CHERRY VALLEY APARTMENTS INC v. John Doe and Jane Doe, Undertenants. (2024)

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In or about April 2023, landlord, a cooperative housing corporation, commenced this nonpayment proceeding based on tenant's alleged failure to pay rent and additional rent (see RPAPL 702 [2]). Landlord moved for summary judgment, taking the position that the only outstanding sums were fees accrued by tenant due to tenant's default under the proprietary lease (lease) which occurred when he refinished the wood floors of his apartment without the prior written approval of landlord's board of directors (Board). Landlord argued, among other things, that paragraph 21 (a) of the lease required tenant to obtain the written approval of the Board prior to any “alteration” to his apartment, which tenant did not obtain when he refinished the floors. Tenant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the petition, arguing, among other things, that the lease does not provide that the refinishing of floors constitutes an alteration and that any ambiguity in the lease should be resolved against landlord. In an order dated September 29, 2023, the District Court (Gary M. Carlton, J.) denied landlord's motion and granted tenant's cross-motion finding, among other things, that the lease is ambiguous as to whether refinishing floors constitutes an alteration. The court further stated that, under the circumstances presented, the ambiguity should be construed against landlord. On appeal, landlord contends, among other things, that the lease was not ambiguous but that, if it is, then there should at least be a trial.

“ ‘Whether or not a contract provision is ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by a court’ ” (Falanga v Hillabrant, 208 AD3d 1308, 1311 [2022], quoting Garcia v American Gen. Life Ins. Co. of NY, 264 AD2d 808, 809 [1999]). Upon a review of the record, we find that the District Court properly determined that the proprietary lease is unclear as to whether refinishing wood floors constitutes an alteration requiring tenant to obtain written Board approval prior to the work. While landlord argues that such work is an “alteration,” the lease does not define what constitutes an “alteration.” Any ambiguity is to be construed against its drafter, which is the landlord (see Matter of Cowen & Co. v Anderson, 76 NY2d 318, 323 [1990]). Thus, no trial is necessary (see Chatterjee Fund Mgt. v Dimensional Media Assoc., 260 AD2d 159 [1999]).

Consequently, the District Court properly denied landlord's motion for summary judgment and granted tenant's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

DRISCOLL, J.P., GARGUILO and CONWAY, JJ., concur.