OKLAHOMA GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY v. OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION (2025)

¶1 This is an appeal from an order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission enjoining Appellant Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company (OG&E) from providing retail electric service to two facilities located in the certified territory of Appellee CKenergy Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CKenergy) and an appeal from the Commission's order staying the injunction under Article 9, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution. We hold that under the Retail Energy Supplier Certified Territory Act's (RESCTA) large load or one megawatt exception, 17 O.S.1971 § 158.25(E), “the connected load for initial full operation” means the total nameplate values of all connected electrical equipment when full operation of the facility commences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 RESCTA, 17 O.S.2011 §§ 158.21-158.32, provides for the division of the state into geographical areas within which retail electric suppliers may be granted the exclusive right to provide retail electric service. The Bison Oilfield Services facility and the Cimarex Energy facility are located in CKenergy's certified territory in Canadian County. OG&E began furnishing retail electric service to the two saltwater disposal sites in July 2018 and November 2017, respectively. On August 7, 2019, CKenergy filed an application requesting that the Commission enjoin OG&E from continuing to serve the facilities, because OG&E was in violation of RESCTA. OG&E responded that it could serve the Bison and Cimarex facilities inside CKenergy's territory under the one megawatt exception, which permits retail electric suppliers to serve such facilities “if the connected load for initial full operation of such electric-consuming facility is to be 1,000 kw or larger.” 17 O.S. § 158.25(E).

¶3 The Commission found the connected load for initial full operation did not meet or exceed 1,000 kW at either facility and, therefore, OG&E was in violation of RESCTA. The Commission enjoined OG&E from continuing to provide electric service to the facilities. OG&E appealed the Commission's final Order No. 714136 in appeal No. 119,088.

¶4 On October 7, 2020, the Commission issued an order granting OG&E's request for a stay upon OG&E posting a supersedeas bond in the amount of $456,396.00. Appellants CKenergy and the Oklahoma Association of Electric Cooperatives (OAEC) appealed Order No. 714817 granting the stay. The appeals were consolidated.  ¹

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 Article 9, § 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides the standard of review from orders of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission:

The Supreme Court's review of appealable orders of the Corporation Commission shall be judicial only, and in all appeals involving an asserted violation of any right of the parties under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, the Court shall exercise its own independent judgment as to both the law and the facts. In all other appeals from orders of the Corporation Commission the review by the Supreme Court shall not extend further than to determine whether the Commission has regularly pursued its authority, and whether the findings and conclusions of the Commission are sustained by the law and substantial evidence.

Okla. Const. art. IX, § 20. OG&E's appeal from Commission Order No. 714136 concerns the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's first-impression interpretation of the phrase “connected load for initial full operation” in 17 O.S. § 158.25(E).  ² The Commission's interpretation of a statute is a legal conclusion. Pursuant to Article 9, § 20, this Court reviews de novo whether the Commission's legal conclusions are sustained by law. See Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 2025 OK 15, ¶¶ 24-25, 565 P.3d 418, 426 (“People's”); City of Oklahoma City v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 2024 OK 77, ¶¶ 37-39, 558 P.3d 1231, 1246-47, ¶¶ 36-38; Dobson Tel. Co., 2017 OK CIV APP 16, ¶¶ 4-5, 15, 392 P.3d 295, 298-299, 303 (approved for publ'n by Okla. Supreme Court). The Commission's legal conclusions are not binding on the courts nor are they presumed to be correct. See People's, 2025 OK 15, ¶ 23, 565 P.3d at 426. “When the Commission ignores the plain language of a statute, or attempts to impose a meaning which is not supported by any recognized rule of statutory interpretation, the Commission's conclusion may be categorized as one which is not sustained by the law.” Id. ¶ 24, at 426. Typically, under a de novo review standard, “an administrative agency's legal rulings are subject to an appellate court's plenary, independent and nondeferential reexamination.” See Dobson, 2017 OK CIV APP 16, ¶ 15, 392 P.3d at 303 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 2014 OK 95, ¶ 25, 341 P.3d 56, 63). However, under Article 9, § 20, the Court's de novo review is limited in the sense that, when a statute is ambiguous, “we give some regard” to the Commission's interpretation of the statute and “at least consider the Commission's decision.” People's, 2025 OK 15, ¶ 23, 565 P.3d at 426. Nonetheless, it remains the Court's duty to “decide what the law is, after considering the Commission's conclusions.” Id.; see Dobson, 2017 OK CIV APP 16, ¶ 15, 392 P.3d at 303 (“This is simply a matter of determining what a statute means, and that is within the expertise of the courts.”). As we said in People's: “This Court is under no constitutional edict to yield our duty as the court of last resort in the judicial branch in Oklahoma for all matters civil to determine on review what the law is, what the law means, and how the law applies.” People's, 2025 OK 15, ¶ 21, 565 P.3d at 426.  ³

