PEOPLE v. DAVIS (2022)

ORDERED that the order, insofar as it granted the branch of defendant's motion seeking to vacate three default judgments, is affirmed, without costs; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order, insofar as it granted the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the three simplified traffic informations, is affirmed.

Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, defendant was charged in three simplified traffic informations with operating an unregistered motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 401 [1] [a]), operating a motor vehicle with improper license plates (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 402 [4]) and operating a motor vehicle without a license (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 [1]), respectively. Upon defendant's failure to “answer,” the court entered guilty pleas on her behalf and “render[ed] [ ] default judgment[s] of [ ] fine[s]” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1806-a). Thereafter, three civil default judgments were entered against defendant. Defendant moved to vacate the three default judgments pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) and, upon such vacatur, to, among other things, dismiss the three simplified traffic informations charging those offenses. The People opposed the motion and, in an order dated September 7, 2021, the court granted it, vacated the three default judgments, and, pursuant to CPL 170.40, dismissed the three simplified traffic informations in furtherance of justice. The People appeal.

A default judgment entered pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1806-a is “civil in nature” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1806-a [1]; see People v Iverson, 37 NY3d 98, 104 [2021]; People v Reyes, 64 Misc 3d 127[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50443[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2022]). Consequently, a motion brought pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) is a proper way to obtain relief from such a default judgment (see Keis v Margiotta, 174 AD3d 697 [2019]; Reyes, 2022 NY Slip Op 50443[U]). Thus, so much of the appeal as is from the portion of the order granting the branch of defendant's motion seeking to vacate the default judgments is civil in nature.

On a motion brought pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]). Here, we find that, in support of her motion, defendant demonstrated reasonable excuses for the defaults and meritorious defenses and, consequently, the court properly vacated the three default judgments.

Additionally, so much of the appeal as is from the portion of the order granting the branch of defendant's motion seeking, upon vacatur of the default judgments, to dismiss the simplified traffic informations is criminal in nature. Here, we find that, upon reciting its reasons on the record, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in dismissing the simplified traffic informations in furtherance of justice (see CPL 170.40; People v McNeil, 75 Misc 3d 131[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50437[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2022]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

GARGUILO, P.J., EMERSON and DRISCOLL, JJ., concur.