BAILEY v. STATE EX REL SERVICE OKLAHOMA (2025)

OPINION

¶1 Appellant, Treyton Bailey, was stopped for a traffic violation and was subsequently arrested for suspicion of DUI after officers observed signs of impairment. Although Bailey consented to a blood test, the result was later excluded due to a discrepancy in the chain of custody. Despite the lack of a valid test result, Service Oklahoma revoked Bailey's license. This case presents three questions: (1) whether Service Oklahoma may serve revocation notice by regular mail under Title 47, Section 2-116; (2) whether Service Oklahoma satisfied due process requirements with respect to notice; and (3) whether the district court properly relied on other competent evidence to sustain the revocation.

I. Background

¶2 Bailey, who was twenty years old at the time, was stopped by Officer Hendrix of the Salina Police Department on February 2, 2024, after he observed Bailey's truck traveling at a low rate of speed and producing a loud exhaust noise. Upon initiating contact, Officer Hendrix detected the odor of alcohol on Bailey. Shortly thereafter, Trooper Johnson of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol arrived at the scene.

¶3 With Bailey's consent, Officer Hendrix searched the truck. Inside the cabin, Officer Hendrix discovered two half-empty bottles of Bootlegger liquor. He described the bottles as appearing “sweaty” and noticeably colder than the ambient temperature inside the truck. In the bed of the truck, Officer Hendrix also located an ice chest containing several types of alcoholic beverages, including beer and liquor.

¶4 While Officer Hendrix searched the truck, Trooper Johnson, with Bailey's consent, administered the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests to Bailey.¹ Trooper Johnson then gave Bailey a preliminary breath test, which returned a positive result for alcohol.² Based on the officers’ observations at the scene and his training and experience, Officer Hendrix placed Bailey under arrest on suspicion of driving under the influence.

¶5 Following the arrest, Officer Hendrix read Bailey the State's implied consent advisory. Bailey agreed to submit to a blood test and was transported to Hillcrest Hospital, where blood was drawn using a sealed blood kit. Officer Hendrix later placed the kit in the department's refrigerator and testified that he believes it was mailed to the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (“OSBI”) by someone in the City Clerk's Office.

¶6 Upon receipt, OSBI conducted a blood alcohol content analysis, along with presumptive and outlying drug screens. However, the district court later excluded the blood test result from evidence due to a discrepancy between the testimony of Officer Hendrix and the OSBI toxicologist. Officer Hendrix testified that the vials used for collection had purple tops, whereas the OSBI toxicologist testified that the vials received and tested had gray tops.

¶7 On June 20, 2024, Service Oklahoma received the Blood Test Officer's Affidavit and the corresponding Criminalistics Examination Report. The following day, Service Oklahoma mailed Bailey a notice of intent to revoke his driving privileges by regular first-class mail.

¶8 Bailey filed a Petition for Review of the revocation, and the district court issued a Stay of Revocation and Order Setting Hearing. At the hearing, Bailey argued that (1) the statute regarding service of notice, Title 47, Section 2-116, does not grant Service Oklahoma authority to serve revocation notice by regular mail because it does not expressly name the agency; (2) the State's proof of service constituted hearsay and, therefore, Service Oklahoma failed to establish adequate proof that notice was properly served; and (3) revocation cannot be sustained without a valid chemical test result where the driver did not refuse testing.

¶9 The district court rejected each of Bailey's arguments, finding that (1) Section 2-116 applies to Service Oklahoma and authorizes the agency to serve revocation notice by regular mail; (2) the State's proof of service was admissible and sufficient to establish adequate proof that notice was properly served; and (3) despite the exclusion of the blood result, the State met its burden of proof based on other competent evidence. The district court subsequently entered a Final Order Sustaining Revocation. It is from this order that Bailey now appeals.³

II. Standard of Review

¶10 On appeal from orders of implied consent revocations, the appellate courts may not reverse or disturb the findings below unless the lower court's determinations are found to be erroneous as a matter of law or lacking sufficient evidentiary foundation. Cole v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2020 OK 67, ¶ 6, 473 P.3d 467, 470 (citing Hollis v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2008 OK 31, ¶ 10, 183 P.3d 996, 999 n.4). Legal questions involving statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo review; so too are constitutional issues. Bailey v. State ex rel. Bd. of Tests for Alcohol & Drug Influence, 2022 OK 50, ¶ 21, 510 P.3d 845, 852; Nichols v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2017 OK 20, ¶ 10, 392 P.3d 692, 695. On de novo review, an appellate court has plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to determine whether the trial tribunal erred in its legal rulings. Snow v. Town of Calumet, 2022 OK 63, ¶ 5, 512 P.3d 369, 372 (citing State ex rel. Protective Health Servs. State Dep't of Health v. Vaughn, 2009 OK 61, ¶ 9, 222 P.3d 1058, 1064).

III. Discussion

Section 2-116 Grants Service Oklahoma Authority to Give Notice

¶11 Through legislation effective November 1, 2022, the Legislature transferred “[t]he applicable powers, duties, and responsibilities exercised by the Driver License Services Division of the Department of Public Safety” to Service Oklahoma. 47 O.S.Supp.2023, § 3-101. That transfer, as this Court recognized, was intended to apply “without exception.” Herrera-Chacon v. State ex rel. Serv. Okla., 2023 OK 52, ¶ 9, 553 P.3d 20, 21.⁴ Consistent with that mandate, Title 47, Section 6-211 exempts license revocation proceedings conducted by Service Oklahoma from the Oklahoma Pleading and Discovery Codes--provisions that govern ordinary civil actions, including service of process under Title 12. Title 47, Section 6-211 thus confirms that Service Oklahoma is the agency charged with administering such proceedings.

¶12 Title 47, Section 2-116 prescribes the method of notice in proceedings regulating vehicle operations, permitting delivery either in person or by regular first-class mail to the address on file. Although numerous statutes were amended to reflect the transfer of authority to Service Oklahoma, this provision was not. It continues to refer--anachronistically--to the Department of Public Safety. No other statute in Title 47 addresses how notice must be given in these circumstances.

¶13 Bailey argues that because Section 2-116 does not name Service Oklahoma, the agency cannot rely on it to provide notice. Under that reading, Service Oklahoma must instead resort to Title 12, Section 2004, which requires certified mail. Bailey maintains this position even though Title 47, Section 6-211, which names Service Oklahoma, explicitly exempts these proceedings from the Oklahoma Pleading and Discovery Codes. Although grounded in the text of Section 2-116, Bailey's interpretation would produce an absurd result--one the Legislature could not have intended.

¶14 Statutory interpretation begins, as it must, with the text of the statute. Hall v. Galmor, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 45, 427 P.3d 1052, 1070. When a statute's text is clear and unambiguous, courts are obligated to give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to rules of construction. Stricklen v. Multiple Inj. Tr. Fund, 2024 OK 1, ¶ 14, 542 P.3d 858, 865-66. A narrow exception to this rule is the absurdity doctrine, which permits courts to depart from the unambiguous words of a statute when a plain reading produces patently absurd results the Legislature could not have intended. Hubbard v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co., 2011 OK 50, ¶ 8, 256 P.3d 69, 72 (collecting cases). In such instances, courts must presume that the Legislature did not intend the absurd result and must adopt a construction that promotes justice and avoids such absurdity. Id.

¶15 To justify a departure from the statute's plain language under the absurdity doctrine, the resulting outcome must be “so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense.” Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60, 51 S.Ct. 49, 75 L.Ed. 156 (1930). A result that “may seem odd ․ is not absurd.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 565, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005). Chief Justice John Marshall articulated the high bar for invoking this doctrine:

But if, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.

Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202-03, 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819). Accordingly, the absurdity doctrine is applied sparingly and only in truly rare and exceptional circumstances. Crooks, 282 U.S. at 60, 51 S.Ct. 49. Its exceedingly limited application reflects the fundamental principle that courts are tasked with saying what the law is, not what the law ought to be. See Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U.S. 244, 249-50, 138 S.Ct. 897, 200 L.Ed.2d 92 (2018) (explaining that each branch of government must operate within the bounds of its constitutionally assigned role).

¶16 Here, although Section 2-116 does not expressly name Service Oklahoma, a literal reading in this context would yield an absurd result. On Bailey's interpretation, the agency now charged with revoking driver licenses is left without any statutory means of giving notice--neither under Title 47, Section 2-116, which still refers to a defunct division, nor under Title 12, Section 2004, which Title 47, Section 6-211 expressly renders inapplicable to these proceedings. The consequence is a procedural limbo: Service Oklahoma would be authorized to revoke driving privileges but would also be left with no statutory mechanism for providing the notice required to sustain those revocations.

¶17 That reading not only fractures the statutory scheme but assigns the duty to provide notice to a division that no longer exists. As this Court recognized in a similar context:

It would be absurd to construe 47 O.S. Supp. 2022, § 6-211 to mean that the Driver License Services Division of the Department continues to have powers, duties, and responsibilities over driver license revocations and appeals in implied consent cases when the Driver License Services Division of the Department no longer exists.

Herrera-Chacon, 2023 OK 52, ¶ 10, 553 P.3d at 22. The same holds here. The Legislature cannot be presumed to have transferred revocation authority to Service Oklahoma while leaving notice obligations with a defunct division.⁵

¶18 Given the Legislature's express transfer of duties to Service Oklahoma, and consistent with Herrera-Chacon, 2023 OK 52, 553 P.3d 20, Section 2-116 must be read to include Service Oklahoma by necessary implication. To hold otherwise would not only produce an absurd result but would also frustrate the Legislature's intent and render the statutory scheme internally incoherent. Accordingly, Service Oklahoma possesses the authority to provide notice under Section 2-116.

Due Process Was Satisfied

¶19 Bailey argues that, even if Section 2-116 governs, Service Oklahoma failed to satisfy due process because it did not provide adequate proof that notice was properly served. Bailey does not dispute receiving written notice, nor does he challenge the sufficiency of its contents.⁶ Instead, he contends that, without formal proof of service, the State cannot demonstrate that the notice met due process requirements--thereby rendering the revocation legally defective. The law does not support this claim.

¶20 One's claim to a driver's license is a protectable property interest that may not be terminated without due process of law under the United States Constitution. Hunsucker v. Fallin, 2017 OK 100, ¶ 14, 408 P.3d 599, 604-05. Oklahoma's Constitution provides no less protection. Id. at ¶ 15 (citing Okla. Const. art. 2, § 7). When a state seeks to terminate such an interest, it must afford notice and an opportunity to be heard that is appropriate to the nature of the case before the termination becomes effective. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). The purpose of notice is to “apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for” any impending hearing. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978).

¶21 It is well settled that “[t]he Oklahoma Implied Consent Law conforms to the constitutional due process requirement by providing notice and opportunity for hearing, providing for administrative hearing subject to judicial review and applying to all licensed motorists in an identical manner.” Robertson v. State ex rel. Lester, 1972 OK 126, ¶ 12, 501 P.2d 1099, 1102.

¶22 Title 47, Sections 753(A) and 754(B) govern the initiation of revocation proceedings. Once initiated, the person whose driving privileges are subject to revocation may seek judicial review by filing a petition in the district court.⁷ That right, however, presupposes that the individual has first received notice of the revocation--as due process requires.

¶23 The statutory framework presumes service has occurred by making it a condition precedent both to the availability of judicial review ⁸ and the revocation of driving privileges.⁹ Once written notice is received, it is the individual--not the agency--who must file the petition and initiate the appeal. While filing a petition does not conclusively establish that notice was received in every case, it generally indicates that the notice requirement has been met. As this Court has explained in a different context:

The general rule is that one who has been notified to attend a certain proceeding and does so, cannot be heard to complain of the sufficiency of the notice because the notice has served its purpose. This rule also applies to one who appears in an administrative proceeding without the notice to which he is entitled by law.

