PEOPLE v. TAYLOR (2022)

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was charged in five separate simplified traffic informations with, respectively, driving while intoxicated per se (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [2]), common-law driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]), failure to keep right (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1120 [a]), driving across hazard markings (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 [d]), and failing to signal (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [a]).

Defendant moved to, among other things, suppress physical evidence and statements that he had made to law enforcement officials. When defendant failed to appear for a combined Huntley/Mapp/Dunaway hearing, the court held that defendant had waived his right to the pretrial hearing. The trial began the next day, and, during the People's case-in-chief, defendant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty, which resulted in a conviction and sentence on the charge of driving while intoxicated (per se).

In People v Taylor (67 Misc 3d 130[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50427[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2020]), this court determined that the District Court erred in concluding that defendant's failure to appear in court constituted a forfeiture of his right to a hearing. As a result, the District Court's denial of the branch of defendant's motion seeking to suppress physical evidence and statements that he had made to law enforcement officers was vacated, and the matter was remitted to the District Court for a determination, on the merits, following a hearing, of that branch of defendant's motion; the appeal was held in abeyance in the interim. On remittitur, the District Court decided, after a hearing, that suppression of physical evidence and two of defendant's four statements was not warranted. On appeal, defendant contends only that physical evidence and those two statements should have been suppressed because there was no probable cause for the traffic stop.

“[A]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred” (People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 348-349 [2001] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Failing to signal a turn, a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [a]), supports a vehicle stop (see People v Foster, 153 AD3d 853 [2017]). “The credibility determinations of a hearing court are entitled to great deference on appeal, and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record” (People v Martinez, 58 AD3d 870, 870-871 [2009]). Here, the record supports the hearing court's determination to credit the officer's testimony that he observed defendant make a right turn without signaling, which justified the stop of defendant's vehicle (see Foster, 153 AD3d 853). Indeed, even defendant confirmed the officer's testimony by testifying that he had made a turn without signaling. Consequently, the court properly denied suppression of physical evidence and two of defendant's four statements.

As we find no basis to warrant the granting of any further suppression, and since the two suppressed statements were similar to the two admissible statements, we find that there is no “reasonable possibility” that the District Court's failure to suppress those two statements prior to defendant pleading guilty “contributed to the plea” (People v Grant, 45 NY2d 366, 379 [1978]; see People v Hightower, 207 AD3d 1199 [2022]; People v Hardman, 135 AD3d 785 [2016]; People v Hardy, 77 AD3d 133 [2010]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

GARGUILO, P.J., EMERSON and DRISCOLL, JJ., concur.