¶6 CKenergy and OAEC's appeal from the Commission's Order Setting and Approving Appeal Bond and Suspending the Effectiveness of Order No. 714136 is reviewed de novo. The appeal challenges whether the stay was mandated by Article 9, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Pursuant to the Oklahoma Constitution, we review the Commission's order as to the stay de novo as it raises a constitutional issue. See Okla. Const. art. IX, § 20 (“[I]n all appeals involving an asserted violation of any right of the parties under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, the Court shall exercise its own independent judgment as to both the law and the facts.”); People's, 2025 OK 15, ¶ 14, 565 P.3d at 424 (explaining appeals from orders involving violations of constitutional rights are reviewed de novo); City of OKC, 2024 OK 77, ¶ 27, 558 P.3d at 1241, ¶ 26 (“de novo appellate review is proper due to appellant's constitutional claims”). De novo review is plenary, independent, and non-deferential. See Med. Park Tel. Co., 2019 OK 21, ¶ 17, 441 P.3d 113, 118; see also People's, 2025 OK 15, ¶¶ 14, 20, 565 P.3d at 424, 426 (noting the “independent” review of orders involving violations of the Constitution).

ANALYSIS

Order No. 714136

¶7 We first address OG&E's appeal from the injunction. The one megawatt exception provides:

The provisions of this act shall not preclude any retail electric supplier from extending its service after the effective date of this act (1) to its own property and facilities, in an unincorporated area, and (2) subject to Section 5 D, to an electric-consuming facility requiring electric service, in an unincorporated area, if the connected load for initial full operation of such electric-consuming facility is to be 1,000 kw or larger.

17 O.S.1971 § 158.25(E). Before the Commission, CKenergy argued “connected load for initial full operation” is the actual electric usage at the time the facility is put in service which is determined by demand. OG&E countered that, in the retail electric industry, “connected load” means the total electric power-consuming rating, or “nameplate rating,” of all devices connected to a distribution system; and, therefore, “connected load for initial full operation” means the total nameplate values of all connected electrical equipment in place at the time the facility is put in service regardless of actual usage. The Commission sided with CKenergy and found the phrase “connected load for initial full operation” was clear and unambiguous and “refers to the purpose of the load and the operational demand of the load at the point in time when the facility is in initial full operation.” The Commission found that during the first eleven months of operations the facilities did not meet or exceed the 1,000 kW of demand during any billing period. Furthermore, OG&E was aware neither facility planned to actually use 1,000 kW.

¶8 On appeal, OG&E argues the Commission's interpretation ignores the specific and well-known meaning of “connected load” in the electric industry: the total electric power-consuming rating, or “nameplate rating,” of all devices connected to a distribution system. OG&E contends the Commission and CKenergy's interpretation of “connected load for initial full operation” is the equivalent of “diversified load,” a different term in the industry.  ⁴ OG&E stipulated that neither the diversified load nor the maximum demand ever reached or exceeded one megawatt during the first year of operations but contends these measurements are immaterial for determining if the exception applies. According to the words in the statute, the connected load is the pertinent measurement.

¶9 CKenergy agrees that in the electric industry “connected load” means nameplate rating of all connected electrical equipment and that the connected load at both facilities when operations began exceeded 1,000 kW. It is CKenergy's position that “connected load for initial full operation” means the electric power consumption of all equipment connected to the electric supply measured at the time the facility is first fully operational in a full normal state.  ⁵ It is not the connected load, which is, without fail, greater than the actual electric load when the facility is fully operational; rather, it is the electric load required for planned, normal, full operation. CKenergy homes in on the word “for” in “connected load for initial full operation.” CKenergy argues “for” relates to the actual purpose of the load and the operational demand of the load rather than a certain point in time. CKenergy contends that if the Legislature had wanted the measurement to be the “connected load at initial full operation,” it would have said so.

¶10 This appeal requires the Court to interpret the phrase “connected load for initial full operation.” 17 O.S. § 158.25(E). The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. See Rickard v. Coulimore, 2022 OK 9, ¶ 5, 505 P.3d 920, 923. To do this, we first look to the language of the statute. Id. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, this Court must apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words. Id. Only when the legislative intent cannot be determined from the statutory language due to ambiguity or conflict should rules of statutory construction be employed. Id.

¶11 We agree with OG&E that “connected load,” as used in the one megawatt exception, means the total electric power-consuming rating, or “nameplate rating,” of all devices connected to a distribution system. We cannot ignore the well-known industry specific meaning of “connected load.” When a statute is enacted to regulate a particular trade or industry, technical terms are to be interpreted as they are generally used and understood in the that industry. See Riffe Petroleum Co. v. Great Nat'l Corp., 1980 OK 112, ¶ 8, 614 P.2d 576, 580 (interpreting the words “development” and “develop” as they are commonly used in the mining industry); City of Stillwater v. Cent. Rural Elec. Co-op., 1997 OK CIV APP 51, ¶ 4, 945 P.2d 505, 507 (“[T]his court must give [the statutory language] an interpretation consistent with the plain meaning of the words employed, the context in which the words are used, and the subject to which they refer.”). RESCTA pertains to the retail electric industry. “Connected load” is a term of art in the retail electric industry. “Connected load” is not defined in RESCTA, but we presume the Legislature knew this industry specific term when it drafted the one megawatt exception. When one gives “connected load” its industry specific meaning, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous; the text is not susceptible to more than one meaning. “Connected load” is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning--that used and understood in the retail electric industry. See Riffe, 1980 OK 112, ¶ 7, 614 P.2d at 579 (“In the absence of a contrary definition of the common words used in the act, we must assume that the lawmaking authority intended for them to have the same meaning as that attributed to them in ordinary and usual parlance.”).