First Nat'l Bank v. Okla. Sav. & Loan Bd., 1977 OK 171, ¶ 11, 569 P.2d 993, 997. That principle applies with even greater force here, where it is not the tribunal that summons the individual, but the individual who initiates the proceeding.

¶24 Here, Bailey filed a petition to challenge the revocation.¹⁰ That act alone strongly suggests that he received written notice and understood its import. He does not claim otherwise. Having acted upon that notice, he cannot now demand additional proof of service as a basis to undo the very process he set in motion. Given Bailey's conduct and the absence of any claim that notice was not received or was deficient in substance, no additional proof of service is necessary to support the revocation.

Revocation Was Proper Without a Valid Test Result

¶25 Bailey contends that, because he did not refuse testing, the State was required to produce a valid chemical test result to revoke his license. Without it, he contends, the revocation cannot stand. That argument, however, overlooks the alternative statutory basis for revocation under Title 47, Section 753(A): sworn report-based revocation.

¶26 In Couch v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2025 OK 26, 567 P.3d 1022, this Court recognized that a 2019 amendment to Section 753(A) “expand[ed] the grounds for revocation.” Under this expansion, “revocation may still be sustained under Section 753(A) even if a chemical test result, which would otherwise support revocation under Section 754(B), is invalidated.” Couch, 2025 OK 26, ¶ 11, 567 P.3d at 1026.

¶27 To do so, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person had been operating or was in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the public roads while under the influence of alcohol and/or another intoxicating substance; and (2) the person was placed under arrest. Id. at ¶ 19, 567 P.3d at 1028 (citing 47 O.S.Supp.2023, § 754(C); 47 O.S.Supp.2024, § 6-211(H); Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, ¶ 13, 725 P.2d 1254, 1260).

¶28 Additionally, “Section 757 allows either party to introduce additional competent evidence bearing on the question of whether the arrested person was under the influence of alcohol or any other intoxicating substance.” Couch, at ¶ 12, 567 P.3d at 1026.

¶29 Here, in addition to the officer's sworn report, the record contains ample competent evidence to support revocation. Officer Hendrix detected the odor of alcohol on Bailey and, during the search of the truck, found two half-empty bottles of Bootlegger liquor in the cabin that appeared “sweaty” and colder than the surrounding air. Trooper Johnson administered the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests and, based on Bailey's performance, concluded that he was impaired. A preliminary breath test corroborated the presence of alcohol. At the time, Bailey was twenty years old and thus subject to Oklahoma's zero-tolerance statute for underage drivers. Taken together, this evidence satisfies the State's burden on appeal.

Conclusion

¶30 Each question presented on appeal is answered in the affirmative. Service Oklahoma is authorized to provide revocation notice by regular mail under Title 47, Section 2-116, notwithstanding the statute's continued reference to the Department of Public Safety. That interpretation is necessary to preserve the coherence of the statutory scheme following the Legislature's transfer of authority to Service Oklahoma. Bailey's due process challenge likewise fails. The record reflects that he received written notice of the revocation and acted upon it by filing a petition for judicial review. Given Bailey's conduct--and the absence of any claim that notice was not received or was deficient in substance--no additional proof of service is required to satisfy due process. Finally, although the blood test result was excluded from evidence, the district court properly sustained the revocation of Bailey's license based on the officer's sworn report and other competent evidence.

DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER SUSTAINING DRIVER'S LICENSE REVOCATION AFFIRMED

¶1 I concur in the majority opinion. Regarding the issue of the revocation of Petitioner's drivers license without a valid chemical test result, I articulated my position in a special concurrence in Couch v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2025 OK 26, 567 P.3d 1022 (Darby, J., concurring specially). My reasoning expressed in Couch applies to Petitioner in this case.

