COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JERMAINE DALTON CROSLEY (2018)

I agree with the Majority that the trial court erred by admitting the evidence of Appellant's prior conviction for the purpose of rebutting Appellant's testimony about the victim's prior acts of violence. I also agree with the Majority that, despite this error by the trial court, Appellant is not entitled to a new trial. However, I base my decision on a different rationale than the Majority. Therefore, I respectfully concur.

Preliminarily, I take issue with the Majority's concluding, sua sponte, that the evidence of Appellant's prior conviction could have properly been admitted to rebut his “unsolicited testimony of his good character.” Majority Opinion at 14. This was not the basis stated by the trial court for admitting the at-issue evidence and, therefore, it is outside our scope of review. See Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 A.2d 1182, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“When a trial court indicates its reasons for its ruling, ‘our scope of review is limited to an examination of that stated reason.’ ”) (citation omitted).

In any event, I also disagree with the Majority that Appellant's testimony that he never carries a weapon permitted the Commonwealth to introduce the evidence of his prior conviction for aggravated assault, because Appellant allegedly committed that crime “while holding a sharp object.” Majority Opinion at 14. The general allegation that Appellant was holding an unidentified, ‘sharp object’ during his assault of the security guard does not demonstrate that he was carrying a weapon prior to that incident.

Thus, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence of Appellant's prior conviction on the basis espoused by the Commonwealth and explicitly accepted by the court, and I would end my analysis of the admissibility of that evidence there.

Nevertheless, I agree with the Majority that Appellant is not entitled to a new trial. The Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence of Appellant's guilt, as aptly discussed by the Majority in assessing his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. The prejudicial effect of Appellant's prior conviction was so insignificant by comparison that I am convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it could not have contributed to the trial court's verdict. See Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1085–86 (Pa. 2017) (“Harmless error exists where: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.”) (citations omitted).

CONCURRING OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: