ARTINOFF v. SACK (2018)

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Maureen A. Healy, J.), entered February 6, 2017. The order granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover $15,000 in damages for, among other things, “Breach of Contract or Warranty ․ Failure to pay for services rendered; Failure to pay for commissions” in relation to his acts helping defendant sell defendant's cooperative apartment. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff could not maintain the action because he was not a licensed real estate broker. Plaintiff opposed the motion. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court entered February 6, 2017 granting defendant's motion.

Plaintiff and defendant were residents in a cooperative apartment building. It is uncontroverted that plaintiff assisted defendant in the sale of her apartment and that the services of a licensed real estate broker were not used. In opposition to defendant's motion, plaintiff asserted that he was a licensed real estate salesman, and was a licensed attorney although not in New York.

“Where the dominant feature of the transaction at issue is the transfer of real property, one who does not have a real estate broker's license is barred from collecting a fee for endeavors in the nature of brokerage services” (Panarello v. Segalla, 6 AD3d 515, 516 [2004]; see Real Property Law § 442-d; Futersak v. Perl, 84 AD3d 1309, 1310-1311 [2011]; Kavian v. Vernah Homes, Co., 19 AD3d 649, 650 [2005] ). This rule applies to the sale of cooperative apartment shares of stock (see Wolf v. Wohl, 103 Misc 2d 1044 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 1980] ). Even assuming plaintiff was a licensed real estate salesman, a fact not established in his papers, he cannot avoid the proscription of Real Property Law § 442-a to the effect that a licensed real estate salesman can only receive, or demand, compensation for his services in selling real estate from a duly licensed real estate broker with whom he is associated (see Conlon v. Teicher, 8 AD3d 606, 607 [2004]; Myles v. Litas Inv. Co., 152 AD2d 731 [1989] ). As plaintiff cannot recover a commission for the services he allegedly rendered relating to the sale of defendant's apartment, his promissory estoppel and quasi-contract contentions will not be addressed.

In view of the foregoing, defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly granted (see Real Property Law §§ 442-a, 442-d; Futersak v. Perl, 84 AD3d at 1310-1311; Conlon v. Teicher, 8 AD3d 606, 607).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

ELLIOT, J.P., WESTON and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.