¶1 As I previously wrote in my dissent in Couch v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2025 OK 26, 567 P.3d 1022, the responsibility to remedy Oklahoma's Implied Consent statutes lies squarely with the Legislature. Oklahoma's Implied Consent statutes, as presently written, are not only troubling and convoluted--they are exhausting. And now twice--in as many months--I find the law leading me to a conclusion that I find profoundly unsettling. But as a member of the judiciary, I am bound to apply the law as written, not as I wish it to be.

¶2 This Court recently upheld the revocation of a driver's license in the absence of a breath test in Couch v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2025 OK 26, 567 P.3d 1022. Therein I disagreed with the Majority's analysis, highlighting the need for a legislative remedy to clarify Oklahoma's Implied Consent statute. Today we are presented with a similar factual scenario, to which I again disagree with the Majority's conclusion and call on the Legislature to clarify Oklahoma's Implied Consent statutes.

¶3 “The quintessence of [Oklahoma's Implied Consent Statutes] is that by driving a motor vehicle on the public highway, the operator consents to the taking of a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood.” Trusty v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2016 OK 94, ¶ 11, 381 P.3d 726, 730-31 (quoting Robertson v. State ex rel. Lester, 1972 OK 126, ¶ 13, 501 P.2d 1099, 1102) (emphasis added). Put differently, the results of a chemical test, or the refusal to take a chemical test, is the basis of every driver's license revocation. Today's opinion fully abandons the statutory objective of requiring the state to offer a chemical test before revoking a driver's license.

¶4 Like in Couch, the Majority focuses on 47 O.S. § 753(A), such that § 753(A) will apply to sustain a revocation in the absence of a chemical test result. I disagree with the Majority's holding that § 753 is applicable to this cause--or that it can serve to negate the state's duty to offer a chemical test.¹ To find § 753 applicable renders the state's duty to offer a chemical test unnecessary.

¶5 Here, Bailey submitted to a blood test and a sworn report was submitted--as such, 47 O.S. § 754(B) was triggered. Bailey appealed his revocation to the district court wherein § 754(C) unambiguously details the mandatory issues to be covered at his de novo trial before the district court. See 47 O.S. § 754(C). To sustain a revocation on appeal, Service Oklahoma was required to prove (1) whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver had been operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other intoxicating substance; and (2) whether driver was placed under arrest. Because the revocation was based upon a blood test (as opposed to a refusal to submit to a test), Service Oklahoma must also prove: (a) whether, if timely requested by the driver, the driver was not denied a breath or blood test; (b) whether the specimen was obtained from the driver within two hours of the arrest of the driver; (c) whether, if under twenty-one (21) years of age, was advised that driving privileges would be revoked or denied if the test result reflected the presence of any measurable quantity of alcohol; (d) whether, if twenty-one years of age or older, the driver was advised that driving privileges would be revoked if the test result reflected an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more; and (e) whether the test result in fact reflects the alcohol concentration. 47 O.S. § 754(C)(1).

¶6 Service Oklahoma failed to satisfy § 754(C)(1)(e) due to the blood test's inadmissibility. Nonetheless, Service Oklahoma argued the inadmissibility of the blood test was not fatal to the case because § 757 operates as a savings statute. To determine the interplay of § 757 with § 754(C), we must look to the text. “The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent and purpose as expressed by statutory language.” Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 2018 OK 23, ¶ 17, 415 P.3d 521, 528. Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective considering relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each. Oklahoma Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 2011 OK 68, ¶ 11, 267 P.3d 838, 844.

¶7 Sections 754(B) and (C) and § 757 are blatantly unambiguous. To revoke a driver's license, § 754(B) unequivocally requires (1) a blood or breath test, or a refusal thereof, and (2) a sworn report detailing the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. On appeal to the district court, § 754(C)² unambiguously details the required issues to be covered before the district court. In both § 754(B) and (C), the Legislature utilizes the word “shall” when listing the requirements for revocation and the issues to be satisfied on appeal. “When the Legislature uses the term ‘shall’, it signifies a mandatory directive or command.” Keating v. Edmondson, 2001 OK 110, ¶ 13, 37 P.3d 882, 888. It is clear the Legislature intended for Service Oklahoma to prove the requirements set forth in § 754(B) in order to revoke a driver's license and for Service Oklahoma to satisfy on appeal to the district court the requirements in § 754(C).

