GOMEZ ALDANA v. STATE (2025)

OPINION

Appellant Vicente Eulofio Gomez-Aldana appeals two convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony.¹ See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01(a), 22.02(a)(2). In one issue, appellant argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress a video recording from his home surveillance system. We affirm.

I. Background

Appellant was indicted for intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to Rene Dario Mencia-Flores (“Mencia-Flores”) with a knife and a glass bottle and for intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly threatening Mencia-Flores with imminent bodily injury by exhibiting a firearm. Appellant filed a motion seeking to suppress a video recording from his home security system that law enforcement seized without a warrant. The trial court held a hearing on appellant's motion and received testimony from Detective Alexander Hickey (“Hickey”) of the Fort Bend County Sheriff's Office and from appellant's wife, Brenda Garcia (“Garcia”).

Hickey testified that he was dispatched to a residence to investigate an aggravated assault. Hickey interviewed witnesses, including Garcia, and learned that appellant was suspected of the offense, had left the scene, was married to Garcia, and lived at the residence with Garcia. Hickey asked Garcia whether he could view the video recorded by the home's outside surveillance cameras. Garcia, a native Spanish speaker, led Hickey into the home and guided him to her bedroom where the electronic equipment and monitor for the surveillance system were located. Hickey testified that Garcia assisted him in changing the channel on the monitor to view the video and pointed out relevant events to the investigation as the video played. Hickey testified that appellant could be seen in the video “walking to the truck with a beer bottle, which we knew that was one of the weapons that was used.” Hickey then downloaded a copy of the video onto a USB flash drive. Hickey testified he did not ask Garcia for consent to copy the video.

Garcia testified the officers did not ask her for permission to copy the surveillance video and that she would have denied any such request. Garcia confirmed she was cooperative with the investigation and assisted officers in trying to locate appellant that night. Garcia stated that the officers asked her whether they could watch the video of what had occurred that night, that her son guided the officer to her and appellant's bedroom, and that she was in the bedroom with Hickey as he accessed and viewed the video until she was asked to retrieve her car insurance.

At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated that Garcia had apparent authority and consented to the officers accessing the surveillance system's monitor and denied appellant's motion. Following a trial, a jury found appellant guilty of both offenses and assessed punishment for each offense at ten years imprisonment suspended for ten years of community supervision. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

In one issue, appellant argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the video from his home surveillance system because the video was seized without a warrant.

A. Standard of Review

We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion, using a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We give almost total deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact that are supported by the record and to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d at 281. We review de novo the trial court's determination of the law and its application of law to facts that do not turn upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See id.; State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

When the trial court has not made a finding on a relevant fact, we imply the finding that supports the trial court's ruling, so long as it finds some support in the record. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see Moran v. State, 213 S.W.3d 917, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (implying findings that were missing from the trial court's findings of fact); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Because the trial court did not make explicit findings of fact in this case, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported by the record.”). We will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

B. Applicable Law

The purpose of both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution is to safeguard an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusions. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (“A search compromises the individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or property.”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (noting that the Fourth Amendment “protects two types of expectations, one involving ‘searches,’ the other ‘seizures.’ ”). A warrantless search or seizure is considered per se unreasonable subject to a few specifically defined and well-established exceptions. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

If an authorized individual voluntarily consents to a search, then a warrantless search without probable cause is not unreasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment or the Texas Constitution. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250–51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); see e.g., Sorensen v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (“Appellant had no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in this particular ‘area.’ His mother had a right to be where the marihuana was found, she could consent to a search of that area, and her consent would vitiate the need for any search warrant and would be binding upon anyone having rights in that ‘area.’ ”). A person is free to limit the scope of the consent that he gives, but a person's silence in the face of an officer's further actions may imply consent to that further action. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Furthermore, if the consent to search is entirely open-ended, then a reasonable person would have no cause to believe that the search will be limited in some way. Id. We measure the scope of a consent by an objective reasonableness standard—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801.

Under the plain-view doctrine, law enforcement may seize incriminating evidence without a warrant if three requirements are met: (1) the police officer must lawfully be where the object can be plainly viewed; (2) the incriminating character of the evidence in plain view must be immediately apparent to the police officer; and (3) the police officer must have the right to access the evidence. See State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

The “plain-view” doctrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but this characterization overlooks the important difference between searches and seizures. If an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy. A seizure of the article, however, would obviously invade the owner's possessory interest. If “plain view” justifies an exception from an otherwise applicable warrant requirement, therefore, it must be an exception that is addressed to the concerns that are implicated by seizures rather than by searches.

Horton, 496 U.S. at 133–34, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (citations and footnotes omitted).

