IN RE: G. J. T.-T. (2025)

In this juvenile delinquency case, youth appeals the juvenile court's order waiving its exclusive jurisdiction over youth so that he would be tried in circuit court on charges of second-degree murder, ORS 163.115, conspiracy to commit second-degree murder, ORS 163.115 and ORS 161.450, attempted first-degree murder, ORS 163.107 and ORS 161.405, first-degree assault, ORS 163.185, and unlawful use of a weapon, ORS 166.220. In two assignments of error, youth challenges the juvenile court's rulings (1) that at the time of the alleged offenses youth “was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved,” ORS 419C.349(2)(a), and (2) that “retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the youth and of society and therefore is not justified,” ORS 419.349C(2)(b).¹

We conclude that the juvenile court applied the correct legal standards and that its legal conclusions follow from and were supported by permissible factual findings from the evidence presented. Because youth has not identified any reversible error, we affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Youth does not request de novo review, so we review the record to determine whether any evidence, including reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, supports the juvenile court's factual findings. State v. J. C. N.-V., 268 Or App 505, 508, 342 P3d 1046 (2015), rev'd on other grounds, 359 Or 559, 380 P3d 248 (2016) (J. C. N.-V. I). We review the juvenile court's legal conclusions, including its interpretation of ORS 419C.349(2), for legal error. Id. We briefly set forth the background and procedural facts with those standards in mind and include additional facts in our analysis of each assignment of error.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL FACTS

In January 2021, JS and his girlfriend AR were shot in their car outside of Hoover Elementary School on Savage Road in Salem. JS was pronounced dead at the scene; AR, who survived a gunshot wound to her head, told police that the shooter was a thin, Hispanic male wearing a surgical mask and that she believed it was Frederic Ferguson, who was “out to get” JS because Ferguson believed JS had “snitched” on him. During their investigation, police learned that Ferguson had ordered a “hit” on JS, that “L” was told to “pop” JS and his girlfriend, and that “L” was in a video call with Ferguson during the shooting so that Ferguson could watch. Police searched Ferguson's phone and found a contact for “L,” whose number police traced to youth, as well as data showing video calls between Ferguson and “L” around the time of the shooting. After youth's probation officer confirmed youth's phone number and that youth's nickname begins with “L,” police arrested youth, who also confirmed his phone number and that his “street” nickname begins with “L.”

In February 2021, the state filed a motion to waive youth to adult criminal court pursuant to ORS 419C.349 and ORS 137.707.² At the five-day waiver hearing in May 2022, the parties presented testimony from over 20 witnesses. The evidence presented included the facts underlying the petition allegations, youth's history of juvenile court adjudications and interventions, and youth's upbringing and gang affiliation, as well as specialized knowledge regarding gang culture, Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) and Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC) placements and programming, adolescent brain development, and psychological evaluations of and expert opinions about youth specifically.

The juvenile court took the motion under advisement and later issued a 41-page letter opinion setting forth its factual findings, the applicable legal standards, and its conclusions of law. The court ruled that the state had proven both prongs of ORS 419C.349(2) and granted its motion to waive youth to adult court.

Beginning with whether youth “was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved,” ORS 419C.349(2)(a), the court framed that inquiry as whether youth has “an overall adult-like rather than juvenile-like capacity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct emotionally as well as intellectually.” The court observed that that standard “requires more than * * * whether the youth understood and acknowledged his own role in the crime, [and] knew that it constituted a crime and would carry criminal consequences.”

The court acknowledged evidence of youth's speech and language deficits, history of trauma and family instability, and ongoing brain development, as well as expert testimony opining that youth's cognitive deficits likely interfered with his capacity to appreciate the nature and quality of his conduct. Nevertheless, the court found that that evidence either persuasively cut against youth's position or was undermined by other evidence. For example, the court found that youth “suffered emotional pain and trauma from losing his father, other family members[,] and a close friend to homicide” and that he “also witnessed the impact of homicide on others, in particular his mother.” Accordingly, the court reasoned, youth “understood better than the vast majority of society what the impact of killing another human would have on the victim's family and friends.” As to youth's expert testimony, the court agreed with the state's expert that youth's experts’ conclusions were “not supported because the conclusions are based on flaw[ed] testing instruments and incomplete information.” For instance, one of youth's experts opined that youth could not understand Miranda warnings despite acknowledging that she did not review youth's recorded January 2021 police interview in which he invoked his right to silence.

