BELL v. MONTGOMERY EDUCATION PRE RELEASE CENTER (1997)

In his complaint, plaintiff, Timothy W. Bell, alleges that defendant, Montgomery Education Pre-Release Center (“MEPC”), failed to install windows in cell doors, causing a door to hit his head when it was opened by a fellow inmate.

 On February 10, 1997, this action came before the court for trial.   The findings and conclusions herein are derived from the documents and pleadings in the case file, evidence at trial, and the respective presentations by both parties.

At the time of the accident, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody and control of defendant pursuant to R.C. 5120.16.   On or about July 22, 1995, plaintiff was approaching a sink to brush his teeth.   Plaintiff inadvertently dropped his tooth brush in front of the cell door.   While bending over to pick up the tooth brush, plaintiff was struck by the cell door when it was opened by a fellow inmate.

Plaintiff asserted that if the cell doors had windows, he would have been able to avoid injury.   However, corrections officers testified and denied that the incident could have been avoided by the installation of windows in the cell doors.

 Plaintiff's complaint is construed to set forth a single cognizable action, which is one sounding in negligence.   In order for plaintiff to prevail upon his claim of negligence, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant owed him a duty, that it breached that duty, and that the breach proximately caused his injuries.  Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 21 O.O.3d 177, 423 N.E.2d 467.   Defendant owed to plaintiff the common-law duty of reasonable care.  Justice v. Rose (1957), 102 Ohio App. 482, 3 O.O.2d 39, 144 N.E.2d 303.   Reasonable care is that which would be utilized by an ordinary prudent person under certain circumstances.  Smith v. United Properties, Inc. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 310, 31 O.O.2d 573, 209 N.E.2d 142.

 Although there is a “special relation” between an inmate and his custodian, no higher standard of care is derived from this relationship.   Scebbi v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (Mar. 21, 1989), Ct. of Cl. No. 87-09439, unreported.   Although the state is not an insurer of the safety of its prisoners, once it becomes aware of a dangerous condition in the prison, it is required to take the reasonable care necessary to make certain that the prisoner is not injured.  Clemets v. Heston (1985), 20 Ohio App.3d 132, 20 OBR 166, 485 N.E.2d 287.   Consequently, plaintiff bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that defendant was on notice or was aware of the condition of the floor where plaintiff fell.  Presley v. Norwood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 29, 65 O.O.2d 129, 303 N.E.2d 81.

The legal concept of notice is of two distinguishable types-actual and constructive:

“The distinction between actual and constructive notice is in the manner in which notice is obtained or assumed to have been obtained rather than in the amount of information obtained.   Wherever from competent evidence the trier of fact is entitled to hold as a conclusion of fact and not as a presumption of law that information was personally communicated to or received by a party, the notice is actual.   Constructive notice is that which the law regards as sufficient to give  notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice.”  In re Estate of Fahle (1950), 90 Ohio App. 195, 47 O.O. 231, 105 N.E.2d 429, paragraph two of the syllabus.

In the case at bar, plaintiff failed to present evidence to show that defendant had actual notice or constructive knowledge that there was a potential danger by not having windows in the cell doors.   Testimony by corrections officers revealed that there had never been a complaint about the potential hazard of not having windows in the cell doors.   In fact, this was the first accident of its kind to have occurred at MEPC.   Thus, plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was on notice, actual or constructive, of the potential hazard.

 Assuming that defendant was negligent, plaintiff still would not prevail.   Ohio's comparative negligence statute, R.C. 2315.19, bars plaintiff from recovery if his actions were a greater cause (more than fifty percent) of his injuries than any acts of defendant.   The court finds that any alleged breach by defendant was less of a causative factor than was plaintiff's own negligence.   Testimony revealed that plaintiff blatantly disregarded the potential hazard.   Therefore, even if defendant were negligent, plaintiff would not prevail due to his own negligence.

The court concludes that plaintiff has failed to prove that defendant breached any duty that it owed to him.   Accordingly, judgment is rendered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.

Judgment for defendant.

J. WARREN BETTIS, Judge.

J. WARREN BETTIS, J., retired, of the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas, sitting by assignment.