the TCPA not apply to post-judgment enforcement, which is the stage at which Moss's TCPA motion was filed, but the Beneficiaries’ motion did not amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief. Further, the TCPA “does not abrogate or lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege available under other constitutional, statutory, case, or common law or rule provisions.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.011(a). Allowing parties to dismiss motions for sanctions permitted by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure under the auspices of the TCPA would abrogate rights that litigants have under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Because Moss did not meet his burden to establish that the TCPA applied to the Beneficiaries’ motion for sanctions, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss. We overrule issues one and four.

B. Effect of the trial court's denial of the TCPA motion to dismiss

In issue two, Moss asks whether the filing of his notice of interlocutory appeal “which was filed after the Probate Court's written denial of the Appellants’ anti-slapp Motion to Dismiss—triggered the automatic stay provision contained within Section 51.014(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.” In issue three, Moss asks the question of “whether the legal proceedings and court orders which have occurred in the Probate Court since the filing of Appellants’ Notice of Interlocutory Appeal of the denial of the anti-slapp Motion to Dismiss are voidable and/or void.” Moss does not allege any error on the part of the trial court in either issue. However, consonant with his appellate briefing, we construe issues two and three together to raise an argument that the trial court erred in conducting further legal proceedings and issuing orders after Moss filed his notice of interlocutory appeal because the stay provision in section 51.014(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code should have automatically stayed further proceedings in the trial court.

1. Motion to dismiss was not stricken

In the trial court, the Beneficiaries asked the trial court to strike Moss's motion to dismiss. The Beneficiaries argued that the motion was properly stricken because the TCPA does not apply to post-judgment enforcement actions and the Beneficiaries’ motion for sanctions was not a legal action. Further, the Beneficiaries asserted that striking the motion would prevent Moss from “taking advantage of continued delays to dissipate his assets.” In the alternative, the Beneficiaries argued the trial court should deny the motion to dismiss. The trial court agreed and on May 21, 2024 signed an order that both denied the motion to dismiss and struck the motion.

However, we conclude that the trial court's “strike” of the TCPA motion to dismiss was effectively a denial. The TCPA statutory scheme requires the trial court to hold a hearing on a motion to dismiss within 60 days after the motion is served and then requires the trial court to rule on the motion to dismiss within 30 days after the hearing. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.004(a), .005(a). The TCPA does not contemplate an avenue whereby the trial court can strike a motion to dismiss. In fact, it specifically provides that if a trial court does not rule on a motion to dismiss, the motion is considered to have been denied by operation of law and the moving party may appeal. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.008(a). As currently written, if a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the TCPA was groundless and filed for purposes of harassment, the remedy for the nonmoving party is to seek costs and attorney's fees. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.009(b). The trial court may not strike the motion to dismiss to avoid the TCPA's statutory and appellate scheme.

2. Moss waived his claim of error related to the stay of proceedings

The Beneficiaries argue that the trial court's ruling was not interlocutory, because a final judgment had already been rendered. In contrast, Moss argues that the order dismissing his TCPA motion was interlocutory. This court has statutory authority to review the trial court's ruling on the motion to dismiss regardless of whether the order was interlocutory or not. The TCPA specifically provides for an appeal of an order on a motion to dismiss a legal action or a trial court's failure to rule, “whether interlocutory or not.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.008(b). The characterization of the ruling determines only the applicability of the stay provision in Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(c), and not the jurisdiction of this court.

We need not determine whether the ruling was interlocutory because Moss has waived any error. The stay provision in section 51.014(c) is not self-executing because it does not vest any exclusive jurisdiction (in the manner that the automatic stay in a bankruptcy matter does).⁷ Roccaforte v. Jefferson Cnty., 341 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. 2011). The Texas Supreme Court has previously concluded a litigant must object to preserve the applicability of the stay in section 51.014 on appeal. Id. (“We agree with those decisions that have held that a party may waive complaints about a trial court's actions in violation of the stay imposed by section 51.014(b) ․ [and] failure to object to the trial court's actions waive[s] any error related to the stay.”). Although Moss acknowledges Roccaforte, he does not cite to anywhere in the record in which he attempted to enforce the stay, nor have we found anything in the existing record. Moss also offers no explanation of what types of actions or orders might be implicated. Therefore, we conclude he waived the issue.

We overrule issues two and three.

IV. Conclusion

In appellate-court case number 14-24-00266-CV, we overrule the three issues raised by Moss and affirm the final judgment of the trial court as challenged on appeal.

Having overruled all issues raised by Moss in appellate-court case number 14-24-00365-CV, we affirm the order of the trial court denying Moss's motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Texas Supreme Court transferred that appeal from this court to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket equalization order. See Tex. Gov't. Code Ann. § 22.220(a) (delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts); id. § 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer).

2.   The Thirteenth Court of Appeals did reverse certain portions of the trial court's order which might have allowed the receiver to transfer title to property when the ownership of the property was disputed. Bumstead I, 2022 WL 710159, at *28.

3.   We also consider our jurisdiction to hear the appeal of this order. The order denying Moss's motion to recuse was signed after the final judgment and an order denying a motion to recuse is ordinarily an unappealable interlocutory order. Hawkins v. Walker, 233 S.W.3d 380, 401–02 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). Specifically, Rule 18a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an order denying a motion to recuse may be reviewed only “on appeal from the final judgment.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(j)(1)(A). However, the instant case comes to us from a probate proceeding, in which “multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.” De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001)). Because the order denying the motion to recuse disposed of a discrete issue in the proceeding, we conclude it is a final appealable judgment. Further, the only legal arguments raised by Moss on appeal relate to Judge Simoneaux's prejudgment conduct in rendering a final judgment. Because that conduct predates the second final judgment, we consider that part of Judge Simoneaux's participation to have merged into the final judgment.

4.   Moss does not raise any challenge to the assigned probate court's award of sanctions against him.

5.   We further note that we have affirmed, above, the probate court's ruling on Moss's motion to recuse. Therefore, even if the TCPA did apply to preclude a motion for sanctions such as the one filed by the Beneficiaries, Moss cannot demonstrate that the Beneficiaries’ motion lacked merit. Much of Moss's allegations in this appeal are premised on the notion that the trial court did not render a final judgment on January 12, 2024, and that he has a meritorious attack on the second final judgment.

6.   The Beneficiaries sought sanctions in the form of their reasonable costs and expenses incurred in responding to the motion for recusal.

7.   This court has repeatedly articulated the general rule that “post-judgment orders made for the purpose of enforcing or carrying into effect a prior judgment are not subject to appeal because they are not final judgments.” Kelly v. Wiggins, 466 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citation omitted). Although we need not resolve it here, we note that to the extent appellant's TCPA motion to dismiss was derivative of his motion to recuse and attacked the finality and/or rendition of the final judgment, then it merged into the final judgment and would not be subject to the stay provision in section 51.014(c).

Tonya McLaughlin, Justice