SAMUELS v. MPANTAS (2021)

ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action, plaintiff seeks to recover damages based on the alleged breach of her apartment lease by her former landlord, defendant Nina Mpantas, and based on defendant Bob Mpantas's alleged damaging and converting some of plaintiff's property. Defendants denied liability and asserted counterclaims based on plaintiff's alleged destruction of the premises and her abuse of process. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff testified that she had leased an apartment from defendant Nina Mpantas, and that Ms. Mpantas had violated a contractual obligation by leasing a downstairs apartment to people who kept pets, smoked, and otherwise disturbed her. Plaintiff indicated that her health had been impacted and her property had been damaged by the downstairs tenants’ behavior. Plaintiff further testified that, shortly before the expiration of her tenancy, in her absence, defendant Bob Mpantas had entered her apartment without permission, and had destroyed and removed some of her property. Defendant Bob Mpantas denied plaintiff's claims and asserted that plaintiff had damaged the apartment. Following the trial, the District Court dismissed the complaint and the counterclaims based on the parties’ failure to prove their prima facie cases. Plaintiff appeals from so much of the judgment as dismissed her complaint.

Proof of damages is an essential element of a cause of action for conversion (see Henderson v Holley, 112 AD2d 190 [1985]; Dixon v Public Stor., 65 Misc 3d 131[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51577[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; Schussheim v Snitkoff, 55 Misc 3d 150[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2017]). Since, at trial, plaintiff failed to describe the specific items of her property that had allegedly been damaged or converted, to establish the condition, age, or cost of the items, or to provide any expert evidence about their value, the District Court properly dismissed the trespass to personalty and conversion causes of action based on plaintiff's failure to prove a prima facie case. Moreover, contrary to plaintiff's trial testimony, there was no contract clause presented establishing defendant's obligation not to rent the downstairs apartment to anyone who owns pets or smokes.

In her appellate brief, plaintiff makes several assertions about the conduct of the trial and the trial court's alleged conflict of interest and prejudice against her, which we do not consider because they are dehors the record (see Chimarios v Duhl, 152 AD2d 508 [1989]). We note that a self-represented litigant, such as plaintiff, acquires no greater rights than any other litigant (see e.g. Roundtree v Singh, 143 AD2d 995 [1988]; Garcia v Cater, 66 Misc 3d 151[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50310[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2020]).

Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

RUDERMAN, P.J., DRISCOLL and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.