¶8 In addition to the mandatory requirements of § 754(B) and (C), § 757 contemplates the introduction of other competent evidence bearing on the question of whether a person was under the influence as it pertains to sections 751 through 761. However, nothing in § 757 suggests that other competent evidence will obviate the requirements to revoke a driver's license set forth in § 754(B) or the requirements mandated to be satisfied on appeal in § 754(C).

¶9 Service Oklahoma's reading of § 757 renders the requirements of § 754(B) and (C) effectively meaningless. Had the Legislature stated the mandatory requirements of § 754(B) and (C) may be overcome by the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing on the question of whether the driver was under the influence, § 757 would operate as a savings statute. Yet, the language of § 757 says nothing to that effect. Undeniably, Oklahoma's Implied Consent statutes are based on a driver's breath or blood test for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration or the presence of other intoxicating substances. The outcome of a revocation proceeding is predicated on a breath or blood test or refusal thereof.

¶10 When read in harmony with § 754(B) and (C), § 757 must yield to the mandatory language set forth in § 754(B) and (C). Section 757 alone cannot sustain a revocation in lieu of § 754(B) and (C)‘s requirements. “A statute must be read to render every part operative and to avoid rendering parts superfluous or useless.” Rickard v. Coulimore, 2022 OK 9, ¶ 12, 505 P.3d 920, 924. “We will not presume that the Legislature has done a vain or useless act.” Id. In light of the mandatory requirements of § 754(B) and (C), I would find the Legislature intended for § 757 to serve as a vehicle for the admission of additional evidence, not evidence in lieu of the clear statutory requirements needed to sustain a license revocation.

¶11 This interpretation does not render § 757 meaningless. Section 757 remains operative, as it allows Service Oklahoma to introduce additional evidence to meet its burden. For example, Service Oklahoma may introduce evidence of failed field sobriety tests pursuant to § 757 to support a finding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was driving under the influence as required by 47 O.S. § 754(C); or, inter alia, Service Oklahoma may introduce expert testimony under § 757 to support a toxicology report in regard to a blood test. With blood test results, other competent evidence is often necessary in the form of expert testimony, particularly in regard to whether the report reflects a substance that is intoxicating.

¶12 Undeniably, the outcome of a revocation proceeding is predicated on the test report, or refusal thereof. As such, without admission of a test result, or evidence of a refusal, other competent evidence under § 757 cannot alone sustain a revocation. Accordingly, I would find the district court erred when it sustained Bailey's revocation in the absence of his blood test results.

FOOTNOTES

1.   During the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, Bailey exhibited four out of six possible clues of impairment. On the Walk and Turn test, Bailey exhibited one out of eight clues. In the One Leg Stand test, Bailey exhibited no clues.

2.   Because Bailey was under the age of twenty-one at the time of the incident, he was subject to Oklahoma's zero-tolerance statute for underage drivers. See 47 O.S.2021, § 11-906.4 (prohibiting persons under the age of twenty-one from operating a motor vehicle with any measurable quantity of alcohol in their system).

3.   47 O.S.Supp.2024, § 6-211(K) provides: “An appeal may be taken by the person or by Service Oklahoma from the order or judgment of the district court to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma as otherwise provided by law.”

4.   In Herrera-Chacon v. State ex rel. Serv. Okla., 2023 OK 52, 553 P.3d 20, this Court confronted a version of Title 47, Section 6-211 enacted in November 2022 that inexplicably continued to reference the Department of Public Safety, despite the Legislature's prior transfer of all driver license functions to Service Oklahoma under Section 3-101. This Court rightly treated the inconsistency as an “unintentional oversight.” Herrera-Chacon, 2023 OK 52, ¶ 11, 553 P.3d at 22. Sixty-one days after Herrera-Chacon was published, the Legislature amended the statute to reflect that understanding. Compare 47 O.S.Supp.2022, § 6-211, with 47 O.S.Supp.2023, § 6-211.

