The People of the State of New York, v. Caridad Goodloe, Defendant. (2026)

On March 19, 2025, Caridad Goodloe (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant"), was arrested and charged with Penal Law ("P.L.") § 240.50[3][a], false reporting in the third degree, a class A misdemeanor. The Defendant was released with a desk appearance ticket and instructed to return to Bronx County Criminal Court for arraignment on April 8, 2025.

Defendant moves for dismissal of the accusatory instrument pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("C.P.L.") § 30.30[1][b]. Defendant contends that the speedy trial time has elapsed, as the accusatory instrument is facially insufficient pursuant to the requirements of C.P.L. §§ 170.35[1][a], 100.40, and 100.15[3].

In the alternative, Defendant moves for suppression of tangible, non-tangible, and testimonial fruits, alleging these stem from her illegal arrest (Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]; Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]).

Upon review and consideration of the submissions, court file and relevant legal authority, the Court finds that, as the accusatory instrument is facially insufficient, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Defendant's motion for suppression hearings is DENIED as academic.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND

On March 19, 2025, Defendant was arrested and charged with P.L. § 240.50[3][a], false reporting in the third degree. Defendant was given a desk appearance ticket and instructed to appear in Bronx County Criminal Court for arraignment on April 8, 2025. At arraignment, the first-party complaint, sworn by the detective deponent, was deemed an information. Defendant pled not guilty, and the case was adjourned to May 29, 2025, for discovery compliance.

On May 29, 2025, the People were not discovery compliant, and the case was adjourned to July 2, 2025. On July 2, 2025, the People were again not discovery compliant, and the case was adjourned to July 28, 2025.

On July 3, 2025, the People filed and served, off calendar, a certificate of compliance ("COC") and statement of readiness ("SOR"). On July 8, 2025, the People filed and served an affirmation of service, affirming that the COC and SOR had been filed and served on July 3, 2025.

On July 28, 2025, at the request of the defense, the case was adjourned for discovery conference to August 13, 2025. At the appearance on August 13, 2025, the COC was deemed valid without objection. The instant motion schedule was set, and the case was adjourned to September 19, 2025, for decision.

At the appearance on September 19, 2025, the court and the prosecution represented that no motions from the defense had been received. A new motion schedule was set, and the case was adjourned to November 25, 2025, for decision.

On November 5, 2025, this Court's attorney reached out to defense counsel and the assigned prosecutor, as no filings had been received from the parties. On November 6, 2025, the parties replied. The assigned prosecutor stated that he had filed no opposition, as he had received no motions from the defense, while defense counsel responded that he had filed and served his motions on September 15, 2025. Defense counsel did not respond to requests from this Court's attorney for additional information about defense counsel's filings, which would assist the court clerk in locating them in the Electronic Document Delivery System ("EDDS").

On November 25, 2025, defense counsel made a record that his motion had indeed been filed and served on September 15, 2025, and Defendant's motion was located in EDDS. The affidavit of service which accompanied the filing, however, included a heading for a different defendant, and indicated service on an opposing party unrelated to the instant matter. A new motion schedule was set, with the matter adjourned for decision to January 23, 2025. Subsequently, the assigned prosecutor searched his own e-mail, as well as the e-mail address designated for motion service on the Bronx County District Attorney, and found no filings from defense counsel prior to November 6, 2025.

By motion filed on September 15, 2025, and served on the People on November 6, 2025, Defendant moves for dismissal of the accusatory instrument pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 30.30[1][b], 170.35[1][a], 100.40 and 100.15[3]. By motion dated December 1, 2025, the People oppose. The defense has declined to file a reply.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A facially sufficient accusatory instrument must "allege[ ] nonhearsay factual allegations of an evidentiary nature which, if true, provide reasonable cause for every element of the offense(s) charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (People v Lawrence, 70 NYS3d 798, 800 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2018]; C.P.L. §§ 100.15[3] and 100.40[1][b]). "Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonable that such offense was committed and that such person committed it" (C.P.L. § 70.10[2]).

A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a "nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite" (People v Alejandro, 70NY2d 133, 135 [1987]). While the accusatory instrument should not be given an overly restrictive or technical reading (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354 [2000]), the factual allegations must give rise to a prima facie case when viewed in the light most favorable to the People (People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677 [1999]; C.P.L. § 100.40). Conclusory statements must be "supported by evidentiary facts showing the basis for the conclusion" (People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 739 [1981]). Evidentiary facts are "nonconclusory descriptions of what the deponent personally observed, heard or experienced" (People v Phillipe, 142 Misc 2d 574, 578 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1989]).

DISCUSSION

I. The Instant Complaint and The Parties' Arguments

The Defendant stands charged with P.L. § 240.50[3][a], false reporting in the third degree. The accusatory instrument, a first-party complaint, alleges, in relevant part, that on or about March 19, 2025, at approximately 12:26 p.m. inside of 460 Morris Park Avenue, Bronx County, NY:

Deponent [Detective Brian Doyle] states that at the above time and place, defendant came to Transit District 12 Precinct of the New York City Police Department, in Bronx County and reported that defendant was operating a southbound Six (6) train, when defendant heard a separately apprehend [sic] individual state in sum and substance, WOO-HOO! WE ARE ALONE! And further observed the cabin door open with said separately apprehend [sic] individual grabbing defendant in the upper part of her left arm.

Deponent further states that he reviewed video surveillance and investigated said incident, and that the defendant was not neither [sic] approached or grabbed by separately apprehended individual and that there was no ongoing emergency.

