HERNANDEZ v. STATE (2023)

OPINION

Appellant, Chon Hernandez, appeals his conviction for deadly conduct.¹ By a sole issue, he contends the evidence is legally insufficient to establish he committed deadly conduct by discharging a firearm in the direction of a habitation. We affirm.

Background

In September 2020, Robert L. Farias and his family awakened to gunshots being fired in front of his house. When Farias checked the video from his security cameras, he noted a large SUV had driven by the front of the house and someone appeared to fire a handgun from the front passenger window at his son's car parked on the street. Farias's spouse called 911 to report the shooting. At the same time, another person in the neighborhood also called 911 because of the gunshots and reported a large, red SUV driving away from the scene. Police located and pulled over a large, red GMC Yukon a short distance away from Farias's house and detained the driver, Joe Trevino, Appellant, and two other passengers. Appellant was riding in the front passenger seat when the vehicle was stopped by police. During a search of the SUV, officers also discovered boxes of ammunition and a handgun. Each person was questioned separately. Trevino claimed he did not know Appellant, and at trial he testified Appellant shot the car and then handed the gun back to one of the passengers in the rear, who then hid the gun under his seat. Appellant was charged and indicted for deadly conduct by discharging a firearm in the direction of a habitation.

At the close of the prosecution's case, Appellant moved for a directed verdict on the basis there was no evidence he fired the handgun “in the direction of” Farias's house. The motion was denied, and he proceeded to present his case-in-chief. The jury, after deliberation, convicted Appellant of “Deadly Conduct – Discharge of Firearm.” He filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. This appeal followed.

Applicable Law

The offense of deadly conduct under the Texas Penal Code is as follows:

DEADLY CONDUCT. (a) A person commits an offense if he recklessly engages in conduct that places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.

(b) A person commits an offense if he knowingly discharges a firearm at or in the direction of:

(1) one or more individuals; or

(2) a habitation, building, or vehicle and is reckless as to whether the habitation, building, or vehicle is occupied.

(c) Recklessness and danger are presumed if the actor knowingly pointed a firearm at or in the direction of another whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded.

(d) For purposes of this section, “building,” “habitation,” and “vehicle” have the meanings assigned those terms by Section 30.01.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.05.

Under Section 30.01 of the Texas Penal Code, the terms “building,” “habitation,” and “vehicle” for purposes of the statute are defined as follows:

DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:

(1) “Habitation” means a structure or vehicle that is adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons, and includes:

(A) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and

(B) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle.

(2) “Building” means any enclosed structure intended for use or occupation as a habitation or for some purpose of trade, manufacture, ornament, or use.

(3) “Vehicle” includes any device in, on, or by which any person or property is or may be propelled, moved, or drawn in the normal course of commerce or transportation, except such devices as are classified as “habitation.”

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.01.

Standard of Review

The only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 243–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781).

“In some cases, however, legal sufficiency turns upon the meaning of the statute under which the defendant is being prosecuted. We ask if certain conduct actually constitutes an offense under the statute. When we interpret statutes, we look to the literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of the text at the time of its enactment. If the plain language is clear and unambiguous, our analysis ends because the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add or subtract from such a statute. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.” Day v. State, 614 S.W.3d 121, 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Analysis

Appellant questions whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove each element of the offense of deadly conduct. Specifically, he asserts there was insufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to show he “knowingly discharge[d] a firearm at or in the direction of ․ a habitation ․” as required by the statute. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.05(b)(2). He contends the State's evidence demonstrated, “at best,” he aimed and fired at a downward trajectory at a car parked in front of Farias's house, not at the house itself. While there was testimony adduced at trial from Farias that, but for the presence of the car, the bullets would have hit his house, Appellant argues this testimony is speculative. He does not dispute the evidence that bullets fired from the gun in question struck the car. Rather, he argues there is an absence of evidence showing the bullets struck the house, or could have struck the house.

In this case, the State introduced video evidence from Farias's house security camera showing someone firing a handgun at a parked car from the front passenger seat of an SUV driving by his house. Bodycam and dashcam video showed that when the police detained Appellant, he was riding in the front passenger seat of a red Yukon. Bodycam footage and testimony established that a firearm and ammunition were discovered upon a search of the SUV. Bodycam footage and testimony established the gun recovered smelled of “fresh” gun powder residue, as if it had recently been discharged. Additional testimony from the other passengers in the SUV identified Appellant as the person who fired the handgun at the parked car in front of Farias's house. There was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant fired a handgun at the parked car in front of Farias's house. The only question remaining is a statutory one: did firing at the car parked in front of the house, albeit at a downward trajectory, constitute firing “in the direction of” Farias's house?

The phrase “in the direction of” is not defined in the deadly conduct statute, and therefore we must employ statutory interpretation in order to ascertain its meaning. Words in a statute are to be given their common meaning unless those words have acquired some technical or particular meaning. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011; see also Clinton v. State, 354 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When determining the fair, objective meaning of an undefined statutory term, a court may consult standard dictionaries. Clinton, 354 S.W.3d at 801 (citing Ramos v. State, 303 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). “[W]e presume that (1) every word has been used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonably possible and (2) the Legislature intended for the entire statutory scheme to be effective.” Herron v. State, 625 S.W.3d 144, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W.3d 820, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). “If the plain language is clear and unambiguous, our analysis ends because ‘the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add or subtract from such a statute.’ ” Id. (quoting Day, 614 S.W.3d at 127).

In this case, “direction” does not have any particular or technical meaning and is defined in the dictionary as: “the line or course on which something is moving or is aimed to move or along which something is pointing or facing.” (Emphasis added).² Firing “at” an object, in common usage connotes aiming a gun at a particular target. Adding “in the direction of” after the word “at” in the context of the statute broadens the scope of the offense, to encompass more than the object aimed at by the perpetrator. Had the Legislature merely intended that discharging a firearm “at” a particular object creates the offense, it could have omitted the words “in the direction of,” but it did not. Further, we note the statute includes an element of recklessness, indicating the Legislature's intent to prohibit conduct with a firearm that endangers the public. Thus, because the evidence demonstrates Farias's house was behind the car that was struck, we conclude there was legally sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant discharged a firearm “in the direction of a habitation.”

The State introduced legally sufficient evidence such that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's sole issue is overruled.

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.05(b).

2.   “Direction,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/direction (last visited June 29, 2023).

Alex L. Yarbrough, Justice