Ultimately, the court found that youth's “actual behavior is more valuable in assessing his capabilities and risk” than evaluation tools, and it found persuasive the “largely uncontradicted” evidence of youth's premeditated intent to kill JS and AR; that the evidence “did not indicate any circumstances of a heightened emotional state” that would implicate youth's lack of coping skills; that youth committed “two unprovoked assaults in detention” while awaiting the waiver hearing; and that youth was able to engage in adult-like behaviors such as holding a job, navigating public transportation, developing a relationship with a girlfriend, conforming his behavior to those he viewed to be in a superior position, and manipulating his probation officers by professing his desire to leave the gang lifestyle while actively engaging in gang activities. Accordingly, the court concluded that the state had proven that youth “at the time of the alleged offenses was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved.”

Turning to whether “retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the youth and of society,” the court considered each factor enumerated in ORS 419C.349(2) (b) and found that they weighed against retaining jurisdiction. It found that youth's amenability to treatment and rehabilitation is poor, given that youth had previously engaged in services at OYA and the Marion County Juvenile Department (MCJD) and had been paroled from OYA six months prior to the alleged offenses. For the same reason, and because youth continued to engage in gang activity and assaultive behavior while in custody awaiting the waiver hearing, it found youth could not be safely rehabilitated under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court; that the alleged offenses were aggressive, violent, premeditated, and willful; that prior OYA and MCJD treatment efforts were extensive but unsuccessful, and youth's persistent gang involvement despite those treatment efforts indicated unhealthy emotional attachments; that youth's prior record included adjudications for assault, criminal mischief, interfering with a peace officer, and resisting arrest; that the gravity of the loss—JS's death and AR's serious injuries—was significant; that the prosecutive merit of the state's case was strong; and that joining youth's case with the pending adult co-offender's in circuit court was desirable to promote judicial efficiency and witness convenience.

The court granted the state's motion to waive youth to adult court and entered a judgment dismissing the petition. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Youth first assigns error to the juvenile court's ruling that at the time of the alleged offenses he “was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved.” ORS 419.349(2)(a). Youth contends that the juvenile court misconstrued that standard as set forth in State v. J. C. N.-V., 359 Or 559, 380 P3d 248 (2016) (J. C. N.-V. II), and that several of the court's factual findings either do not support the legal conclusion that youth met that standard, compel a contrary conclusion, or cannot be relied upon at all.

We begin with J. C. N.-V. That case involved the first appellate interpretations of the ORS 419C.349 requirement that “[t]he youth at the time of the alleged offense was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved” as a predicate to being waived into adult court; the interpretation adopted in this court was adjusted in the Supreme Court.³ We had held that “[t]he text, context, and legislative history of ORS 419.349[(2)(a)] reflect the legislature's intent to allow waiver for those youths who, by nature of their sophistication and maturity, understand what they are doing in a physical sense and understand that their actions are wrong or will likely have criminal consequences.” J. C. N.-V. I, 268 Or App at 539. In doing so, we had focused on the “nature and quality of the conduct” phrase and largely relied on its legal meaning in the context of criminal capacity dating back to its use in M'Naghten’s Case, 10 Clark & Fin 200, 8 Eng Rep 718 (1843). Id. at 518-20.

On review, the Supreme Court explained that although “the words ‘nature and quality’ may well have roots in the M'Naghten rule” and other common law criminal capacity cases, those cases “referred almost uniformly to a capacity to ‘know’ the nature and wrongfulness of the conduct,” while the legislature “chose a different word—’appreciate’ ” in enacting ORS 419C.349. J. C. N.-V. II, 359 Or at 580. Further, the legislature's choice to borrow the words “sophistication and maturity” in ORS 419C.349 from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kent v. United States, 383 US 541, 86 S Ct 1045, 16 L Ed 2d 84 (1966), which held that a waiver decision implicates a juvenile's due process rights, suggested that it “intended that a court look for indicia of adult-like mental, social and emotional development as it relates to a youth's ability to ‘appreciate [ ] the nature and quality of the conduct involved.’ ” Id. at 585. Thus, “[t]he issue under ORS 419C.349[(2)(a)] is not the youth's general sophistication and maturity as it relates the waiver decision (as it is under the Kent criterion), but the particular aspects of ‘sophistication and maturity’ that are involved in ‘appreciat[ing] the nature and quality’ of one's own criminal conduct.” Id. at 584-85 (emphases in original).

