TOLEDO FAIR HOUSING CENTER v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (1998)

1. Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to Ohio's Fair Housing Act, R.C. 4112.02(H), and alleged in their first amended complaint that the Nationwide companies named in the caption as defendants (“Nationwide”) violated that Act by discriminating on the basis of race and racial composition of neighborhoods in the provision of homeowners insurance products in Toledo's African-American neighborhoods.   Nationwide denies that it has engaged in the form of discrimination alleged or any other discrimination in violation of Ohio's Fair Housing Act.   In order to fully and finally resolve this matter without a trial, the parties reached a negotiated agreement in compromise of plaintiffs' claims, which has been reduced to writing (“the Settlement Agreement”) and which is attached hereto as Appendix A.

2. Following its execution by all parties, the Settlement Agreement was submitted to this court for a determination of fairness as required by Civ.R. 23.

3. Notice of the Settlement Agreement was provided in writing to all identifiable class members by regular United States mail between June 8, 1998, and June 26, 1998.   In addition, notice of the Settlement Agreement was published in the Toledo Blade on June 11 and June 18, 1998, and in the Toledo Journal on June 17, 1998.   These notices advised class members of the terms of the parties' settlement, advised them of their right to object to the settlement, and gave notice that this court would hold a fairness hearing on the settlement's terms on August 13, 1998.   A copy of the Notice of Proposed Settlement and Hearing is attached hereto as Appendix B.

4. On June 8, 1998, counsel for plaintiffs filed a motion for award of attorney fees and costs with a memorandum and exhibits in support, seeking an award of attorney fees from Nationwide in the amount of $1,500,000 and an award of costs and expenses in the amount of $350,000.   The court scheduled a hearing on this motion for August 13, 1998.

5. On August 13, 1998, this matter came before the court for hearing on the question of whether the parties' Settlement Agreement fairly, fully, and finally resolved all matters at issue in this litigation and on plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees and costs.   Albert Lloyd appeared at the hearing to object to the Settlement Agreement.   Additionally, attorney Thomas McCarter spoke at the hearing on behalf of, but not as a legal representative of, Salonda Washington, who wished to  preserve her right to join the case as a named plaintiff.   In addition to considering these objections, the court considered the written objection to the settlement filed by Albert Lloyd and Julia Lloyd on July 6, 1998, and a letter from Ennis Pratcher filed on July 10, 1998.   The court also heard comments from counsel for the parties.   No written objections were filed to the motion for an award of fees and costs.

6. In determining whether the Settlement Agreement is fair and reasonable, the court considered, inter alia, the following factors:  (1) the likelihood of success or recovery, (2) the amount and nature of discovery or evidence, (3) the settlement terms and conditions, (4) the recommendation and experience of trial counsel, (5) the expense and duration of future litigation, (6) the number of objections to the Settlement Agreement and the nature of the objections, and (7) the presence of good faith and the absence of collusion among the parties and attorneys.   See 2 Newberg & Conte, Newberg on Class Actions (1992) 11-97, Section 11.43.   See, also, Granada Invest., Inc. v. DWG Corp. (C.A.6, 1992), 962 F.2d 1203, 1205;  Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation (3 Ed.1995) 238, Section 30.42.

7. This court, now being fully advised in the premises of the parties' Settlement Agreement, and following notice and hearing, finds that the parties' Settlement Agreement is fair.   The objection to the settlement lodged by Albert Lloyd and Julia Lloyd is not well taken.   None of the claims or issues in this case involved residential properties used solely for rental purposes, nor did the named plaintiffs purport to represent landlords or owners of rental property.   The court also finds that the proposed time period for recovery from the Claim Fund-ownership and occupancy in the class census tracts between January 1, 1990 and April 15, 1998-is reasonable.   The written comments filed by Ennis Pratcher also do not warrant rejection of the proposed settlement.   His comments do not relate to insurance, but rather to a dispute with the city of Toledo, which is not a party to this case.   Moreover, there are no preset limits on the amount of recovery eligible claimants may recover from the Claim Fund, as Pratcher seems to assume.   The amount of recovery is dependent on the total number of qualified claimants.   The court also finds that Salonda Washington failed to file a timely objection to the Settlement Agreement and failed to appear at the hearing either personally or through her attorney.   In any event, the comments made by McCarter on behalf of Washington do not warrant disapproval of the Settlement Agreement.

8. The court also finds that plaintiffs' motion for award of attorney fees and costs is well taken and should be granted.

9. This court has jurisdiction to consider and resolve these claims and the parties agree to and request entry of this judgment entry.

 JUDGMENT ENTRY

1. It is ordered that the Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties on April 20, 1998 and attached hereto is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

2. It is ordered that the motion for attorney fees is granted.

3. It is ordered that entry of this judgment entry shall resolve all claims contained in plaintiffs' first amended complaint against Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (collectively “Nationwide”) in this action and all claims that plaintiffs could have alleged against Nationwide under the Ohio Fair Housing Act, based upon Nationwide's policies and practices in the city of Toledo up to and including the date of entry of this judgment entry.

4. It is ordered that this court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for a period of four years from the date of entry of this judgment entry for the purpose of monitoring the parties' performance under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, which terms are incorporated into and shall be fully enforceable before this court as though specifically set forth in this judgment entry, and for the purpose of entering any orders necessary for the implementation and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement.

5. It is ordered that, in the event that any issue shall hereafter arise concerning implementation of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the parties have agreed to and shall work cooperatively to resolve any issues that might arise as implementation proceeds, and to petition the Lucas County Common Pleas Court only as to those issues that cannot be resolved through good-faith negotiations.   Unless resolution of a particular matter is governed by a specific procedure set forth elsewhere in the Settlement Agreement, any party may identify the issue(s) it believes to be in question and give written notice to the other parties.   If the issue is not earlier resolved by informal means, within thirty days after receipt of such notice, the parties agree to meet and confer regarding the issues raised.   If the issue remains unresolved after the parties have met and conferred in good faith in an effort to resolve the issue, then the matter may be brought before this court for determination upon the motion of any party.

6. Nationwide is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiffs' counsel the sum of $1,500,000 as and for attorney fees, and the sum of $350,000 as and for costs and litigation expenses incurred in this matter through the date of this judgment entry.   Nationwide shall pay these amounts according to a payment schedule agreed to by the parties.   Attorney fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs' counsel after February 28, 1998, for monitoring, enforcement, and administration shall be paid from the interest on the Claim Fund as provided by the Settlement Agreement.

 7. Four years from entry of this judgment entry, the court shall fully and finally dispose of this case by judgment entry dismissing the case in its entirety with prejudice and without costs.

Judgment accordingly.

 APPENDIX A

 APPENDIX B

FREDERICK H. McDONALD, Judge.