¶12 In addition to substituting “connected load” for “diversified load,” the Commission's interpretation also renders the word “connected” meaningless.  ⁶ The Court will not contort or re-write the statutory language. Rather, we presume that if the Legislature had intended 1,000 kW be measured by the diversified load, actual load, or operational demand, it would have used those words in the statute.

¶13 Finally, we are not persuaded by CKenergy's attempt to deflect from the clear and unambiguous meaning of “connected load,” by over-relying on the word “for” in “for initial full operation.” We agree with CKenergy that “for” connotates purpose. The purpose of the “connected load” is to fully operate the facility. The parties, the Commission, and this Court agree the time to measure is when the facility begins full operation.  ⁷ The dispute centers around what load to measure at that point in time. We have said it is the connected load when full operation commences.

¶14 Because the Commission's interpretation of “connected load for initial full operation” ignores the plain language of the statute, it is not sustained by law. It is undisputed that when full operation commenced the connected load for each facility exceeded 1,000 kW. Therefore, the one megawatt exception applies, and the Commission improperly enjoined OG&E from providing retail electric service in CKenergy's certified territory.

Order No. 714817

¶15 CKenergy and OAEC appealed the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's issuance of a stay under Article 9, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution.  ⁸ The Commission's order found if it is finally determined by the Oklahoma Supreme Court that OG&E may lawfully serve the facilities in question, then Order No. 714136 shall no longer be in effect and the appeal bond shall be exonerated. Because we hold the Commission improperly enjoined OG&E from serving the facilities, CKenergy and OAEC's appeal from the stay is moot.

CONCLUSION

¶16 The connected load for initial full operation exceeded 1,000 kW at the Bison and Cimarex facilities. Therefore, the one megawatt exception applies, and OG&E may provide electrical service to both facilities located in CKenergy's certified territory.

ORDER OF THE OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION REVERSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The consolidated appeals were assigned to this office on April 7, 2025.

2.   The Commission adopted, for the first time in the course of this litigation, its interpretation of “connected load for initial full operation.” This is not a situation where the Commission changed an established rule or its longstanding interpretation of a statute which has been recognized and relied upon in the industry. See Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 2025 OK 15, ¶¶ 55-57, 565 P.3d 418, 433 (citing Branch Trucking Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 1990 OK 41, ¶ 7, 801 P.2d 686, 690).

3.   Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), is neither controlling nor instructive in this case. Nonetheless, we recognize our limited de novo review of Oklahoma Corporation Commission orders interpreting statutes under the Oklahoma Constitution is consistent with some of the principles discussed in Loper Bright. See, e.g., id. at 385 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)) (“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”); id. at 403 (courts are to give “due respect” to agency interpretations); id. at 400 (explaining that, instead of declaring the agency's interpretation “permissible,” the court uses every interpretative tool at its disposal to determine the best reading of the statute); id. at 402 (noting the agency's interpretation, while not binding, may be persuasive); id. at 394 (explaining courts may “seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes” under the APA).

4.   CKenergy's expert witness testified that “[d]iversified load is a common practice in the electrical industry to determine the actual requirements that any given electric-consuming facility will place on the electrical system, so that the system can be designed adequately and efficiently.” He acknowledged “connected load” and “diversified load” are completely different concepts in the electric industry but maintained “I feel the term ‘connected load for initial full operation’ has virtually the same meaning as diversified load.”

5.   CKenergy does not dispute OG&E's contention that CKenergy's proposed definition and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's interpretation of “connected load for initial full operation” is the equivalent of “diversified load.”

6.   “Load,” as defined by the Commission, has a very different meaning than “connected load.” “Load” is defined as “the amount of electric power delivered or required at any specific point or points on an electric transmission and distribution system.” O.A.C. § 165:35-1-2 (as amended by 35 Okla. Reg. 1030) (effective Sept. 12, 2014).

7.   We note that while CKenergy denies the word “for” has any temporal significance, it also advocates for it. CKenergy's position is the one megawatt exception is determined by the actual electric usage at the time the facility is first fully operational.

8.   Article 9, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides, in part: “Upon the giving of notice of appeal from an order of the Corporation Commission, the Commission, if requested, shall suspend the effectiveness of the order complained of until the final disposition of the order appealed, and fix the amount of suspending or supersedeas bond.”

KANE, J.:

CONCUR: Kuehn, V.C.J., Winchester, Combs, Darby, and Kane, JJ. DISSENT: Rowe, C.J. DISQUALIFIED: Edmondson and Gurich, JJ. NOT PARTICIPATING: Jett, J.