The court cautioned that, “[i]n so narrowing the inquiry, * * * the Oregon legislature did not evidence an intent * * * to narrow the means by which sophistication and maturity are to be ascertained.” Id. at 585. The court also acknowledged that the legislature “did not set out with any specificity the standard that a court should use to decide what [adult-like intellectual and emotional capabilities indicative of blameworthiness] entail and whether a youth has a ‘sufficient’ modicum of those capabilities,” although it likely concerned “the capabilities that a typical adult would have and that a court would consider in deciding whether a youth is sufficiently blameworthy that adult prosecution is warranted, such as capacities for premeditation and planning, impulse control, and independent judgment.” Id. at 589. Accordingly, the court interpreted ORS 419C.349(2)(a) to “permit a juvenile court to determine, as a matter of fact, what those capabilities are and whether a particular youth possesses them to a sufficient extent that the court can conclude that the youth can ‘appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved,’ including its consequences and wrongfulness.” Id. at 589-90.

Returning to this case, youth first contends that the juvenile court applied the incorrect legal standard because, in his view, the court “essentially used the ‘criminal capacity’ test” largely rejected by the Supreme Court in J. C. N.-V. II. We disagree. Although some of the juvenile court's factual findings concern youth's criminal capacity (i.e., whether youth understood his acts in a physical sense and understood that his actions would likely have criminal consequences), the court also relied on factual findings regarding the capabilities identified in J. C. N.-V. II “that a typical adult would have and that a court would consider in deciding whether a youth is sufficiently blameworthy that adult prosecution is warranted”—youth's premeditation and planning, impulse control, and independent judgment. 359 Or at 589. For example, the court relied on evidence that youth arranged certain details of the execution—its location on his gang's territory and live broadcast to Ferguson—and that youth is able to conform his behavior to those he views as being in a superior position. And the court further relied on more than the “minimal knowledge that [i]s required to establish criminal capacity for purposes of the M'Naghten rule.” Id. at 581. For example, the court found that youth understood the consequences and wrongfulness of his actions on both an intellectual and emotional level based on evidence that he fled the scene and later lied to police about his involvement, and evidence that he reached out to counseling services while detained at MacLaren after learning that a close friend had been killed.

Youth next contends that that the juvenile court misapplied the legal standard in several ways: by placing too much emphasis on the facts of the shooting itself; by relying on youth engaging in behaviors that are not necessarily adult-like, his gang involvement, and his invocation of the right against self-incrimination; and by accepting the state's expert opinions over those of youth's experts. Again, we are not persuaded.

As noted, because “the legislature did not specifically describe [the relevant] capabilities and the words the legislature used do not permit [an appellate court] to decide, as a matter of law, the capabilities that distinguish a typical adult from a typical youth,” ORS 419C.349(2)(a) “permit[s] a juvenile court to determine, as a matter of fact, what those capabilities are and whether a particular youth possesses them to a sufficient extent that the court can conclude” that the youth meets the statutory standard. J. C. N.-V. II, 359 Or 589-90. And the legislature did not intend to “narrow the means by which sophistication and maturity are to be ascertained.” Id. at 585. Accordingly, the juvenile court has wide discretion in determining what capabilities demonstrate a youth's sophistication and maturity and what evidence is relevant and credible to its factual findings regarding those capabilities. ORS 419C.349(2)(a) therefore permits a juvenile court to rely on a youth's behaviors to the extent the court finds as a matter of fact that they shed light on a youth's adult-like capabilities or lack thereof.

We cannot conclude that the juvenile court erred, as a matter of law, in basing its determination on the facts of the shooting—which, as youth acknowledges, are relevant to a youth's “sophistication * * *, motivation, comprehension, truthfulness and remorse,” State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Dahl, 37 Or App 839, 842, 588 P2d 132 (1978)—or on youth's adult-like behaviors that are perhaps more typical of older youth. See J. C. N.-V. II, 359 Or at 588 (“We certainly would expect a 17-year-old to more easily pass muster under such a comparison [with the capabilities of a normal adult] than would a 13-year-old, but that is, perhaps, as it should be.”). And we disagree with youth that, on this record, his gang involvement compels a conclusion that he was not sufficiently sophisticated and mature to appreciate the nature and quality of his conduct.