C. Analysis

On appeal, appellant does not dispute that Hickey had consent from Garcia to use the electronic equipment at the home to view the video—i.e. to search for and access the video. Appellant only argues that Hickey did not have consent to seize the video because he never asked Garcia for permission to copy it and the scope of Garcia's consent did not include copying the video. At the trial court, the State argued in part that the plain-view doctrine allowed for the seizure of the video, and appellant argues in his brief on appeal that the plain-view doctrine is inapplicable because the video was not clearly contraband.

Assuming, without deciding, that copying the video was outside of the scope of Garcia's consent, we nevertheless conclude that Hickey's seizure of the video was reasonable and lawful because the record supports a finding that the incriminating character of the video was immediately apparent to Hickey and thus the plain-view doctrine applied.

Here, Hickey's warrantless search for the video was reasonable and legal because Garcia consented to Hickey entering the home and using the surveillance system's electronic equipment and monitor to access and view the video. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250–51, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (“[W]e have long approved consensual searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.”); Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 448 (“The entry into a residence by police officers is a ‘search’ for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, but an owner's or occupant's voluntary consent makes that entry constitutionally ‘reasonable.’ ”); U.S. v. Mendez, 431 F.3d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Consensual searches are established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.”); see also State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“[A]ctual authority is not necessarily a prerequisite for a valid consensual search.”). At this point, the video was in Hickey's plain view without any intrusion or violation of appellant's privacy interest. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 133, 110 S.Ct. 2301.

It is further undisputed that Hickey was dispatched to appellant's home to investigate an aggravated assault, that Hickey knew an individual had been stabbed, and that appellant was the suspect of the offense and had left the residence. It is further undisputed that Hickey saw appellant in the video “walking to the truck with a beer bottle, which we knew that was one of the weapons that was used.” This record supports an implied finding that the incriminating character of the video was immediately apparent to Hickey. See State v. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d 184, 189–190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“Supreme Court precedent does not dictate that we construe ‘immediately apparent’ necessarily to mean ‘quickly apparent.’ Rather, ‘immediately apparent’ in this context means without the necessity of any further search.”). In other words, there was probable cause to associate the video with criminal activity. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (“[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief ․ that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime ․”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Hickey was lawfully where the video was in plain view because Garcia guided him to her bedroom where the electronic equipment for the surveillance system was located; the incriminating character of the video was immediately apparent to Hickey for the reasons noted above; and Hickey had the right to access the video because Garcia consented to him using the electrical equipment to access and view the video. See Betts, 397 S.W.3d at 206; Keehn, 279 S.W.3d at 334. Therefore, we conclude that the plain-view doctrine allowed for Hickey to seize the video without any violation of the Fourth Amendment or Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution. See Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 65–66, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) (“Suppose, for example, that police officers lawfully enter a house, by either complying with the warrant requirement or satisfying one of its recognized exceptions—e.g., through a valid consent ․ If they come across some item in plain view and seize it, no invasion of personal privacy has occurred.”); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5–6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (“The ‘plain view’ exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has the right to be.”); see, e.g., U.S. v. Whaley, 415 Fed. App'x 129, 134 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (concluding that the plain-view doctrine applied to the seizure of a computer when an officer opened a program that showed child pornography because the officer had the owner's consent to open a different, similarly-titled program and “[o]nce Schoenfeld clicked on the ‘auto racing 13’ icon, the child pornography was in plain view”); Flowers v. State, 438 S.W.3d 96, 100, 109 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref'd) (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress the screenshots of defendant's call list after defendant consented to officer searching the cellphone for a phone number because the screenshots contradicted appellant's alibi claim in a murder investigation); see also United States v. Flores, 193 Fed. App'x 597, 599, 604–05 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying plain view doctrine to a consensual search); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589–90 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (same). In other words, Hickey's seizure of the video was reasonable. See Soldal, 506 U.S. at 69, 113 S.Ct. 538 (“[T]he plain-view cases clearly state that, notwithstanding the absence of any interference with privacy, seizures of effects that are not authorized by a warrant are reasonable only because there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity ․ [S]uch seizures must satisfy the Fourth Amendment and will be deemed reasonable only if the item's incriminating character is ‘immediately apparent’ ․”); State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”); Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“It is our holding that Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution contains no requirement that a seizure or search be authorized by a warrant, and that a seizure or search that is otherwise reasonable will not be found to be in violation of that section because it was not authorized by a warrant.”).

We conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion to suppress the surveillance video and overrule his sole issue.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Both convictions arose out of the same incident on September 26, 2020. Appellate cause number 14-23-00329-CR stems from appellant's conviction in trial court cause number 22-DCR-100345 for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon by threatening the complainant with a firearm. Appellate cause number 14-23-00330-CR stems from appellant's conviction in trial court cause number 20-DCR-09327 for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon by causing bodily injury to the complainant with a deadly weapon other than firearm.

Tracy Christopher, Chief Justice