5.   Bailey points to the Legislature's failure to amend Title 47, Section 2-116 as evidence that it did not intend for the statute to apply to Service Oklahoma. But legislative silence is never probative of legislative intent. Allen v. State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Okla. Unif. Ret. Sys. for Justs. & Judges, 1988 OK 99, ¶ 11, 769 P.2d 1302, 1306.

6.   In his brief, Bailey acknowledges that the Notice of Revocation identifies the grounds for revocation, the date it would take effect, and the procedures for reinstatement and appeal.

7.   47 O.S.Supp.2024, § 6-211(A) provides, in relevant part:Any person denied driving privileges, or whose driving privilege has been canceled, denied, suspended or revoked by Service Oklahoma, except where such cancellation, denial, suspension or revocation is mandatory, under the provisions of Section 6-205 of this title, or disqualified by Service Oklahoma, under the provisions of Section 6-205.2 or 761 of this title, shall have the right of appeal to the district court ․

8.   47 O.S.Supp.2024, § 6-211(E) provides, in relevant part: “The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days after the notice of revocation, pursuant to Section 753 or 754 of this title, has been served upon the person by Service Oklahoma.”

9.   47 O.S.Supp.2023, § 753(A) provides, in relevant part: “The revocation or denial shall become effective forty-five (45) days after the arrested person is given written notice thereof by the officer or by Service Oklahoma as provided in Section 754 of this title.”47 O.S.Supp.2023, § 754(B) provides, in relevant part: “Revocation or denial of the driving privilege of the arrested person shall become effective forty-five (45) days after the arrested person is given written notice thereof by the officer or by Service Oklahoma.”

10.   In his brief, Bailey acknowledges that he filed a Petition for Review of the revocation.

1.   Notably, § 753 governs the factual scenario in which an arrested driver refuses to submit to a chemical test. If § 753 functioned as the Majority suggests, the administering of any chemical test is effectively meaningless, as the officer's observations alone would be sufficient to revoke a driver's license.

2.   Title 47 O.S. § 754(C) provides:C. The appeal hearing before the district court shall be conducted in accordance with Section 6-211 of this title. The hearing shall cover the issues of whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person had been operating or was in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the public roads, highways, streets, turnpikes or other public place of this state while under the influence of alcohol, any other intoxicating substance or the combined influence of alcohol and any other intoxicating substance as prohibited by law, and whether the person was placed under arrest.1. If the revocation or denial is based upon a breath or blood test result and a sworn report from a law enforcement officer, the scope of the hearing shall also cover the issues as to whether:a. if timely requested by the person, the person was not denied a breath or blood test,b. the specimen was obtained from the person within two (2) hours of the arrest of the person,c. the person, if under twenty-one (21) years of age, was advised that driving privileges would be revoked or denied if the test result reflected the presence of any measurable quantity of alcohol,d. the person, if twenty-one (21) years of age or older, was advised that driving privileges would be revoked or denied if the test result reflected an alcohol concentration of eight-hundredths (0.08) or more, ande. the test result in fact reflects the alcohol concentration.2. If the revocation or denial is based upon the refusal of the person to submit to a breath or blood test, reflected in a sworn report by a law enforcement officer, the scope of the hearing shall also include whether:a. the person refused to submit to the test or tests, andb. the person was informed that driving privileges would be revoked or denied if the person refused to submit to the test or tests.D. After the hearing, the district court shall order the revocation or denial either rescinded or sustained.

KUEHN, V.C.J.:

CONCUR: KUEHN, V.C.J., and WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, COMBS, DARBY, J. (by separate writing), and KANE, JJ. CONCUR IN RESULT: JETT, J. CONCUR IN PART/DISSENT IN PART: ROWE, C.J. (by separate writing), and GURICH, J.