Next, youth contends that the juvenile court “used youth's invocation of the right not to incriminate himself against him.” We read the court's letter opinion differently. In our view, the juvenile court did not rely on youth's invocation of his right to silence as evidence that he was sufficiently sophisticated and mature to appreciate the nature and quality of his conduct. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 US 284, 295, 106 S Ct 634, 88 L Ed 2d 623 (1986) (“What is impermissible is the evidentiary use of an individual's exercise of his constitutional rights after the State's assurance that the invocation of those rights will not be penalized.” (Emphasis in original.)). Rather, because youth did not discuss the shooting with any of the evaluators and did not testify at the waiver hearing, the court explained that it was required to consider other evidence when assessing youth's state of mind and that it was not persuaded by youth's experts’ opinions in part because they failed to take the facts of the shooting and its aftermath into account, including in assessing what youth was capable of understanding. Indeed, the court expressly acknowledged that youth “had an absolute right not to testify.” Thus, we are not persuaded that the juvenile court used youth's invocation of his rights as evidence against him.

Finally, because youth argues that the juvenile court's acceptance of the state's expert opinion over youth's experts was based on the same purported legal errors we have already rejected, that argument also provides no basis to disturb the juvenile court's ruling.

In sum, we conclude that the juvenile court applied the correct legal standard in reaching its determination that youth, at the time of the alleged offenses, was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved, that its legal conclusions are supported by permissible factual findings, and that those factual findings are in turn supported by evidence in the record.

We turn to youth's second assignment of error to the juvenile court's ruling that “retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the youth and of society and therefore is not justified,” ORS 419.349C(2)(b). Youth does not challenge the juvenile court's factual findings with regard to any of the factors but instead argues that it erred as a matter of law because, in his view, the court misallocated the burden of proof and because its factual findings either do not support its legal conclusion or compel a contrary conclusion. Again, we are not persuaded.

We first conclude that the juvenile court did not impermissibly shift the burden to youth to disprove any of the factors. Rather, we read the court's letter opinion to find persuasive the state's evidence regarding youth's history of unsuccessful treatment and juvenile court interventions and the underlying facts of his alleged conduct, and to conclude that that evidence was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of youth and society. The record supports the juvenile court's factual findings, J. C. N.-V. I, 268 Or App at 508, and its conclusions permissibly follow from them. See, e.g., State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Reed, 124 Or App 495, 863 P2d 1291 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 458 (1994) (on de novo review, holding that the state established by a preponderance of evidence that “remand” for prosecution as adult in circuit court was in best interests of juvenile and society under predecessor statute).

We further conclude that, contrary to youth's contention, none of the court's factual findings compel a conclusion that the state failed to meet its burden overall or on any individual factor, including its acknowledgement that youth “possess[es] some individual characteristics that provide some mitigation,” his “continuing adolescent brain development,” and his “undeniable speech and language delays that impact his comprehensive and complex reasoning.”

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   ORS 419C.249(2) provides:“After the [waiver] hearing, the juvenile court may waive the youth to a circuit, justice or municipal court of competent jurisdiction if:“(a) The youth at the time of the alleged offense was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved;“(b) The juvenile court, after considering the following criteria, determines by a preponderance of the evidence that retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the youth and of society and therefore is not justified:“(A) The amenability of the youth to treatment and rehabilitation given the techniques, facilities and personnel for rehabilitation available to the juvenile court and to the criminal court that would have jurisdiction after transfer;“(B) The protection required by the community, given the seriousness of the offense alleged, and whether the youth can be safely rehabilitated under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court;“(C) The aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner in which the offense was alleged to have been committed;“(D) The previous history of the youth, including:“(i) Prior treatment efforts and out-of-home placements; and“(ii) The physical, emotional and mental health of the youth;“(E) The youth's prior record of acts that would be crimes if committed by an adult;“(F) The gravity of the loss, damage or injury caused or attempted during the offense;“(G) The prosecutive merit of the case against the youth; and“(H) The desirability of disposing of all cases in one trial if there were adult co-offenders.”

2.   There is no dispute that youth, who was 16 years and six months old at the time of the alleged conduct, is eligible for waiver under ORS 419C.349(1)(a) and (b)(C).

3.   That requirement was codified at ORS 419C.349(3) at the time of the youth's waiver hearing and when the Supreme Court issued its decision. See Or Laws 2019, ch 635, § 3e (amending the statute such that the requirement now appears in ORS 419C.349(2)(a)). We cite to the current version of the statute throughout this opinion.

ORTEGA, P. J.