IN RE: the Application of City Firefighters Union Local 28 (2026)

Defendants-Respondents have brought a motion to dismiss the Petition/Complaint in this proceeding on the ground that it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted (CPLR 3211[a][7]). Petitioners have opposed the motion. This matter concerns the proper forum for hearing disciplinary charges against a City firefighter. Petitioners assert that the charges must be adjudicated pursuant to § 75(2-a) of the Civil Service Law. Respondents assert that the charges must be adjudicated pursuant to the Second-Class Cities Law. The parties presented their respective positions to the Schenectady Commissioner of Public Safety, who decided that the Second-Class Cities Law should be applied.

Petitioners then brought this combined declaratory judgment action and CPLR art. 78 proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment that the Second-Class Cities Law no longer has any force or effect for professional firefighters in the City of Schenectady, an injunction directing firefighter discipline proceedings to be conducted pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75(2-a), and an order overturning the decision of the Commissioner of Public Safety as being arbitrary, capricious, and affected by error of law.

On a § 3211(a)(7) motion, the Court must accept the facts alleged in the Petition/Complaint as true, afford Petitioners the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the allegations in the Petition fit within a cognizable legal theory (Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]).

The Petition/Complaint bases all three of its causes of action on Civil Service Law § 75(2-a). In opposing this motion, Plaintiffs-Petitioners point to operative language from the statute, which states, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, including but not limited to subdivision four of section seventy-six of this title ." Civil Service Law § 76(4) is the "grandfather" provision relied upon by Defendants-Respondents to argue that the Civil Service Law does not repeal or revise the Second-Class Cities Law.

Notably, the language from § 76(4) relied upon by Defendants-Respondents states that Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 "shall not be construed to repeal or modify any general, specific or local laws," a phrase that refers to laws already in existence when that statute was enacted (see Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of New York, Inc. v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 6 NY3d 563 [2006]). The legislation that produced § 75(2-a) was enacted in 2022 and thus does not predate § 76(4), the current form of which dates to 1985.

Given the very specific language of § 75(2-a), and the timeline of the enactment of the competing statutory provisions being asserted here, the Complaint-Petition articulates a claim that Civil Service Law § 75(2-a) carves out an exception to the grandfather clause specifically for firefighter discipline, so that the decision under review was affected by error of law. The motion to dismiss brought by Defendants-Respondents must be denied.

Dated: April 13, 2026

ENTER.

Thomas D. Buchanan

Supreme Court Justice

Papers considered:

NYSCEF documents 1 through 19.

Thomas D. Buchanan, J.