WEBB COUNTY TEXAS v. CYNTHIA MARES (2024)

DISSENTING OPINION

Affirmed in Part and Reversed and Rendered in Part, and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed December 17, 2024.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and the court's judgment as I conclude that we may not reach the merits of this appeal because the trial court's judgment granted unauthorized relief and is therefore void.

The trial court signed a final judgment on July 10, 2023. At that time, the only live claims at issue in Cynthia Mares's Third Amended Petition were for mandamus and declaratory relief based on the Webb County Commissioners Court's alleged violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act (the “Act”). See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 551.041, 551.141-.142. Mares alleged that, pursuant to a public notice preceding a September 26, 2016 commissioners court meeting, the commissioners court notified the public that it would discuss and potentially adopt a county budget for the 2016-2017 fiscal year and that the commissioners court may make any modifications to the proposed budget that it considered warranted by law and required by the interests of the taxpayers. During that meeting, the commissioners court voted to “split” or reorganize the county's Administrative Services Department into two separate departments, namely the Risk Management Department and the Human Resources Department, as a modification to the proposed budget. Mares, who was the director of the Administrative Services Department (at a $105,000 annual salary), would, as a result of the reorganization, become director of the Human Resources Department (at a $75,000 annual salary). Mares alleged that the pre-meeting agenda provided no notice that her duties or salary would be evaluated and potentially changed.

In her claim for mandamus relief, Mares requested that the trial court reverse the commissioners court's decision to split the Administrative Services Department due to the lack of adequate notice under the Act. In her declaratory judgment claim, Mares requested that the court declare that Webb County violated the Act because it failed to provide adequate notice of the challenged decision, and she requested reinstatement, back pay, costs, and attorneys' fees.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Mares's motion and denied Webb County's motion.

In its judgment, the court:

• ordered that Mares “recover” mandamus that Webb County violated the Act by not providing notice of the subject of its September 26, 2016 government action to split the Administrative Services Department;

• found that Mares brought her action in good faith;

• found that Webb County's conduct had no reasonable basis in law, because the budget notice was not adequately tailored to meaningfully inform the public regarding the proposals intended for discussion; and that Mares's “demotion” was a “disguised personnel action and punitive”;

• declared Mares the prevailing party and awarded backpay, lost retirement, reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees, and costs; and

• stated the judgment disposed of all claims and all parties and is appealable.

As the majority opinion correctly notes, the Supreme Court of Texas has held that the Act does not waive governmental immunity from suit for declaratory judgment claims. Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 554 (Tex. 2019). Although the Act contains an express waiver of governmental immunity, that waiver extends only to claims for mandamus or injunctive relief. Id.

Important to this case is the nature of mandamus relief. A trial court judgment granting mandamus relief would consist of an order compelling action, or an order preventing action or threatened action. See id. (citing Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146, 153-54 (Tex. 2016) (describing the difference between mandamus and injunction); Burks v. Yarbrough, 157 S.W.3d 876, 878-79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)). When, as here, a judgment is unambiguous, it is our duty to construe it in light of the literal meaning of the language used. See Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 441 (Tex. 2003). That is, we interpret the judgment according to its substantive language. See Redwine v. Peckinpaugh, 535 S.W.3d 44, 48 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.).

Although the word “mandamus” appears in the judgment, the substantive and literal words of the judgment do not actually grant any mandamus relief. The judgment does not, for example, compel the county or the commissioners court to reverse its September 26, 2016 decision splitting the Administrative Department into two separate departments. It merely declares that the county violated the Act by failing to provide adequate notice of the subject at issue discussed during the September 26, 2016 meeting. In my view, the judgment in substance grants only declaratory relief and money damages; it does not grant mandamus relief.

As Swanson makes clear, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant declaratory or monetary relief because the county's immunity from suit has not been waived for such relief in the context of an Open Meetings Act lawsuit. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d at 554. Thus, the only relief the trial court granted was relief it was not authorized to grant.¹

When a trial court has no authority or jurisdiction to sign a particular judgment, the judgment is void. See Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005); Custom Corps., Inc. v. Sec. Storage, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Webb County does not challenge the judgment on this ground, but we may not ignore questions of jurisdiction simply because the parties do not raise the issue. See Walker Sand, Inc. v. Baytown Asphalt Materials, Ltd., 95 S.W.3d 511, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). A court of appeals faced with a void judgment has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. See Freedom Commc'ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam); State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). Rather, we must declare the judgment void and make appropriate orders based on that determination, which usually involves dismissing the appeal. See Freedom Commc'ns, 372 S.W.3d at 623; Owens, 907 S.W.2d at 486; Waite v. Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). We should vacate the judgment and dismiss the appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(e).

FOOTNOTES

1.   While my colleagues in the majority correctly note that the monetary damages must be reversed, it is my view that the entire judgment is void.

Kevin Jewell Justice