CAPITAL 155 EAST 55TH LLC v. Mary Cantwell and “John Doe”, Respondents–Occupants. (2018)

Orders (John H. Stanley, J.), dated, respectively, May 18, 2017, and September 20, 2017, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, with one bill of $10 costs.

The summary judgment record conclusively shows that the stabilized apartment at issue was originally leased to a corporate tenant (Learning Environments for Children Inc.) for the intended use of a single designated individual (Heather Rodts); that the first renewal lease listed the same tenant by its current name, the “Garden House School of New York,” and specified that the apartment was to be occupied by the school's “Director and the Director's immediate family”; that Heather Rodts vacated the apartment many years ago; and that the apartment is currently occupied by Mary Cantwell, who serves as co-director of the school, and her husband John.

“While ․ a corporate tenant is entitled to a renewal lease provided it can meet the primary residence test, rent stabilization was never intended to place such a tenant's leasehold estate in perpetual trust for the benefit of whomever, at a particular point in time, might happen to occupy a corporate office” (Matter of Cale Dev. Co. v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 94 A.D.2d 229, 234–235, 463 N.Y.S.2d 814 [1983], affd 61 N.Y.2d 976, 475 N.Y.S.2d 278, 463 N.E.2d 619 [1984] ). “[A] corporation is entitled to a renewal lease where the lease specifies a particular individual as the occupant and no perpetual tenancy is possible” (Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 229 A.D.2d 197, 205, 654 N.Y.S.2d 339 [1997], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 835, 660 N.Y.S.2d 710, 683 N.E.2d 332 [1997] [emphasis in original]; Avon Bard Co. v. Aquarian Found., 260 A.D.2d 207, 211, 688 N.Y.S.2d 514 [1999], appeal dismissed 93 N.Y.2d 998, 695 N.Y.S.2d 743, 717 N.E.2d 1080 [1999] [even where a corporation's rent stabilized lease is “manifestly for the benefit of” an individual occupant, the individual is not protected by the Rent Stabilization Law if he or she is not designated in the lease [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Here, since it is undisputed that the only individual identified in the lease as the intended occupant (Rodts) has vacated the premises, the corporate tenant is not entitled to a renewal lease (Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 229 A.D.2d at 205, 654 N.Y.S.2d 339). Contrary to appellants' contention, the listing of the apartment's present occupants on the DHCR RA–23.5 forms submitted with certain renewal leases, does not satisfy the Manocherian requirement that the lease designate an individual who is to occupy the premises (see Fox v. 12 E. 88th LLC, 160 A.D.3d 401, 403, 74 N.Y.S.3d 29 [2018] ).

The notice of nonrenewal was reasonable in view of all attendant circumstances (see Hughes v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 226 A.D.2d 4, 17, 651 N.Y.S.2d 418 [1996], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 829, 660 N.Y.S.2d 552, 683 N.E.2d 17 [1997] ), as it fairly stated the nature of landlord's claim and the facts necessary to establish the existence of such claim. Insofar as pertinent, the notice states that the grounds for the proceeding are that the premises are not occupied as the tenant's primary residence. It further recites that the designated occupant originally specified in the lease, Heather Rodts, has vacated and that John Cantwell primarily resides with his wife, Mary, at a specified address in Yonkers, New York (see Avon Bard Co. v. Aquarian Found., 260 A.D.2d at 210, 688 N.Y.S.2d 514).

Landlord was only required to serve the notice of nonrenewal upon the tenant (see Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] § 2524.2[c]; Hughes v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 226 A.D.2d at 17, 651 N.Y.S.2d 418). The only entity that comes within the regulatory definition of “tenant” (9 NYCRR 2520.6[d] ) is respondent Garden House School of New York. The conclusory allegations that the tenant did not receive the notice were insufficient to rebut the presumption that a proper mailing occurred (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 111 A.D.3d 423, 974 N.Y.S.2d 388 [2013] ).

Nor was Heather Rodts a “necessary party” to this proceeding whose presence was indispensable to providing complete relief as between landlord and the corporate tenant (see One Arden Partners, L.P. v. Unique People Servs. Inc., 29 Misc. 3d 135[A], 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 51977[U], 2010 WL 4668465 [App. Term, 1st Dept. 2010] ).

We have considered appellants' remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Per Curiam.