PEOPLE v. RANALLO (2021)

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was charged in a misdemeanor information with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [2]) for recklessly closing the window of his vehicle on the hand of his wife, the complainant, with whom he was in the middle of divorce proceedings. Subsequently, the District Court granted the People's motion to dismiss the reckless assault charge and, instead, proceed on a charge of harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]); accordingly, a superseding information was filed. Following a nonjury trial, in which the complainant and defendant were each the sole testifying witness for the prosecution and defense, respectively, the court found defendant guilty of harassment in the second degree and later sentenced him.

We reject defendant's contention that the trial evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction. Viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Gordon, 23 NY3d 643, 649 [2014]; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that the prosecution presented “competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof” (CPL 70.10 [1]). The complainant's consistent, credible testimony was supported by a video of the incident taken by defendant using his cell phone. The video demonstrated clearly that, while defendant indeed may not have intended the window to come in contact with the complainant's hand, he did intend to annoy or alarm her by, at minimum, acting in a way that threatened to subject her hand to physical contact with the window (see Penal Law § 240.26 [1] [prohibits “subject(ing) such other persons to physical contact, or attempt(ing) or threaten(ing) to do the same”]). Hence, the trial evidence was legally sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of harassment in the second degree.

In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]), we accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony and observe their demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). In light of the weight of the credible evidence of defendant's guilt, we find no reason to disturb the court's guilty verdict.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

RUDERMAN, P.J., EMERSON and DRISCOLL, JJ., concur.