Defendant argues that the complaint fails to make out a prima facie case that Defendant "gratuitously report[ed] to a law enforcement officer or agency the alleged occurrence of an offense or incident which did not in fact occur" (P.L. § 245.50[3][a]). Defendant contends that the factual portion of the complaint contains conclusory statements which lack supporting facts of an evidentiary character.

The People maintain that the factual allegations of the accusatory instrument are sufficient to support each element of false reporting in the third degree. The prosecution avers that the complaint "presents detailed observations by the deponent," who, after "reviewing the relevant video surveillance footage," determined that the incident reported by the Defendant had not occurred.

II. The Elements of False Reporting in the Third Degree (P.L. § 245.50[3][a])

A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the third degree pursuant to P.L. § 245.50[3][a] when that person: 1) gratuitously report[s] to a law enforcement officer or agency 2) the alleged occurrence of an offense or incident which did not in fact occur, 3) with knowledge that the information reported is false (People v Taylor, 913 NYS 2d 308, 311 App Div 2d Dept [2010]).

a. Gratuitous Reporting to Law Enforcement

The word 'gratuitously' in P.L. § 240.50[3] "has been interpreted by New York courts to mean 'voluntary' and 'unsolicited' " (People v Brito, 110 NYS 3d 793 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2018], citing People ex rel. Morris v Skinner, 323 NYS2d 905 [Sup Ct, Monroe County 1971]). Here, the factual allegations provide that "defendant came to Transit District 12 Precinct of the New York City Police Department" to make her report. As the factual portion of the complaint alleges that Defendant initiated contact with police in order to make her report, the complaint is sufficient with regard to the element of "gratuitous" reporting.

b. Of an Offense or Incident that Did Not Occur

The complaint is facially insufficient, however, with regard to the element of falsity. That the reported incident or offense "did not in fact occur" is an element of P.L. § 245.50[3] which must be adequately pled in the complaint. According to the complaint, the Defendant reported that, as she operated a southbound six train, a separately apprehended individual opened the cabin door and grabbed her upper left arm. The complaint goes on to state that the detective deponent "reviewed video surveillance and investigated said incident, and that the defendant was not neither [sic] approached or grabbed by separately apprehended individual."

The complaint's conclusion that the reported incident did not occur relies entirely on the deponent's statement that he reviewed surveillance footage, as no other investigative actions are described. But the complaint fails to connect the surveillance footage to the reported incident in any articulated manner. The complaint does not specify the time or place of the alleged incident's occurrence and connect this to the time and camera location of the footage reviewed. Nor does the complaint describe any parties or events depicted in the footage in a way that supports the conclusion that the incident did not occur (compare People v Pino, 2019 NYLJ Lexis 1069 [Crim Ct, New York County] [Complaint was facially sufficient where it pled that defendant had reported the gunpoint robbery of his cell phone, and that the detective deponent reviewed surveillance footage showing the taking of defendant's cell phone without the use of a gun]). Here, it is unclear what, if any, events or interactions were depicted in the footage—and even whether the Defendant, the separately apprehended individual, or anyone else appears in it. Notably, the People's summary of the factual allegations in the complaint—that the detective deponent reviewed the "relevant video surveillance footage"—links the reviewed footage to the incident in a way the factual allegations of the complaint do not. As a result, the complaint lacks evidentiary facts to support the deponent's conclusion that the reported incident did not occur (People v Swint, 20 NYS3d 294 [Crim Court, New York County 2015]).

c. With Knowledge that the Information Reported Was False

Finally, the complaint contains no facts which provide reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant reported information which she knew to be false. While the complaint contains a conclusory statement asserting that the reported incident did not occur, it contains no factual allegations at all from which to infer that the Defendant "knowingly" reported false information. The complaint alleges, for example, no admission by the Defendant, no internal inconsistencies or conflicting accounts of reported information, no facts showing the event's impossibility or fabrication, and no allegation ruling out mistake or misperception.

Ultimately, the complaint lacks facts of an evidentiary character which provide reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant reported an incident which did not occur, and that she did so knowingly. As a facially sufficient accusatory instrument must provide reasonable cause to believe that the accused committed each and every element of the charged offense, the complaint here is defective pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 170.35[1][a], 100.40, and 100.15[3].

THE CPL § 30.30 CALCULATION

The first day counted for speedy trial purposes is the day after the commencement of the criminal action—here, the day after arraignment on the desk appearance ticket (C.P.L. § 100.05; People v Morrison, 85 Misc 3d 1272(A) [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2025]). The People filed and served a COC and SOR on July 3, 2025; however, as discussed supra, the misdemeanor information was facially insufficient. Consequently, the speedy trial clock was not tolled until July 28, 2025, when the case was adjourned at Defendant's request for discovery review and conference (April 9, 2025—July 28, 2025=111 days).

A minimum of 111 days is chargeable to the People, and their statutorily allotted 90-day speedy trial period has elapsed.

CONCLUSION

Upon review and consideration of the submissions, court file and relevant legal authority, Defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument as facially insufficient pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 30.30[1][b], 100.40, 100.15[3], and 170.35[1][a] is GRANTED. Defendant's motion for suppression hearings is DENIED as academic.

This constitutes the opinion, decision, and the order of the Court.

Dated: January 23, 2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Deidra R. Moore, J.C.C.

Deidra R. Moore, J.