PEOPLE v. MATOS (2023)

Defendant, Alexis Matos, is charged with Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Signal (VTL § 1111[d][1]), Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (PL § 195.05), and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (PL § 265.01[1]). By motion filed on November 14, 2022, the defendant challenges the facial sufficiency of count two of the information charging PL § 195.05 and moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL § 30.30.

For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion is granted.

FACTS

In the early morning hours of June 29, 2022, the defendant is alleged to have been driving a blue electric scooter through a steady red light at the intersection of Lexington Ave. and Classon Ave. When he was stopped by the police, the defendant repeatedly refused to provide the police with a driver's license. These factual allegations are the basis for which the accusatory instrument charges a violation of VTL § 111(d)(1) and PL § 195.05.

Approximately fifteen minutes later while at the police station located at 298 Classon Ave., the accusatory instrument alleges that brass knuckles were recovered from the defendant's person, the defendant refused to be fingerprinted, and he refused to provide pedigree information. These factual allegations are the sole basis for which the accusatory instrument charges PL § 265.01(1).

FACIAL SUFFICIENCY

In order to be facially sufficient, an information along with any supporting depositions must contain non-hearsay allegations that provide reasonable cause to believe that the People can prove every element of the crime charged (see, CPL § 100.40[1][a]-[c]; see also, People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 517 N.Y.S.2d 927, 511 N.E.2d 71 [1987]; People v. McDermott, 69 N.Y.2d 889, 515 N.Y.S.2d 225, 507 N.E.2d 1081 [1987]; People v. Dumas, 68 N.Y.2d 729, 506 N.Y.S.2d 319, 497 N.E.2d 686 [1986]; People v. Case, 42 N.Y.2d 98, 396 N.Y.S.2d 841, 365 N.E.2d 872 [1977]). Facial sufficiency does not require the accusatory instrument to state facts that would prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather that the accusatory instrument contains allegations of fact that “give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense” (People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233 [2000]). In reaching a determination on the facial sufficiency of an accusatory instrument, the court must assume that the factual allegations are true and must consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the allegations (CPL §§ 100.15; Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d at 135, 517 N.Y.S.2d 927, 511 N.E.2d 71; People v. Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d 677, 685 N.Y.S.2d 409, 708 N.E.2d 165 [1999]).

The accusatory instrument charging the defendant with Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (PL § 195.05) alleges, in pertinent part, that the police “asked the defendant to provide the defendant's drivers [sic] license to the [police] and the defendant refused multiple times.” Even if true, these facts do not establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant obstructed governmental administration (see, In re Davan L., 91 N.Y.2d 88, 92, 666 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 689 N.E.2d 909 [1997]); Case, supra). The failure to set forth sufficient facts establishing all of the elements of PL § 195.05, renders the instant accusatory instrument facially insufficient (Alejandro, supra; McDermott, supra; Dumas, supra; Casey, supra).

STATEMENT OF READINESS

“Upon a local criminal court accusatory instrument, a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts charged in the accusatory instrument meet the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter and those counts not meeting the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter have been dismissed” (CPL § 30.30 [5-a] [emphasis added]). The plain language of CPL § 30.30(5-a) mandates that a statement of readiness is only valid when all charges in an accusatory instrument are facially sufficient and those that are not have been dismissed (id.; see generally New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Police Department, 32 N.Y.3d 556, 94 N.Y.S.3d 185, 118 N.E.3d 847 [2018][mandatory NY statutory provisions expressly guarantee confidentiality by using the word “shall”]; People v. Golo, 26 N.Y.3d 358, 362, 23 N.Y.S.3d 110, 44 N.E.3d 185 [2015][“shall” is mandatory, “may” is permissive]; Losurdo v. Asbestos Free, Inc., 1 N.Y.3d 258, 265, 771 N.Y.S.2d 58, 803 N.E.2d 379 [2003][the term “shall” signifies a mandatory clause]; Crown Point Iron Co v. Aetna Ins Co, 127 N.Y. 608, 615, 28 N.E. 653 [1891][the term “shall” is not permissive]; Thomas v. Alleyne, 302 A.D.2d 36, 40, 752 N.Y.S.2d 362 [2d Dept. 2002][shall is a mandatory verb form]; In re Lupoli, 275 A.D.2d 44, 50, 714 N.Y.S.2d 497 [2d Dept. 2000][the term “shall” is not permissive, it is mandatory]).

There is no bill jacket providing the legislative intent behind the passage of CPL § 30.30(5-a) because it occurred as part of the passage of a budget bill. However, guidance can be found in the legislative memorandum of Senate Bill 1738. In passing CPL § 30.30(5-a), the Legislature substantially mirrored the language contained in Senate Bill 1738 and its legislative memorandum, which sought to amend CPL § 30.30 so that all counts of an accusatory instrument must be converted and facially sufficient before the People could announce ready for trial. It is logical then to conclude that CPL § 30.30(5-a) is also designed to abrogate prior case law permitting partial conversion (Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL § 30.30). Thus, this Court holds that it is a pre-requisite to a valid statement of readiness that an accusatory instrument is facially sufficient as to all charges not dismissed by the People (CPL § 30.30[5-a]).¹

Accordingly, since the instant accusatory insufficiently alleges a violation PL § 195.05, the People's statement of readiness is invalid pursuant to CPL § 30.30(5-a).

SPEEDY TRIAL

The charges in the instant information require the People to be ready within 90 days of arraignment (CPL § 30.30[1][a]). There is no dispute that the defendant was arraigned on June 29, 2002, and that the instant motion was filed on November 14, 2022. Since the statement of readiness is not valid, 138 chargeable days have accrued since arraignment. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30 is granted.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Neither the People nor the defendant have presented binding case law from an appellate court and the court is not aware that any exists. Upon careful consideration of the holdings of other trial courts that permit the dismissal of individual counts in an accusatory instrument under CPL § 30.30(5-a), this Court declines to adopt such holdings.The Legislature could have allowed for the survival of a partially converted accusatory instrument by simply changing the term “all counts” to “any count” or “some counts” but instead chose to use a comprehensive term when mandating facial sufficiency as a pre-requisite to the People's readiness. Additionally, while CPL § 30.30(5) establishes a good faith clause for the People's certification of compliance with their discovery requirements (along with the defendant's ability to challenge the good faith assertion), the Legislature made no such good faith clause for a statement of readiness in either CPL § 30.03(5) or in CPL § 30.30(5-a). As such, the court is not empowered to make a good faith exception to the clear statutory language of CPL § 30.30(5-a).

Dale Fong-Frederick, J.