VILCHEK v. JEWELRY APPRAISER (2024)

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, and the action is dismissed.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action seeking a refund of the purchase price of a custom diamond engagement ring, alleging that the ring he purchased from defendant was worth significantly less than the $4,725.41 he paid defendant, as the diamond was not of the quality it was represented to be by defendant.

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether “substantial justice has ․ been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law” (UDCA 1807; see UDCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126). However, although a small claims court is not held to the same statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure, pleading or evidence (see UDCA 1804), a small claims judgment cannot be based on hearsay alone (see Zelnik v Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., 242 AD2d 227 [1997]; Levins v Bucholtz, 2 AD2d 351 [1956]; Mark v Dutchess Jeep Chrysler Dodge, 79 Misc 3d 128[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50684[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2023]; Osipova v Koss & Schonfeld, 69 Misc 3d 136[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51297[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]).

Plaintiff testified that, after his engagement ended, he spent two years trying unsuccessfully to sell the custom engagement ring. He then sent the ring to a company which removed the diamond, sent the diamond to the Gemological Institute of America (GIA), and then put the diamond up for auction. According to plaintiff, although the GIA report did not indicate the value of the diamond, it set forth the various aspects relating to the quality of the diamond. Plaintiff testified that the GIA's description differs from that which defendant had represented it to be. He further stated that he was told by the company to which he had sent the ring that, at auction, the highest bid for the diamond was less than ten percent of what he had paid for the ring. The diamond was not sold, as plaintiff told the company that he would not accept that amount.

Plaintiff's testimony regarding the auction, the amount of the alleged high bid, and the GIA report was all hearsay. Consequently, as plaintiff's entire proof was based on hearsay, plaintiff failed to establish his prima facie case. In view of the foregoing, we find that substantial justice was not done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1804, 1807).

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the action is dismissed.

GARGUILO, P.J., WALSH and GOLDBERG-VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.